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1 Introduction
‘Great ancient and current civilizations begin in deltas’
(The Jakarta Post, 6 October 2011).
1.1 THE DELTA: VITAL BUT VULNERABLE
The last three years have been hectic years for stakeholders who are involved
in delta issues. In 2010, the first World Delta Dialogue was held in Louisiana,
United States, and in 2011 the first World Delta Summit was held in Jakarta,
Indonesia. Alongside these two global events, the Delta Alliance was formed
in 2010. The Delta Alliance is an international knowledge-driven organization
which currently focuses on eleven deltas worldwide, including the Ciliwung
and the Mahakam Delta of Indonesia. The events and the alliance have brought
together representatives from government agencies and civil society groups:
engineers, academics in ‘hard’ and social sciences, environmentalists and many
others.
What makes the participants with various backgrounds willing to gather
and cooperate is that they have all noticed that the vital function of deltas is
currently under threat. They realize that the deltas which provide homes to
more than half of the world’s population, are vulnerable. This vulnerability
has increased due to industrialization, population growth and climate change.
These three factors have generated environmental problems like congestion,
depleted fresh water supply, land subsidence, erosion, saline intrusion, water
pollution, increasing temperatures and flooding (Wim, Slingerland and Trajan
2010). In the end, the deterioration gradually weakens the deltas and prevents
them from playing their vital role of providing environmental resources and
services (Bucx, Marchand, Makaske and Guchte 2010).
For deltas which are situated in rural remote areas and provide rich natural
reserves, human rights abuses appear as another important issue besides
environmental destruction and poverty. Strong evidence suggests that the
deterioration of the environment eventually hampers the majority of the
population who inhabit the deltas in securing adequate standards of living,
food, water, housing, health and life (United Nations Development Project
2006; Amnesty International 2009, p. 12).
The discussion about the rise of economic and ecological problems of the
delta is often associated with ineffective government. An assessment held by
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the Delta Alliance on the vulnerability and resilience of ten deltas worldwide
discovered that conflicting government layers and agencies, centralization and
poor public participation in policy making, are the most common governance
issues which eventually lead to ineffective governance of the delta (Bucx,
Marchand, Makaske and Guchte 2010). These conflicts between governing
institutions are seen as incongruent with the nature of the delta ecosystem
which needs an integrated and collaborative management approach. In addi-
tion to conflict, weak or inadequate capacity of government officials plays a
role too (World Bank 1995; Bucx, Marchand, Makaske and Guchte 2010). In
case of the rural remote deltas, they are described as regions which suffer from
administrative neglect (UNDP 2006, p. 9; Amnesty International 2009, p. 9).
Taking South Aceh of Indonesia as an example, McCarthy (2006, p. 14) said,
‘in remote areas power might be highly localized, while the official institutional
frameworks of state policy may be weakly established’.
The notion that deltas suffer from administrative neglect is widely accepted.
This has led to many promoting the establishment of coordinating forums,
and building capacity as solutions to the problem of neglect. A workshop held
by the Delta Alliance Indonesia Wing in 2010, attended by representatives of
national institutions, regional governments, universities, international institu-
tions and the private sector, recommended a better institutional structure and
capacity to cope with the governance problems of Indonesia’s deltas.1 The
issue of climate change which is seen to accelerate the vulnerability of the
deltas, has made the recommendation more urgent.2
Those who point at the abovementioned problem of administrative neglect
of the delta and present a number of simple solutions, usually emphasise that
the intended goals of planned programmes are usually not (fully) achieved.
This view often focuses on the performance of government officials who work
at the national, provincial and sub-district offices. Accordingly, this approach
has not paid much attention to the factors that influence the local, social
realities of policy implementation. The so-called ‘compliance’ view of admin-
istration assumes that once policies are announced they will be implemented
by subordinate administrators and that intended results will be achieved in
non-political and technically competent ways (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983,
p. 26). As a result, the notion overlooks the agency and the field officials who
actually attempt to implement law and policy by developing particular be-
haviours that respond to their social environments. Instead of taking into
account the actual implementation, this view is quick to regard such behaviours
1 See ‘Scoping Workshop of Delta Alliance International Indonesia Wing’, held in Jakarta
on 2-3 August 2010, p. 4. www.delta-alliance.nl/nl/25222819 %5Blinkpage%5D.html?...true...
(accessed on 23 May 2012).
2 How climate change, vulnerability and recommendations are related can been seen in
various documents produced by the Delta Alliance. They can be found on http://promise.
klimaatvoorruimte.nl/pro1/publications/publications.aspx.
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as illegitimate. It is therefore not surprising that the recommendations that
this view proposes neglect the context, including the complex relation between
the agency, field officials and local people, and between formal and informal
rules.
Focusing on the Mahakam Delta which is situated in the Kutai Kartanegara
District of the province East Kalimantan, Indonesia, this book will examine
formal and informal rules on resource use, and how these rules have been
formed and implemented. It shows how the processes of formation and imple-
mentation have been prominently influenced by a context where numerous
and complex factors and actors coincide. One of the contextual factors that
this book emphasizes is the fact the Mahakam Delta is located in a remote
area and is scarcely populated. By paying attention to the local officials, whose
work brings them into direct contact with the resource users, this book ex-
amines the formation of formal and informal rules and the implementation
of law. This book argues that apart from pursuing self-interest, the local
officials also seriously and rightly take into account the context. As a result,
they do not always implement the formal rules but together with local resource
users generate informal or semi-official rules, which legitimize the actual
resource use.
1.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
A central question that this book poses is how law regulates resource use in
the Mahakam Delta, how it has been implemented and what prominent actors
and factors have influenced its making and its implementation. The main
question is further elaborated in the following three sub-questions.
How does legislation, including both laws and regulations, regulate natural resources
use in the Mahakam Delta?
This sub-question allows for an examination of the legal aspects of public
management of natural resources of the Mahakam Delta. Numerous important
provisions on forest, oil, gas, fish and land resource use are described and
analysed. The provisions do not only concern rules on resource rights, but
also on the government institutions which are assigned to implement and
enforce the formal rules. Here I define law as legislation which is made by
the Peoples’ Representative Council (national parliament) together with the
President; regulation should be understood as lower legislation made either
by executive organs – national or sub-national – or by sub-national representat-
ive councils (see Section 4.3).3
3 On the difference definition between ‘law’ and ‘regulation’ see for instance Black (2002,
p. 29-34).
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To which extent and in what way have regional and local bureaucracies implemented
these laws and regulations, and which are the key actors and factors which have
influenced the implementation of these laws and regulations?
This sub-question examines to which extent the formal rules have been imple-
mented, and the level of (attempted) influence of a number of actors and
factors in the implementation process. The sub-question also looks at the actual
behaviours of the legal implementers in coping with these actors and factors.
How has the making of some of these regulations been influenced by the administrative
and political context?
The third sub-question examines the making of some regional regulations and
drafts concerning natural resources management in the Mahakam Delta. It
investigates various factors, notably administrative and political factors that
prominently influence the making of those regulations.4 Unlike the first and
the second sub-questions which also examine the laws, this sub-question only
deals with regulations.
1.3 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
1.3.1 Bureaucracy’s role in legal processes
Bureaucracy in developing countries is often criticised for impeding the devel-
opment process as well as public service provision. La Palombara (1963) argued
that in developing countries where the bureaucracy is the legacy of the colonial
tradition of law and order, the use of bureaucracy is more a tool to control
rather than to achieve development. According to Palombara, bureaucracy
impedes development and public service delivery due to its simultaneously
powerful and powerless position.5
In the case of a seemingly powerful bureaucracy, it can become a captive
and exclusive institution in which development goals are subject to vested
4 I use the word ‘legislation making’, and ‘law-making’ interchangeably. In as far as laws
are meant to lay down policies, law-making coincides with policy making. Even though
there have been some studies on law-making, yet for the most part, in order to understand
the actual processes, we must borrow from studies on policy making to which the study
of public administration has paid much attention. Hence, I use certain theories on policy
making in explaining law-making.
5 Haque (1997) mentioned many dimensions of incongruities and incompatibilities between
the bureaucracy and social reality that subsequently cause the bureaucracy in developing
countries to become an impediment to or shortcoming for development. Dube (1969) pointed
at the alienation and uprootedness of bureaucracy from society as factors which lead to
its shortcoming.
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interests, and public services are delivered unjustly and unequally. In that
situation, the bureaucracy is not responsive and sensitive to public needs,
making it a dead weight on society that eventually hinders development and
socio-economic change (Jain 1992, p. 23). Moreover, a powerful position can
enable the bureaucrats to anticipate and adapt to any plans or efforts that
might jeopardize their comfort zone from which they benefit (Dube 1969, p.
214 and 216; Hirschmann 2000, p. 289). In the situation where the bureaucrats
consider themselves as a new class and where their power is not based on
ownership of the means of production but on the position in the state
apparatus and the level of access to various state agencies that regulate and
control resources, they become exclusive, and allocate resources and provide
public services on the basis of self-interest (Haque 1997, p. 447).
In the opposite situation, when the bureaucracy is seemingly powerless,
it is subject to severe interference from external influences, either from elites,
patrons or families, making it dependent and preferential (Dube 1969, p. 216-
217; Eisenstadt 1969, p. 370; Haque 1997, p. 437-438; Hyden et al. 2004, p. 137).
In Indonesia, since the resignation of President Soeharto (1966-1998), elected
politicians have more influence than public administrators as a result of the
multiparty democratic system (Hyden et al. 2004, p. 132). Apart from external
forces, the decrease in the power of the bureaucracy may also be due to the
incompetence and unwillingness of the bureaucrats. It is believed that the
dependence on particular external groups leads to an unequal allocation of
resources while incompetence and unwillingness hinder the bureaucracy from
effectively carrying out policies (Haque 1997, p. 446-447). As Haque (1997,
p. 448) points out, the bureaucracy in developing countries in general, instead
of being the agent of development and change, has maintained existing
structures, benefits from affluent classes and foreign capital and exacerbates
the dependence and underdevelopment of poor classes and the nation. Riggs
(in Hirschmann 1981, p. 472) even points out that the bureaucracy contributes
to negative development, while Harold Laski (in Sayre 1969, p. 342) sees the
bureaucracy as a threat to democratic government.
These views on bureaucracy have also been criticized. One argument
against this view, for example, is that it is unlikely that the bureaucracy, when
they have an interest in ensuring that development is continued is indeed
mostly perceived as a development impediment. Moreover, as a result of
establishing relations with external groups, the bureaucracy is constantly
influenced and therefore adapts to external demands (Eisenstadt 1969).
Rather than regarding bureaucracies in developing countries either as
powerful and self-interested, or powerless and ineffective, one could also
depart from the assumption that the bureaucrats always have to adapt to the
societies in which they live. Firstly, due to a great spread of traditional institu-
tions and practices on one hand and the perception which bureaucrats in
developing countries often hold of themselves as the agents of development
on the other hand, they often assign themselves the duty to modernize more
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traditional, lower-educated people (Dube 1969, p. 213; Asmerom, Hoppe and
Jain 1992, p. 23; Kajembe and Monela 2000, p. 381). In that context, the bureau-
crats are more required to be pioneers, negotiators and motivators rather than
policy implementers (Eisenstadt 1969; Esman 1974, p. 14).
Maintaining a continuous equilibrium between autonomy and responsive-
ness to external influences is another reason why a bureaucrat is often not
willing to be strict about its formal tasks (Eisenstadt 1969). To a large extent,
the strategy is needed in the hope that the bureaucracy can still fulfil its formal
functions. For the field officials who live in the same community as the affected
groups, it is important to be responsive or adaptable to the external influences,
not only for ensuring that planned programmes are implemented but also as
a survival strategy. As Kajembe and Monela (2000, p. 383) found, forest field
officials in Tanzania were unwilling to break the link with the local people
who dwelled in state forest, for they perceived the local communities as their
living environment. The ability to survive will prevent the bureaucrats from
social exclusion (Thompson and McEwen 1958, p. 29). In many occasions they
even have to be in favour of the affected community in an effort to obtain
social insurance (Milne 1970, p. 61; Gray (1985). In other words, they have
to create a credible social relationship to avoid social risk in which the affected
communities may resist or even jeopardize them physically (McCarthy 2006,
p. 105-106). As one of the forest field officials of the National Gunung
Halimun-Salak National Park of West Java, Indonesia, said, ‘Without credible
relationships with the local community, we cannot work (Kubo 2010, p. 246).
The above refers to ways in which the bureaucracy plays a role in develop-
ment in general. What role does the bureaucracy play in legal processes,
notably law-making and implementation of law? For critics who regard the
bureaucracy as an obstacle to development, law-making in non-Western
countries is seen as a top-down process in which particular elites or a small
group of powerful persons have the main say. As Seidman (1978, p. 454) said,
in some African countries feedback institutions in which people can participate
in policy formulation favour the local elites over the mass. As Riggs (1964)
pointed out, in a society in which family ties and traditional forms of authority
are still prevalent, elitist or corporatist groups may dominate the law-making
processes.
Not only the domination of the elites influences the formation of law but
also the competition among government agencies in pursuing their own
agencies’ interests (Otto et al. 2008, p. 60). Moreover, when the society has
become increasingly complex and heterogeneous, the process of law-making
tends to import law through legal transplantation (Seidman and Seidman 1994).
The type of law making in which the public hardly participates and in which
there is hardly a rational debate and decision making process can jeopardise
the quality of the law. Consequently, the pursuit of compliance and enforce-
ment will be more difficult.
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Concerning the implementation of law, the bureaucracy is often found to
prevent the law from reaching its primary goals by shaping the implementation
of the law in favour of its personal interests or the interests of a closely
affiliated group. Pursuing personal interests in the implementation of law has
led to corrupt behaviour among the bureaucracy. Whilst, when the bureaucracy
is captured by the interests of a powerful regulated group, the bureaucrats
may be reluctant to implement the law (Riggs 1969, p. 418; Cotterrell 1984).
As Seidman and Seidman (1994, p. 139) point out, whereas the bureaucracy
is far from favouring the mass, it seems that it systematically implements the
law in ways that strengthen the reigning oligarchy. Hauck (2008), for instance,
has shown that despite the fact that the Government of South Africa has
promulgated democratic fishery laws since 1998 to give small-scale fishermen
the opportunity (bona fide) to formally obtain access to marine resources, the
implementation of the law has not been effective because powerful local elites
have hijacked the opportunities.6
These point to circumstances, attitudes and practices of administration
which may be incongruent with formal arrangements (Riggs 1969, p. 416;
Haque 1997, p. 444-445). Obidzinski (2003) has described how a patronage
network for illegal logging in the Berau District of East Kalimantan generated
a form of informality whereby formal forest rules were denied. McCarthy
(2006, p. 170) describes a similar situation in South Aceh where new institu-
tional arrangements or new informal understandings emerged concerning forest
resource use in a way to accommodate local demands and corrupt behaviours
of the local forest officials at the same time. Furthermore, due to functional
pathologies, the bureaucracy is blamed for increasing the gap between planned
goals, policies and their actual implementation. In natural resources manage-
ment, a bureaucracy widely practicing corrupt behaviour, obviously puts the
natural resources at risk (Auer, Karr-Colque, McAlpine and Doench 2006;
McCarthy 2006).
Apart from such negative assessments, other insights in the literature point
to different attitudes, for example that the bureaucracy is continuously seeking
ways to make law which has an effect on society on one hand and takes into
consideration people’s voices on the other hand. The gap between what the
law says and what the social reality requires constitutes the main reason for
why this balance is needed. There are a number of actual social circumstances
that call for more responsive and adaptable laws. Firstly, the diversity and
complexity of societies. Secondly, the different abilities of its citizens. Thirdly,
the need to provide access to its citizens. Fourthly, the need to avoid unwanted
or unexpected situations such as worse local livelihoods, conflict, larger viola-
tions of law and a larger workload for the bureaucracy.
6 Similar accounts could be also found in Gezelius and Hauck (2011).
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That societies are diverse and complex is an important factor. In a 2000
report the World Bank suggests that when public participation is limited, there
are various normative systems, and the enforcement institutions are weak,
the bureaucracy needs to apply the law flexibly in an effort to pursue compli-
ance. In such circumstances, the bureaucracy is better off advancing co-
operation, maintaining a non-repressive approach in law enforcement, and
using strict sanctions and deterrent methods, if the first way of working has
failed (Aalders and Wilthagen 1997).
When the bureaucrats try to follow the law but need to take into account
the ability of the regulated groups as well, they often make the law com-
promising whereby they may not impose all necessary legal requirements
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Rosenbloom and Schwartz 1994; Baldwin, Cave
and Lodge 2012).
Due to the different abilities of citizens to change their behaviours as
required by the law, the bureaucracy has to establish dialogues which result
in different patterns of service and methods of delivery (Esman 1974, p. 14).
The importance of pointing at the factor of ability is that compliance is often
influenced by the extent to which the regulated actor has the ability to comply
with a certain rule (Kagan and Scholz 1984).7
Likewise, an adaptable and responsive law matters when it concerns some
unexpected circumstances as mentioned above. When poorly regulated groups
violate the law to sustain their livelihood, the bureaucracy is better off neglect-
ing or reinterpreting the law to avoid the livelihood problems getting worse
(Kaimowitz 2003). As McCarthy (2006, p. 105) wrote, ‘…forestry officials were
reluctant or afraid to arrest poor villagers with few economic options other
than logging the forest’. In cases of forest resource use, when it is clear that
illegal forest use is the only source of income for the local users, the forest
bureaucrats prefer to only warn rather than punish those breaking the law
(Chhteri, et al. 2012). Kubo (2010) found that the field forestry officials of the
National Gunung Halimun-Salak National Park preferred to give warnings
to the illegal forest occupants and firewood collectors, and sometimes take
them to an office to draft a statement about their wrongdoing. The field
officials did not punish them according to the formal forestry rules, as they
knew that this form of local use would not harm the National Park. The same
policy is often followed when bureaucrats expect that the imposition of formal
rules could generate conflict or larger violations.
Literature on administrative law, sociology, public administration and
regulatory studies have long mentioned discretionary power-based policy and
decisions as administrative means to cope with the gap or discrepancy between
law-in-the books and law-in action. As what Riggs (1964, p. 183) labelled
‘formalism’, bureaucrats may produce interpretations of law which permit
7 On factors that influence people to abide by the law see Seidman and Seidman (1994,
p. 45-46); Seidman, Seidman and Abeyesekere (2001, p. 16) and Tyler (2006).
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them to do what the affected groups find useful, when social behaviour does
not confirm to a prescribed norm. Hyden et al. (2004, p. 133) suggest that local
bureaucrats often use discretionary powers to twist central government policy
in directions other than those originally intended.
In the context of this book it is important to underline that bureaucrats
attempting to make the law responsive and adaptable is not always merely
driven by the interest of maximizing wealth or maintaining the existence of
the bureaucracy, but could also be because of rising social concerns and
solidarity among the bureaucrats with the affected groups (Barnard in Milen
1970; North 1990; Dixit 1997). In addition the bureaucracy has to take into
account the fact that it often lacks resources (funds, capacity). The field officials
of the Federal Ministry of Environment and Rivers of Nigeria, for example,
relied on the vehicles and laboratories of the private oil companies to in-
vestigate the pollution that, according to the local people, was caused by the
oil company alone (UNDP 2006; Amnesty International 2009, p. 44). As said,
due to the shortage of resources, the bureaucracy often realizes that they are
not able to fulfil the required conditions or be ready for the consequences if
they impose the formal rules.
In other words, a situation whereby the bureaucrats are not willing to make
the law enforceable may well coincide with them wanting the law to benefit
the affected groups. The bureaucracy can have these two seemingly contra-
dictory attitudes simultaneously. As said, sustaining their autonomy whilst
responding to external influences means that bureaucrats must strive for a
continuous equilibrium (Eisenstadt 1969). Having these attitudes simultaneous-
ly, the bureaucracy can appear to be ambivalent in orientation (Riggs 1969,
p. 427). Such ambivalence will also follow from a deliberate strategy to set
up flexible law enforcement. The flexibility ranges from cooperative to punitive
law enforcement. Punitive law enforcement is needed to maintain the credibil-
ity of threat (Braithwaite 2002). Moreover, in the case of field officials, the
range of options could help them play their role as intermediary agent, subject
to administrative duties on one hand but needing to be responsive to the
demands of the community on the other hand (Arce 1993).
In the context of decentralization regional and local government officials
often cannot effectively implement policy on decentralization due to a number
of structural factors, including reluctance and fear of central government
officials, competition among different levels of government, and political and
social structures.8 Reluctance and fear eventually lead to a shortage of financial
resources at the level of local administration, given that the central government
keep the largest proportion of financial resources to themselves (Chemma and
Rondinelli 1983, p. 295-314). Regional and local governments in Latin America,
for example, can hardly cover their basic operational costs, let alone other
8 For an account of the numerous factors which influence the policy implementation on
decentralization see Cheema and Rondenelli (1983).
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activities such as expanding the range and quality of public services (Harris
1983, p. 195). The structural factors coincide with behavioural factors, such
as a centralist mentality or centralist ideology. Field officials of regional and
local governments in many Asian countries are hindered in implementing
policies, as central officials often do not trust them and consider them as
incompetent and lazy (Mathur 1983, p. 71).
At this point it is useful to elaborate on what is meant by the process of
implementing the law. As already mentioned above, this book defines the
implementation of law as an effort to ensure that laws have an effect. Regard-
ing the effect, Seidman et al. (2001, p. 10-11) argued that it emerges if the
implementation of law can change institutions. It is important to underline
that the term ‘institution’ is here understood in the sociological sense of a
repetitive pattern of social behaviour. Thus, it could be argued that law is
effective if those who are regulated behave in accordance with prescribed
norms. As Aubert (1966, p. 99 and 105) said, law has an impact if the behaviour
of affected people is confirmed by the rules laid down in the law.
Effectiveness may also relate to validity and legitimacy (Soeprapto 1998,
p. 19). It is presumed that valid and legitimate law will not be resisted by the
affected people given it is desirable and useful (Manan 1994, p. 28).
Another point that must be underlined regarding the implementation of
law is that ‘administrative implementation’ can be distinguished from
‘regulatory implementation of law’. The former refers to the actual role of
public administration in the implementation process, in other words, to law-in-
action. The latter refers to ‘making lower executive regulations’,9 i.e. it refers
to the normative aspects, to the law and regulations which govern the admin-
istrative implementation of law. In other words, it could be seen as the promul-
gation of implementing rules by the government accompanied by mechanisms
for monitoring and enforcement (Black 2002, p. 11)
1.3.2 The quality of legislation
This book includes a discussion of the quality of Indonesian legislation with
regard to the different expectations that resource users, and regional and local
government officials have. The resource users expect legislation to be able to
provide certainty about their tenure rights whereas the government officials
expect the legislation to be able to inform them on the following two issues:
their authority and what constitutes as legal/illegal. The different demands
of the two different actors show that the ‘quality’ of legislation can vary in
the eyes of different beholders (Florijn 2008, p. 76-77). In academic discourse,
there are at least two strands of thought about the quality of legislation. Firstly,
9 Chen (2002, p. 1) and Otto (2002, p. 23).
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there are theories on the rule of law or general jurisprudence. The second
strand of thought consists of theories on the relation between the quality of
legislation and social change (Van Rooij 2006, p. 33).
Theories on the rule of law discuss the quality of legislation in terms of
two substantive elements of the rule of law: formal legality and democracy.
It is assumed that legislation will be of good quality if it is clear, certain,
consistent, predictable and general in its application (Tamanaha 2004; Bedner
2010). Good legislation should also result in general consent so that legislation
can be an instrument for controlling state intervention (Bedner 2010). In
practice, democratic law-making can turn into the reverse situation as it can
cause unclear law, but at the same time it might enable legislation to fulfil
various expectations (Florijn 2008, p. 76). In general, formal legality enables
the regulated people to plan their behaviour because they know how the state
responds to their actions. In other words, the legislation gives predictability
so people know in advance what legislation demands from them, what legis-
lation grants to them, and what sorts of behaviour they can expect from the
officials, if they undertake particular actions (Seidman et al 2001, p. 255).
The element of formal legality of the rule of law is actually a primary
subject matter of the doctrinal study of law. Doctrinal analysis of law is primar-
ily concerned with the extent to which legal authoritative text (laws, regula-
tions, court decisions) are consistent and coherent so that they are able to bring
about certainty as well as equality (Dworkin 1986; Kissam 1988; Hesselink
2009). Consistency and coherence are pursued on the assumption that law
has an inner system or logical integrity (Schwartz 1992, p. 181). Consistent
legislation means that there are no contradictions, whereas coherency refers
to the entirety of legislation (Fuller 1964, p. 66; Ehrlich and Posner 1974;
Seidman et al. 2001, p. 262-263; Siems 2008, p. 149). Schrama (2011) suggests
that non-contradiction does not only apply to the different pieces of legislation
itself (internal consistence), but also when legislation is compatible with the
context and culture in which it operates (external consistence). Coherent
legislation means that the different pieces of legislation do not logically cancel
each other out, but that they fit together. They have to be mutually inter-
dependent (Balkin 1995, p. 116).10 Another definition of coherence is that there
should be as many relations as possible among the different pieces of legis-
lation, where one piece of legislation is a reason for another (Mommers 2002,
p. 46 and 48).
It should be underlined that consistency and coherence have a relation.
As Balkin (1994, p. 117) argues, legal coherence is possible, if principles that
underline law and regulations are consistent with one another. That includes
consistency in resolving conflicts among laws and regulations. Hage (2004,
10 Discussions on legal coherence mainly focus on principle, policy and purpose underlining
legal rules. Therefore legal coherence is understood as a connection between legal principles
and legal rules. See Balkin (1994) and Hage (2001).
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p. 90) even suggests that consistency is a dimension of coherence next to
comprehensiveness and mutual support.
Theories on how law relates to social change assume that law can be an
instrument to generate social change, acknowledging that law can also be a
product of social change (Mehren and Sawers 1992; Seidman et al. 2001). To
be able to generate social change one may say that law should be
implementable. Van Rooij (2006) concisely summarizes four characteristics
of good or implementable legislation: adequacy, feasibility, certainty and
adaptability. One prominent indicator of adequacy is if compliance with the
law by the affected group results in greater benefits than violation of the law.
The law is feasible if it takes into consideration the ability of the regulated
people to comply with the law and of officials to implement it. The aspect
of ability is related to what resources are available to the regulated people
and officials. Thus, the aspect of feasibility means that law enforcement is
possible (Van Rooij 2006, p. 37).
As already said, certainty concerns clarity and predictability. If a law is
clear and free from ambiguity and vagueness, it helps prevent the use of
discretion in interpreting the law. Unlike certainty which requires that law
is as detailed as possible, adaptability requires the law to be abstract and open.
This is to allow the implementation to adapt to a complex reality and to be
balanced with regards to the interests of different stakeholders. In developing
countries where administrative implementation often lacks resources on one
hand and there is often a huge gap between law-in-the books and law-in-action
on the other, an adaptable law is needed.
Based on the above accounts, it is clear that the four characteristics of good
legislation can contradict each other. It occurs because on one hand the law
is concerned with the needs and wishes of the law makers, and on the other
hand it needs to take into account the social reality in which the law operates.
In this regard, implementable law is law that balances these characteristics
(Van Rooij 2006, p. 43).
In Indonesia, law itself has set the standards for how to make good legis-
lation, as can be found in Law No. 12/2011 on the Making of Legislation. It
should be noted that this law contains a complete set of indicators of good
legislation. Law No. 12/2011 does not only apply the substantive elements
of the rule of law (Bedner 2010), it is also concerned with the implementability
of the legislation.11 Apart from the substance and implementability, this law
adds the law-making process as another indicator of good legislation. To a
large extent, these indicators of good legislation resemble the indicators, which
Indonesian legal scholars have put forward. These include the following:
clearly defined objectives, made by an authorized state institution, proper
subject matters, consensual, implementable, certain, and in conformity with
11 On the substantive and procedural elements of the rule of law see Bedner (2010).
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national fundamental norms and the constitution (Attamimi 1990; Manan 1994,
p. 27-29).
Concerning the elements of the rule of law, Law No. 12/2011 determines
that legislation should be easy to understand so that it does not generate multi-
interpretations.12 In other words, it should be clear (Rahardjo 1991, p. 84;
Manan 1994, p. 29). The legislation should also be general in application
without taking religion, ethnicity, race and social status into consideration.13
Furthermore, Law No. 12/2011 determines that to pursue certainty, the legis-
lation should take into consideration legality and make lower legislations
compatible with higher legislation.14 In this regard, Law No. 12/2011 reasserts
the official adoption of the theory on the hierarchy of legislation within the
Indonesian legal system (see Section 4.3).
Indonesia’s legal discourse also relates the hierarchy of legislation to the
concept of harmonization.15 It suggests that the hierarchy of legislation consti-
tutes a means to achieve harmonization. In its broader meaning, harmonization
is not only concerned with the relation between higher and lower legislation,
but also with the relation among sectoral legislations, between legislation and
administrative rules, legislation and court decisions, formal rule and social
rule, and between national law and international law (Gandhi 1995, p. 30; Otto
2003, p. 16; Goesniadhie 2006, p. 300). Wargakusumah et al. (2000, p. 33-34)
points to eight causes that could cause disharmony. These include the differ-
ences between statutory law and customary law, statutory law and court
decisions, higher legislation and lower legislation, central regulation and local
regulation, and conflict of authority among the government agencies. The
ultimate goal of harmonization is certainty and equality. In relation to the
cause, Otto (2003, p. 17-18) points out that disharmony may emerge throughout
all stages of the ‘law-and-policy cycle’ notably during the setting of goals,
principles and legal norms, administrative competition, implementation, and
enforcement.
It is even suggested that there cannot be legal certainty without harmoniza-
tion. Harmonization is the situation in which legal sub-systems fit together
or are congruent (Gandhi 1995; Goesniadhie 2006). Thus, in this respect har-
monization resembles coherence. Congruence is possible because different sub-
systems are brought into agreeable conformity with one another (Otto 2003,
p. 16 and 19).
With regard to the law-making process, two indicators of good legislation
can be suggested. Firstly, the legislation should be made by an authorized
state institution (Attamimi 1990, p. 345-346). Any legislation which is not made
12 See the Elucidation of Article 5f of Law No. 12/2011.
13 See the Elucidation of Article 6h of Law No. 12/2011.
14 See the Elucidation ofArticle 5c and Article 7(2) of Law No. 12/2011.
15 For thoughts, which suggest this relation, see for instance Goesniadhie (2006, p. 119-129)
and Wargakusumah (2000).
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by an authorized state institution should be avoided.16 Another procedural
indicator that Law No. 12/2011 states is that the process in which legislation
is made should be transparent and provide every citizen the opportunity to
give input or suggestions.17 This form of open process will result in con-
sensus-based legislation (Manan 1994, p. 28).
In the legal analysis in Chapters 5-9, I will use the standards of good
legislation, namely the substantive elements of the rule of law and implement-
ability, as Law No. 12/2011 suggests, to assess the natural resources legislation
for the Mahakam Delta.
1.3.3 Tenure rights
Resource tenure and property rights
This book deals with legislation on the use of natural resources and how it
has been implemented in the Mahakam Delta (see 1.2). It employs the term
‘resource use’ in the sense of ‘land tenure’ in its broader meaning. Thus this
term includes tenure of land as well as of other natural resources. Sometimes,
instead of the term ‘resource use’, people use the term ‘land tenure’ referring
to the same meaning (FAO 2002, p. 7). As Bruce (1998, p. 2 and 6) has pointed
out, resource tenure describes the rights to land, water, trees and other
resources. The term may also include flora, fauna and the water system in
so far as they are associated with an area of land (Leonard and Longbottom
2000, p. 35).
This book prefers not to make sharp distinctions between the terms
‘resource tenure’, ‘land tenure’ and ‘property rights’ given that they are con-
ceptually not significantly different.18 Conceptually, the three terms are con-
cerned with the relationship between and among persons from which a person
gains legitimacy to use resources. I will therefore use the terms inter-
changeably. I here follow the notion that resource tenure should not be seen
simply as a set of rules, but also as principles and processes. When it includes
social practices as well, a more proper term that could be used is ‘resource
arrangements’.19
In academic discourse, the term ‘resource arrangements’ actually represents
a criticism on earlier thoughts which saw property rights and land tenure
simply as rights and obligations, or as terms and conditions on the basis of
which resources were held, used and transacted (Adams, Sibanda, and Turner
16 See the Elucidation of Article 5b of Law No. 12/2011.
17 See the Elucidation of Article 5g of Law No. 12/2011.
18 For work which conceptually distinguishes between the two terms see for instance Safitri
(2010, p. 24).
19 See McCharty (2006) and Safitri (2010, p. 24).
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1999). In discussions about property rights, the instrumentalist rule-based
approach defines property rights as rights to use, to earn income from, and
to transfer or exchange assets and resources (Libecap 1989). This notion, which
strongly echoes a neo-classical economic approach, has recently re-emerged
through the work of Hernando De Soto. De Soto basically argues that the
informal sector will gain certainty, if it is formalized. Formalization will make
extra-legal property easy to transfer and use as a collateral. According to De
Soto, this could ultimately eradicate poverty (De Soto 2000).
Some scholars have reacted to this instrumentalist approach arguing that
it overlooks a usually complex reality. This type of criticism originates in
notions, which challenge rule-based and legal centralist approaches. The
scholars point out that instead of land tenure merely consisting of a rule, it
comprises of principles, practices and processes, whereby society defines
control over, access to, management of, exploitation of, and use of means of
existence and production (Dekker 2001). Broader than a mere legal institution,
resource tenure is a social institution that specifically governs how humans
interact with nature, particularly in relation to the control of the use of natural
resources (Hanna et al. 1996, p. 1). It is perceived as patterns of behaviour
rather than that it specifically serves to control society’s use of environmental
resources (Crocombe 1971). The social reality that profoundly influences the
forming of resource tenure often consists of different rule systems that exist
simultaneously. The different rule systems interact which makes resource
tenure rather complex (Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann in Moeliono
2000).
This book will approach the issue of land tenure from both a legal and
social perspective. As a result, this book suggests that resource tenure includes
complex and various sets of norms, practices and processes regarding resource
use in which both legal and non-legal factors have an impact. The processes,
in which various actors with different or even conflicting interests and per-
ceptions and influenced by various prominent factors interact, have shaped
a form of resource tenure where formal and informal legitimacy meet. Formal
and informal legitimacy are in constant contact, which sometimes turns into
conflict, but also accommodate each other or support mutual recognition. An
accommodating relation can result in tenure rights based on a combination
of formal and informal legitimacy – even when in terms of form they could
still be identified as formal or informal rights. Because of the fact that there
are many different forms of legitimacy of resource use, this book does not
rigidly follow the categorization of formal, informal and de facto resource
tenure.20
Meanwhile, property rights are also perceived as bundles of rights. This
means that there may be several layers of rights over one certain piece of
20 On this categorization see for instance Reerink (2011, p. 15).
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property. Riddell (1987) points out that a parcel of land might belong to a
person or a group of persons, whilst it is used by others to collect firewood,
fruits, and crops and in some cases even to live on. Regarding the bundle of
rights, it is important to underline that in a situation where formal and in-
formal rules are combined, it may happen that each right in the bundle is
subject to a different normative order. For example, the ownership rights could
be subject to formal rule, while the use rights fall under informal rule or vice
versa. The dynamic aspect of the rules constellation suggests that a bundle
of rights changes over time subject to constant interaction between the actors
involved (Van Meijl and Von Benda-Beckmann 1999).
Tenure security
Tenure security broadly refers to the holding or exercise of rights by right
holders without any hindrance or interference from other (groups of) persons.
A more detailed definition of tenure security is that someone has the right
to resources on a continuous basis, free from the imposition or interference
from outside sources, as well as the ability to reap the benefits of labour and
capital invested in the resources, either in use or upon transfer to another
holder (Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994; Bruce 1998). Accordingly, tenure
security is associated with the extent and duration of the rights, which deter-
mine the scope of the rights (Ubink 2008, p. 18). It is conceptually assumed
that rights are secure if: (i) they encompass many actions that right holders
may exercise including the exclusion of others; and (ii) they have a long period
of validity. Given these assumptions, formal private property is often assumed
to have the strongest tenure security (FAO 2002, p. 18; Lund in Ubink 2008,
p. 18).
However, due to the weak correlation between formal resource tenure and
tenure security, some critics suggest that tenure security should also take into
account informal or actual resource use. In a 2003 report, the World Bank
pointed out that formal land titles are not necessarily sufficient for a high level
of tenure security. In a situation where formal institutions are absent or power-
less, it is better to choose a gradual approach and build on the existing sys-
tem(s) of land tenure, such as local non-state institutions (Deininger 2003, p.
33). Thus, tenure security is also possible within an informal tenure system
(Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994, p. 25).
Concerning the source of tenure security, this book follows Safitri’s and
Reerink’s notions that perceived security can also contribute to tenure security
besides formal and actual tenure security. Safitri (2010, p. 30) and Reerink
(2011, p. 16) define perceived security as a perception, or strong conviction,
that the right holders are secure in having and exercising their rights, because
they think that the government officials agree with them. In such cases the
perception may derive from their knowledge and experience with formal
tenure (Safitri 2010, p. 30). Nevertheless, following the definition and sources
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of tenure security as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has
formulated, this book found that the perceptions of other actors, such as
government officials and company employees, also contribute to perceived
tenure security (FAO 2002, p. 18-20).21 As Reerink (2011, p. 221 and 225-226)
found, as far as a regional and local government is concerned, long residence
and land-related documentation are two prominent factors that encourage local
officials to perceive semi-formal de facto land tenure as legitimate. As already
mentioned (Section 1.2), such perception might emerge as a result of the
bureaucrats’ understanding of the ability of the land holders to abide by the
law or the risks or consequences they might encounter if they impose the
formal rule.
1.4 METHODS OF RESEARCH
When I commenced my research mid-2007, East Kalimantan was indeed not
new for me. My first visit to this second largest province of Indonesia was
in 1999. At that time, I joined a group of NGO activists and university lecturers
who were undertaking a comparative study on community forestry. We visited
some upstream villages in the West Kutai District, at that time a new district
and formerly part of the Kutai Kartanegara District. The local villagers we
met during this study belonged to Dayak indigenous groups.
I grew more familiar with the Province when I worked in Balikpapan city
in 2000, and during my consulting jobs for a local NGO and in the course of
two international projects. The jobs provided me many opportunities to meet
the Dayak indigenous groups who resided in the interior part of the Province.
Likewise, I also had the chance to meet Provincial and Kutai District officials
through which I enhanced my knowledge on legal and policy issues in East
Kalimantan. I was fortunate to have two opportunities which later became
important for my PhD research. The first opportunity was to contribute to
an international research project concerning the management of Balikpapan
Bay, through which I became familiar with the coastal issues of the Province.
The second opportunity was to carry out a research on community forestry
policy for a Bogor-based NGO in 2002.
Considering the abovementioned work experience in the Province, I could
say that my PhD research has given me a great opportunity to develop a closer
acquaintance with the Kutai District government, and with coastal issues as
well. This research then led to my first encounter with the Mahakam Delta.
It brought me, who formerly worked in the field of indigenous peoples, into
closer contact with immigrant communities.
21 According to the FAO’s definition, tenure security may derive from many sources. It may
derive from communities and the government. One may have tenure security from those
sources in cumulative (FAO 2002, p. 19-20).
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I obtained most information and data for this research through interviews
and the collection of documents. In addition to these two methods, I undertook
non-participatory observations in which I observed the ways in which the
officials of the Province, Districts and deconcentrated government agencies
acted and understood their day-to-day activities. Meanwhile, from a number
of village visits which I made in the course of 2007 up to 2011 and from a
survey carried out by a post-doc researcher in the East Kalimantan Program,
I became acquainted with the villagers and their local tenure (see Section 1.5
for an account of the project).
1.4.1 Collection of Documents
The documents that I obtained can be divided into three groups/types of data.
Firstly, there are authoritative legal texts consisting of legislation, administrat-
ive rules and court decisions. The local regulation and administrative rules
comprise of provincial, district and sub-district legislations and administrative
rules. The court decisions comprise of district court, high court and supreme
court decisions and also include a decision by the Constitutional Court. Second-
ly, I collected and studied research reports and publications of government
agencies, companies, universities and NGOs. Thirdly, I used official reports
and minutes of Provincial and Kutai District government meetings. Apart from
these three types of data, I also gathered documents regarding dispute settle-
ments on environment and land.
Given that the Mahakam Delta was practically new to me, I first collected
several research reports which provided me with much information concerning
the environmental condition of the Mahakam Delta, the livelihood of the local
people, and stakeholder initiatives in the pursuit of sustainable management
of the Mahakam Delta. Those reports and publications also provided me with
an overall picture of the law and policy problems of the management of the
Mahakam Delta, which this research further examines in a comprehensive
and analytical manner. It should be underlined, however, that the reports had
little to say about the role of local bureaucrats in the law and policy processes.
Therefore data collection through interviews was important for this research.
In general, there were few serious handicaps in getting the authoritative
legal texts. Nowadays, national legislation, certain administrative rules and
quite a number of court decisions can easily be accessed via the internet. Yet
local regulations and policies are not all online. I collected these from various
circles, including government offices, NGO activists, company employees, and
university lecturers. I visited the Provincial and Kutai District Fishery, Forestry,
Environmental Agencies and several bureaus of the Provincial and District
Secretariat Office to obtain local legislations, administrative rules and draft
regulations. I also visited regional offices of the Ministry of Forestry and the
National Land Agency, as well as the offices of some NGOs, company
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employees and university lecturers. I visited the Kutai District Court and two
law offices to get the verdicts of lower and higher courts. I found the cassations
on the internet. To obtain the research reports, publications, meeting reports,
minutes and maps, I mostly visited the offices of government officials, NGOs,
company employees, and university lecturers.
My contact with some NGO activists in East Kalimantan also helped me
with collecting data. They introduced me to government officials and company
employees, which helped me in building trust. This made them more willing
to provide the data I needed. However, I also encountered some difficulties
in getting the data. The district annual budget, maps of the Forest Areas and
the reports of forest delineation were the three documents that were most
difficult to obtain. I had to make an appointment with a Provincial Forestry
official to get a map of the delineated Forest Area of the Mahakam Delta. He
asked me to meet him at the office, where he held a side job. I was asked to
pay for the map.
To obtain the report on forest delineation, I even had to wait until an office
head was moved to another office. I was lucky because the new head trusted
me and allowed me to copy the reports, though this only occurred after we
had met and discovered we shared cultural ties. I received the reports in the
last year of my PhD research. On the other hand, when I met government
officials who had formerly worked as a journalist or NGO activist, I found it
easy to obtain the data. They were even willing to send me any data I still
needed by email.
I also collected documents during my several visits to the Netherlands.
My first two visits in 2007 and 2009 introduced me to the academic debates
through the expansive university library collections. It is an extraordinary
privilege to have access to such a huge collection of publications and reports.
There I found not only literature on the Mahakam Delta but also on Indonesia
and on the theoretical framework that I employ for this book.
1.4.2 Interviews
In total I interviewed 120 respondents consisting of civil servants (82), retired
civil servants (11), company employees (6), university lecturers (6), police
officers (4), NGO activists (3), a parliament member (1), lawyers (2), and com-
munity members (5). The fact that the largest group of respondents consists
of active and retired civil servants (93/120), shows the focus of this research.
On average, I interviewed these people more than one time, and in some cases
three or four times.
As previously said, my network among the East Kalimantan NGOs helped
me to get the documentary data from government officials and company
employees. It provided me with similar support for conducting interviews.
With the help of the network, few government officials asked me to present
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ahead my research permits before the interviews took place. Nevertheless,
the network was not the only factor that eased the process of holding inter-
views. I noticed that my official status as PhD student at a foreign university
and sharing cultural ties also helped.
Some of my interviewees were welcoming once they knew that I was
following a PhD program abroad. The interviews often commenced and ended
with conversations about what it meant to have or how they could get an
opportunity to study abroad. The interviewees’ questions about studying
abroad could be out of personal interest or for their children’s future education.
On some occasions, attempts to get interviews scheduled and the running of
the interviews themselves went well, because I consciously and naturally used
my cultural ties (which I prefer not to disclose due to ethical reasons).
Yet, the main reason for the success of the interviews was the growing
transparency of the Kutai District government. The environment started
changing after the prosecution of a number of high-ranking officials who were
accused of corrupt practices. The prosecutions, to some extent, forced the Kutai
District government officials to be more welcoming to those who were request-
ing public information. However, this context impeded the interview process
at the same time. I found it difficult to make interview appointments with
some retired government officials. They or their family members were not
very willing to meet me, suspecting I was sent by the central government to
hold a legal investigation. Therefore several interviews were refused. Their
family members explained that the person I was looking for, was not an active
official anymore, and asked me to contact the active officials instead.
High-ranking employees of the companies were the most difficult persons
to reach during the research. I sent official letters twice asking for an interview
but neither was answered. As an alternative I held informal interviews with
some of the company’s middle and lower-ranking employees. I had met them
before during some seminars and conferences. They were willing to be inter-
viewed on the condition that I would not disclose their identity.
Meanwhile, it seemed that the lawyers were pleased to be interviewed as
they expected their office names to be quoted in a book written abroad. They
therefore did not mind if I copied the relevant legal documents I needed,
something that they may not have done, if I had been a student at an
Indonesian university.
When arranging the interviews with the Kutai District government officials
I was not necessarily intent on interviewing the officials, who were at the top
of the decision making processes in their respective agencies. Given my
research does not focus on top-level decision making processes, I actually
needed interviewees who had adequate knowledge of matters of my interest.
It was a fact that some or even most of the District Agency Heads or Heads
of Divisions of the Agencies knew little about their office regulations and
policies. This was mainly due to the unstable condition of the Kutai District
government during the period 2006-2011. In that period, many high-ranking
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officials were frequently replaced due to political favouritism. Lower staff was
therefore the only group that had useful knowledge for they had been working
in their respective offices for a longer period of time.
1.4.3 Observation
As said, I conducted a non-participatory observation for this research. I used
two methods. Firstly, I observed what the officials did routinely during office
hours. Secondly, I took part in the implementation process of some programs
and out-of-office hour activities.
From observing the daily routine of the officials, I learned firstly and
foremostly much about the working environment of some agency offices. Due
to the fact that the Kutai District government is overstaffed, too many
employees work in one room, leading to an overcrowded office space. The
officials whom I interviewed were sometimes uncomfortable answering my
questions because their colleagues and superiors could hear them. Therefore,
when necessary, I encouraged them to have conversations outside their offices.
A situational factor that helped me was the fact that many agency officials
did not have a chair, which made it easier to approach them. Some of them
stayed in the rooms, and occupied themselves with activities that were not
related to their job. Others were standing or sitting at the corridors of the
offices during office hour. This situation enabled me to easily approach them
and have conversations, as they were not on duty.
Meanwhile, my observations in two sub-district offices provided me with
another view of the bureaucratic environment. At least two realities I can share:
how the sub-district officials provided daily administrative services to various
resource users, and how the sub-district officials who did not have a back-
ground in law dealt with legal matters. Concerning the first reality, I witnessed
how the sub-district officials, who dealt with issuing legalization letters to
resource users, were not aware of the formal signatory procedures. One day
in March 2009, I came across an official, who was in charge of a land matter,
and was under a lot of pressure, because some people were demanding to
receive the sub-district secretary’s signature immediately. The reason for doing
so was that if the newly appointed sub-district head were inaugurated they
might not be able to get the signatures from the new sub-district head so easily.
This put the official in a difficult position, because on one hand she knew that
the signature of the sub-district secretary did not have a strong legal basis,
but on the other hand she did not want to disappoint the people.
With regard to the second reality of the sub-district bureaucracy, I found
how an official with an educational background in agriculture tried to master
law. She bought some books on land legislation for self-study. During the
interview I found she had misunderstood some provisions of the land legis-
lation. I did not correct her, for I knew that it could influence the way she
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was thinking. At the same time, I found myself in a dilemma. Whilst I did
not want to have my research influenced by changing the mind of an inter-
viewee, I also knew that correcting her at an early stage could help improve
the services to the public. I finally decided to point her to the correct legal
provisions, but only after my fieldwork was nearing the last stage.
The second form of observation consisted of various activities. I joined
several field officials’ village visits. My opportunity to become more involved
in the agency’s official activities grew, when I informally assisted the Kutai
District Land Bureau in setting up some policy development. Apart from my
involvement in their official activities, I also joined them informally in the
canteens and played cards with them in the office’s back rooms. These settings
gave me the opportunity to get information that maybe they would hesitate
to tell me in the office rooms or during office hours.
1.5 DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH
This research formed part of an extensive research project called the ‘East
Kalimantan Program’ (EKP). The original title of the EKP is ‘Linking Forests
with Marine Systems: Investigating Developmental, Biological, Legal and
Economic Ties across Scales in East Kalimantan’. The main title was later
divided into several sub-titles and my research falls under the sub-title ‘Stake-
holder Interests and the Potential for Sustainable Coastal Management through
Rights Regulation Practices in the Context of Decentralization in the Mahakam
Delta, East Kalimantan’.
The EKP was a joint collaboration between a number of Dutch universities
and Indonesian universities and government institutions. The researchers
involved came from various educational backgrounds due to the interdisciplin-
ary nature of the research. Most researchers involved in the EKP studied natural
sciences, namely biology, geology, hydrology and engineering. Thus, legal
and social aspects formed only a small part of the EKP. My specific sub-project
involved one post-doc researcher and one PhD researcher.
The different members of the EKP were keen on applying an interdisciplin-
ary approach. Regular internal meetings and conferences were held in which
the various researchers presented their findings. By learning about the findings
of other disciplines, the researchers were expected to seek the link between
their own research and that of others, either within the natural sciences or
between the natural sciences and socio-legal sciences. To some extent this has
been successful, at least in the form of being able to use findings from other
pieces of research as supporting data.
Another effort to apply the interdisciplinary approach was to prepare a
synthesis report of the EKP where the major research findings of two clusters
of this project namely the Mahakam Cluster and Berau Cluster, were combined
into one report. The main idea of making the synthesis report was to formulate
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a future scenario for the management of the two deltas from an interdisciplin-
ary point of view. From a substantive point of view, the synthesis was aimed
at making comparisons and finding interconnectedness between the two deltas.
For this purpose, I undertook nine days of fieldwork in Berau, as did the post-
doc researcher. I have not included the findings from the fieldwork in Berau
in this book for it was originally intended for the synthesis. More importantly,
it would be methodologically incorrect seeing that I spent far more time in
Mahakam (one and half years) than in Berau (nine days), making it impossible
to compare the fieldwork and the results on an equal footing.
As said, this PhD research was originally a joint research project with a
post-doc researcher. Within the framework, a division of focus was set up.
The post-doc, a social anthropologist, was to focus on local tenure arrange-
ments, whereas I myself being a jurist would focus on state tenure arrange-
ments. To maintain collaboration, periodic meetings between the two of us
were planned. We envisaged that the meetings would take place somewhere
in between our two work spaces between the village and the city: at one
particular coffee shop (Ind. warung kopi) in the sub-district. That we would
meet at a coffee shop is mentioned not only to indicate the division of focus
but also because the coffee shop symbolizes where our research meets. Some
of the data used in this book therefore originates from the coffee shop
meetings.
1.6 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH
On many occasions where I had the opportunity to present the preliminary
findings of this research, it was suggested to me to also pay sufficient attention
to the accounts of local resource use. I would have liked to respond to these
suggestions, yet due to the division of focus I already described, this book
will not discuss local resource use much. Thus the extent to which I have
included accounts of local resource use is mainly limited to what I gathered
from government officials. More extensive accounts of local resource use are
expected to be available in the works of the post-doc researcher.
In describing law-making, this book focuses on the processes that took
place within the district bureaucracy. Very little is said about the processes
in which the district parliament was involved. Therefore, the number of local
members of parliament who were interviewed is small: in a book focusing
on the bureaucracy, there is less need for accounts about the legislative and
judicial institutions.
There are three sub-districts in the Mahakam Delta, as other reports and
publications suggest (see Section 2.1). However, due to time constraints, this
research only focuses on two of the three sub-districts, i.e. Anggana and Muara
Badak. In terms of distance, the two selected sub-districts are closer to Sama-
rinda, the Province’s capital city, where I mostly stayed during my field work.
24 Chapter 1
1.7 OUTLINE
The chapters of book can be divided up in three main parts. The first part
consists of the chapters in which I mostly describe my fieldwork findings
(Chapter 5-9). The second part is mostly based on the documents and literature
I collected (Chapter 1-4). In the third part I analyse the data which have been
described in the previous chapters (Chapter 10). The topic and content of each
chapter is briefly outlined below.
As an introductory chapter, Chapter 1 explains why this research is sig-
nificant (1.1), the research questions (1.2) and the conceptual background for
the analysis of my findings (1.3). The remaining parts of the chapter concern
methodology, the research obstacles, issues of access, strategy and forms of
collaboration when the research took place (1.4 and 1.5). In relation to the
applied methodology, this chapter also lists the limitations of this research
(1.6).
Chapter 2 is about the setting and environment of my research, including
the geography (2.1), ecology (2.2), human settlements (2.3), social structures
(2.4), livelihood (2.5), stakeholders (2.6) and policy problems (2.7).
Chapter 3 and 4 function as background chapters. Chapter 3 provides a
historical background whereas Chapter 4 gives a legal and administrative
background. The focus of Chapter 3 is the history of state intervention in
resource use in three historical periods, namely 1945-1970 (3.1), 1970-1998 (3.2)
and 1998-present (3.3). Meanwhile, Chapter 4 provides an account of govern-
mental structures in Indonesia, both horizontally (4.1) and vertically (4.2), and
of the legislative system (4.3).
As said Chapter 5-9 provide extensive accounts of the field findings. In
general, the five chapters contain the following sections: (i) law-making pro-
cesses and main legal provisions, (ii) implementation of law, (iii) legal prob-
lems, and (iv) interactions between state and resource users. The sections on
law-making processes portray how national legislation on forest delineation
(5.2; 6.2), local regulations on fisheries (7.2), land (8.2) and spatial planning
(9.2) were made. The sections on the main legal provisions (5.2; 6.2; 7.2; 8.2)
chiefly describe government institutions or officials who are authorized to issue
rights or permits, terms and conditions to obtain the rights or permits, rights
and obligations of the right- or permit-holders and how to exercise the rights
or permits. In addition to the provisions, the section describes a number of
government institutions that were formed to implement and enforce the formal
rules. The legal provisions encompass local, regional and national legislation.
The sections on the implementation of law (5.3; 6.4; 7.3; 8.4; 9.3) focus on
some areas, where the implementation of law has been effective or not. They
further point to prominent factors that have hampered effective implementa-
tion. The sections on the interaction between state and resource user (5.5; 7.5)
zoom in on the actual reality of the implementation of law, whereby one can
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see that field officials frequently made direct contact with the local resource
users.
Meanwhile, the sections on legal problems (5.4; 6.3; 7.4; 8.3; 9.4) examine
the appearance of incoherence and inconsistency in the formal rules in the
respective sectors, which consequently had an effect on the way in which the
law was implemented. They also assess its impact on the legal certainty of
the resource users.
Chapter 10 systematizes the legal problems and factors that have influenced
the law-making processes and the implementation of law. Concerning the legal
problems, the chapter examines the extent to which laws and regulations are
inconsistent and incoherent (10.1). Meanwhile, in assessing why and how actors
were involved in law-making, the chapter suggests three areas of focus (10.2).
Factors that are internal and external to administrative institutions are recalled
to explain why the regional and local government officials did not effectively
implement the formal rules and at the same time provided legitimacy to the
actual resource users (10.3). By way of conclusion, the final section of the
chapter presents a conceptual recommendation to improve the management
of the Mahakam Delta, namely that the actual implementation of law needs
to be taken into account during all phases of the policy process (10.4).

2 The setting
This chapter deals with the various settings in which the different forms of
resource use discussed in this book took place and where state jurisdiction
was exercised. The settings concern geography, ecology, social structure,
livelihood and policy. This book argues that the settings have directly or
indirectly influenced the making and the implementation of laws and regula-
tions concerning natural resources use in the Mahakam Delta. Conversely,
the laws and regulations have also impacted those settings.
2.1 GEOGRAPHY: AN INACCESSIBLE AREA
Due to its geographical location and formation, the Delta is not an easy place
to reach. It is a remote area indeed. The Delta is located at the mouth of
Mahakam River, in the eastern part of Borneo Island (see Map 2.1). The Delta
is in front of the Makassar Strait, which separates the two islands Borneo and
Sulawesi. The Delta itself comprises of a chain of 92 small islands (totalling
1,000 km²), in addition to three main tributary rivers and dozens of connecting
rivers (Bapedalda Kukar and PKSPL IPB 2002, p. III-1 and 3).
Map 2.1: Mahakam Delta with research location indicated
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None of the 92 small islands can be reached by road; the only way to reach
them is by boat. To reach and leave the Delta, most of the Delta villagers use
a small boat for four to five people locally named dompeng and ketinting/ces.
A few of the residents as well as non-residents use privately rented boats.
Thus, there is no public sea transportation that the government provides.
Likewise, there are no public river ports that the government has built in the
Delta (Bappeda Kutai Kartanegara 2010, p. 58).1 The three main villages of
the Delta are approximately two hours away by speedboat from Anggana,
the capital city of Anggana sub-district, three hours away from the Provincial
capital Samarinda, and four hours by car and boat from Tenggarong, the
capital of Kutai District. The trip can take longer if made by a small boat such
as a dompeng or ketinting. Yet it can be faster if a large speed boat (called
sea-truck) is used, which is common for the employees of Total E&P Indonesie,
the gas and petroleum company which has been operating many production
units in the Delta. The rental price for a one way trip on the speedboat is
approximately US$ 390-490.
It is only Muara Pantuan and Tani Baru that have been connected by a
wooden road. Therefore, to travel around the islands, the villagers mostly use
the dompeng and ketinting. Dompeng and ketinting are both motor boats with
an engine size of 13-24 and 5-12 horsepower respectively. Actually, most of
the time, the villagers use the dompeng and ketinting for fishing. There is
hardly a household in the Delta that does not have a dompeng or ketinting
(Lenggono 2004, p. 136).2
The story about the remoteness and inaccessibility of the Mahakam Delta
has long been known, for it has been used many times as a hiding place by
pirates, independence fighters and fundamentalist Islamic activists. In the
course of the Sultanate period (late 15th century-1844) and the Dutch admin-
istration (1844-1942), pirates had hidden or taken a rest in the Delta before
they raided the ships which were loaded with exported forest products and
imported goods (Magenda 1991, Peluso 1987, Knapen 2001). In independent
Indonesia, during the period of the Revolutionary War (1945-1949), some
nationalist fighters had hidden away in the Delta to escape the Dutch army
(Magenda 1991). More recently, in the Reformation era, two allegedly funda-
mentalist Islamic activists hid in the Delta before an Indonesian anti-terrorism
special force finally discovered them in Tanjung Berukang, Sepatin village
in November 2002.3 Lately, some immigrants from South Sulawesi who were
1 A recent draft of the District’s development planning reveals that water transportation is
still an important means of transportation in the District, for only small parts of its areas
are otherwise accessible. Since founded in 1957 up to present, the District has had eight
public river ports and no public sea ports. Meanwhile, oil and gas companies have built
five sea ports for private use. See Bappeda Kutai Kartanegara (2010, p. 58-59).
2 A 2003 survey shows that 77.5% of the residents of the three villages of the Delta had a
dompeng, while 15.5% had a ketinting. See Rachmawati (2003, p. 48).
3 ‘Imron Akui Terlibat Bom Bali’, Suara Pembaruan daily 14/1/2002.
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sought for crimes, such as gambling and drugs, moved to the Delta to hide
away from a police investigation.
2.2 ECOLOGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
The ecological formation of the Delta is highly determined by the mangrove
ecosystem. The ecosystem has subsequently determined the existence of various
flora and fauna. The dominant vegetation of the Delta consists of trees that
are associated with mangrove. The three most common trees are bakau (rhizo-
phora), nypa (nypa fruticans) and api-api (avicennia). The nypa appears most
frequently, covering approximately 60,000 ha and thereby making it one of
the largest nypa-growing areas in the world (Dutrieux in Kusumastanto 2001,
p. 63).
Being predominantly a mangrove ecosystem, the Delta is a favourite place
for various fish species to feed, spawn and nurse. The mangrove provides the
fish with abundant nutrition. The calm of the waters and the shade cast by
the leaves of the mangrove trees furthermore make it a suitable place for
spawning and nursing the young (Soetrisno 2007, p. 24-25). Not only is the
Delta a favourite place for the fish, some mammals too take advantage of the
abundance of the Delta. One of these is the ‘proboscis monkey’ (nasalis larvatus),
an endemic species. The ‘proboscis monkey’ lives of the leaves of the bakau
and api-api (Alikodra et al. in Soendjoto et al. 2006, p. 35).
Meanwhile, the geological development of the Delta has allowed for the
existence of fossil fuels. Scientists widely believe that the oil and gas reserves
in the Delta do not originate from the sea, but that they were formed by
sedimentation flowing downstream (Tokita et al. 2005). In addition, the tidal
nature of the Makassar Strait also contributed to the content of the reserve.
Due to this ecological formation, the Delta has a large biodiversity on one
hand and rich natural resources on the other. Traditionally, the two most
prominent valuable natural resources of the Delta are fish and petroleum. In
terms of biodiversity, the Delta has 129 species of fish (Sandjatmiko 2005,
p. 54).
Besides providing valuable resources and biodiversity, the ecosystem of
the Delta also has a basic ecological function. The Delta protects the environ-
ment from destruction by for example abrasion, sedimentation, sea water
intrusion and pollution (Aspar in Kusumastanto et al. 2001, p. 28, Husein 2006).
The way the mangrove ecosystem offers protection is by managing the effects
of the tide and predators for a multitude of fauna that find the mangrove a
very suitable reproduction area (Bourgeois et al. 2002: 23).
However, over the last fourteen years, the basic ecological function of the
Delta’s mangrove forest has been tested due to major environmental changes
resulting from large-scale and destructive natural resources use. It has re-
peatedly been suggested that deforestation namely the conversion of mangrove
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forest into particular uses is the main cause of environmental destruction in
the Delta (Bapedalda Kutai Kartanegara and PKSPL IPB 2002, p. III-46; Bourgeois
et al 2002, p. 2; Lembaga Afiliasi Penelitian dan Industri (LAPI) ITB and Bappeda
Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara 2003, p. IV-10; Noryadi et al. 2006, p. 23).
Deforestation has caused other forms of environmental destruction, such as
abrasion, water intrusion, depleted fishery resources and reduced biodiversity.
In most cases where the mangrove forest has been converted – as suggested
by bureaucrats, academics, politicians and NGO activists – the purpose was
to build shrimp ponds. Some suggest that new settlements and the installation
of pipes and other facilities by the oil and gas companies might have been
other reasons to convert the forest (LAPI ITB and Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai
Kartanegara 2003, p. IV-5; Hidayati 2004, p. 98; Syafrudin 2005, p. 17 and 18).
The latter have allegedly caused water pollution (Dinas Perikanan dan Kela-
utan Kutai Kartanegara 2007c, p. 8).
Finding reliable data concerning the scale of mangrove conversion into
shrimp ponds is not easy, as the figures vary according to how the satellite
imagery is interpreted. However, in general it can be observed that deforesta-
tion has increased considerably over the last decade (Sidik 2009). Moreover,
some researchers in the early 2000s presented useful figures in this regard.
According to Dutrieux (2001, p. 63-64), in the early 1980s, the entire Delta was
covered by extremely dense vegetation, composed of different mangrove
species. In 1992, as a result of the initial emergence of large-scale shrimp ponds,
deforestation began with 3,700 ha of deforested area in 1992. Within three
years, in 1996 the figure reached 15,000 hectares. As the price of exporting
shrimp rocketed due to devaluation of the Indonesian currency against the
US$ during the Asian financial crisis, it triggered a more massive opening of
new shrimp ponds resulting in 67,000 ha deforested area in 1999. Deforestation
peaked in 2001, when it reached 85,000 hectares (Duitrieux 2001, p. 64).4
As mentioned, the deforestation was followed by abrasion, water intrusion,
depleting fishery resources and reduced biodiversity. The best indicator of
the water intrusion is the extent to which upstream cities like Samarinda and
Tenggarong have had water intrusion especially during the dry season. When
the water has reached the two cities then drinking water supply emerged (Sidik
4 In 2002, a Total E&P sponsored research report reiterated the above figures (Bourgeois et
al. 2002, p. 28-31). These figures have also been widely used by various stakeholders of
the Delta including the regional and local government. Some regional government-funded
research reports, government planning documents as well as multi-stakeholder official
documents repeatedly quote these figures. For instance see Bapedalda Kutai Kartanegara
and PKSPL IPB (2002, p. III-46), LAPI ITB and Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara (2003,
p. IV-10), Tim Sosialisasi Kawasan Delta Mahakam (2008, p. 7), UNDP (2009, p. 4-5), and
Bengen et al. (2011, p. 17). Recent figures of the scale of the conversion are contested. Some
say conversion is still continuing and has reached 90,000 ha (Bengen et al. 2011, p. 17),
whereas others say the areas have been naturally reforested, as many shrimp farmers have
abandoned their shimp ponds due to decreasing productivity. For the latter observation
see Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara (2007c).
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2009, p. 5). Abrasion can lead to sedimentation on the bottom of river basin.
In the last decade, there has been ten times as much abrasion as in the previous
decade (UNDP 2009, p. 5). At the same time, during high tide, local people were
affected as some settlement areas, shrimp ponds and sport fields were flooded.
Deforestation also causes a depletion of the fishery resources and reduction
of the biodiversity. Once the mangrove ecosystem disappears the fish lose their
favourite spawning and nursery grounds. In association with the depleting
fishery resources, there is a significant reduction of biodiversity, which is
especially catastrophic for endangered species such as ‘proboscis monkey’
(Sandjatmiko et al. 2005; Bengen et al. 2011).
The other environmental destruction that the local people often complained
about is soil and water pollution which decreases the productivity of the
shrimp ponds. In the period 1996-1999, when pond productivity peaked, a
one-hectare pond could yield 20-40kg of tiger shrimp and 600kg of wild shrimp
and crab (Bourgeois et al. 2002, p. 65). One study even stated that a one-hectare
pond could yield up to 200-1,000kg of tiger shrimp (Dinas Perikanan dan
Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara 2008c, p. 25-26). More recently, productivity has
fallen to only 21,5kg/ha and 24,5kg/ha of tiger shrimp and wild shrimp
respectively (Noryadi et al. 2006). Regarding the cause of the decreasing
productivity, while company employees, bureaucrats and academics believe
that white spot disease (see footnote 8) caused the decrease, the shrimp farmers
suspected that oil spillage from the oil and gas extraction caused the pollution
(Aspar 2001, p. 28).
2.3 HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
The history of human settlement in the Delta is closely related to the history
of war and the economy, which are the two main factors that have motivated
people to move to and settle in the Delta. In relation to war, migration to the
Delta was an effort to escape conditions at home (Vayda and Sahur 1985, p.
94; Vayda and Sahur 1996, p. 9). Particularly the Bone War (1859-1860) and
the Banjarmasin War (1859-1863) led to migration to the Delta and to East
Kalimantan at large.
Despite the fact that traders had for long sailed along the tributary rivers
of the Delta (Peluso 1987, Magenda 1991, Linblad 1985, 1988, Zwager 1996),
none of them had established any settlement there. The main reason was
because they feared the pirates who had been actively operating across the
Mahakam Strait before the Dutch colonial government pacified them by the
nineteenth century (Black 1985, p. 281; Peluso 1987, Magenda 1991).5 Therefore,
5 For a further account of how pirates existed along the Makassar Strait see Zwager (1996)
and for how they existed in South-East Kalimantan in particular see Knapen (2001).
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the first people who braved to settle in the Delta were Bajau people.6 It
occurred some time in the early nineteenth century. It is important to note
that during the Sultanate and colonial period, Bajau people were often asso-
ciated with pirates (Healey 1985, p. 3). However, the first settlement was inland
in order to avoid raids from the pirates (Levang 2002, p. 4).7
The second wave of migration to the Delta occurred in late nineteenth
century when a group of Bugis people migrated from the Pasir district due
to the Dutch army carrying out an attack on the Pasir Sultanate. This group
did not start a new settlement and joined the Bajau people in the two already
existing settled areas. New settlements were established when the Bajau and
Bugis people in the Delta moved to places nearer to the sea. These waves of
migration took place before the Second World War. Apart from the fact that
the coastal area was now safer due to the pacification of the pirates by the
Dutch, the main reason for the move was an epidemic of smallpox. The two
new settlements they established later became the largest villages in the Delta,
called Sepatin and Muara Pantuan. In the 1940s, other people trekked further
south which eventually resulted in a new village, called Tani Baru.
The next settlers in the Delta hardly established new settlements but joined
the existing settlements, even though they came in large groups. In the late
1950s, a large wave of migrants, mostly Makassar people, came to the Delta,
escaping the Indonesian army which hunted anyone who was alleged to be
a supporter of the Kahar Muzakar rebellion. In the Delta, they mostly moved
into the hamlets of Sepatin and Muara Pantuan. Sometime in this period, a
small group of Banjar fishermen coming from up-stream of the Mahakam river
also moved to Sepatin, and established a new hamlet called Sungai Banjar.
Meanwhile, the establishment of settlements also occurred on the Kutai
mainland, such as in Salo Palai and Saliki villages. Settlement on the Kutai
mainland took place later than on the coastal Delta (i.e. the islands), namely
in the early twentieth century (Levang 2002:4). Besides the Bugis people, Banjar
people were also involved in the settlement. The latter moved to the Delta
due to the Banjarmasin War in the nineteenth century (Magenda 1991, p. 3;
Knapen 2001). Settlement in the mainland further occurred in the 1950s when
some Makkasarese from South Sulawesi and Banjarese from South Kalimantan
6 Bajau or Bajo people are considered as the earlier inhabitants of the major coastal areas
of East Kalimantan before the arrival of the Buginese. In this period, Bajo people had an
important role as link between the Chinese traders and indigenous population of East
Kalimantan. Apart from that role, Bajo people were also known as pirates, which explains
why the Kutai Sultan had asked help from the Buginese in order to control the Bajo people.
As the attempt was successful, people started to associate Bajo people with a bad character.
As a result Bajo people gradually started to hide their cultural identity and indentify
themselves as Buginese. In the Mahakam Delta, they sometimes call themselves Bugis-Bajo
Wijaya (N.d., b).
7 The first settlements were located in Pemangkaran and Mangkubur. Both are currently
under the administration of Sepatin village.
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moved to the Delta in order to avoid the chase of respective Kahar Muzakar
and Ibnu Hazar followers.
Settlements in or migrations to the Delta as of the New Order regime (1965-
1998) up to the present have almost all been driven by economic reasons.
Lenggono (2004) states that the reason for the migrants to move to the Delta
in this period is to pursue a better life. In addition, in terms of ethnic back-
ground, the migrants during this period are more diverse for the group also
includes Javanese people. Yet, in terms of place, the migrants in this period
have not actually discovered new places, but rather reside in already existing
settlements. Some are temporary settlers, as they originate from nearby districts
and sub-districts so they regularly return to where they came from in the first
place.
The heavily economic-oriented migrations commenced in the late 1960s
(1968-1970). Most people from South Sulawesi, mostly from Bone and Wajo,
moved to East Kalimantan hoping to be able to find employment in non-
mechanized timber extraction, popularly named as banjir kap. Their relatives
who lived in the Delta encouraged them to come to East Kalimantan arguing
that there were ample job opportunities in timber extraction (Vayda and Sahur
1996, p. 9). However, after the timber extraction came to an end in 1970 when
the national government introduced a centralized timber management policy,
the migrants who previously worked in the timber extraction chose to stay
in the Delta instead of returning to South Sulawesi.
Not long after the banjir kap ended, other migrants from South Sulawesi
and Java came to the Delta to pursue two types of labour opportunities. Firstly,
a job with an oil and gas company. Given the migrants were mostly unskilled,
the companies offered them a position as surveyor, speedboat driver or security
guard. The two oil and gas companies commenced their operations in 1972
and 1973 respectively. Secondly a job as a fisherman for one of the two cold
storage facilities , which were established in 1974 and 1975. The two cold
storage facilities needed more fishermen who would catch fish and sell it to
them through local Buginese leaders, the punggawas. About the extent to which
the companies impacted the population size in the Delta, Levang (2002) says:
Until the beginning of the 1970s population in the Delta was scarce. Everything
was to change with the start of oil exploration and production.
The Delta continued to attract migrants through to 1997 and 1998. In this
period Indonesia was hit by the Asian financial crisis which dramatically
weakened the value of the Indonesian currency against the US dollar. The crisis
caused a steep price hike of all Indonesian export products including shrimps.
The rise in prices made some villagers rich, and their stories spread across
South Sulawesi. Apart from the success stories in that period, some shrimp
ponds in South Sulawesi were suffering from a massive white spot disease
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which Java had experienced earlier (Bailey 1988, Bailey 1997, Jhamtani 2003).8
The attraction that the Delta offered this time was stronger than before; the
migrants did not only originate from South Sulawesi but also from nearby
districts of the mainland. The migrations also included many temporary
workers originating from East Java.
2.4 SOCIAL STRUCTURE
In the seventeenth century, La Ma’dukelleng, Prince (Arung) of Singkang, led
a number of Buginese, wishing to escape the Bone War, to flee to East Kali-
mantan. The Kutai Sultan pleasantly welcomed them and granted them a place
to settle. In their new homeland, East Kalimantan, they pleaded (Ind. ber-
sumpah) to move away from a stratified or socially ranked society as they had
formerly practiced in their homeland. As a result they expected to apply a
new system, in which each person would be of equal social status (Ind. sama
rendah).9
Unfortunately, the dream never came true. As several studies point out,
instead of moving away from the stratified social system, the Bugis migrants
across Indonesia in fact continued this system. The stratified system here
mentioned is one based on a patron-client relationship, called punggawa-sawi
or loosely understood as a leader-follower system.10 Yet, according to Pelras
(1996), the original patron-client system has been adapted from a historical
political to an economic relationship. The adapted patron-client system is
characterized by ties where the patron ensures that the basic life needs for
the client are provided, while the client ensures the supply of labour (Vayda
and Sahur 1996, p. 15). However, despite the fact that the present punggawa-
sawi system has been influenced by modern capitalism it is not purely a
capitalistic mode of production given the system developed a level of reci-
procity and charity between patron and client, as Lenggono (2004, p. 133;
Lenggono 2011, p. 307) points out. This is exactly what currently occurs in
the Mahakam Delta.
Despite the fact that the patron-client system in the Delta started to lack
social cohesion, and became more secular and individualistic, the punggawas
have taken over some of the state roles e.q. as service provider. This makes
the system considerably influential. According to Powell and Osbeck (2010,
p. 8), in the absence of governmental and social services, the patron-client
8 White spot disease (ichthyophthirius multifiliis) also known as Ich, is a parasite that most
tropical fish will at one time or another have to deal with. These parasites can be fatal to
a fish and getting rid of them takes persistence (see at http://www.wikihow.com/Treat-
Tropical-Fish-With-White-Spot-Disease-(ich), accessed on 7/10/2011).
9 See Magenda (1991) and Levang (2002, p. 23).
10 For an account of how elementary the Bugis’ patron-client ties are in their homeland see
Pelras (1996), and for Bugis abroad see Acciaioli (1989), and Vayda and Sahur (1996).
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system has become an important institution in the daily life of fishermen and
shrimp farmers. Within the system, rather than acting narrowly as an em-
ployer, the punggawas also act as wholesale traders, service providers and
dispute settlers (Levang 2002, Lenggono 2004, Timmer 2010, p. 707). Indeed,
the main role of the punggawas in the Delta is as money lender and/or trader.
They lend money to poor people (fishermen, shrimp farmers) to enable them
to engage in fishing and hold aquaculture. In the case of aquaculture, usually
the punggawas provide their own land to be cultivated by the workers. It is
widely known that the punggawas have large parcels of land.11
Yet in other cases, the punggawas do not only provide land, but also vessels
and seeds, and meals before the first harvest. In return, the fishermen and
farmers sell their catch or harvest to the punggawas until the loan is completely
repaid (Lenggono 2004, p. 218). Not only do the punggawas provide money
for operational purposes, but also for house repairs, medical and school fees
and ceremonial obligations (Timmer 2010, p. 707).
Nevertheless, economic dependence is not the only pillar that underpins
the leader-follower system. There are also two social pillars that support the
system, namely kinship ties and the social status of haji – having made a
pilgrimage to Mecca. The punggawas can easily ask their relatives from South
Sulawesi or elsewhere in East Kalimantan to work for them due to their social
status. From their relatives’ point of view, the punggawas are respected people
due to their economic achievements. The fact that almost all punggawas have
a haji-title, further increases their social prestige. For a commoner Bugis, a haji-
title endowes social status rather than religious status, because the title in-
dicates that someone is economically capable (Wijaya n.d.a).
Having such important economic and social position, it is inevitable that
the punggawas further influence the running of the village affairs, as Lenggono
(2004, p. 117) points out:
[…] as leaders who have many followers, the punggawas have quite strong in-
fluences, and they are also taken into account in village policy making.
As mentioned before, some followers even involved their punggawas in settling
a dispute with a company. Actually, the participation of the punggawas in
dispute settlement is to ensure that their followers will repay part or all of
their debts. Yet, whatever the reason behind the support, in most cases when
a punggawa is involved in a particular dispute, he is the one who shapes the
11 Even though no study mentions the exact size of all land owned by the punggawas, some
studies indicate that there is a concentrated land ownership in the Mahakam Delta. Accord-
ing to Bourgeois et al. (2002, p. 37) some people have a thousand hectares. A fisherman
who used to be the head of a neighbourhood of Sepatin village confirmed the finding by
pointing at a punggawa, who held almost a thousand hectares of land. The area is consti-
tuted by fifty ponds, which all are located in Sepatin village. Interview J, the head of Benati
neigbourhood of Sepatin village, 22/2/2010.
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followers’ ideas. Therefore, the companies will prefer to listen to the punggawas
rather than the village government official. A recent case on compensation
in Muara Pantuan shows the strong influence of a punggawa. In favour of the
company, the village head urged for the 300 fishermen to accept the compensa-
tion that the company offered, but most fishermen refused the offer as they
were bound by the punggawa’s decision to claim a higher compensation than
the company offered.
In spite of its considerable role, the patron-client system is actually not
the only factor that influences the social structure. Social classification based
on the period of settlement, and/or profession is another factor that influences
the system. The earlier migrants regard themselves as bugis kalimantan or orang
asli (native people) while they perceive the later migrants as bugis sulawesi or
pendatang (Wijaya n.d.a). Meanwhile, those who work at the oil and gas
company are socially more respectable than the fishermen or pond workers.
Meanwhile, the migrant occupants possess more land than the native occupants
as the latter have sold most of their land to the migrant occupants. The native-
migrant divide always becomes manifest during the election of the village
head. Apart from the Bugis people, there are also thousands of Javanese people
who work as labourers for the Bugis people. Most of them live in the Delta
temporarily.
2.5 ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND LOCAL LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES
The economic activities and local livelihood strategies of the people living in
the Mahakam Delta reflect the situation in the Province and the District on
a small scale. As is the case in the Province and District, the abundance of
natural resources influences the nature of economic activities and livelihood
strategies of the Delta inhabitants to a great extent.
As mentioned before, the Mahakam Delta is rich in oil, gas and fish. Oil
and gas alone contribute significantly to both national and local revenue.
Recent figures show that Total E&P Indonesie and Vico, who operate in the
Delta area, are jointly responsible for 43% of the total gas production in Indo-
nesia and that Total E&P Indonesie also contributes 9% to Indonesian oil
production (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2010, p. 10-11). In the last five years,
the Province has been responsible for around 31% of Indonesia’s annual GDP
and the majority of it originated from oil and gas revenues.12 In fact, the
Province ranked among the top three in terms of revenue from oil and gas
in the country (Ahmad and Mansoor 2002). Even though only around 5% of
the revenue was sent back to the Province in the form of shared revenue, this




Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah abbrev. APBD).13 Shared revenue from oil and
gas features even more prominently in the District annual budget. On average,
shared revenue forms 70% of the total annual revenue. For instance, in the
District 2011 budget, the shared revenue added up to US$ 340 million out of
the total annual revenue of US$ 410 million.14 As a result Kutai District is
dependent on revenues from oil and gas extraction especially since revenues
from forest extraction have started to gradually decline.
The vast amounts of shared revenue do not necessarily benefit the Delta
people, yet, as Levang points out, the presence of oil and gas extraction pro-
vides economic opportunities to the people.15 As most of the villagers are
unskilled, they cannot work as managers, supervisors or technicians. However,
some of them work as operators. More importantly, the way the local people
have benefited most from the companies is by trading basic goods and services
with the companies’ salaried workers (Levang 2002, p. 7). Many studies con-
cerning the sources of economic income or occupation of the people of the
Delta show that apart from fishing and aquaculture, trade is another major
occupation and source of economic income as well.16
Recently, due to the massive decline of shrimp pond productivity since
2002, many aquaculture farmers have deliberately generated disputes with
the companies accusing them of pollution and hoping that the companies
would pay compensation for the loss of shrimps (Bourgeois et al. 2002, Timmer
2010, Simarmata 2011, p. 177-196). Another way to deal with the declined pond
productivity is the recent selling of land by pond owners to absent land owners
who live in nearby towns or even in other parts of Indonesia (Bosma et al.
n.d, p. 11).
Meanwhile, even though the revenue in terms of numbers of fishery and
shrimp cultivation is not as large as the revenue of oil and gas extraction, this
13 Shared revenue has been an issue of discussion for both the Provincial and District govern-
ments as well as for civil society groups. These groups demand that the central government
increases the share to at least 10%. For recent discussions concerning this issue as recorded
in the local media see ‘Kepala Daerah Diajak Judicial Review ke MK. Vico: Kaltim Idealnya
Dapat Bagi Hasil 50%, Kaltim Post daily, 6/1/2011, and ‘Kaltim tak Minta Otonomi Khusus.
Gubernur Kaltim Singgung Minimya Dana Pusat’, Kaltim Post daily 17/1/2011.
14 See ‘APBD Kukar 2011 Didominasi Dana Perimbangan’, Kaltim Post daily 6/1/2011. For
the dominant role of oil and gas in the District’s economy before fragmentation (pemekaran)
in 1999, see Casson (2001, p. 9-10).
15 One reason why the people living in the Delta do not benefit from the shared revenue is
because the sub-districts near the Delta receive a smaller share of the revenues as distributed
by the Kutai District government than other sub-districts, especially those that are situated
nearby the District capital. For instance in 2011, Anggana and Muara Jawa sub-districts
received a share of only around $US 12 and 1 million respectively. See ‘Warga Muara Jawa
Blokade Jalan Protes Infrastruktur Jelek, Minim Alokasi APBD, and ‘Anggana Minta ‘Mahar’
206 M Konsekuensi Tak Bergabung untuk Kutai Pesisir, in Kaltim Post daily, 10/1/2011
and 18/2/2011.
16 Examples of these studies are Bourgeois et al. (2002); Hidayati et al. (2004) and Sandjatmiko
et al. (2005).
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sector has attracted most of the people to the Delta.17 Many studies have
pointed to the prominence of the occupations of fishermen and aquaculture
workers in the Delta.18 In Anggana sub-district for instance, most of which
is situated in the Delta, 50% of its total population work as fishermen and
aquaculture farmers (Bosma et al. n.d., p. 6, Bapedalda Kukar and PKSPL IPB
2002, p. III-48). Yet, the fishermen too have their disputes with the companies.
They have seen the amount of fish decline due to the use of destructive equip-
ment. From the dispute settlements they expected to receive compensation
from the companies whom they accused of ruining the fishing nets or disabling
them from fishing in particular areas.
Nevertheless, fossil fuels, fish and shrimps are not the only resources of
the Delta; the people of the Delta have other sources of income and occupations
too. As already mentioned, some people use the forest to make a living, for
instance by making nypa roof covers and cutting mangrove (rhizophora) trees
for making the frame of a julu net (Rachmawati 2003, p. 36). The production
of nypa roofs is even quite substantial; as 1,164 households of Anggana and
Muara Jawa sub-districts are involved in it, it creates sufficient income (Rach-
mawati 2003, p. 36, Bapedalda Kukar and PKSPL IPB, p. III-45). Moreover, there
are some other activities that are associated with fishing and shrimp farming.
Regarding the former, people make money by catching crab, collecting seeds,
making crab traps, and drying salted fish. Concerning the latter, people work
as pond-caretakers and shrimp collectors (Bosma et al. n.d., p. 6). Next to the
activities directly associated with the oil and gas companies and fish and
shrimp sector, a small number of people in the Delta serve as civil servants
or military officers.
2.6 OVERVIEW OF STAKEHOLDERS
It is possible to discern two categories of stakeholders or key actors in the
Delta. The first group provides government services, while the second group
is directly involved in private production and trade (Bourgeois et al. 2002,
p. 3).19 The first group consists of civil servants both from the central as well
17 Actually, the Kutai Kartanegara District catches the most amount of fish compared with
other districts in the Province. On average the District brings in approximately 40%-45%
of the total fish on offer of the Province. See Pemerintah Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara
(2006, p. 77), Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara (2007b, p. 1 and 4), and
Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara (2008b, p. 1).
18 See for instance in Bourgeois et al. (2002); Hidayati et al. (2004) and Sandjatmiko et al. (2005).
19 Meanwhile Powel and Osbeck (2010) divide the stakeholders in the Delta into three cat-
egories: owners, actors and clients. The owners are the Ministries of Internal Affairs and
Forestry; the actors are the Provincial and District governments; the clients are farmers,
companies and traders.
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as regional and local government, including people at the district, sub-district
and to some extent village level. In the second group there are numerous
stakeholders. Fishermen and shrimp farmers are stakeholders who are engaged
in primary production, while shrimp collectors and cold storage companies
engage in trading. Oil and gas companies engage in production as well as
in trading. The stakeholders of this group who engage in production could
also be called resource users. They are right holders when they have rights
over the resources legitimized by either formal, non-formal rules or practices
(Harkes 2006, p. 45).
The above definition of a stakeholder is only one of many. From a policy
point of view, it may be useful to distinguish between those who make or
determine decisions and actions, and those who are affected by the decisions
and actions of others. In this view, the former group could be regarded as
active stakeholders and the latter as passive stakeholders (Grimble and Wellard
1997, p. 176; Grimble et al. N.d, p. 3). In line with this distinction, groups of
stakeholders could also be divided based on their influence on policy formula-
tion as well as its outcome (Reed et al. 2009, p. 138). Regardless of the dis-
tinction or variety of stakeholders they all have in common that they have
an interest or stake. As Persoon (in Harkes 2006, p. 45) noted, stakeholders
are people who make a claim or have an interest in a resource. Here, ‘interest’
refers to the utility and welfare of the stakeholder (Grimble and Wellard 1997,
p. 175).
The list of stakeholders of the Delta as mentioned above would be longer
if NGOs, academics and even international actors like importing companies
were included (Bapedalda Kukar and PKSPL IPB 2002, p. 61-62; Hidayati et al.
2005: 3,). Regarding the NGOs and academics, even though they do not engage
in either production or trade, they are perceived to play a role both in the
promotion of community rights and sustainable resource management.
The various stakeholders of the Delta have demonstrated different view-
points and concerns when they were asked to discuss the Delta’s problems.
About the differences, Bourgeois et al. (2002, p. 90) write:
The bounded perceptions of each make discussions difficult. It leads to misinter-
pretations or misunderstandings, rendering agreement hard to reach and can even
lead to type of conflicts seen in the Delta.
Sometimes particular stakeholders have different ideas on what is important.
For example, while some stakeholders notably oil and gas companies, local
officials, university lecturers, NGO activists, and some farmers thought that
mangrove rehabilitation was important, the punggawas believed the opposite,
for it would not benefit them (Hidayati 2004, p. 102-103). They do not see
themselves as having an active role in the rehabilitation (Bourgeois et al. 2002,
p. 87).
40 Chapter 2
Many studies have suggested that the difference in interests leads to conflict
amongst stakeholders (Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Science of Mulawarman
University 2010: 18). It is important to underline that the conflict is not only
between the resource users or right holders, but between the various levels
of government as well (Hidayati 2004, p. 104, Hidayati et al. 2005).
2.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
On the basis of the above observations, one could say that the Mahakam Delta
is a vital frontier area. Its nature reserve, ecological functions as well as bio-
diversity demonstrate the importance of the Mahakam Delta. Due to its wealth
in natural resources, the Mahakam Delta has attracted many migrants who
have moved to the area in the pursuit of a better life. The extraction potential
has also attracted large-scale private companies. At the same time, due to its
remoteness, many people have used the Mahakam Delta as a place to hide
in times of war and unrest.
The richness of the Mahakam Delta has boosted state revenue and has had
implications for the livelihood of the local people. As for the government,
particularly oil, gas and fishery have long made significant contributions to
its income. Meanwhile, the local population benefits from the richness by
conducting fishing and shrimp cultivation, working for the companies or
providing goods and services that the companies need. These settings may
in one way or another all affect how the institutional arrangements of resource
use in the Mahakam Delta work, as the following chapters will show.
3 A short history of state intervention in the
Mahakam Delta
Let me commence this chapter by quoting a statement, to which many other
scholars have referred: ‘No introduction to East Kalimantan is complete with-
out mentioning the fact that East Kalimantan’s petroleum, liquid natural gas,
and timber export have earned nearly one-quarter of Indonesia’s total export
earnings in some years’ (Daroesman 1979, p. 43). The period that the statement
refers to is East Kalimantan in the late 1970s, but this is still the case today.1
As said (Section 2.5), natural resources in the Mahakam Delta in general, and
oil and gas extraction in particular constitute a significant part of national
revenue in Indonesia.
Due to the importance of natural resources extraction for state revenue,
state intervention (formal and actual exercise) in natural resources management
in East Kalimantan2 and Kutai Kartanegara3 has been influenced considerably
1 The significant contribution of East Kalimantan to national revenue had actually begun
in the 1920s, when the Dutch government managed oil extractions around Balikpapan,
Tarakan, Sanga-Sanga and Samboja. In 1928, for instance, the Province provided 66% of
the total Netherlands-Indies production of crude oil, before it decreased to 22% in 1940
due to the discovery of oil fields mainly in Sumatera Island (Daroesman 1979, p. 50;
Lindblad 1985; Wood 1985, p. 65; Lindblad 1989). Meanwhile, the forest sector began to
contribute significantly to national revenue in the early 1970s. The Province became used
to being the centre for commercial timber industry, for it supplied 25% of national com-
mercial needs (Poffenberger and McGean 1993, p. 2). Another figure shows that in 1970,
the Province had a share of US$ 55 million of Indonesia’s total value of timber export of
US$ 91.7 million (Manning 1971, p. 31 and 56). In 1975 it rose to US$ 307.43 million of the
national total value of US$ 500 million of timber export. Meanwhile, for domestic con-
sumption, East Kalimantan supplied two-thirds of total national timber supply (Magenda
1991, p. 83-84).
2 East Kalimantan Province was officially established in 1956 when the central government
enacted Law No. 25/1956 concerning the Establishment of the Autonomous Regions of
West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and East Kalimantan. Previously, as stated in Law
No. 2/1953, the whole Indonesian part of Borneo Island was administered in only one
province. When it was officially established in 1956, East Kalimantan consisted of three
autonomous regions namely Kutai, Berau and Bulungan.
3 The name of Kutai Kartanegara district was found in 1999 when the district was fragmented
into three districts and one municipality (see Section 3.3 footnote 61). Before that, from
1959 onwards, the district was named Kutai. The central government officially declared
Kutai as autonomous district (swapraja) together with three other districts and two muni-
cipalities (kota praja) through Law No. 27/1959. Prior to the status as an autonomous district,
as of 1953 Kutai had a status as special region (daerah istimewa). See Pemerintah Provinsi
Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Timur (1992, p. 130-137).
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by the desire to control the natural resources in the Province (Daroesman 1979;
Wood 1985; Magenda 1991; Peluso 1992; Jemadu 1996). Putting an emphasis
on forestry resource, Peluso (1992, p. 53; Peluso 2000, p. 148) points out that
the nature of natural resources management of East Kalimantan, and in parti-
cular forest resource, is epitomized by formal forestry control superimposed
on traditional forms of natural resources management. Some scholars suggest
that the high level of state intervention in natural resources management has
been strongly pushed by the motive to get money to fund political agendas
(Magenda 1991, Obidzinski 2003, p. 94-95). It is also due to its richness in
natural resources, in particular in oil and gas, that the Province was often listed
as a priority target for conquest during wars (Magenda 1991, p. 37-38; Pemprov
Kaltim 1991; Obidzinski 2003, p. 75).
Although the state declared its formal control over natural resources use
in the marine part of the Mahakam Delta since the 1960s over fisheries, 1970s
over oil and gas and 1980s over mangrove forest, it is important to highlight
that the way formal control was exercised differs from the way it was done
on the Kutai mainland. The nature of natural resources – whereby oil and gas
are more profitable compared to forest and fishery resources -, in this remote
area with few inhabitants, and with actual open access of resource use, has
led to a different exercise of state intervention in the Mahakam Delta than
on the mainland.
This chapter discusses state intervention in natural resources management
of the Mahakam Delta throughout three periods. The three periods are 1945-
1970, 1970-1998, and 1998-2011. For each of these periods, evolvement and
changes in state intervention will be described. The period of 1945-1970 in
itself could be divided into two sub-periods. In the first sub-period, from 1945-
1950, formal colonial natural resources management mostly remained in place.
In the second sub-period, from 1950-1970, the Indonesian government eventual-
ly obtained political and legal authority to control natural resources manage-
ment. Yet, in response to strong demands from the regions to share power,
the central government applied decentralized natural resources management.
In practice, the Provincial and Kutai District governments hardly intervened
in the Mahakam Delta.
Unlike the first period, in the second period of 1970-1998 the state inter-
vened actively and systematically by enacting some laws and regulations
followed by a formal designation of the administrative territories of sectoral
departments. It is a period, in which natural resources management is centralist
in nature. For the Mahakam Delta it is a period of both formal and actual state
intervention.
The period of 1998-2011 is a period in which state control was seriously
tested by the strong competition to gain access to natural resources. For the
Mahakam Delta in particular, it is also a period in which the District Govern-
ment together with other stakeholders developed many policies and programs
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to pursue sustainable resource use, notably of fish, shrimp, and mangrove
forest.
This book argues that the type of state intervention in natural resources
management in the Mahakam Delta that matters most in practice, is interven-
tion at the district and provincial level. Therefore, an account of state interven-
tion at the district and provincial level will be put ahead of that by national
agencies, especially in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.1 THE PERIOD OF 1945-1970: HARDLY ANY INTERVENTION
Even though independent Indonesia had declared formal state rights to control
natural resources management in the 1945 Constitution, in reality these could
not be exercised due to the re-entry of Dutch colonial rule, e.g. the Nether-
lands-Indies Civil Administration (NICA), which resulted in five years of
Revolutionary War (1945-1949). This was certainly the case for East Kalimantan,
where the NICA administered forestry and mining as before. Regulations on
natural resources management implemented during this period were actually
identical to those, which had existed prior to the three years of Japanese
military occupation (1942-1945). They will be described briefly in the following
paragraphs.
As of the late nineteenth through to the early twentieth century, formal
rule on natural resources management in East Kalimantan was influenced
considerably by the common colonial strategy known as ‘indirect rule’. This
meant that four sultanates, namely Kutai, Bulungan, Sambaliung and Gunung
Tabur, were given the political status of self-governing territory. The status
supported the traditional relation between the sultans and the land, which
they claimed they owned, and the condition that land use was conditional
upon a license issued by a village head (petinggi/demang). The same principle
was applied both to the extraction of minerals and the collection of forest
products (Kanwil Depdikbud Kalimantan Barat 1990, p.119-120 and 132).4
The sultanates’ status of self-governing entity and their authority over land
and natural resources were laid down in an exclusive contract and a ‘short
declaration’ (in Dutch Korte Verklaring), in the late nineteenth and early twen-
4 Many scholarly works (Wortman 1971; Peluso 1983; Peluso 1987; Magenda 1991; Peluso
1992) have actually highlighted the impossibility of the sultan to be able to exercise its
domain declaration by controlling people’s activities, production and land use. In reality,
due to the absence of a strong bureaucracy which had real power and the fact that the
sultanate was more like a tributary state, the domain declaration was hardly exercised
effectively, in particular in the case of Dayak’s communities, who mostly resided in the
interior. The domain declaration is therefore perceived as a mere claim which was strongly
influenced by Islamic law, and reinforced by a mystical Hindu-Buddhist philosophy (Peluso
1987, p. 5).
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tieth century.5 At the same time, the contract and declaration abolished the
sultans’ authority to collect tributary payments on agricultural and forestry
products.
The acknowledgment of the self-governing status on one hand, and the
take-over of management control over natural resource use on the other hand
resulted in the following arrangement of power-sharing. Firstly, the Dutch
government in Batavia would pay a regular salary, share of revenue and rent
to the sultans (Peluso 1983; Peluso 1987; Lindblad 1988; Potter 1988; Magenda
1991; Pemprov Kaltim 1991, Selatto 2001; Obidzinski 2003). Having obtained
all the rewards, the sultanates were not allowed to collect taxes and tributary
payments from the resource users. All power to collect taxes and tributes now
rested with the Dutch authorities. Secondly, the sultanates still had the author-
ity to issue particular forest utilization rights to foreigners and native people.
In addition, they could grant permits to native people for collecting non-forest
products and fishing.6 With regard to fishing rights, the sultanates could
award exclusive rights to collect sea cucumbers or shells on the condition that
the fishermen paid a levy (Knapen 2001; Butcher 2008, p. 7).
Apart from debates among the Dutch government officials about the extent
to which the ‘domain declaration’ (domeinverklaring) was socially and culturally
appropriate for the colonial government to apply in Borneo, and the fact that
the ‘domain declaration’ could not entirely be enacted in self-governing states,
it was officially enacted in Southeast Borneo in 1888.7 However, the ‘domain
declaration’ only slightly enhanced state intervention in natural resource use.
With the enactment of the domeinverklaring through which forest was perceived
as waste ground, the Dutch government could now issue plots for long-lease,
which at that time were needed to grow tobacco (Potter 1988, p 130; Lindblad
1988).8 In Samarinda and Upper Mahakam, where the Dutch government
exercised direct government and where therefore all populations were subject
to the Dutch administrative and judicial system, the domeinverklaring could
5 An exclusive contract was signed with the Kutai sultanate, while the other three sultanates
signed a short declaration. The Kutai sultanate was given an exclusive contract as a reward
for its neutral position in the Banjarmasin War, while the other three sultanates had been
on the side of the Banjar sultanate (Lindblad 1988; Magenda 1991; Obidzinski 2003).
6 There were three types of utilization or collection rights over forest resources at that time,
namely a long-term contract or concession, small logging plot and small-scale cutting permit.
Long-term contracts and small logging plots were given for commercial purposes, while
small-scale cutting permits were merely for subsistence needs. Small logging plots and
small-scale cutting permits were awarded by the Sultan and did not exceed 5,000 ha. In
practice, resident or resident assistants had the authority to review the issuance of small
logging plots (Potter 1988, p. 139 and 142; Obidzinski 2003, p. 67).
7 The domein verklaring is a legal principle which was laid down in the Agrarische Wet of 1870
during Dutch colonial rule. It stated that all land of which absolute private ownership right
(eigendom) could not be proven, could be claimed as state land.
8 See Potter (1998, p. 133-134) about objections against the application of state designation
on forest, which traditionally belonged to indigenous communities.
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even be fully imposed.9 Following the passing of a regulation on land reclama-
tion in the 1920s, the award of land reclamation permits to native people had
to be approved of by the Dutch authorities (districthoofd) as well as traditional
local authorities (demang/petinggi).
Through the resurgence of the pre-Japanese legal framework on natural
resources management, NICA reorganized supervision over natural resources
extraction, mainly mining and forest, that had laid idle during the three years
of Japanese military occupation. In order to boost tree cutting, NICA issued
a regulation through which small-scale logging was re-legalized (Obidzinski
2003, p. 88). Meanwhile, as the status of self-governing state was returned to
them, the sultanates regained their rights to receive a salary, a share of the
revenue and rent. In addition, the authority of the sultanates to issue permits
on the collection of non-forest products and fishing was recovered as well
(Magenda 1991, p. 42).
Following the agreement of the Round Table Conference in The Hague
(1949) between the Indonesian and Dutch delegations, in which the Dutch
government officially recognized Indonesia’s independence, the actual control
over natural resources management went to the government of the Republic
of Indonesia. The official incorporation of the Federation of East Borneo10
into the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in August 1950 marked
the end of the first sub-period. In spite of the official status of the four sultan-
ates as self-governing territories (daerah swapraja, daerah istimewa) during the
first sub-period, their authorities and rights over natural resources extraction
were considerably reduced from now on. The oil and gas, coal and forest
companies did not directly pay royalties to the sultans through the Federation
of East Borneo, but to the central government instead. The central government
subsequently shared a particular amount of the revenue from natural resources
extraction with the provincial government of South-East Borneo, which
included the present region of East Kalimantan. The Provincial government
office, which at that time was situated in Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan),
further shared the budget they obtained with the four sultanates or swaprajas
of East Kalimantan (Peluso 1983, p 133; Magenda 1991).11
Despite the shift of power with regard to the collection of revenue from
the NICA to the government of the Republic of Indonesia, the appointed
resident of East Kalimantan (see Section 4.1 for an elaborate description of
governmental structure and position in East Kalimantan) continued to use
the legal framework as well as norms on natural resources management,
9 For an account of the forms of traditional and Dutch administrative and judicial structures
and the division of jurisdiction see Pemerintah Provinsi Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Timur
(1992, p. 55-73).
10 This federation of sultanates in East Kalimantan was established in 1946.
11 The arrangements of sharing the revenue were stipulated in Law No. 32/1956 on the Fiscal
Balance between the Central Government and Autonomous Regions.
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inherited from the NICA. With the sultanates having been granted the formal
status of autonomous regions during the early years of the unitary Republic
of Indonesia, the central government e.g. resident continued to recognize their
former authorities to issue forest utilization rights, and permits for the
collection of non-forest products and fishing (Peluso 1983, p. 139). To give
an example, in the early 1950s, the resident of East Kalimantan issued a regula-
tion, which allowed the sultanates to issue small-scale logging permits on an
area of 1,000 ha (Obidzinski 2003, p. 95). The inherited colonial legislation still
largely existed in 1957, when the central government eventually enacted and
established some new regulations and government institutions concerning
forest management. One of the important regulations passed in that year is
the Government Regulation of 1957 concerning the Partial Devolvement of
Authority from Central to Provincial Government with regard to Fisheries,
Forestry and Small-Scale Rubber Plantations.12
Even though there was a significant level of power sharing between the
central and the provincial government concerning forest management, in the
second sub-period (1950-1970) there was little change in the form of state
intervention. The only two changes were that the central government emerged
as a new actor replacing the role of the former Dutch government, and that
the Provincial government enjoyed greater autonomy. The forest exploitation
system that was officially determined by the Government Regulation of 1957
did not differ much from the colonial and the first sub-period. As Obidzinski
(2003, p. 95) points out: ‘The exploitation system relied on the continuation
of regulations from the Dutch period that allowed for timber extraction either
by means of large concessions or smaller logging plots’.
Given the central government assumed itself as the highest political author-
ity, thereby undermining lower non-state authorities, the Government Regula-
tion of 1957 determined that the central government was entitled to exploit
forests or allow someone to carry out forest exploitation on the grounds of
a license. Concerning the license, the Government Regulation maintained the
previous categorization of types of forest utilization and collection, comprising
of large-scale logging (concession), small-scale logging (kapersil) and the
collection of forest and non-forest products. The concession was given for an
area, the size of which did not exceed 10,000 ha and for twenty years. A license
for kapersil applied to an area which did not exceed 5,000 ha and was valid
for five years. A license for the collection of forest and non-forest products
was given for the duration of two years.13 The governor was authorized to
award a concession, while the district head could award a license for kapersil
and collection. Meanwhile, the authority to issue a concession for an area larger
12 No. 64/1957 on Partial Delegation of Government Affairs on Fishing, Forestry and Small-
Scale Rubber Plantation to Provinces. The Government Regulation was made to implement
the new Law No. 1/1957 on Regional Autonomy.
13 See Article 10 (2) of Government Regulation No. 64/1957.
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than 10,000 ha rested with the Director-General of Forestry of the Ministry
of Agriculture (Magenda 1991, p. 78).
The implementation of the Government Regulation of 1957 which lasted
for more than a decade (1957-1970) was seen to benefit local people greatly.
As Magenda (1991, p. 79) wrote:
The period between 1967 and 1970 was considered a happy and prosperous one
by most of the people of East Kalimantan who in one way or another benefited
from the flood of logs.14
Peluso (1983, p. 177) also points at the importance of the period saying that
not only there were banjir kap, but also an increase in employment opportun-
ities, investment, high profits and prosperity for nearly all participants. Not
only did it benefit local residents, the implementation also stimulated large
waves of migration to East Kalimantan from South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan
as well as Java (Wood 1985; Magenda 1991, Jemadu 1996; Obidzinski 2003).15
However, instead of getting the benefit from effective implementation of
the Government Regulation, the local people and migrants actually benefitted
from a severe lack of effective implementation. With only a simple forestry
administrative organization with low-educated officials, effective protection
and supervision of fourteen million ha of production forest proved difficult.16
Meanwhile, forestry officers from the Ministry of Agriculture undertook only
irregular surveys of East Kalimantan (Obidzinski 2003, p. 95). As a result, the
only way the local people could benefit from the regulations was through the
revival of small-scale logging and the easy procedure of obtaining a cutting
permit.17 The system only required local people to get a permit from the sub-
14 Flood of logs or Banjir kap, is a term for the manual (non-mechanized timber extraction)
felling of trees particularly along the river banks and then floating them down river when
the monsoon floods come (Daroesman 1979, p. 45; Tacconi et al. 2004, p. 141).
15 For an account of the migration from South Sulawesi in response to job opportunities see
Vayda and Sahur (1985). On how it also attracted Dayak people see Peluso (1983, p. 179)
and Urano (2010). See also Manning (1971, p. 56) and Peluso (1983) for how the small-scale
timber extraction impacted the labour dynamic in general. Whereas for an account of how
it also attracted villagers of the Mahakam Delta see Levang (2002, p. 7).
16 The fourteen million hectares of production forest came under control of the Provincial
government after the Directorate-General of Forestry was pushed for several years to hand
over the forestry management to the Province, following its establishment in 1956. As the
Directorate-General of Forestry accepted the demand, Perhutani, which was replaced by
Inhutani II in the 1960s, only managed the remaining 3,5 million hectares. Perhutani got
the 3,5 million hectares concession from the Ministry of Agriculture through a Government
Regulation No. 35/1963 (Manning 1971, p. 36; Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai 1971, p. 66; Peluso
1983, p. 176; Departemen Kehutanan RI 1986, p. 76; Magenda 1991, p. 77-8; Jemadu 1996,
p. 128).
17 In brief the system was shaped by an exchange between upstream people and downstream
trading communities. The latter consisted of town-based timber exporters, middlemen and
contracted lumberjacks. The parties involved were interlinked by a system of advance
48 Chapter 3
district government to be able to cut trees, regardless of what they found before
they sold the logs to downstream traders (Peluso 1983, p. 177; Magenda 1991,
p. 78). In this system, family-owned businesses would only need to ask local
people, who resided upstream, to cut trees, which could then be sold down-
stream.
It is important to remember that the revival of the small-scale logging
system coincided with the rise of political power of the military following the
declaration of a state of emergency in 1958.18 Across regions, the state of
emergency put civil administrative government under the supervision of
regional military commanders (Penguasa Perang Daerah abbrev. Peperda). In
East Kalimantan, this resulted in the dissolution of the Provincial Forestry
Agency in 1958, just one year after the agency was created. In that political
context, it is not surprising that family-owned forestry firms became connected
with local military officers (Obidzinski 2003, p. 104). Besides military officers,
some members of political parties, who courageously campaigned against
foreign timber concessions for the sake of nationalism, also had family-owned
forestry firms (Magenda 1991, p. 77-78). This context impeded effective imple-
mentation of the Government Regulation of 1957 and a Provincial Regulation
of 1963.19 One expert even suggests that the small-scale logging was entirely
unregulated whilst hundred kapersils that the regional government had issued
were insufficiently monitored (Daroesman 1979, p. 45).20 This turned forest
exploitation predominantly into economic and political assets.
Decentralized forest management and anti-foreign investment policies
which were in place during the second half of the 1950s officially came to an
end after the issuance of the Basic Forestry Law of 1967 and two liberal invest-
ment laws.21 The Basic Forestry Law of 1967 provided a legal basis for central-
ized forest management, whereby state control and authority over forests
seemed to be the most important principle (Peluso 1994; Jemadu 1996, p. 127).
Nevertheless, political conditions at that time were still not suited to imple-
menting centralized forest management. As a result, the Ministry of Agriculture
notably the Directorate-General of Forestry, on one hand commenced central-
ized state intervention in forest exploitation by issuing several large-scale forest
concessions, but on the other hand kept old lower regulations, which allowed
payment, either in kind or cash for deliveries of timber within an agreed period of time
(Obidzinski 2003, p. 54-55).
18 The state of emergency was officially declared through Government Regulation in Lieu
of Law No. 1/1958.
19 Provincial Regulation No. 9/1963.
20 In 1963 across East Kalimantan, 245 kapersils were granted covering a total of 584, 300
ha. Kutai District was dominant among other districts of East Kalimantan with 213 kapersils
covering a total of 447, 200 ha (Obidzinski 2003, p. 312-313).
21 The two investment laws were respectively No. 1/1967 on Foreign Direct Investment and
No. 6/1968 on Domestic Investment. The two laws have been superseded by Law. No.
25/2007 on Investment.
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governors and district heads to issue small-scale logging concessions, in force.
This resulted in a contradictory three year period (1967-1970), in which the
Directorate-General of Forestry gave a large part of the 17 million ha of Pro-
duction Forest of East Kalimantan to non-residential foreign and domestic
forest concession holders. Other parts were given to local family-owned firms
for small-scale logging by governors and district heads.22
Meanwhile, the absence of an up-to-date land use map, a strong desire
to attract foreign investment, and a political motive to repay some generals
who supported the New Order, caused the large and small-scale logging
concessions to neglect the forest rights of the local people (Peluso 1983; Magen-
da 1991).23 As Poffenberger (1997, p. 456) points out:
The mapping of areas for timber leases, due to the paucity of information, has rarely
considered the boundaries of community lands, particularly forest tracts used for
hunting, gathering, and long rotation agriculture.
With the forests on the mainland of the Mahakam Delta being downstream
of the Mahakam River, logged trees could be easily transported to the sea.
They therefore formed an attractive project location. So, it was widely known
that East Kalimantan was one of the most favorable provinces for timber
extraction, due to its well developed river transport system, of which the
Mahakam River and its tributaries are the most important parts (Manning 1971,
p. 57). About 1,000 hectares of the one million hectares of Perhutani/Inhutani
II area in Kutai District was situated on the mainland of the Mahakam Delta
(Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai 1971, p. 66). Likewise, the 600,000 ha of the PT.
ITCI concession area which was awarded in 1967 was partly located on the
mainland of the Mahakam Delta.24 Nevertheless, during all this years there
were no forest concessions nor kapersil and Perhutani/Inhutani II areas in
the Mahakam Delta. This restricted the level of state intervention in this area
severely.
Compared to forestry, the level of state intervention in oil and gas resources
in the Mahakam Delta during the second sub-period of 1945-1970 was much
higher. This commenced in 1967 when the Minister of Mining officially desig-
nated Mahakam-Bunyu Block as a state mining zone, and at the same time
22 During 1968-1971 the Governor and four District Heads issued kapersils totalling 1,148,750
ha in size (Obidzinski 2003, p. 314-318).
23 Poffenberger (1997, p. 456) points out that due to the issuance of large forest concessions,
an estimated 2,5 million indigenous Dayak people were displaced or resettled due to logging
activities, resettlement projects, and other development activities. For accounts of how the
issuance of forest concessions affected the actual local and indigenous forest rights in East
Kalimantan see Kartawinata et al. (1984); Vargas (1985); Peluso (1992); Poffenberger and
McGean (1993); Eghenter (2001).
24 Another forest company, which obtained a large forest concession, was Kayan River Timber
Products, a Philippine subsidiary of an American company. The company obtained 1.2
million hectares in Bulungan District (Gunawan et al. 1999, p. 17).
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awarded a concession to the Japanese oil and gas company, Japan Petroleum
Exploration (hereafter Japex). As will be described further in Chapter 6, the
award of the concession was given a legal basis through Law No. 44 Prp/1960
on Oil and Gas and Law No. 11/1967 on Basic Mining Law. The two laws
both respected communities, by prohibiting mining extraction taking place
in areas where grave yards and sacred places (tempat-tempat suci) existed.25
In addition, the Basic Mining Law provided access to local people to get
involved in mining extraction through a scheme of community mining.26
3.2 THE PERIOD OF 1970-1998: AUTHORITARIAN STATE
According to the annual figures of East Kalimantan Province and Kutai District
in 1970, the number of kapersils had increased significantly since 1963. In Kutai
District alone, 865 kapersils had been awarded by the district head, and 58
by the governor. The nearly 1,000 kapersils of the Kutai District were located
in around two million hectares of forest area (Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai 1970,
p. 65). Across East Kalimantan, the governor awarded hundreds of kapersils
sizing 1,200,000 ha in total (Operation Room Kantor Propinsi Kaltim 1971, p.
78-81).27 The volume of logs from small-scale logging in Kutai District formed
two-thirds of the total production of logs in East Kalimantan (Peluso 1983,
p. 181). This led to a large increase in revenue. To give an example, during
1969-1970 the Provincial government earned around US$ 200,000 from timber,
while the Directorate-General of Forestry could only earn around US$ 30,000
(Magenda 1991, p. 86). Other figures shows that in 1970, the Provincial govern-
ment received IDR 978 million for forest royalties, whereas the Directorate-
General of Forestry only received IDR 445 million (Manning 1971, p. 44).
Concessions, which were owned by foreign and Jakarta-based companies, were
not as profitable as the kapersils, due to the lack of experience in tropical
logging, and the longer gestation period of large-scale investment (Manning
1971, p. 57).
Having a legal basis in the Forestry Law of 1967, an interest-based coalition
of concession owners, the Directorate-General of Forestry and some high-
ranking military officers was formed which campaigned for centralized forest
management. The coalition pursued the central government to dissolve the
25 Article 7(3) of Law No. 44 Prp/1960 and Article 16(3) of Law No. 11/1967.
26 Pursuant to Government Regulation No. 32/1969, a license for community mining can be
given by the Minister of Mining or governor for a maximum of 25 ha and a five year expiry
date.
27 Manning (1971, p. 57) and Daroesman (1979, p. 47) estimate that the Governor issued
kapersils of a total size of two million hectares. In the same period, the Directorate-General
of Forestry awarded around 37 national and domestic forestry companies with concessions
on an area of approximately 5,600,000 ha (Operation Room Kantor Gubernur Propinsi Kaltim
1971, p. 81-83).
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governor’s and district head’s authority to issue kapersils. To advocate the
dissolution, the coalition used three arguments mainly on environmental,
economic and political grounds. They argued that centralized control was more
effective than decentralization of authority as far as forest conservation was
concerned (Jemadu 1996, p. 129). Besides, for administrative officials and
military officers of the central government, the enormous income that the
Provincial and District government earned from the timber exploitation was
frightening, for it could lead to a substantial accumulation of economic power
outside Jakarta (Magenda 1991, p. 80).28 With good access to as well as polit-
ical and economic ties with policy makers in Jakarta, the coalition easily
reached their desired objective.
The successful lobbying of the coalition resulted in the issuance of the
Government Regulation No. 21/1970 on Forest Exploitation Rights and Rights
to Collect Forest Products. Through the Government Regulation, the central
government fully took over the authority to issue kapersils from the governor
and district head.29 The authority was now given to the Minister of Agri-
culture.30 Nevertheless, the Government Regulation maintained that the
issuance of rights to collect forest and non-forest products belonged to the
district head.31 The above provisions together with other provisions stipulating
that a timber fee had to be paid to the Directorate-General of Forestry, as well
as the control and freeze of the existing indigenous rights over the forests,
marked the emergence of centralized forest management. In other words, the
new regulation ended nearly twenty years (1950-1970) of regional and local
governments benefiting from decentralized forest management.
Concerning the implication of the new regulation for local rights on forest
use, Peluso (2000, p. 154) points out that such regulation, which favors timber
production and ignores local people’s rights, led to the criminalization of local
forest use.32 Legally speaking, the criminalization was later confirmed through
Government Regulation No. 28/1985 which stated that a permit was needed
for any logging or the collection of forest products and that this activity would
otherwise be criminalized (see Section 5.2 for detailed accounts of the Govern-
ment Regulation).33 The move towards centralization of forest management
can also be seen in the Government Regulation of 1970 on Forest Planning,
28 For accounts of environmental grounds see Manning (1971); Vargas (1985, p. 143) and
Magenda (1991).
29 Cf. Article 10 (1) of Government Regulation No. 64/1957.
30 See Article 12 (1) of Government Regulation No. 11/1970.
31 See Article 12 (2) of Government Regulation No. 21/1970.
32 Jemadu (1996: 136) points at the alienation of local people from the management of forest
resources as another impact of centralized forest resource.
33 Article 9 (2 and 3) of Government Regulation No. 28/1985 on Forest Protection.
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which puts matters of forest designation and status under the authority of
the Ministry of Agriculture.34
The implementation of the abovementioned centralized forestry manage-
ment resulted in six years (1970-1976) of widespread issuance of concessions
in East Kalimantan. The majority was issued during 1970-1973 (Daroesman
1979, p. 47). In fact, 15 million hectares of production forest of East Kalimantan
were granted to 120 non-residential foreign and domestic forest concession
holders (Vargas 1985, p. 142; Jemadu 1996, p. 132).35
Meanwhile, on the Kutai mainland, the largest part of which was included
in the work area of the so-called Technical Unit for Forest Product Circulation
of the Provincial Government (Ind. Unit Pelaksana Teknis Daerah Peredaran Hasil
Hutan, hereafter TUFPC), dozens of forest concessions were granted.36 Some
examples are PT. Baltimur Timber (70, 000 ha), PT. Meranti Sakti Indonesia
(32,500 ha), PT. Perdana Kutai (23,500) and PT. Kayu Mahakam Kutai (40,000
ha).37 As happened during the peak of the kapersil issuance, no single forest
concession was issued in the Mahakam Delta. This set the mangrove forest
of the Mahakam Delta apart from the mangrove forest in the northern part
of East Kalimantan (Bulungan District). In the latter mangrove forest, the
Directorate-General of Forestry gave separate concessions to four companies.38
Meanwhile, apart from the considerable difficulties of the Directorate-
General of Forestry to control the 120 concessions, it did manage to exercise
some degree of state intervention in forest resource use.39 The exercise of
control was stepped up, when in 1983, the Minister of Agriculture issued a
decree which designated the Forest Areas of East Kalimantan.40 Legally speak-
ing, the Forest Area designation gave the government the authority to apply
forest regulation in the designated areas, in spite of its late appearance. The
34 See Article 5 and 8 of Government Regulation No. 33/1970 on Forest Planning. For detailed
accounts of the regulation see Section 5.2.
35 According to Daroesman (1979, p. 47) only six of the 120 concessions were held by persons
or firms resident in East Kalimantan.
36 There were twenty granted forest concessions in 1984 covering an area of 364,295 ha in
total. This dropped to fifteen in 1986 with area of 404,565 ha. However, some of them were
inactive at that time. See Laporan Tahunan KPH Mahakam Ilir 1983/1984, 1984/1985 and
1985/1986.
37 Small-large forest concessions were for instance CV. Karya Jasa, Fa. Alga, and Fa. Telaga
Mas.
38 Namely, Karyasa Kencana, Bina Lestari, Inhutani II and Jamaker. The concession area of
the four companies together sized approximately 213,040 ha (Soetrisno 2007, p.12). About
(perceived) reasons for why there is no forest concession granting in the Mahakam Delta
see Chapter 5.
39 The lack of forestry officials to exercise the control was significant. A lack of skilled/trained
personnel and operational equipment has often been cited as a prominent factor causing
ineffective control. Another factor was that local forestry officials were afraid of enforcing
the law upon the large forest concessions, for they were backed up by high-ranking officials
and military officers in Jakarta (Magenda 1991; Jemadu 1996; Poffenberger 1997).
40 No. 024/Kpts/Um/1/1983.
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issuance of the Government Regulation of 1985 on Forest Protection later
strengthened this legitimacy. The 1985 Government Regulation gave legitimacy
to forest officials to enforce the law on those who did not have licenses. Across
the Forest Areas of East Kalimantan, forest officials or forest rangers warned
forest settlers for clearing land or cutting trees or they even caught them.41
On the Kutai mainland, the exercise of state intervention in illegal forest
use in the designated Forest Areas also took place. One instance of a form
of control that the TUFPC used frequently was curbing illegal logging. To
eradicate illegal logging, the TUFPC established dozens of check points with
guards, who were assigned to do daily checks on trucks which were loaded
with logs. Due to its downstream location, the TUFPC encountered more illegal
logging cases than the other two technical units of the Provincial Forestry
Agency which were situated upstream. The groups of people that were
involved in illegal logging and which the TUFPC dealt with included local
residents, forest companies and sub-contractors of Pertamina.42 Confiscating
the illegal logs and filing the cases with a court were two of the most common
forms of control that the TUFPC used. At the TUFPC it was thought that if the
institution would collect levy they could legalise illegal logs,43 but in practice
this did not happen.
Vargas’s work (1985) on the interface between the customary law of a
Dayak community and national law on land in a village of the Loa Kulu sub-
district of Kutai District interestingly shows how state intervention which
infringed upon customary land rights appeared through the operation of the
PT. International Timber Corporation Indonesia (ITCI).44 The employees and
lawyers of the ITCI denied the request for compensation conveyed either by
the indigenous Dayak community or migrant communities arguing that the
Dayak traditional group did not have legitimate rights. The local forestry
officials told the Dayak community that the ITCI should not have to pay com-
pensation for cutting down trees, given that the company already paid to the
41 For concrete examples of law enforcement as cited above see Vayda and Sahur (1985); Vayda
(1996, p. 42).
42 The sub-contractors of Pertamina cut trees from Forest Areas mainly for constructing
platforms of rigs, employees’ housing and helipads (Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan Mahakam
Ilir 1985, p. 4 and 8).
43 See Laporan Tahunan KPH Mahakam Ilir 1983/1984.
44 The name of the village is Jonggon. When Vargas did her field work, the village was mostly
inhabited by Kedang Dayak. Indeed, Loa Kulu is not precisely located on the mainland
of the Mahakam Delta. It is located further upstream. See Poffenberger and McGean (1993)
for a comparison of how the presence of the ITCI also neglected the traditional rights over
forest resource in other villages of the Dayak community. I could not find any literature
which describes how state intervention occurred through large-scale extraction on the
mainland of the Mahakam Delta during the period of 1970-1998.
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government, as the owner of the forest (Vargas 1985, p. 167).45 Using the same
argument, the ITCI employees and local forestry officials forbade the Dayak
community to cut trees in their customary primary forest, arguing this area
now fell within the forest concession. The government also denied customary
land rights in the case of a project of a small-holder in rubber, run by the
Provincial Plantation Crop Service. In addition, the Kutai District government
denied customary rights over non-timber forest products, notably birds’ nests
by forbidding the Dayak community to exercise their traditional rights, whilst
awarding licenses for the harvesting of bird’s nests to outsiders.
Whilst most parts of East Kalimantan experienced such fierce state inter-
vention in forestry resource use, particularly since the 1983 forest designation
followed by the enactment of the Government Regulation of 1985 on Forest
Protection, this contrasted rather starkly with what happened in the Mahakam
Delta. As will be further elaborated in Chapter 5, there was hardly any exercise
of state intervention in the ‘Production Forest’ of the Mahakam Delta. As a
result, unlike the local residents on the Kutai mainland who were unable to
utilize surrounding forest land due to the claim of state ownership, the local
residents of the Mahakam Delta freely opened the mangrove forest to plant
coconut and pepper crops, before converting to shrimp ponds (Levang 2002,
p. 6 and 17; Lenggono 2004, p. 112-113). However, though they did not ex-
perience any state intervention directly, there was a level of intervention
through the presence of oil and gas companies, as is explained in the following
paragraphs.
After three years of failing to discover an oil reserve, in 1970 Japex handed
over the Mahakam-Bunyu Block to Total E&P Indonesie with the agreement
of equal benefit sharing (see Section 6.2). Two years after the hand-over (1972),
Total E&P discovered an oil field which was followed by further oil field
discoveries in 1974, 1977, 1986, 1991 and 1992 (Sandjatmiko et al. 2005, p. 149).
Meanwhile, Virginia Indonesia Company (Vico) discovered an oil and gas field
in Muara Badak sub-district in 1972 which was estimated to deposit the largest
oil and gas reserve in Indonesia.46
The commencement of oil and gas exploitation by Total E&P and Vico
definitely affected fishermen and farmers. Total E&P occupied some river and
sea areas in the Mahakam Delta that were used for fishing (Hidayati et al.
2004; Hidayati et al. 2005), while Vico used some plots of land that were
already utilized or possessed. Given that both Total E&P and Vico used fishing
grounds and land that the local people had been using, this inevitably turned
45 When the ITCI eventually paid the compensation, the real motive was not that they recog-
nized the land rights of the Dayak community and recent immigrants, but primarily to
avoid trouble (Vargas 1985, p. 166).
46 The field was named Badak Field. The discovery was followed by six other oil and gas
fields in adjacent areas. VICO used to be called HUFFCO Indonesia or Huffington Company
Indonesia. The company was founded by two Americans. See http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/
VICO_Indonesia (accessed on 27/10/2011).
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to conflict. To deal with conflicts with fishermen regarding fishing grounds,
Pertamina Unit IV with which Total E&P and Vico had signed production
sharing contracts sent a letter to the Kopkamtib’s Regional Special Operation
Unit (Laksusda) of East Kalimantan asking to pay attention to the fishing and
sailing in or around the platforms of oil and gas companies.47 Laksusda con-
veyed this message in a radiogram to the Governor. The Governor, then, sent
a radiogram to the Kutai District Head. The correspondence finally ended with
a letter made by the District Head which was sent to the Head of the Kutai
Fishery Agency and four sub-district heads, namely those of Bontang, Sangkuli-
rang, Anggana and Muara Badak. In general, the radiogram and letter aimed
at controlling the fishing and sailing in and around the companies’ platforms.
In the meantime, Vico and Total E&P, strongly assisted by Pertamina Unit
IV, obtained land for their exploitation through land acquisition. Recognizing
the local ownership of land, Vico and Pertamina provided compensation for
land, trees and huts. However, they sometimes applied a physical standard
to determine whether a plot of land was private (tanah garapan) or state land.
If the land was still fully covered by trees, they would claim it as state land
and compensation would not have to be paid. When intending to obtain 30
ha of forest land in Sambera, Salo Palai village of Muara Badak sub-district
in 1978, Vico did not pay compensation to the local residents, but instead to
PT. Meranti Sakti, whose concession areas included this area.48
Whilst state intervention in land, forest and oil and gas resources occurred
primarily through the issuance of concessions, this was not the case for fishery
resource use. Apart from issuing permits, determining fishing zones and
prohibiting particular types of gear, the state used two other prominent policy
measures to control fishery resource use. Since the late 1960s the Provincial
and Kutai District government passed some regulations on fishery resource
use to implement the national fishery regulations.49 In order to exercise formal
state intervention, the Kutai District Fishery Agency installed some warning
boards and check points. However, as occurred with the forestry regulations,
formal state intervention in fishery resource use similarly lacked effective
implementation. As Hartoto (1997, p. 78) observed.
47 The term Kopkamtib stands for Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and
Order (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban). It used to be an intelligence
organization. It was established not long after the so-called G30 S event in 1965. Like the
ordinary military organizational structure, the Kopkamtib also existed at the regional level
namely in the form of Laksuswil (Kopkamtib’s Inter-regional Special Operations) and
Laksusda.
48 Vico paid around US$ 30,000 to PT. Meranti Sakti for cutting down all trees. The acquired
30 ha of land are presently located in non-forest area.
49 See Hartoto (1997, p. 78) about the severe ineffectiveness of the Kutai District Regulation
of 1978 on Fishing.
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Even though the Kutai District Agency has built some check points nearby the lakes
of the middle Mahakam River, no guards stayed at the check points or watched
around the lakes. Likewise, even though there were some warning boards installed
prohibiting fishing in the lakes, during my field research, there were more than
twenty boats operating.
3.3 PERIOD OF 1998-2011: THE ‘REFORMASI’ AND DECENTRALIZATION
As said, in the period from 1998 until 2011, the fierce competition to gain
access to natural resources tested formal state intervention, which had been
developed as of the late 1960s in the Mahakam Delta and since the 1950s
elsewhere in East Kalimantan. Due to the abovementioned pressure, environ-
mental deterioration came up as overarching issue. This has recently led to
discussions on how to establish sustainable natural resources use in the Maha-
kam Delta, which could generate income for various users on one hand, and
protect and preserve the environment on the other.
The pattern of competing to gain access to natural resources in this period
is heavily influenced by the way local actors perceived the ‘reformasi’ in relation
to natural resources management. For local actors, whether government offi-
cials or local people, the reformasi has been understood as an opportunity
to benefit from natural resources extraction from which they had been excluded
for more than thirty years of timber concessions steered by the central govern-
ment (Barr et al. 2001; Obidzinski and Barr 2003; McCharty 2006; Moeliono
at el. 2009). In relation to the perception which suggests that reformasi is an
opportunity, district government officials on many occasions said that the
reformasi, which held decentralization of natural resources management high
on the agenda, would provide greater prosperity to local people. One way
to achieve that goal would be to give greater access to local people in utilizing
natural resources, so they would get a greater share of its benefits (Casson
2001, p. 15).
Similarly, regional and local government officials regarded the reformasi
as an opportunity to end centralized natural resources management. Pursuing
revenue generation and enhancing the prosperity of local people were two
of the most important reasons for pushing the central government to move
to immediate and full regional autonomy (Moeliono at al. 2009). The former
Kutai District Head said during his opening speech of the start of an ambitious
program, entitled ‘Moving Forwards Kutai’s Development Endeavours’ (Gera-
kan Pengembangan Pemberdayaan Kutai abrrev Gerbang Dayaku).
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With capital originating from Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999,50 we had
many opportunities to determine and colour our future lives. We can shape the
regional community of Kutai to be independent, creative and prosperous.51
At the time the central government was formulating laws and policies on
decentralization, in many places local people reclaimed their rights over natural
resources, which they perceived as having arbitrarily been taken away from
them by the government or private companies. Those who made the claim
on the basis of their customary rights argued that customary law was now
equal to state law (Barr et al. 2001, p. 26; Potter 2005, p. 390; Barr et al. 2006,
p. 12).52 Their claims corresponded with the long standing promotion of
community-based natural resources management, which NGOs had campaigned
for the early 1990s. In a place like the Mahakam Delta, the occupation of state
forest land was not based on customary claims, but on the fact that the forest
land was not utilized (Hidayati et al. 2005; Timmer 2010). Apart from these
specific arguments, there was an underlying general notion at stake, namely
the perception that the reformasi meant the disappearance of previous control,
which in Indonesian language is popularly called freedom (bebas) (Potter 2005,
p. 390; Arnscheidt 2009, p. 350).
These changing social phenomena at the regional and local level influenced
the substance of the reformasi in natural resources management that the central
government was shaping, considerably. A former Head of the Kutai Forestry
Agency, who served during 2001-2004, conveyed a very interesting view on
the reason which the Minister of Forestry used for forming the policy that
gave district heads the authority to issue small-scale logging. To him, the policy
was primarily aimed at controlling the anger of the local people by allowing
50 While as far as political issues are concerned the two laws were made in the hope to prevent
national disintegration, from a legal point of view the two laws were enacted in a way
to formulize legal instruments for decentralization policies after 32 years of an authoritarian
regime led by Soeharto. Prior to the passage of the two laws in 1999, the People’s Consultat-
ive Assembly had made the decree No. XV/MPR/1998 concerning regional autonomy,
just natural resources use and fiscal balance between the central government and the regions,
which laid down an official political consensus on decentralized government. The political
consensus was subsequently translated into the two laws. Law No. 22/1999 on Regional
Autonomy in which the central government transferred some of its authorities to regional
governments, indeed contained a spirit to boost regional governments to pursue people’s
prosperity by allowing the regional governments to generate regional development on the
basis of local creativity. This creativity can, for example, be translated into exploring
potential sources of local revenue that can be used to fund regional development. For this
purpose, Law No. 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and
the Regions was made. This law introduced new fiscal relations between the center and
the regions and provides new formulas for dividing revenues (Hidayat and Antlov 2004:
270). It was assumed that the two laws formed a package for policy on regional autonomy.
See Fauzan (2006, p. 225); Sabon (2009, p. 152) and Sutedi (2009, p. 8).
51 Casson (2001: 15). See also Syaukani (2004a); Syaukani (2004b).
52 For the accounts of how local people reclaimed their customary forest land to pursue
compensation from private companies see Casson (2001); Obidzinski and Barr (2003, p. 25).
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them to enter forest areas and cut trees.53 This view reminds us of the reasons,
which motivated the central government, when responding to the emergence
of regionalism in the 1950s and 1960s (see Section 3.1).
This concrete instance of forest policy formulation shows that allowing
local people to legally participate in natural resources extraction was an
important objective of the reformed policies on natural resources management.
Some departments of the central government thought that giving the authority
to district/municipality governments to issue small-scale logging would be
the most appropriate response to the increasing demand of the local people.
In addition, they also thought that decentralization would enable democratic
natural resources management, given that the local people could more easily
access decision-making (Barr et al. 2001, p. 25; The Asia Foundation 2003;
Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Moeliono at al. 2009, p. 5).
In the light of the above developments, the central government immediately
passed some regulations on the transfer of government affairs to regional
government, notably at the district/municipality level. With regard to natural
resources management, public management of forests, plantations and mining
was transferred. In the forestry sector, the partial transfer of authority through
the enactment of the Government Regulation of 1998, had even taken place
before the Law on Regional Autonomy, the Law on the Fiscal Balance between
the Central Government and the Regions and the Law on Forestry were all
passed in 1999.54 Without waiting for the completion of the new Forestry
Law, which was in the process of being drafted, the Minister of Forestry
continued to make regulations concerning the transfer of authority through
the issuance of a Government Regulation and two ministerial decrees in
1999.55
With the ultimate goal of decentralizing forest management, notably by
issuing concessions which increase local people’s access to forest exploitation,
the regulations stipulated the following two things. Firstly, they expanded
the authority of the provincial and district/municipal governments in matters
of forest management. Secondly, they gave a governor the authority to issue
small concessions on timber and the extraction of forest products on areas
sizing no more than 10,000 ha, whereas a district head/mayor could issue a
concession on an area not larger than 100 ha. To ensure that the concession
53 Interview SS, a former Head of Kutai Forestry Agency, 11/6/2008.
54 Government Regulation No. 62/1998 on the Partial Delegation of Authority in the Forestry
Sector to the Region. This regulation replaced Government Regulation No. 64/1957.
55 The Government Regulation was No. 6/1999 concerning forest enterprises and the extraction
of forest products in areas designated as Production Forest, and the Decree of the Minister
of Forestry and Estate Crops No. 310/Kpts-II/1999 concerning guidelines for the issuance
of licenses for the extraction of forest products, and No. 317. Later, the Ministerial Decree
was changed by No. 317/Kpts-II/1999 concerning the indigenous rights on the collection
of forest products in areas designated as Production Forest. Later, the former ministerial
decree was replaced by No. 05.1/Kpts-II/2000.
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would be given to local people, the regulations stated that the concession had
to be awarded to an individual Indonesian citizen, cooperatives or another
Indonesian legal body.56
Similarly, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources formed regulations
which granted a district/municipality the authority to issue a mining license.
In 2000, the Minister passed a decree, which authorized district heads/mayors
to issue a small mining concession over an area sizing no more than 5,000
ha.57 Before this decree was issued, licenses concerning vital and strategic
mining which could only be issued by the Minister of Energy and Mineral
Resources. Restrictions remained. For example, the district head/mayor could
only issue a license for mining which was not classified as vital and strategic.
The small mining concession could be assigned to local cooperatives (Salim
2005; Susmiyati 2007, p. 22 and 38).
Policies aimed at enabling local communities to benefit more from land
and natural resources extraction occurred too in the plantation sector. In 1999
and 2002, the Minister of Forestry and Estate Crops and the Minister of Agri-
culture respectively issued decrees. The decrees gave a governor and district
head/mayor the authority to grant licenses for small-scale estate plantation
(Colchester et al. 2006, p. 45).58
Meanwhile, in contrast with the forestry, mining and plantation sector,
no such regulations, which were to create greater access for local people, were
introduced for the fishery sector (Patlis in Resosudarmo 2005, p. 233).59
As a province which has approximately ten million hectares of production
forest, and which contains large mining reserves, East Kalimantan was one
of the first provinces in Indonesia to implement the regulations on the issuance
of small-scale logging. Moreover, the number of forest concessions that were
still active by the end of the centralized government had decreased from 120
to 75 (Poffenberger 1997, p. 456). On the Kutai mainland, some of the large
forest concessions had ceased to operate since the second half of the 1980s.60
Since many large forest concessions were no longer active, around two millions
hectares of Production Forest lay idle and became suitable for the issuance
of small forest concessions (Badan Planologi Kehutanan 2002, p. 9). The frag-
mentation (pemekaran) into new districts, which sought to immediately generate
56 See Article 22(2) Government Regulation No. 6/1999, and Article 4 (3) the Decree of the
Minister of Forestry No. 310/Kpts-II/1999.
57 The provision was stated in the Decree of the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources
No. 1453K/29/Mem/2000.
58 Pursuant to the Decree of the Minister of Forestry and Estate Crops No. 603/2000 and the
Decree of the Minister of Agriculture 357/Kpts/HK.350/5/2002, a district head could issue
a license on an area sizing no more than 100 ha.
59 In 1999, Berau District Government issued Local Regulation No. 69/1999 concerning the
management of turtles and their eggs (Obidzinski and Barr 2003, p. 13-15).
60 Interview A, a staff of Muara Badak office of Kutai Forestry Agency, 6/3/2009.
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district revenue, was another factor that pushed district governments to issue
small concessions.61
Through these enabling and push factors, the implementation of the regula-
tions on the transfer of authority in East Kalimantan resulted in a large number
of small concessions on forest, mining and plantation.62 To illustrate the point,
this book takes Kutai District as an example. During 1999-2000, the period
when many small forest concessions were granted, the Kutai District Head
issued 200 Timber Collection and Utilization Permits (Izin Pemungutan dan
Pemanfaatan Kayu abbrev. IPPK) and 50 Forest Product Collection Permits (Hak
Pemungutan Hasil Hutan abbrev. HPHH).63 During the period of 2002-2006,
the Kutai District Head issued 493 letters confirming coal mining licenses (Surat
Keterangan Izin Pertambangan). Of these, 309 permits resulted in exploration
permits, and 90 exploitation permits (Susmiyati 2007, p. 44).64 It should be
noted that the issuance of the small concessions was only possible through
the prior passing of some Kutai District regulations. Two of these are Kutai
Regulation No. 22/1999 concerning private forest land, and No. 2/2001 con-
cerning mining permits.
As said, the central government expressed hopes that the decentralization
of natural resources management in which the local people would have a
greater share of its benefits, would effectively control their anger on one hand,
61 After being divided into four districts and two municipalities in 1959, in 1997 East Kaliman-
tan province saw the establishment of another municipality called Tarakan. During the
early stage of the 1999 decentralization, the Province saw a further division with two large
districts, Kutai and Bulungan, being fragmented into several smaller districts through Law
No. 47/1999. The fragmentation resulted in Kutai District being divided into three districts
and one municipality namely Kutai Kartanegara, Kutai Timur, Kutai Barat and Bontang.
Bulungan District was divided into three districts namely Bulungan, Nunukan and Malinau.
In 2002 and 2007, the region was further fragmented with Penajam Pasir Utara and Tanah
Tidung as new districts.
62 Another push factor behind the issuance of the large number of small-scale concessions
on natural resources extraction in East Kalimantan was the desire of local politicians to
collect money for their respective political activities. It resembled the situation of the 1950s,
when there was a democratic multi-party rule. The engagement of local politicians in the
business coincided with the emergence of new local networks, mostly with ethnic and
kinship ties, which benefited from the small-scale concession system. See Peluso (1983);
Obidzinski and Barr (2003); Obidzinski (2003); Barr et al. (2006). For an account of how
the local networks evolved and played a role in the small-scale logging in Central Kaliman-
tan see McCarthy (2001); McCarthy (2004), and in Sumatera see McCarthy (2005), and
McCarthy (2006).
63 Across East Kalimantan, around 700 IPPKs/HPHHs were issued during that time, covering
hundreds of thousands of hectares of forest land. See Casson and Obidzinski (2002, p. 137-
138); Barr et al. (2006, p. 89).
64 According to a figure released by the Indonesian Forum for Environment of East Kalimantan
(Walhi Kalimantan Timur), with a total area of 1.2 hectares of coal mining, Kutai District
has the largest coal mining area in East Kalimantan. See ‘Total Izin Melebihi Luas Kaltim.
IUP Tambang Bermasalah Disorot Lagi. LSM Sebut Bertolak Belakang Kaltim Green’. Kaltim
Post, 7/8/2010.
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and prevent environmental destruction on the other hand. However, un-
controlled issuance of small concessions generated serious social and environ-
mental problems. Due to a severe lack of local forestry officials, particularly
for newly established districts, the destructive management of the small
concession holders could not be controlled (Casson 2001; Obidzinski and Barr
2003; Barr et al. 2003; Moeliono at al. 2009). Moreover, in reality there was
much logging without a permit from the district government (Casson and
Obidzinski 2002; Obidzinski 2003; Barr et al. 2006).
As said, in a Production Forest like the Mahakam Delta where no forest
concession or protection existed, the practice of competing to gain access to
natural resources was widespread. At that time the local people and recent
immigrants who cleaned up the forest to convert it into shrimp ponds, found
the area empty and belonging to nobody. For this reason they felt that their
occupation was legitimate, despite perceiving the empty area as state land
(Hidayati, Djohan and Yogaswara 2008, p. 57).65 The only state-like interven-
tion in obtaining land rights was through the role of village heads, who gave
semi-official permissions to some land holders (Lenggono 2004, Hidayati et
al. 2005; Hidayati, Djohan and Yogaswara 2008). Only after the land holders
started undertaking transactions on their land – e.g. acquisition, sale and
loan –, formal and semi-formal rules began to apply. Only later, they
encountered objections to or contestations about their rights over the forest
land by advancing economic, social and legal arguments (see Chapter 8 for
a further description of the various arguments that land holders advanced).
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since independence in 1945 until the late 1950s, natural resources management
in East Kalimantan, notably in Kutai District, did not only rely on legal norms,
but also on government structures inherited from the colonial times. In the
course of this period, regulations concerning permits on forest, mining and
fishery resource use chiefly continued to be based on a colonial framework.
The only change to the legal system on natural resources in this period was
the person, who makes the decisions in public administration, notably who
was authorized to issue permits and collect royalties, levy or tax. One thing
that should be noted is that in the course of the period, due to their past status
as self-governing states and the slow establishment of regional government
agencies, the four sultanates still played a significant role in issuing permits
in addition to collecting tax, levy and royalties. In the years between 1957 and
1970 the decentralization of management of natural resources enabled local
65 For an account of how a similar argument was used by local residents and migrants to
occupy a mangrove forest in Bulungan District see Setiawati (1999).
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people to interact more closely with local politicians or policy makers so that
they could practice their customary norms on natural extraction.
During the period of 1970-1998 state intervention in natural resources
use was carried out through centralized natural resources management. To
implement the centralized state intervention, the central government produced
a packet of laws and regulations. The laws and regulations did not only move
the authority to issue permits to the central government, but also superimposed
formal rules on traditional or local rights on land and natural resource use.
During the period of centralized management it became difficult for people
to exercise their local rights on natural resources management. In many places,
it was prohibited for local people to clear land and cut trees. The only way
the local people were able to practice their rights was through informal and
semi-informal arrangements, which could emerge since the actual implementa-
tion of formal state intervention was very weak.
It can also be observed that during the period of centralized management,
state intervention was less exercised in one sector, but strongly exercised in
others. As will be elaborated in detail in Chapter 5, in this period the local
people were relatively free to clean up forest to convert it into farms and later
shrimp ponds. There were hardly any local forest officials who warned or even
asked them to stop converting the forest land. Unlike the timber companies
on the mainland, which regarded the rights claims of the local people as
illegitimate, Vico and Total E&P behaved differently. They recognized the local
people’s rights on their land by providing compensation. At the same time,
state intervention in fishery resource use was fiercely exercised by creating
restricted fishing zones. This fiercer form of state control ensured that oil and
gas extraction was not interrupted.
From 1998 the reformasi and decentralization were perceived by the local
actors (government officials, politicians, community leaders and ordinary local
people) as implying more freedom to exercise authority and customary law
on one hand, and by the central government as an opportunity to manage
the anger of local actors on the other. The period of 1999 until the present has
been filled with regulations which primarily allowed provincial and district/
municipality governments to issue permits on small-scale natural resources
extraction. By awarding small-scale extraction to the local people, the regulators
expected that the local people would get a greater share in benefit from natural
resources use. However, this objective has not been fully realized, as narrow
self-interests of local networks have impeded an effective exercise of state
intervention. As a result, in reality, the extent to which the local people could
utilise local natural resources use has depended heavily on informal and semi-
informal arrangements. This has also been the case with the local people of
the Mahakam Delta, as no official permit has been issued by either the Pro-
vincial or Kutai District government.
4 Indonesia’s government structure and
legislation system
Indonesia is a republic and a unitary state.1 As a republic, power is distributed
among the legislative, executive and judicial branches. Nevertheless as a
unitary state, the authority of public administration primarily rests in the hands
of the central government (Ridwan 2009, p. 15). As a result, the regional and
local governments have the authority to carry out public administration only
if the central government transfers (some of) its powers through decentral-
ization (Gadjong 2007, p. 71-72). In this context, the book uses a narrow de-
finition of the concept ‘decentralization’, the meaning of which corresponds
closely with ‘devolution’. In the broader sense, decentralization can be defined
as the transfer of authority, responsibility, and resources, through deconcentra-
tion, delegation, or devolution, from the centre to the lower level of administra-
tion (Rondinelli 1981, p. 137; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007, p. 1).2 However,
it is important to underline that Indonesia is not a pure unitary state given
that the way in which government authority is divided between the central
and regional is fixed in the Constitution and laws. Thus, to some extent Indo-
nesia is federally organized (Asshiddiqie 2001, p. 28).
Apart from transferring some government authorities to the regional
governments, the central government also distributes its authority over its own
units, notably the departmental ministry, non-departmental ministry (Ind.
lembaga pemerintah non-departemen abbrev. LPND) and executive branch
agencies.3 The ministerial departments, non-ministerial departments and
executive branch agencies can further transfer the governmental authority to
their respective established lower units. That kind of authority is in the
Indonesian context based the principle of deconcentration.
This chapter approaches ‘government’ in the sense of executive power.4
Focusing on the executive, this chapter will therefore only describe Indonesia’s
public administration, looking at both its horizontal and vertical sectors. The
1 Article 1(1) of the Constitution of 1945.
2 Meanwhile, devolution is defined as the divestment of functions by the central government
and the creation of new units of governance outside the control of central authority (Rondi-
nelli 1981, p. 138). In addition, in the Indonesian context the concepts of desentralisasi and
dekonsentrasi are distinctly legal and are explicitly defined by law.
3 There are various names for the LNPD namely (Ind.) badan, lembaga, biro or dewan. See
Hadjon (1990, p. 171).
4 In its broader meaning, that term could also encompass legislative and judicial power
(Manan 2002, p. 100-101 and 103).
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horizontal sectors here refer to the layers of government in terms of decentral-
ization, while the vertical sector refers to the sectoral departments and agencies
and its deconcentrated lower units.
Government structure and the theory of the ‘hierarchy of legislation’ are
the main factors that shape Indonesia’s legislation system, which is structured
hierarchically. The principle, popularly named as the ‘hierarchy of legislation’,
presupposes that lower legislation shall not be in contradiction with higher
legislation. In line with the unitary form of the state, the hierarchy should make
sure that legislation enacted by regional governments shall not be in contra-
diction with legislation made by the central government. Yet, the principles
resulting from the unitary government structure and the ‘hierarchy of legis-
lation’ have been long disregarded through the fact that administrative or
policy rules (peraturan kebijakan) are often different from and in contradiction
with higher legislation. That often occurs when government officials exercise
discretionary powers.
4.1 GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE: HORIZONTAL LAYERS
I will first assess Indonesia’s broader government structure as stipulated in
the 1945 Constitution, before moving to the accounts of the horizontal structure
of Indonesia’s government structure. Pursuant to the Constitution there are
a number of state institutions that have the authority to exercise legislative,
judicial and executive power. Together with the Regional Representative
Council (Ind. Dewan Perwakilan Daerah abbrev. DPD), the People’s Representat-
ive Council (Ind. Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat abbrev. DPR) has the power to make
legislation in addition to two other functions, namely determining the public
budget and monitoring the executive.5 Meanwhile, the DPD is formed to
strengthen regional representation, so that it can convey the regional demands
in the process of law-making to the central level. The DPD and DPR sit together
to form the People’s Consultative Assembly (Ind. Majelis Permusyawaratan
Rakyat abbrev. MPR). Unlike its powerful pre-constitutional amendment (2001
and 2002) position, the MPR presently has only very limited functions: to
amend the Constitution, inaugurate the president and vice-president, and
impeach the president.6
The Supreme Court (Ind. Mahkamah Agung abbrev. MA) together with lower
provincial and district courts, and the Constitutional Court exercise judicial
power.7 They hear civil and criminal cases. For particular cases concerning
matters on commerce and administration, commercial and state administrative
courts are in charge. There are also courts which hear cases involving particular
5 See Article 20 (1) and 20A (1) of the Constitution.
6 See Article 3 of the Constitution.
7 Article 24(2) of the Constitution.
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groups of society, such as the military courts for military officers and the
Religious Court for Muslims. As said, beside the Supreme Court, the Constitu-
tional Court can also exercise power over the judiciary. The Constitutional
Court specifically hears cases concerning the legality of the law, general
elections, the dissolution of political parties, and the scope of the authority
of state institutions.
The president together with the vice-president holds power over the
administration of the government.8 In running the administration of govern-
ment, the president and vice-president are assisted by a number of ministers
and the heads of the non-ministerial departments as well as executive branch
agencies.9 Each ministerial and non-ministerial department deals with parti-
cular matters of government.10 In addition to holding power over administer-
ing public matters, the president also has the power to submit law to DPR.11
It is important to note that besides this traditional division of power among
and within the legislative, executive and judicial branch, a state auxiliary organ
(organ negara penunjang) has emerged which exercises mixed or quasi legislat-
ive, executive and judicial powers. This state auxiliary organ comprises of
independent state agencies or independent regulatory bodies, and executive
branch agencies or dependent regulatory agencies (Tauda 2012, p. 5 and 96).
Concerning its position, the former are neither part of the legislative nor
executive branch, while the latter is part of the executive (Indrayana 2009,
p. 57). Having mixed powers, the independent state agencies are able to make
law, provide public services as well as dispute settlement (Asshiddiqie 2006b,
p. 79; Asshiddiqie 2006c, p. 8; Indrayana 2009, p. 6-7; Tauda 2012, p. 93). As
of December 2009, Indonesia has fourteen independent state agencies12 and
29 executive branch agencies (Indrayana 2009, p. 11-12 and 57-58).13
As said, Indonesia is a unitary state in which government matters are not
wholly exercised by the central government, but partly transferred (dipencar)
to regional governments, whether provincial or district/municipality.14 This
8 See Article 4 and 17 (3) of the Constitution.
9 See Article 19 (1) of Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Autonomy, Article 7 of Law No. 39/2008
on State Ministries, and Article 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 103/2001 concerning
the functions, tasks, authority and organizational structure of non-ministerial departments.
10 Law No. 39/2008 on State Ministries: Article 5 elaborates on what are government affairs.
The Law however states that not every government ‘affair’ needs a ministry (Article 6).
11 Article 5 of the Constitution.
12 Examples are the National Commission on Human Rights (Komisi Hak Asasi Manusia),
the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) and the Judicial
Commission (Komisi Yudisial).
13 Examples are the National Law Commission (Komisi Hukum Nasional), the Public Attorney
Commission (Komisi Kejaksaan), and the Indonesian Police Committee (Ind. Komisi
Kepolisian Indonesia).
14 The term ‘district’ refers to ‘kabupaten’ in Bahasa while ‘municipality’ refers to ‘kota’. One
often sees the term ‘regency’ as a translation of ‘kabupaten’. As said, autonomous regions,
both districts and municipalities, have a similar government structure except for the fact
that a municipality does not have villages. Concerning formation, districts should comprise
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is clearly stated in the Constitution, which determines that Indonesia is divided
into provinces, districts and municipalities. Every provincial and district/
municipal government carries out their respective government duties.15 In
an effort to implement the principle of deliberate consultation (permusyawara-
tan), the Constitution determines that the regional governments have their
own Regional House of Representation.16 This has led to the regional govern-
ments exercising executive and legislative powers concomitantly.17 In other
words, regional governments are composed of an executive and legislative
body. The local executive and legislative body are meant to be on an equal
footing, and a cooperative and harmonious relation between the local executive
and legislative body is expected (Soeprapto 1998, p. 86-87).
According to Manan (2002: 105-6), the formation of the Regional House
of Representatives does not really change the type of affairs that the regional
government administers. Even though the regional government has a Regional
House of Representatives which has legislative power, this legislative power
is limited to matters of public administration only (administrasi pemerintahan
negara); As a result, regional regulation that the Regional House of Representat-
ives passes only concerns matters of public administration and not constitu-
tional matters (ketatanegaraan). The limited legislative power of the Regional
House of Representatives and regional government is due to the restricted
authority granted by the law to implement regional autonomy. Therefore, one
may say that the main task of the Regional House of Representatives is to
control the regional executive, whereas the legislative task comes secondary
(Asshiddiqie 2006c, p. 302).
Governors, district heads and mayors have two main roles. One is related
to decentralization and the other to deconcentration. The title of governor,
district head or mayor is given in their capacity to lead their autonomous
regional government, while their title of local head (kepala daerah) is related
to their role as the leading regional or local representative of the central
government (Soeprapto 1998, p. 88).
There is a slight difference between the organizational structure of a
provincial and district/municipal government. The organizational structure
of the provincial government primarily consists of a secretariat or office of
governor, inspectorate, implementing divisions (unsur pelaksana), and support-
ing divisions (unsur pendukung). The organizational structure of the district/
municipal government also includes sub-districts.18 In accordance with the
above provisions, village governments are not officially part of a district
of no less than seven sub-districts, while municipalities should comprise of no less than
four sub-districts. One other thing that distinguishes a district from a municipality is that
districts cover a larger area but have a smaller population compared to a municipality.
15 Article 18 (1 and 2) of the 1945 Constitution.
16 Article 19 (3) of the 1945 Constitution. See also Gadjong (2007) and Ridwan (2009).
17 Article 19 (2) and 40 of Law No. 32/2004.
18 See Article 120 of Law of 2004 on Regional Autonomy.
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government. The implementing divisions of the provincial and district/muni-
cipality government usually constitute of an agency (dinas) whereas supporting
divisions include an office (kantor), a body (badan) and a local hospital.19
Concerning their functions, the secretariat of the provincial and district/
municipal government or office of governor/district head/mayor is primarily
there to prepare policies and coordinate the different implementing divisions
and supporting divisions. Consequently, every bureau of the secretariat has
those two primary functions. Similarly, the implementing divisions and sup-
porting divisions are there to prepare policies concerning their respective work
fields. Yet as an implementing division, the agency can provide public services,
whilst the supporting division has only supporting tasks. Meanwhile, the sub-
district government is there to carry out some of the government tasks, which
have been transferred by the district/municipal government, namely to
coordinate community participation, to maintain order and enforce the law,
to supervise the running of the village governments and to provide public
services.20
Implementing divisions and supporting divisions are primarily composed
of secretariat office, division (bidang, bagian) and expertise-based official ((Ind.
kelompok jabatan fungsional). Under the divisions there are section and sub-
division. Apart from a secretariat and a division the implementing division
and supporting division usually also has a technical implementation unit (Ind.
unit pelaksana teknis). The technical implementation unit has the following
organizational structure: secretariat office, section (seksi) and expertise-based
officials. Before decentralization effectively was in force in 2001, the implement-
ing divisions could have regional or local office (cabang dinas).21 The organiza-
tional structure of a sub-district government is composed of a secretariat office
and sections. The organizational structure of the village government is much
more simple. It consists of a secretariat, a technical section for implementation
(pelaksanan teknis lapangan) and territorial units. The territorial units can be
neighbourhoods (Ind. rukun tetangga).22
19 The office (kantor) and office (badan) are formed to administer more specific government
affairs such as environment, food security, library or archive. Like the implementing
divisions, the supporting divisions are under the supervision of the governor, district head
or mayor. The regional government are free to choose whether to use the term kantor or
badan for their supporting divisions. See Article 15(1) of Law No. 32/1004, Article 8 of
Government Regulation No. 41/2007, and the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affair
No. 57/2007 concerning the Organizational Structure of Regional Government.
20 Article 126(3) of Law of 2004 and Article 17(3) of Government Regulation No. 41/2007
concerning the Organizational Structure of Regional Government.
21 See Government Regulation No. 84/2000 on Organizational Structure of Regional Govern-
ment.
22 The Elucidation of Article 202(2) of Law of 2004 and Article 12(3) of Government Regulation
No. 72/2005 concerning the village.
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As for the current regulation on the organizational structure of the provin-
cial and district/municipal government, below are two organizational charts
of the provincial and district government.
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4.2 GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE: VERTICAL OR SECTORAL GOVERNMENT
As said, the president and vice-president are assisted by a number of ministers
who head departmental ministries as well as non-departmental ministries
(LPND) and executive branch agencies in order to run the government admin-
istration. Pursuant to legislation, the ministries can be divided into two distinct-
ly defined groups: the ministries which are charged with carrying out parti-
cular government affairs, and the ministries which are not charged with a
particular government affair. The latter is popularly named a ‘coordinating
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ministry’ (kementerian koordinator).23 The main task of the coordinating minis-
tries is to synchronize and coordinate the making and implementation of
policies in their respective areas.24 Meanwhile, the former can be divided
into three groups. Firstly, ministries which are explicitly named in the Constitu-
tion.25 Secondly, ministries whose names are not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion but whose scope of work is.26 Thirdly, ministries whose main task is
to pursue coordination and synchronization among and within the different
departments.27












The organization of a departmental ministry whose title and scope of work
have been named and stated in the Constitution, primarily consists of the head
(pimpinan), assisting (pembantu), implementing (pelaksana), supporting (pendu-
kung) and inspecting (pengawas) divisions,28 regional technical implementation
23 Indonesia currently has three coordinating ministries. The first deals with political, legal
and security issues. The second deals with economic issues and the third with welfare issues.
24 Article 6 and 7 of Presidential Regulation No. 47/2009.
25 They are respectively the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
Ministry of Defense.
26 For instance, the Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Marine and Fishery Affairs, and Ministry
of Energy.
27 For instance, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Land Affairs, and Ministry of Science
and Technology.
28 The inspectorate is an internal control instrument. Its main functions are to monitor perform-
ance and budget expenses. The inspectorate can conduct an internal investigation in case
of corruption, nepotism and administrative abuse (pelanggaran administrative). See Article
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units (unsur pelaksana tugas pokok daerah) and foreign representatives (Figure
4.3). The assisting division refers to the secretariat or office of the minister.
The implementing division refers to the directorate-general, which is
subsequently divided into directorates and sub-directorates, whereas the
supporting division usually consists of a body (badan) or a center (pusat).
The regional technical implementation units are usually called unit pelaksana
teknis (abbrev. UPT) in Bahasa. There are a number of important things that
need to be underlined regarding the technical implementation unit. Firstly,
this unit can be tasked with technical and operational matters. It is not charged
with policy-making.29 Secondly, the technical implementation unit has a work
area which may differ from the division of administrative territory. The work
area of a technical implementation unit may be located in more than one
administrative territory, thereby trespassing administrative boundaries.30
Thirdly, with regards to their hierarchical position, the technical implementa-
tion unit can fall under a directorate-general, agency or centre.31
The president forms LPNDs for specific government matters (Soeprapto 1998,
p. 78). These LPNDs have to coordinate their tasks with particular departmental
ministries. For the most part, the organizational structure of a LPND is similar
to a departmental ministry, given it has a head, an assistant (secretary), imple-
menting and inspectorate divisions, and regional technical implementation
units.32 The implementing division encompasses a number of directorates
and centers. If needed, the LPND can also form working groups.33 A particular
LPND such as the National Land Agency can also form regional offices in an
attempt to carry out its assigned task at a regional level.34
It is important to note that before decentralization in 2001, some depart-
mental ministries and non-departmental ministries had regional offices (kantor
wilayah). After decentralization, only departmental ministries which are charged
39 Presidential Regulation No. 47/2009, and Article 602 and Article 639 of the Regulation
of the Minister of Forestry No. P. 40/Menhut-II/2010 concerning Organizational Structure
of the Ministry of Forestry.
29 Article 4(1) of the Regulation of the Minister of Administrative Reform No. PER/18/M.
PAN/11/2008 concerning a guide for forming the organization of a service unit of the
ministerial and non-ministerial departments.
30 Article 4(1) of the Regulation of the Minister of Administrative Reform No. PER/18/M.
PAN/11/2008.
31 See Article 2(1) of the Regulation of the Minister of Administrative Reform No. PER/18/M.
PAN/11/2008.
32 See Article 79 of the Presidential Directive No. 103/2001 concerning the function, tasks,
authority and the organizational structure of non-ministerial departments, and Article 2(1)
of the Regulation of the Minister of Administrative Reform No. PER/18/M. PAN/11/2008.
33 See Article 102 of the Presidential Regulation No. 103/2001.
34 See Article 29 of the Presidential Regulation No. 10/2006 on National Land Agency.
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with government affairs which are not transferred to regions, can have regional
offices.35
4.3 THE LEGISLATION SYSTEM
4.3.1 Hierarchy of legislation
Discussions on Indonesia’s legislation system often refer to the legal principle
of ‘hierarchy of legislation’ (in Indonesian commonly known as hirarki or
susunan perundang-undangan). The ‘hierarchy of legislation’ which was theorised
by a prominent legal positivist, Hans Kelsen and later by his student Hans
Nawiasky, primarily postulates that the validity of lower legislations is given
by higher legislations while the validity of the highest legislations is provided
by a hypothetical fundamental norm (Grundnorm) presupposed by the jurist
(Soeprapto 1998, p. 39; Nurbaningsih 2004; Asshidiqie 2010). A higher legis-
lation can overrule a lower legislation if they both rule on the same matter.
From a historical point of view, the official application of the principle to
Indonesia’s legislation system as first stated in the Decree of MPRS/1966 was
meant to bring order to Indonesia’s legislation system, which had been dis-
rupted during the Old Order (Nurbaningsih 2004, p. 40). In an attempt to
realize this aim, the regulations concerning the ‘hierarchy of legislation’ deter-
mine that Indonesia’s legislation is structured by a hierarchy. In accordance
with Law No. 12/2011, the below figure illustrates this hierarchy of legis-
lation.36
The hierarchical structure prevents lower legislations from contradicting
higher legislation. In line with this hierarchy, district/municipal regulation
cannot be in contradiction with provincial regulation. Likewise, provincial
regulation can not be in contradiction with a presidential regulation, and so
on and so forth. Meanwhile, the Constitution which sits at the top of the
hierarchy has to be compatible with the Pancasila, which is laid down in the
constitutional preamble and is considered as the state fundamental norm or
ultimate legal source.37 The hierarchy of legislation presupposes that there
is no need to seek the validity of the state fundamental norm through higher
35 The departmental ministries are the Ministry of Foreign Affair, the Ministry of Defense,
the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of
Religion.
36 See Article 7(1). The above hierarchical structure as stated in Law No. 12/2011 revised the
hierarchy of the Decree of MPR No.III/2000 which made a Government Regulation in Lieu
of Law equal to a law. The MPR’s Decree of 2000 revised the 1966 MPR’s Decree, which
mistakenly classified the Constitution as legislation. According to Soeprapto (1998: 48-49),
the Constitution should have been classified as legislation given it still consists of funda-
mental norms and therefore the norms are still very general.
37 See Article 2 of Law No. 12/2011 and its Elucidation.
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legislation because it already existed before the Constitution and legislation
were made. The validity of the fundamental norm is pre-supposed (Siman-
juntak 1994, p. 26; Soeprapto 1998, p. 28-29). This implies that all legislations
of the hierarchy must be compatible with the values of the Pancasila.




Decree of the MPR
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Lower legislation not contradicting higher legislation is needed as it will
provide validity to the lower legislation. In a more legalistic approach, it is
suggested that lower legislation will be valid only if its making is requested
by higher legislation or if it is made by authoritative officials (Soeprapto 1998,
p. 19; Asshiddiqie and Safaát 2006, p. 110).38
Apart from legislation listed in the hierarchy, all regulations made by the
MPR, DPR, DPD, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, state commissions,
38 See also Article 8(2) of Law No. 12/2011.
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ministerial departments, non-ministerial departments, Provincial and District/
Municipal House of Representative, Governors, District Heads/Majors and
village heads, are regarded as legislation as well.39 However, existing laws
and regulations do not clearly stipulate the place of the respective regulations
in the hierarchy. This lack of clarity used to lead to a serious question: was
a local regulation higher than a Ministerial Decree given the latter did not
exist in the hierarchy? The question can be answered by regarding Indonesia
as a unitary state. Given that the ministers are part of the central government,
namely as the president’s assistants, leads to the conclusion that any regula-
tions they enact overrule the local regulations. As an organ of the central
government the ministers make legislation, which is enacted nationally.40
Asshiddiqie (2006a, p. 107-110) points out that because Indonesia is a unitary
state, it is reasonable that the central government exercises control over
regional governments. In line with that, regional and local legislations should
therefore be compatible with higher national legislations.41
In order to ensure that the legal principle and norms concerning the ‘hier-
archy of legislation’ function effectively, Indonesian law provides a general
control mechanism namely the judicial, legislative and executive review.
Regarding the judicial review, laws and regulations primarily state that the
Constitutional Court reviews laws to check whether they are in contradiction
with the Constitution or not, while the Supreme Court reviews any lower
legislation to check whether it may be in contradiction with laws.42 Mean-
while, the laws and regulations state that the executive review over local
regulations is to be carried out by the President or Minister of Home Affairs.
Pursuant to the Law on Regional Autonomy of 2004, the President and Minister
of Home Affairs can annul local regulations which are in contradiction with
the public interest and/or higher legislation.43 Provincial and district/
municipal governments, whose regulations are annulled, can lodge an appeal,
by filing a judicial review with the Supreme Court.44
39 Article 8 of Law No. 12/2011.
40 The statement is a legal advice given by the Minister of Justice and Human Rights respond-
ing to similar questions addressed by various ministries concerning the position of the
Ministerial Decree in the hierarchy of legislation. See Letter No. M.UM.01.06-27, dated on
23rd February 2001.
41 See Latief (2005, p. 65-68) for a similar argument.
42 See Article 24A(1), 24C(1)of the 1945 Constitution; Article 9 of Law No. 12/2011, Article
10(1) of Law No. 24/2003 on the Constitutional Court, and Article 11(2) of Law No. 4/2004
concerning judicial power.
43 See also Article 37 of Government Regulation No. 79/2005 concerning Pedoman Pembinaan
dan Pengawasan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah.
44 See Article 145 of Law No. 32/2004.
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4.3.2 Administrative rules
Whilst discussing legislation and its implementation by government officials
we also need to refer to administrative rules or policy rules (peraturan kebija-
kan). There are two reasons for that. Firstly, to a great extent, the state reaches
society by means of such administrative rules (Cotterrell 1984, p. 260). In other
words, legislation can affect a regulated group through administrative rules.
Secondly, government officials have long been using administrative rules in
a way to mediate between legislation or rule of law and their practical signi-
ficance for the regulated (Cotterrell 1984, p. 278). That way may enable govern-
ment officials to meet broader developmental or governmental goals (Baldwin
1995, p.12; Black 1997).
In Indonesia, discussions on administrative or policy rules are often asso-
ciated with a discussion on the limit of legislation as a governmental instru-
ment. Legal scholars of constitutional law and public administrative law believe
that administrative or policy rules are derived from discretionary powers given
to government officials. These discretionary powers are given due to the limits
or lack of legal rules as a means to achieve development goals. Thus, dis-
cretionary powers are expected to enable government officials to strive for
prosperity or effective public services (Marzuki 1996; Hadjon et al. 2001, p. 156;
Ridwan 2003, p. 133; Latief 2005). Having the discretionary power to make
administrative rules, government officials can no longer refuse providing public
services by arguing that no legislation exists yet (Ridwan 2003, p. 133).
Even though government officials are not required to base administrative
rules they make on certain prevailing legislation, such rules should not be
against the rule of law. As Atmosudirdjo (1994, p. 82) already emphasized,
administrative rules are bound by the principle of legality where all govern-
ment actions must be based on law. Nonetheless, as administrative rules should
comply with the principle of legality on the one hand yet are not regarded
as legislation on the other hand, Indonesian legal scholars are still debating
whether administrative rules can or can not be a subject of judicial review.
Those who suggest that administrative rules can not be a subject of judicial
review argue that administrative rules are practices; not law.45 Those who
suggest that they are subject to judicial review argue that so long as admin-
istrative rules are meant to generally bind (Ind. mengikat secara umum), they
are legislation and can therefore be reviewed (Latief 2005, p. 234).
Concerning the binding force of administrative rules, Attamimi (1993, p. 12)
points out that administrative rules are generally binding since the regulated
community is not able to refuse abiding by it. However some legal scholars
argue that administrative rules are not generally binding, but that they have
a legal relevance (Manan in Ridwan 2001, p. 139; Hadjon et al. 2001, p. 153).
45 See for instance in Hadjon et al. (1994, p. 154).
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Given that they are generally binding, the content of administrative rules is
abstract and can be applied generally. In this respect, administrative rules
resemble legislation and are unlike a beschikking (penetapan, keputusan).
Administrative rules could appear in the latter form when they regulate
concrete matters and are applied to particular individuals (konkrit, individual,
final) .46 However it should be underlined here that unlike legislation which
can stipulate both criminal and administrative sanctions, administrative rules
can only stipulate administrative sanctions.
In terms of content and form, administrative rules can resemble legislation.
Yet some administrative rules can be unwritten, such as an official announce-
ment made by a government official or a spoken order of a superior to his
staff. Written administrative rules can appear in the form of a decree (keputu-
san), directive (instruksi, surat perintah), official note (nota dinas), circular letters
(surat edaran) and administrative guidance (pedoman).47 Thus, administrative
rules do not have a standard form.
Legal scholars of administrative law strongly relate the emergence of
administrative rules to the absence or vagueness of legislation. This insight
helps explain the way they define discretionary power. They define discretion-
ary power as power given to government officials to make an appropriate
administrative decision, whenever the legislation is absent or vague. Such
definition has led to a rather formalistic way of viewing administrative rule
by scholars of administrative law. They very much stress the absence or
vagueness of legislation as the foremost, if not only, factors that cause govern-
ment officials to make administrative rules. In other words, according to these
scholars, discretionary power only appears, if legislation is lacking or vague.
The above insight is much different from notions developed by scholars
of regulatory studies who approach the issue more from an empirical point
of view. According to them, discretion can appear even if the legislation is
present and clear. It occurs given discretion results from interpretation and
choices made by public officials (Black 2001). Thus discretion should be seen
as a complex instead of a simple phenomenon. It appears not solely because
of official descriptions and designations of organizational goals and practices
but through complex interactions between the regulators and regulated com-
munity (Cotterrell 1984, p. 280). It is seen by some to be the outcome of the
interactions between networks, or alternatively webs of influence, which
operate in the absence of formal governmental and legal sanctions (Black 2002,
p. 8 and 27). Pursuing vested interests, protecting government agencies from
political interference, a lack of resources, taking into account the living law,
the perception of the regulated community, and advancing the realization of
policy goals are instances of the combined complex of factors from which
46 Soeprapto (1998, p. 52).
47 See Attamimi (1993, p. 13); Ridwan (2001, p. 137), and Latief (2005, p. 12).
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discretion could derive (Cotterrell 1984; Rosenbloom and Schwartz 1994;
Baldwin 1995; Black 1997; Black 2001).
4.4 REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW
As already mentioned (Section 1.3.1), it is important to distinguish between
‘regulatory implementation of law’ and ‘implementation of law’. Understanding
the regulatory implementation of law as the promulgation of implementing
rules, this chapter brings ‘the making of lower regulations’ into the discussion
on the regulatory implementation of law. In the Indonesian legal system, the
making of lower legislation is perceived as the first instrument to implement
law, while the second one is to implement policies or provide public services.
Concerning the first perception of the implementation of law, it is common
that Indonesian legislation requests lower officials to make lower legislation
or implementing rules as a way to implement (Ind. melaksanakan or menjalankan)
the enacted higher legislation.48
4.4.1 Transferred legislative power
That the first instrument of the implementation of law consists of making lower
legislations is based on the authority given by legislation to a particular
government unit or state/government bodies (Soeprapto 1998, p. 35; Matutu,
Latief and Mustamin 1999, p. 127). There are two kinds of transfer, namely
attribution and delegation. The former is given by the constitution or a law
to a particular government unit or official. Since the authority originates from
the constitution or law, the authority therefore exists unless the constitution
or law changes. Meanwhile, delegation to make law is given by particular
legislations to particular government units or officials either to create new
legislation or merely to further elaborate the subject matter of higher legis-
lation. Unlike the former type of transfer, the latter is temporary and valid
as long as the transferred authority is not withdrawn.
Indonesia’s legislation system practices the transfer of legislative power
strongly. The Constitution, for instance, gives the president legislative power
by stating that the president can propose draft bills to the DPR, and make
government regulations in order to carry out law and Governmental Regulation
in Lieu of Law (Ind. Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang abbrev.
Perpu).49 The Constitution does not only grant the president, but also the
regional government legislative power to make regulations to implement
48 For instances see Article 5(2) of the Constitution and Article 146(1) of No. 32/2004 on
Regional Autonomy.
49 See Article 5, and Article 22(1).
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regional autonomy.50 In this respect the president, regional governments
receive legislative power by means of attribution.
The majority of legislative power, which the executive receives however,
is by means of delegation. Delegation is certainly subject to the government
structure and the hierarchy of legislation. In accordance with this structure
and hierarchy, the president can delegate legislative power either to the
ministers, heads of the non-departmental ministries, executive branch agencies
or lower officials such as governor. An example of this is Government Regula-
tion No. 26/2008 on a National Spatial Plan which stipulates that a minister
who is in charge of water management will further regulate the water resource
management model.51
Meanwhile, the ministries, heads of non-departmental ministries and the
executive branch agencies are able to delegate legislative power to the heads
of their respective implementing, inspectorate and supporting divisions or
service units. In the meantime, the governors can transfer legislative power
either to his secretariats or agencies, technical/service units and district/
municipal governments. Likewise, the district head/mayor can delegate power
to his respective secretariats, agencies, technical/service units and village
governments.
The transfer of legislative power does not always go in steps. The provincial
and district/municipal governments for instance, can obtain legislative power
from laws directly. A number of laws on natural resources have given author-
ity to district/municipal governments to make local regulations concerning
the recognition of indigenous groups.52 The Law on Regional Autonomy of
2004 repeatedly stipulates that provincial and district/municipal governments
have legislative power in order to support regional autonomy and implement
higher legislation. It even specifically states that in order to implement regional
and local regulations, governors and district heads/mayors are able to make
regulations (peraturan) and decrees (keputusan).53
It is important to note that in accordance with the Law on the Making of
Legislation of 12/2011, only the state and government bodies which are
mentioned in the Law can receive legislative power, given they have the
authority to make legislation (Ind. kekuasaan membentuk hukum).54 Their legis-
lative power does not merely derive from legislation which gives them the
power but also from the legislation which has established state and government
bodies. For example, the Government Regulation on State Ministries of 2009
stipulates that state ministries are to formulate, endorse and implement the
50 See Article 18(16).
51 See Article 48(6).
52 See Article 67(2) of the Forestry Law of 1999, Article 9(2) of the Law on Estate Plantation
No. 18/2004, and Article 6(2) of the Law on Water Resources Management No. 7/2004.
53 Article 146(1) of Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Autonomy.
54 See Soeprapto (1998: 54).
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policies of their respective fields of work.55 Likewise, a Presidential Directive
on the National Land Agency of 2006 gives the National Land Agency the
task to formulate policies on land.56
4.4.2 Policies and Public Services
Implementing policies or providing public services are another instrument
for the regulatory implementation of law. In this respect, implementing policies
or providing public services constitute administrative activities to realize what
laws desire. Whereas in policy studies law is usually seen as a ‘policy instru-
ment’, in legal studies we might say that a policy is an instrument enabling
law to reach the public by for instance determining which rights and services
the enactment of the law should guarantee for the public. As said, public
officials can make administrative rules, if they think that is necessary to achieve
policy goals effectively.
As said above, the legal basis for public officials to make policies and
provide public services is the legislation on the forming of the respective
government body. Such legislation states that the making of policies and
providing public services belong to the main functions or tasks of the govern-
ment body. To give an example, the Kutai District Marines and Fisheries
Affairs Agency is there to formulate as well as control their implementation
policies on marines and fisheries.57 It is stated that the policies made by the
Kutai District agencies should be compatible with the district development
planning documents.
Both the central, regional government are obliged to make long-, medium-
and short-term development plans.58 Regarding the process, in making the
development plans, the agencies follow the principles of the unitary state. The
‘Short-Term Working Development Plan of a Departmental Ministry/Non-
Departmental Ministry and Regional/Local Agency’ should refer to the ‘Short-
Term Working Development Plan of Central or Regional Government’. The
making of the ‘Medium-Term Development Plan of the Departmental Minis-
tries and Non- Departmental Ministries’ should take into account the ‘Medium-
55 See Article 26 of Government Regulation No. 47/2009.
56 See Article 3 of Presidential Directive No. 10/2006.
57 Article 41 of Kutai Regulation No. 12/2008 concerning the Organizational Structure of Kutai
District Agencies.
58 The long-medium-short-term development plans are respectively called ‘National/Regional/
Local Long-Term Development Plan’, ‘National/Regional/Local Medium-Term Development
Plan’, ‘Medium-Term Strategic Plan of the ministerial departments and local agencies’,
‘National/Regional/Local Short-Term Working Development Plan’, and ‘Ministry and
Regional Agency Short-Term Development Plan’. Long-term indicates twenty years,
medium-term five years, and short-term one year. See Law No. 25/2004 on National
Development Planning System, and the Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Autonomy.
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Term National Development Plan’. Equally, the ‘Medium-Term Development
Plan of a Regional Government Agency’ should refer to the ‘Medium-Term
Regional/Local Development Plan’. Meanwhile, the making of a ‘Medium-
Term Regional/Local Development Plan’ should refer to the ‘Long-Term
Regional/Local development Plan’ and take into account the ‘National Long-
Term Development Plan’. The making of the ‘Regional/Local Long-Term
Development Plan’ should refer to the ‘National Long-Term Development
Plan’. The highest standard in development planning, the ‘National Long-Term
Development Plan’, is made in an effort to elaborate the ultimate goals of
Indonesia as written in the Preamble of the Constitution.
The ‘Medium-Term Strategic Plan’ of regional government agencies primar-
ily contains a vision, a mission statement, objectives, strategies, policies and
main programmes or activities, while the ‘Short-Term Working Development
Plan’ contains policies, main programmes and activities.59 In addition to
policies, main programmes and activities, the ‘Short-Term Working Develop-
ment Plan’ also contains a budget estimate for each planned program/activity.
The budget of each program/activity is further detailed in another planning
document called the ‘Budget and Activity Plan’.
The Regional Planning Agency uses the Short-Term Working Development
Plan to make a Regional Short-Term Development Plan. The latter planning
document is further used to inform the regional annual budget.60 Pursuant
to the Law on Regional Autonomy, Government Regulation No. 79/2005 and
the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 53/2007, a draft Provincial
Regulation on the regional annual budget – agreed on by the governor and
the Provincial House of Representatives – should be submitted to the Minister
of Home Affairs for evaluation. In the case of a district, a draft district regula-
tion is submitted to the governor. Draft regulations that the Minister of Home
Affairs/governor accept can be promulgated as a definitive regional regulation
on the regional annual budget.
Not only do the regional/local agencies implement policies, they also have
the task to control the implementation of the policy they make. Internal control
is carried out alongside external control by the district inspectorate. Like the
function of the directorate of ministries (see Footnote 28), the main function
of the district inspectorate is to monitor and evaluate the activities of the
district, sub-district and village governments. In cases of corruption, the
inspectorate is responsible for carrying out the investigation.61
59 See Article 151 of the Law on Regional Autonomy of 2004.
60 At the national level, the National Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan
Nasional abbrev. Bappenas) uses the short-term working development plans of the ministries
to make the central annual budget, which may end in a promulgation of a law on the central
annual budget. See Article 21(2) of Law No. 25/2004.
61 See Article 7 of the Kutai Regulation No. 15/2008 concerning the organizational structure
of the district inspectorate, office and technical unit.
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4.5 GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AT PLAY IN THE MAHAKAM DELTA
The next five chapters (5-9) will frequently mention the following government
institutions: regional technical implementation units of ministerial departments
and of East Kalimantan’s Provincial government, the bureaus of the office of
the Kutai District Head, the agencies/bodies/offices of Kutai District govern-
ment, and sub-district governments (Section 4.1).
The regional technical implementation unit of the Ministry of Forestry that
will be most frequently mentioned is the Unit for Forest Area Establishment
of Region IV (Balai Pemantapan Kawasan Hutan). The Ministry of Forestry
established this technical implementation unit in 2001 under the Directorate
General of Forestry Planning. Besides this regional technical implementation
unit, there also used to be – until 2001 – the former Regional Office (Ind. Kantor
Wilayah) of the Ministry of Agriculture/Forestry. Another regional technical
implementation unit of a ministerial department is the Port Administration
Office at Samarinda of the Ministry of Public Transportation, which falls under
the Directorate General of Sea Transportation.
Apart from the above two regional technical units of two ministerial
departments, another government institution that will also be frequently
mentioned is a non-ministerial department called the Executive Agency for
Upstream Oil and Gas Activities or Executive Agency of the Regions of Kali-
mantan and Sulawesi (Badan Pelaksana Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas
Bumi). The president appoints the head of the Executive Agency whereas the
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources appoints its vice-head. In some
matters, particularly program planning and budgeting, the Executive Agency
is under the supervision of the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources.
The Executive Agency was officially established in 2002 and to some extent
it took over the tasks of Pertamina, a state-owned oil company.
The Provincial and District Offices of the National Land Agency will also
appear frequently in the next five chapters.
There are two Provincial government’s technical implementation units that
will be frequently mentioned as well: the Technical Unit for Forest Planning
at Samarinda (Unit Pelaksana Teknis Daerah Planologi Samarinda) and the Tech-
nical Unit for Forest Product Circulation (Unit Pelaksana Teknis Daerah Peredaran
Hasil Hutan). The former used to be a regional technical implementation unit
of the Ministry of Forestry called Unit for Inventarisation and Mapping (Balai
Inventarisasi dan Perpetaan Hutan) whereas the latter used to be a district office
of the Provincial Forestry Agency. Both units were established in 2001.
Of the Kutai District government, the secretariat office including the assist-
ants of the Kutai District Head and three bureaus, two agencies and one body
will often be mentioned in the next five chapters. The three bureaus are re-
spectively the bureau for the administration of natural resources (Bagian
Administrasi Sumberdaya Alam), the legal bureau (Bagian Hukum) and the bureau
for land administration (Bagian Administrasi Pertanahan). The two agencies are
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the Forestry Agency (Dinas Kehutanan) and the Fishery and Marine Affairs
Agency (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan) whereas the body is the Environmental
Agency (Badan Lingkungan Hidup Daerah). The two agencies have their own
local officials, the local offices (Cabang Dinas) of Anggana and Muara Badak
sub-districts respectively.
At the sub-district level, one can distinguish Anggana and Muara Badak
sub-district offices of which the section on government (Seksi Pemerintahan)
will be frequently mentioned. Below is a table of the frequently mentioned
government institutions.
Table 4.1: Frequently mentioned government institutions
Name of institution Position Office location
Unit for Forest Area
Establishment Region IV of
the Ministry of Forestry
A regional technical
implementation unit under
the Directorate General of
Forestry Planning
Samarinda
Unit for Inventory and





Regional Office of the
Ministry of
Agriculture/Forestry
Former regional office Samarinda










the Directorate General of
Sea Transportation
Samarinda
The Executive Agency for
Upstream Oil and Gas




supervision of the Ministry




Offices of the National
Land Agency














Office of the Kutai District
Head
Assisting division to the
Kutai District Head
Tenggarong
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Name of institution Position Office location
Bureau on the
Administration of Natural
Resources, Bureau on Land
Administration, and Legal
Bureau of Kutai District
government
Assisting divisions to the
Kutai District Head
Tenggarong
Forestry Agency of Kutai
District government
Implementing division Tenggarong
Fishery and Marine Affairs






Local office at Anggana and
Muara Badak of Kutai




Local office at Muara Badak
of Kutai Forestry Agency
Muara Badak Ulu
Sub-district office of




5 A forest area: the fate of the mangrove
forest ecosystem
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In 2003 the Kutai District Head issued a circular letter (No.100/75/Pem A/IV,
dated April 14th) concerning illegal conversion of mangrove into fish ponds
and the use of an excavator (digging machine) in the Mahakam Delta. The
circular letter targeted all people who live by and/or own a shrimp pond in
the Delta, asking them to pay attention to as well as give support for the
preservation of the mangrove forest of the Delta (see Section 2.2). For the sake
of preservation, the Kutai District Head asked the target groups to no longer
clear the mangrove forest or convert it into new ponds. In addition, he asked
them not to operate illegal excavators anymore.
To back up his argument, the circular letter mentions Law 41/1999 on
Forestry and 4/1982 on Environmental Management Law. The idea behind
mentioning these laws is to inform the people that according to the two laws
the conversion of the mangrove forest into shrimp ponds is prohibited. As
the conversion is legally prohibited, the Kutai District Head ordered the
concerned Kutai agencies, and particularly the Forestry Agency, to implement
the provisions of these two laws.
The circular letter actually points to a more general dilemma which the
Kutai District government was facing on how to exercise authority in the Delta.
The sending of the letter constitutes the maximum effort that the Kutai District
government could make in this dilemma. Some external factors had pushed
the Kutai District government to issue the letter. Two of the push factors were
research findings and land conflicts. The former contributed to the rise of
environmental concern amongst the Kutai District government for the research
data revealed severe deforestation as well as environmental degradation.
However, the Kutai District government’s concern to pursue environmental
preservation was limited, for they also had to take into account the interests
of the shrimp farmers at the same time. They could not turn a blind eye to
the fact that the conversion into ponds had provided thousands of people with
an income. Furthermore, the Kutai District government was hesitant to carry
out serious enforcement as it could trigger a political demand of the coastal
inhabitants to establish a new separate district.
Not only was the Kutai District government influenced by these economic
and political factors. The making and content of the letter was also influenced
by the legal framework. Rather than enforcing the law, the letter only aimed
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at preventing deforestation due to new conversions. The Kutai District govern-
ment officials deliberately chose such aim because they regarded themselves
unauthorized to carry out law enforcement in respect of an illegal occupation
and utilization of the mangrove forest. They still believed that this authority
was in the hands of the Ministry of Forestry and the Provincial Forestry
Agency. Because of this perception, the Kutai District government officials
could only carry out prevention and rehabilitation of the production forest
of the Delta.
This chapter discusses the legal framework as well as the legal norms
regulating the use of forest resources in the Delta, both from a normative and
empirical perspective. From the normative perspective, this chapter mainly
discusses the consistency and coherence existing within the legal framework
and norms on the use of forest resources. In order to know why the content
of the forest laws and regulations is coherent and consistent or not, this chapter
examines the making of the laws and regulations. From the empirical perspect-
ive, the discussion deals with the following matters: (i) the extent to which
the political and economic context have influenced the making of the so-called
Agreed Forest Land Use Plan (hereafter Agreed Forest Plan); (ii) the extent
to which the forestry legal norms on delineation and protection have been
effectively implemented, and major factors that have influenced the imple-
mentation; and (iii) the actual interactions between the Provincial and District
government officials and the shrimp farmers in implementing the forestry legal
norms on delineation and protection.
With these questions as the underlying basis, the chapter will be organized
into four sections. It begins with a section (5.2) which describes how legislation
on the Agreed Forest Plan was made. This also discusses some main provisions
of forestry legislation with a focus on legislation on forest delineation and
forest protection. Focusing on forest delineation and forest protection, the next
section (5.3) describes how formal forest rules have been implemented. It shows
how a number of factors have influenced the implementation. The following
section (5.4) concerns some of the legal problems which can be found within
the formal forestry rules. How the local officials who are geographically and
socially close to the regulated communities, adapted the formal rules to real
life situations is described in the next section (5.5). Some concluding remarks
end this chapter.
5.2 LAW MAKING AND LEGISLATION: MAIN LAWS AND PROVISIONS
5.2.1 The Forest Designation as an epicentre of law making
The epicentre of law making concerning the use of forest resources of the Delta
lies in a 1983 Forest Designation by the Minister of Agriculture. This is still
the case despite the fact that the central government has devolved some affairs
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of forest management upon the Kutai District government as of 1995. The
designation which led to the enactment of the forestry laws and regulations,
has made some subsequent policy initiatives as well as law-making that the
Kutai District government had organized, static and uncertain. The following
comment of an official of the Kutai District government shows how decisive
the designation is:
Almost all discussions about the Delta rest on the question of the legal status of
the mangrove forest; there is however no solution to it.1
The designation has not only hampered subsequent policy initiatives and law
making yet it has also raised tensions between the Kutai and the Provincial
government which has led to an absence of forest protection in the rich oil
and gas delta. Due to the decisiveness of the designation, it is therefore im-
portant to describe how it has been formed.
After independence, from 1959 onwards, the Minister of Agriculture
granted some large and small forest concessions.2 Yet, the Minister of Agri-
culture designated the Forest Area (Ind. kawasan hutan) of East Kalimantan
in early 1983. The minister made the designation through a decree issuance.3
The areas which were designated forest were written down in a document,
the so-called Agreed Forest Plan. The designation is actually an implementation
of the Forestry Law of 1967 and some consecutive forestry regulations. The
law and regulations stipulated that the Ministry of Agriculture should use
the designation as a means to determine particular areas as Forest Area.
According to the law, in addition to fulfilling the ecological criteria, a Forest
Area should be officially designated thus by the government. At the same time,
the designation of the Forest Area implied the passage of state jurisdiction
over the areas.
In general, the 1967 law and regulations stipulated that the Minister should
base the designation on a plan for land use and on particular ecological indi-
cators namely slope, soil type and rainfall. In addition, the laws and regulations
stipulated that the designation should also take into account administrative
borders and the interests of those people whose land would be expropriated
because of it. Furthermore the law and regulations regulated that the Ministry
of Agriculture should engage other related ministries to arrange the designa-
tion. How has the 1983 forest designation of East Kalimantan been prepared,
1 Interview M, a head of section of Kutai Fishery Agency, 11-12/6/2008.
2 Before 1984 forestry affairs were handled by a directorate-general under the Ministry of
Agriculture. In 1983, by an issuance of Presidential Decree No. 45/M 1983 concerning
Kabinet Pembangunan IV a new Forestry Ministry was established. By that time, the
Regional Office of the Ministry of Agriculture was changed into the Regional Office of the
Ministry of Forestry. See also footnote 10.
3 No. 024/Kpts/Um/1/1983.
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and to what extent has the preparation complied with the provisions of those
earlier laws and regulations?
In the early 1980s the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Agriculture
(POMA) commenced the making of Agreed Forest Plan of East Kalimantan.
There are two main sources that the POMA used to compose the Agreed Forest
Plan. The first source is a draft plan for land use of East Kalimantan. The draft
document was actually the result from a survey, the so-called systematic survey
on land use that the Provincial Office of the National Land Agency (PONLA)
undertook during the late 1970s and the early 1980s. To make the document
the PONLA itself relied on two sources of data. Firstly, a truthing check. Whilst
carrying out the truthing check the agency officials also visited the Delta where
they found some coconut plantations, settlement areas, and the few shrimp
ponds which existed at that time. Secondly, a topographical map that the
topographical agency of the Indonesian Army (Jawatan Topograpi Angkatan
Darat) had previously released. The topographical map was a renewed version
of the map that the Dutch government had made in 1941, 1942 and 1946
respectively. The earliest version of the Dutch map was actually a vegetation
map of 1924 and 1926. The vegetation map resulted from an initial inventory
and exploration. It basically indicated primary and secondary Forest Areas,
as well as grasslands and agricultural land. In accordance with the 1924 map,
94% of Southeast Borneo residency (presently East, South and Central Kaliman-
tan) was indicated as Forest Area (Potter 1988, p. 136-137; Peluso and Vander-
geest 2001, p. 782; Obidzinski 2003, p. 43).4
The systematic survey that the PONLA undertook was actually aimed at
examining the soil type. To provide comparable estimates, the survey had
measured four ecological and physical indicators namely height, slope,
hydrology, and rainfall. Though it took several years, the survey finally came
up with a spatial division that generally divided East Kalimantan into a Forest
Area and a Non-Forest Area with the Forest Area covering 80% (17, 116,000
ha) and the Non-Forest Area covering 20% (3,189,000 ha).5
The second source for the Agreed Forest Plan is the maps of forest conces-
sion areas. As already mentioned, prior to it, the Forestry Directorate General
of the Ministry of Agriculture had granted numbers of forest concessions in
the Province. Forest concessions were not only granted by the Forestry Direct-
orate General but also by district heads and governors. In fact, hundreds of
4 Based on the 1924 map, later in the same year the Dutch government issued a forestry
ordinance in which Forest Areas were divided into reserved and unclassified Areas. In
the reserved Forest Areas, utilization was not allowed, while in the unclassified Forest Areas
utilization was allowed once an official license either from the resident or sultans had been
obtained (Potter 1988, p. 139).
5 The composition resembles the official data which appeared in a 1971 report of the Provin-
cial government, which states that the Forest Area sized 17.3 million ha or 85% of the total
size of the Province (Operation Room Kantor Gubernur Kepala Daerah Kaltim 1972, p. 77).
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thousands or even a million hectares of the concession areas were held by
timber companies, so it is not surprising that the entire area of East Kalimantan
was completely divided into concession areas (Vargas 1985, p. 165).6 Concern-
ing preparatory process, because of the initial absence of the forest designation,
forest concessions were mostly issued based on desk study.7 According to
a former head of the District Land Agency, the reason why the entire area
of the Province became a Forest Area was because the desk study method
relied on a map scaling of 1:1,000,000. On the basis of these dimensions the
entire Province area likely appeared as forest, for it could only indicate the
location of cities of sub-districts and municipalities.8
The second source which the Agreed Forest Plan drew from, the maps
of the forest concessions, was apparently supported by a legal instrument,
the decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 291/Kpts/UM/5/1970. The
decree determined that the forest concession areas automatically functioned
as production forests (Sumardjani 2007, p.125-126). A subsequent ministerial
decree appearing seven years later stipulated that the delineation of those
timber areas was intended as a preparation for declaring them as definite
Forest Areas.9
However, POMA did not resort to both sources equally and favoured the
maps of the forest concessions. Later it turned out that this choice did not only
affect the way the agency coordinated with other agencies, but also existing
land use, and most importantly it impacted people living nearby or inside
Forest Areas.
Despite the fact that the POMA had received the draft plan for the land use
from the PONLA, it was not followed up by engagement with PONLA during
the making of the Agreed Forest Plan. It is apparent that the officials of the
POMA perceived that the submission of the draft of a plan of the land use was
already a form of participation so that they felt it was no longer necessary
to invite the PONLA at meetings that they organized. The POMA was also
reluctant to engage the PONLA for there existed a contestation at that time
between the two agencies. The drafting of the Agreed Forest Plan coincided
with an initiative of the Directorate-General of Land of the Ministry of Home
Affairs which drafted a law on land use planning, which also intended to
6 The 121 small timber concessions (locally named kapersil) granted by district heads and
governor sized 1,161,750 ha in total. Meanwhile for particular companies, the size of the
areas that the Forestry Directorate-General granted (locally named konsesi) was extremely
large: it could sometimes add up to a million ha. To name two of them, PT International
Timber Corporation Indonesia (ITCI) held 601,100 ha, and PT. Kaya River Timber Products
held 1,2 million ha (Operation room Kantor Gubernur Kepala Daerah Kalimantan Timur
1971, p. 78-83; Daroesman 1979, p. 47-48; Vargas 1985; Wood 1985; Poffenberger and McGean
1993, p. 11). See Section 3.2 for the previous accounts of the kapersil and konsesi.
7 For accounts of the process see Safitri, Bangun and Philipus (1999, p. 8).
8 Interview HI, a former Head of Kutai District Office of the National Land Agency, 26/6/
2008, 19&31//8/2009, and 26/1/2010.
9 Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 54/Kpts/DJ/1/1975.
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divide the Provincial area into forest and non-Forest Area.10 Without suffi-
ciently consulting the other provincial agencies on the draft of the Agreed
Forest Plan, POMA submitted the draft to the Ministry of Agriculture in Jakarta
(Jemadu 1996, p. 145-146). Due to this process, some of the regional and local
officials cynically called the Agreed Forest Plan as a ‘unaccepted’ document.
Meanwhile due to considerable lack of human resources the making of
the Agreed Forest Plan missed the truthing check. A figure of 1977 indicates
this lack, saying that in East Kalimantan on average one forestry official was
in charge of 314,000 ha of forest (Poffenberger 1997, p. 456 and 458). Therefore
the officials did not check whether the condition of the field agreed with the
three formal bio-physical criteria as stated in the ministerial decrees concerning
delineation. As a result some forest classifications were not compatible with
the real conditions. A 1990 report of the Regional Physical Planning Program
for Transmigration (RePPProT) pointed out that the Agreed Forest Plan map
was over-generalized, inaccurate, and that much land was misclassified which
caused it to not reflect the real forest situation (RePPProt 1990, p. 40, 167 and
186).11 This was likely related both to the absence of local consultation as
well as truthing check (Potter in Goenner 1985, p. 30-31; Jemadu 1996, p. 145).
Based on the abovementioned two sources and processes the 1983 designa-
tion of the East Kalimantan Forest Areas eventually stated that East Kalimantan
had 21,144,000 ha of Forest Area. The number is exactly the same as the size
of the Province’s area. The 1970 annual statistical report of the Province says
that the terrestrial size of the Province was 21,144,000 ha. It comprised of
Production Forest (17,292,000 ha), Conservation Forest (41,000 ha), Agri-
cultural/Estate Land (136,400 ha), Fishery (2,664,245 ha) and ‘Other’ (760,245
ha). Although the size is alike, the 1983 designation significantly changed the
composition of Protected Forest (5,612,460) and Production Forest (15,531,540).
10 After eleven years of being independent (1955-1965), in 1965 the Ministry of Agraria (Land
Affairs) was downgraded to become a Directorate-General under the Ministry of Home
Affairs. In 1988, the independent position returned when a Presidential Decree of 1988
endorsed the National Land Agency as a departmental ministry. This remains so until the
present. See Badan Pertanahan Nasional (1998, p. 13-29) Meanwhile the Directorate-General
of Forestry fell under the Ministry of Agriculture from the moment it was established in
1971 up to when it was set up as an independent ministry in 1984. See http://www.dephut.
go.id/index.php?q=id/profil (accessed on 15/8/2011). See Chapter 4 for a more detailed
account of the history of those two Directorate-Generals.
11 RePPProt was a project hosted by the Ministry of Transmigration and funded by the British
government in the 1980s. Due to the unwillingness of the Ministry of Forestry to release
production forest for transmigration, the project aimed at mapping real land use as well
as vegetation in attempt to find suitable places for transmigrants. Having used more
sophisticated satellite imaginary as well as carrying out truthing checks, the project found
remarkable inaccuracies in the Agreed Forest Plan map. For instance, the project found
that the forested areas of East Kalimantan covered 17,900,000 ha, leaving three millions
ha for other land use such as wet-rice, tree crops, shifting cultivation as well as settlements.
Later the drafting of Law No. 24 of 1992 on Spatial Use Management was carried out on
the basis of the RePPProT maps (Potter 2005, p. 382-383 and 388).
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At the same time, the designation declared 11, 246,351 ha of the former Kutai
District as Forest Area. The designation also classified the entire land of the
Delta as Production Forest. Thus it included the agricultural land and settle-
ment areas that the surveys from the 1970s and 1980s had already discovered.
Some scholars, researchers and even the local bureaucrats questioned the
classification and considered it in disagreement with the formal criteria.
According to the general criteria of the 1981 decree of the Minister of Agri-
culture, Production Forests12 should have been areas that were economically
feasible and geographically accessible. Furthermore, the designation of pro-
duction forest should not damage either the ecology or the environment.13
The mangrove Forest Area of the Delta did not fulfil the criteria because it
is dominated by approximately 60,000 ha of palm trees, which are not eco-
nomically feasible (Deutriex in Kusumastanto 2001; Bourgeois et al 2001,
Bapedalda and PKSPL IPB 2002, p. III-4, 29 and 31; Creocean in Sidik 2009). The
difference between what the regulation wanted and the real ecological
condition of the Delta led to the suspicion tha the classification was more
determined by political-economic interests. The difference suggested that the
classification was in favour of the oil and gas that has existed earlier in the
region (Hidayati 2004, p. 115). An official of the Provincial Forestry Agency
made a guess saying that
The classification could be because the ministry has taken into account the earlier
existence of the oil and gas extraction there. The idea was that its function as
production forest would prevent the companies from encountering complicated
formal procedures, something that they would have encountered if it was classified
as protected or conservation forest.14
Yet it is likely that the inconsistency does not only originate from a gap
between the formal criteria and the real ecological conditions, but within the
regulations themselves. The Ministry of Agriculture did not classify the man-
grove forest of the Delta as protection forest, for at that time and this is still
the case at present, there are other provisions saying that protection forest
must be hilly land that functions as a hydrological buffer for adjacent lower
areas. Another provision that recalls this view is the decree of the Minister
of Agriculture of 1980 concerning criteria and measures for the designation
12 Indonesian forestry laws, on the basis of function, divide forests into three main categories:
conservation forests, protection forests, and production forests. In accordance with the
Agreed Forest Land, the remaining areas which are not included in the three categories
of forest are by default classified as conversion forests. See page 92 for a definition of
conversion forest.
13 See attachment of the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 683/Kpts/Um/8/1981.
14 Interview IF, a staff of the Technical Unit for Forest Planning Samarinda of the Provincial
Forestry Agency, 22/4/2008.
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of protected areas.15 Therefore protected forests should chiefly function as
catchment areas.
Yet if that was the reason why the mangrove forest of the Delta was not
suitable as a protection forest, then it raises another question: why then was
the Delta’s mangrove forest not designated a conservation forest? It is obvious
that in terms of ecology the Delta’s mangrove forest preserves the life of sea
biota, protects coasts from erosion thereby protecting any land use behind
it. The question becomes relevant, not only because of its suitable ecological
condition, but also because the Minister of Forestry has designated other
mangrove forests in other places in East Kalimantan as conservation forest
like in Pasir District. Of the 425,372 ha of state mangrove forest in this
province, 79,322 ha is conservation forest. Only a small part of it, 567 ha, is
designated as protection forest. The largest part is production forest sizing
347,472 ha (Balai Pengelolaan DAS Mahakam Berau 2006, p. II-2; Soetrisno 2007,
p.12).
To answer the question why the mangrove forest of the Delta was not
classified as conversion forest, the above view suggests consensus as its sole
factor. At the time of the drafting of the Agreed Forest Plan, the Provincial
Forestry Agency officials asked other agencies about suggestions for develop-
ment projects in Forest Areas, such as agriculture, plantation, residence,
government buildings, industry areas as well as fishery. As a response to the
question the other agencies strongly suggested that the areas that would be
allocated for conversion forest should not be situated away from the existing
main roads, settlement areas and agricultural land.
Taking into account the suggestion of the other agencies, the Provincial
Forestry Agency then plotted 5,192,380 ha for Conversion Forest in the Agreed
Forest Plan.16 Pursuant to the prevailing forestry regulations conversion pro-
duction forest is production forest that can officially be used for non-forestry
purposes such as transmigration and agriculture. Anybody or any government
agency that wishes to use conversion forest should submit a proposal to the
Minister of Agriculture, and later the Minister of Forestry. The proposal expects
the minister to take the proposed areas out of the Forest Area. Due to its small
population at the time, the mangrove forest of the Delta was not included in
the 5,192,380 ha of conversion forest although nearly all its adjacent mainland
was included.17
The fact that the 1983 designation stated that the entire province was Forest
Area subsequently affected the prevailing land use. All residential areas in
cities such as Balikpapan, Samarinda and Tenggarong were inevitably included
15 Decree No. 837/Kpts/Um/11/1980 which was later reasserted in Presidential Decree No.
32/1990 concerning the Management of Protected Zones.
16 Nationwide the size of the conversion forest reached 30 millions ha which the Minister
of Forestry designated in mid 1980s (Fay, Sirait and Kusworo n.d, p. 8).
17 Interview S and S, lecturers at the Forestry Faculty of Mulawarman University, 11/8/2009.
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in the Forest Areas. This situation is actually a mere continuation of affairs,
as those parts had been included in the areas of timber companies at an earlier
stage (Gunawan et al 1999, p. 17). For example, some parts of the Tenggarong
city used to be included in the concession area of PT International Timber
Corporation Indonesia (ITCI).18
The above descriptions of the drafting process of the Agreed Forest Plan
show that this Plan was not in accordance with the law due to a lack of
resources, administrative competition as well as the inconsistency amongst
the legal rules. Due to its contestation with the PONLA, the POMA missed a good
opportunity to learn more about the draft of land use planning. Most im-
portantly, through the absence of the truthing check, the drafting process did
not take into account the local realities and interests of the inhabitants of the
Delta who had lived there for more than a century. Those processes were
subsequently reiterated in many parts during the making of the 2001 integrated
map that the Ministry of Forestry had commissioned.
In 1999, about the same time as the commencement of the 1999 decentral-
ization, under coordination of the Provincial Office of Ministry of Forestry
(POMF) and technically assisted by a regional technical implementation unit
of the Ministry of Forestry the so-called Unit for Inventory and Mapping (Ind.
Balai Inventarisasi dan Perpetaan Hutan, abbrev. UIM), the Ministry of Forestry
started the revision of the 1983 Agreed Forest Plan. Across Indonesia the
revision of the Agreed Forest Plan was meant to harmonize it with Provincial
Spatial Plan (PSP).19 There are two reasons on the grounds of which the Minis-
try of Forestry argued why the revision was needed. Firstly, the ministry
supposed that PSPs had not yet taken into account the interests of the ministry.
One instance of such interest is that the ministry wished for estate crops to
be grown in conversion forest only, not in production forest. Secondly, the
making of the state’s designation over the Forest Area had to be improved
to become more participatory through more involvement from stakeholders
(Safitri, Bangun and Philipus 1999, p. 17).
In East Kalimantan the difference appeared after the Provincial government
endorsed a PSP in 1993. Yet soon the officials realized that the PSP was not
harmonized with the 1983 Agreed Forest Plan. One issue that led to incompat-
ibility is that the PSP used the term ‘non-Forest Area’, which the Agreed Forest
Plan did not. The Ministry of Forestry contested the term arguing that the term
implied that non-Forest Areas had to be excluded from Forest Areas. In
response to the contestation, the Provincial government therefore revised the
PSP in 1999 to harmonize it with the Agreed Forest Plan. Both the Provincial
government and the Ministry of Forestry agreed on the use of a similar term
18 ITCI is a joint venture between Weyerhauser, an American based forest company, and P.T.
Tri Usaha Bhakti, an Indonesian holding company controlled by seventy-five generals of
the Indonesian army (Vargas 1985, p. 143; Wood 1985, p. 76).
19 For an account of the spatial use planning see Chapter 9.
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to indicate Forest and non-Forest Areas, with Kawasan Budidaya Kehutanan (KBK)
for Forest Area and Kawasan Budidaya Non-Kehutanan (KBNK) for non-Forest
Area. The agreement upon the term implied that the Province’s area was no
longer entirely regarded as Forest Area because 5,184,771 ha had been excluded
from the Forest Area.
Given that the 1999 PSP was made compatible with the 1983 Agreed Forest
Plan, the Agreed Forest Plan revision was supposed to be much easier. It only
needed to affirm what had been stipulated in the 1999 PSP. Nevertheless
according to the prevailing regulations the revision involved consultations
with other concerned agencies as well as a truthing check. Yet, the revision
apparently missed both the consultation and the truthing check. The field
officials of the Kutai agency or the officials of the Sub-District Government
were not consulted. Moreover, they did not even hear of officials of the POMF
or UIM undertaking a truthing check. The villagers suggested the same. This
happened despite the fact that the mangrove conversion into ponds was
expanding at the time the revision was taking place. The lack of consultation
rendered one of the revision’s objectives, namely widely engaging stakeholders,
futile.
Given the lack of consultation and truthing checks, it seems that the
revision of the Agreed Forest Plan was solely aimed at reconfirming the
existing division of Forest and non-Forest Areas as of the 1999 PSP. After three
years the revision of the Agreed Forest Plan was eventually accomplished and
the Minister of Forestry officially designated it through a decree of 2001.20
The decree designated 14,651,000 ha as the new figure of Forest Area without
mentioning a figure for non-Forest Area. The Ministry of Forestry just revealed
the figure for non-Forest Area in its correspondence with the Provincial govern-
ment in 2007, saying that its figure is 6,492,447 ha. Parts are situated in the
Mahakam Delta. They spread across the Delta in five plots. They are respective-
ly located in Letung Island, Lerong Island, Tanjung Aju Island, Terantang
Island, and Parangatan Island (for an account of the reasons why the five
locations were excluded from the Forest Area, see Chapter 9). Indeed, the five
plots are the places of which the survey of the PONLA discovered in the 1970s
and 1980, and which was rediscovered by the RePPProt in the second half
of the 1980s, that they were used for settlement, coconut plantations and a
few fish ponds.
However, even though the decree is regarded as an effort to harmonize
the Agreed Forest Plan and PSP, in reality this is not the case. In fact, the decree
shows some differences instead. Firstly, instead of using KBK and KBNK, which
the PSP uses, it uses other terms, notably Forest Area and area for other pur-
poses (Ind. Area Penggunaan Lain abbrev. APL). The former is equivalent to
20 No. 79/Kpts-II/2001 concerning the Designation of Forest and Water Area of East Kaliman-
tan.
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KBK, while the latter is to KBNK. Secondly, the size of the KBNK or area for other
purposes is not as large as in the PSP; it is 21.535 ha smaller.
5.2.2 Forest tenure rights: some main provisions
As has already been mentioned, the 1983 designation subsequently enabled
the state to extend its jurisdiction over the designated Forest Area. The juris-
diction, in turn, allows the state to enforce the forestry laws and regulations
upon the areas. The latter stipulate how and by whom the forest land as well
as forest resources therein can be legally used (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995,
p. 387; Kumar and Choudary 2006). The designation finds its legal basis in
forestry legislation based on Forestry Law No. 5/1967 which was superseded
by Law No. 41 of 1999 as well as in their respective organic regulations. This
section describes three main provisions of the forestry laws and regulations
namely delineation, use and utilization, and forest protection.
Delineation21
In accordance with forestry laws and regulations, especially Government
Regulation No. 33 of 1970 concerning forestry planning, the Minister of
Forestry should delineate all designated Forest Areas after the designation
has come into effect. The delineation was supposed to be followed by mapping
and endorsement. The reason why delineation needs to be carried out soon
after the designation is that it would confirm the legal status of the designated
Forest Areas by making forest borders as well as size visible. Not only the
boundaries and size would become visible but the designation would also
safeguard the Forest Areas against any rights claims of private parties.
The laws and regulations determine that the delineation should be carried
out by a committee, the so-called Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation
(Panitia Tata Batas). There are two main differences between regulations which
were promulgated before and after 2001; they concern the official who may
form the committee and the members of the committee. Prior to 2001, the
Minister of Forestry was authorized to form the committee. The minister may
delegate the authority to governors.22 Strongly influenced by the authoritarian
government, the members of the committee before 2001 consisted entirely of
government officials. These officials came from district agencies, including
21 Here delineation is used to cover two terms namely delineation (penataan batas) and mapping
(pemetaan) of Forest Areas. Delineation and mapping are two of four steps of determining
a Forest Area. The other two steps are, at the start, designation (penunjukan), and, at the
end, endorsement (penetapan). See Article 15 and its Elucidation of Law No. 41/1999.
22 See in the Decree of Minister of Forestry No. 400/Kpts-II/1990 Article 2(1 and 2) as
amended by decree No. 635/Kpts-II/1996.
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Sub-District Governments, and the regional units of the Ministry of Forestry.
A district head or mayor chaired the committee. Later, following the decentral-
ization policy, the authority was handed over to district heads.23 A significant
change to the composition of committee members occurred when village heads
as well as community/adat leaders were included in the committee. The other
significant change after 2001 is that the law does not determine anymore which
government unit shall prepare funds for delineation. Before 2001, the fund
primarily came from the Ministry of Forestry.24
In order to realize the delineation, the committee is expected to install
provisional boundary markers to mark the borders of the Forest Areas. In case
they find private land rights along the delineated border or inside the Forest
Areas, they are asked to make an inventory of the land rights and settle any
arising claim. Only after the borders have been marked and the land rights
have been inventoried and settled, the committee can yield two documents
namely the so-called official report of gazettement and a map of the delineated
Forest Area. All the members of the committee, including district heads and
mayors have to sign those two documents unless they disagree. The delineation
process comes to an end when district heads or mayors have officially sub-
mitted the two documents to the Ministry of Forestry. Endorsement by the
Minister of Forestry of the two documents is the next step. This is the last link
in the chain of the determining of a Forest Area (see footnote 21 for an account
of the chain). The endorsement consequently gives a definite legal status to
the Forest Area as state-owned Forest Area.
Concerning the definite legal status of a Forest Area it is important to
underline that recently different interpretations have developed on when this
status is achieved. Researchers and NGO activists have developed the inter-
pretation that the status of Forest Area will be achieved only if all four neces-
sary steps are followed, from designation through to endorsement. By referring
to Forestry Law 1999, they understand the measures as cumulative in nature.
Fay and Sirait (1999; 2005, p. 8) point out that the definite status will be
reached only if there is no longer any private land in the Forest Area.25 A
similar interpretation was developed in the case of Darianus Lungguk Sitorus
(DL Sitorus) who was charged by the public prosecutor of illegal occupation
and use of roughly 80,000 ha production forest situated in South Tapanuli
District, North Sumatera. One argument the defendant raised in the course
of the court sessions was that the land, which he occupied, was not official
forest land, as the Ministry of Forestry had not yet completed all the four steps.
23 See the Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 32/Kpts-II/2001 Article 8a, and Government
Regulation No. 44 of 2004 Article 20(2) concerning Forestry Planning.
24 Article 6 of the Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 400/Kpts-II/1990.
25 Following that interpretation, Fay and Sirait (2005, p.10) eventually come up with the figure
that in 2003 the definite state Forest Area adds up to only 12 millions ha (10%) while the
remaining 108 millions ha (90%) is non-state forest land, upon which the Ministry of
Forestry has not yet accomplished all necessary measures.
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In its cassation verdict, Supreme Court judges were in favour of the argument
presented by public prosecutor, as they viewed the disputed area as forest
land. They argued that the land had been officially designated forest land,
even though the Ministry of Forestry had not yet taken all necessary steps.26
In 2009 the Minister of Forestry issued a regulation reasserting that it was no
longer necessary that the measures were cumulative in nature, instead this
would be optional.27 The Ministry of Forestry has actually put the opinion
in their official administrative document when the Minister of Forestry sent
a letter to the National Police Headquarter explaining that the steps are
optional.28
Yet, a very recent decision of Indonesian Constitutional Court in 2012
favoured the notion which suggests that the four steps need to be cumulat-
ive.29 In this case, five district heads from Central Kalimantan province30
and a resident of Palangkaraya municipality filed a case requesting the Con-
stitutional Court to determine that Article 1(3) of Forestry Law 41/1999 is
against the Constitution. In general, the Article 1(3) of the Forestry Law states
that the four steps of determining a Forest Area are not cumulative, but
optional. The five district heads argued that the implementation of the article
has made it very difficult for them to carry out their authority, notably provid-
ing public services since their respective administrative areas were partly or
wholly included in Forest Areas.31 In accordance with formal forestry rules
on forest use (penggunaan kawasan) as described below (page 99-100) whenever
the government of the districts use the Forest Land, they are required to hold
a forest use permit given by the Minister of Forestry. The district heads added
to their argument that the implementation might cause human rights violations
to residents who have their land and housing inside the Forest Areas because
the Ministry of Forestry could take away their property anytime.
Meanwhile, the resident argued that the implementation of the article has
made it difficult for him to get land certificates.32 The District Office of the
National Land Agency refused his application for land certificates saying that
the land he proposed was situated in a Forest Area which falls under the
26 Verdict No. 2642 K/Pid/2006.
27 Regulation No. P. 50/Menhut-II/2009 concerning the Reassertion of the Status and Function
of State Forest. Article 2 (1).
28 See a letter of the Minister of Forestry No. S.426/Menhut-VII/2006.
29 See verdict No. 45/PUU-IX/2011.
30 They are respectively the district heads of Kapuas, Gunung Mas, Katingan, Barito Timur
ans Sukamara.
31 For instance, in accordance with a decree of the Minister of Agriculture of 1982 concerning
the Agreed Forest Land Use of Central Kalimantan province, the administrative area of
Kapuas district was wholly included in a Forest Area sizing 1.499.900 ha. Like Riau and
Riau Island provinces, Central Kalimantan Province does not have a map which synchron-
izes the Agreed Forest Land Use and Spatial Plan like East Kalimantan has had as of 2001.
32 He had applied for land certificates for two plots of land sized 200m² and 619m². For the
application he submitted land letters as land ownership evidence.
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authority of the Ministry of Forestry. In addition, the requesters (pemohon)
argued that Article 1(3) of the Forestry Law 41/1999 is inconsistent with Article
15(1) of the Forestry Law which determines that the four steps are cumulative.
In their decision, the judges of the Constitutional Court argued that the
steps should be cumulative, as optionality could lead to an abuse of power
in the determination of Forest Areas. If the determination or establishment
of Forest Area lacks the last step (endorsement) then it may violate human
rights of the people concerned, given the designation step does not require
prior consultation with these people. In addition, the decision suggests that
the inconsistency between Article 1(3) and 15 of Forestry Law 41/1999 has
generated legal uncertainty damaging the constitutional rights of the requestors
to get legal protection, legal certainty and equality before the law.33 On the
basis of that argument, the Constitutional Court conclusively determined that
Article 1(3) of the Forestry Law is against the Constitution and therefore is
not legally binding. Thus, one may say that the Supreme Court and Constitu-
tional Court recently have had different legal interpretations of the required
steps of forest area determination.
Use and Utilization34
Regarding the question who are allowed to utilize the forest, the two forestry
laws and their subsequent organic regulations emphasize that priority should
be given to the government namely the Ministry of Forestry, provincial and
district government. This, however, does not mean that private parties are
fully excluded from using the forest and resources therein. The forestry laws
and regulations stipulate that the government can engage private parties in
the utilization through two instruments. Firstly, by a joint cooperation with
particular private parties, and secondly, by granting rights or permits to the
particular private parties.
Yet in respect of the priority that the law and regulations determine, the
government should at first carry out the utilization on its own at first, unless
it considers itself incapable. Meanwhile, the fact that the engagement of private
parties must necessarily go through the government’s authority i.e. through
a contract or permit, implies state control over all Forest Areas. The forestry
regulations further regulate which private parties can be invited for a joint
cooperation or awarded the rights or permits. The laws stipulate that only
Indonesian citizens and Indonesian-owned companies are entitled to these
privileges.
33 See Article 28D (1) of the Constitution.
34 ‘Use’ is the direct translation from the word memakai in Bahasa. It means to use forest land
for non- forest purposes. ‘Utilize’ is the direct translation from the word memanfaatkan in
Bahasa. It means to extract forest products.
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The Minister of Forestry, governor or district head are officials who are
authorized to grant the rights or permit of forest utilization and collection to
a particular private party. Over time the person of authority changed repeated-
ly according to whether the government structure was centralized or decentral-
ized. In early 1999, before Law No. 22/1999 concerning decentralization was
enacted, the central government granted authority to the governor or district
head to issue permits or rights on utilization and collection. The governor
could grant forest concessions applicable to an area smaller than 10,000 ha.
District heads could grant rights to collect timber forest products for one year
long and maximum 100 ha in size.35
In response to the developments of national legislations, the Kutai District
government passed several district regulations (peraturan daerah kabupaten) with
further details mainly repeating what was stated in the national legislation.
The regulations state that the Kutai District Head is authorized to issue rights
to either an individual, group, community or cooperative. Each permit cannot
exceed 100 ha and is valid for only one year.36
Yet, due to the serious social and ecological impact of the grand-scale
issuing of the IPPHK,37 the Minister of Forestry withdrew the district head’s
authority in 2002.38 Recently the Minister of Forestry is the only official who
can issue a forest concession as well as a license to collect forest products,
leaving only the issuance of rights to collect non-timber forest products to the
district head.
The laws and regulations do not only regulate forest utilization and
collection, but also how to use Forest Area for non-forestry purposes. In
principle, the laws and regulations prohibit any non-forestry use in the Forest
Areas because this could potentially change their natural functions. Neverthe-
less, the prohibition does not apply to all forms of non-forest use, as some
have strategic goals. For this purpose, the regulations have set up a fixed list
of allowed forms of non-forestry use. The list, for example, includes mining,
but excludes aquaculture such as shrimp farming.39 The exclusion of
aquaculture from the list likely resembles a 1984 joint ministrial decree that
35 Those provisions were mentioned in Government Regulation No. 6/1999 and the Decree
of the Minister of Forestry No. 0.51/Kpts-II/2000.
36 For a detailed account of the provisions, see Kutai Kartanegara District Regulation No.
15/2001 on the Collection of Timber Forest Products.
37 See Section 3.3 on IPPK.
38 See the Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 541/Kpts-II/2002.
39 Apart from mining other instances of allowed non-forestry use are religion, installation
of renewable energy plants, electricity, television and radio transmitters, the building of
railways, highways and public roads, defence, as well as the construction of provisional
settlements for the victims of a disaster. The above provision can be found in Government
Regulation No. 24 of 2010 and the Regulation of the Minister of Forestry No. P.14/Menhut-
II/2006 concerning Forest Use Permit, Article 4 (1 and 2).
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prohibits aquaculture in production forest.40 The decree specifically prohibits
aquaculture development in production forest and in small islands sizing less
than 10 km².41
Regarding the question who may hold a forest use permit (izin pinjam pakai)
to use the Forest Areas for non-forestry activities, the laws and regulations
mention a minister, governor, regent, mayor or company. However, the Minis-
ter of Forestry is the only official that is authorized to grant the forest use
permit. To be able to get the permit from the minister, applicants should pass
several procedures as well as obtain some required documents. A primary
requirement is that the applicants provide a type of compensation to the
ministry. According to the laws and regulation, they may choose between two
kinds of compensation, either providing a Forest Area in exchange, situated
in another location, or paying tax or rehabilitating watershed areas.
Besides determining which officials are authorized as well as to which
parties a forest use permit may be granted, the laws and regulations determine
too how the permit holders should exercise their rights over the granted forest
areas. Prior to the provisions on how the rights could be exercised, the laws
and regulations stipulate the type of rights that permit holders can exercise.
Once the permit has been granted, the permit-owner is allowed to cut trees
inside the Forest Areas in addition to exercising his/her own non forest use
rights. The laws and regulations do not only regulate rights, they also describe
some obligations for the permit holder, so that they fulfil their duties. The
obligations stipulate that a sum of money must be paid for every tree which
is cut as well as that the area must be delineated, rehabilitated and protected.
As said any utilization, collection and use of the forest is only possible
through a right or permit issued by either the Minister of Forestry, governor
or district head. The necessity to have a right or permit extends to any occupa-
tion of the Forest Area as well as to any device that could be used to cut
trees.42 This raises an important question: what would happen, if utilization,
collection, use or entrance of the Forest Area would be undertaken without
a right or permit? The answer to this question will bring us to another im-
portant part of the forestry laws and regulations; that is the provisions concern-
ing the goals of forest protection.
Forest protection
Forest protection has two goals. The first is to prevent and eliminate the
depletion of the forest, Forest Areas and forest products by human activities,
40 The Decree is No. KB 550/246/Kpts/4/1984 jointly signed by the Minister of Agriculture
and Minister of Forestry.
41 Nevertheless, the decree still allows aquaculture development in conversion forest.
42 See Government Regulation No. 28/1985 Article 6(1), Forestry Law No. 41/1999 No. 50
(3) and Government Regulation No. 45/2004 Article 14 (1).
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natural disaster, fire, and disease. Second is to secure the rights of state and
private property over the Forest Areas as well as to forest products harvested
from the Forest Areas.
Concerning the question who should protect the forest, this can be
answered on several levels. First, we could back to the previous clause pre-
scribing that all right or permit holders are obliged to protect their respective
area. In addition, common people especially those who live inside and nearby
the Forest Area are also obliged to care for the forest’s protection. This provi-
sion comes from the argument that the forest affects the livelihood of many
peoples.43 Government at every level is another party of which the laws and
regulations expect that they look after the protection beside the permit holders.
However, it is important to outline that there is a shift regarding the govern-
ment role in forest protection. Under the Forestry Law of 1967 and government
regulation of 1985 on forest protection, government was still expected to take
part in forest protection of the granted Forest Areas despite the fact that the
duty of protection also was imposed on the permit holders. Yet under the
Forestry Law of 1999 and government regulation of 2004 on forest protection,
the responsibility seems to be mostly handed over to the permit holders.44
With this shift the government only needs to complement the permit holders
by supervision and monitoring.
In the same way as the authority to grant a right or permit, the tasks and
obligations to undertake forest protection have also been influenced by the
government structure. Before 1998 the assignment to undertake forest pro-
tection rested with the provincial and district forestry agencies as well as any
forestry units of the Ministry of Forestry which were situated in the
province.45 This division of tasks remained unchanged even when the central
government ran a pilot project for decentralization in 1995 when Kutai Karta-
negara was selected together with 25 other districts. The relevant Government
Regulation No. 19 of 1995 did not include forest protection as an affair that
should be devolved to the selected districts. This exclusion is not surprising
given the Government Regulation of 1995 had copied the provision of a decree
of Minister of Forestry, which excluded forest protection from the list of
devolved forestry affairs to district government.46
43 See Article 15 (3) and its elucidation of Law No. 5/1967, and Article 10 (2) Government
Regulation No. 28/1985.
44 Government Regulation No. 45 of 2004 on Forest Protection clearly shows the shift as can
be seen in Article 8, 9 and 10.
45 For details of the provision, see Government Regulation No. 64 of 1957 Article 14, and
Government Regulation No. 28 of 1985 Article 15 (1).
46 See No. 86/KPTS/II/1994. Following the decree the forestry transferred duties concerning
rehabilitation, water and soil conservation, natural silk, honey resources, the management
of private forest, as well as developing communities’ skills on forestry. The decree was
later upheld by a Minister of Forestry and Home Affairs joint decree No. 230/Kpts-II/94
and No. 52 of 1994. See Muttaqien and Prabowo (n.d, p. 4-5).
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As of 1998 forest protection became an absolute responsibility of the Kutai
District government. It is Government Regulation No. 62 of 1998 on Devolving
Specific Tasks to the Regional Government that changed the 41 years of regula-
tion, by stipulating that forest protection is devolved to the district level.47
Thus, under the present regulatory framework the district carries the primary
responsibility for forest protection even though particular parts of the task
also rest with the central government and provincial government.48
In response to the national legislation on devolving authorities and strongly
influenced by the decentralization euphoria of those days, the Kutai District
government had promulgated a regulation concerning the Kutai’s District
government authorities which was very ambitious in terms of its content.49
Not only did it reassert the forest protection as one of Kutai’s authorities, the
regulation moved all forest affairs under the authority of the Kutai District
government. Concerning forest protection, this regulation clearly states that
the Kutai District government is responsible for protecting as well as safe-
guarding the entire Forest Area situated in the Kutai’s area.
Despite the fact that the 1999 forestry law and regulations has shifted
responsibility of forest protection from the government to permit holders, the
government continues to carry out some actions in relation to forest protection.
They are required to organize some activities such as disseminating forestry
legislation, developing collaboration with permit holders, generating alternative
sources of income for forest communities, taking preliminary action to any
potential destruction of Forest Area, and enforcing law upon those who
trespass the law. In relation to the latter, forest rangers and civil servants who
are authorized to carry out investigation over a legal case (in Ind. Pegawai
Penyidik Negeri Sipil, abbrev. PPNS) of the forestry agency are authorized to
undertake surveillance as well as criminal investigation.
Not only do the forest rangers and PPNS have the authority to examine
people who do not have a permit for the utilization, collection, use and access
of the forest, they can also examine all people who move away, break, make
disappear or cut any boundary markers of designated Forest Areas as has often
happened in the Delta. Punishment for any violation of those provisions varies
and changes over time. Government Regulation 28/ 1985 on Forest Protection
stipulates a maximum of ten years in jail or a fine of up to IDR 100 million
for any illegal forest occupation. Besides repeating what the old forestry
legislations stated, the Forestry Law 41/1999 and Government Regulation 45/
47 See Article 5i.
48 The central government is responsible for protecting Forest Areas which are located across
provinces, whereas provincial governments are in charge of Forest Areas which are located
across districts/municipalities. See Government Regulation No. 25 of 2000 concerning the
central and regional government’s authorities. Government Regulation No. 38/2007 which
superseded the Government Regulation No. 25/2000 hardly made any changes to the
provision.
49 No. 27/2000 concerning the authority of Kutai as has been superseded by No. 11 of 2008.
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2004 on Forest Protection which superseded Government Regulation 28/1985,
introduce new sanctions as well. They penalise any action of moving away,
making disappear, pulling out, breaking or cutting the boundary markers with
a maximum of ten years in jail or 10 billion IDR. Similarly there is a sanction
for the cutting of any forest tree located in a green belt. Interestingly the
regulations contain the same sanctions for illegal mining exploration and
exploitation, run without a permit, taking place within a Forest Area.
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW BY REGIONAL AND LOCAL OFFICIALS
This section describes the extent to which regional and local officials imple-
mented the main provisions of the forestry laws and regulations as discussed
above. Because neither the Minister of Forestry, nor governor or district head
has ever granted any rights or permits to state-owned companies or private
parties to use or utilize the Delta’s production forest, this book regards the
implementation of law in the light of the goals of forest delineation and
protection.
Besides looking at the implementation of law (see Section .1.3.1 on the
difference between implementation of law and the regulatory implementation
of law), this section also examines the ‘regulatory implementation’ by looking
at the extent to which those organic regulations of forestry legislations are
internally consistent (or not) with the main provisions as stipulated in the
higher legislation notably laws and government regulations (see Section 4.4
on the accounts of regulatory implementation). To what extent have the
officials complied with those main provisions in carrying out the implementa-
tion? It is important to note that even though regional and local officials are
the focus of this book yet it also discusses the officials of the Forestry Ministry
based in the province.
5.3.1 Forest delineation
As already mentioned, the Ministry of Forestry, prior to 1983 the Ministry
of Agriculture, should have delineated the production forest of the Delta in
order to bring a certain legal status to the designated Forest Area. Beyond
the normative necessity, for political purposes demarcation would facilitate
state territorial control and facilitate state property claims; and would enable
the implementation of ground patrols and legal enforcement (Vandergeest
and Peluso 1995; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; McCharthy 2006). An official
report which discusses ‘agreed forest use’ in East Kalimantan (the 1987
Regional Physical Planning Programme for Transmigration Report) suggests
that all boundaries which aim to restrict entry or use of land must be clearly
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demarcated in the field (RePPProt 1990, p. 47 and 167; Potter in Hardjono 1991,
p. 201).
Yet in the Delta the real implementation of law regarding the delineation
has been far from what the legal texts desire. The delineation or demarcation
of the production forest only began in the year 2000, seventeen years after
the designation and would take five years. Demarcation of the production
forest became a focus after the 1999 decentralization. A technical implementa-
tion unit of the Provincial Forestry Agency the so-called Technical Unit for
Forest Planning of the Provincial Government (Ind. Unit Pelaksana Teknis Daerah
Planologi Samarinda, hereafter TUFPS) carried out the demarcation. Prior to
decentralization, demarcation had been the duty of a regional technical imple-
mentation unit of the Ministry of Forestry namely UIM but this unit was
transferred to the Provincial government in 2001 without having commenced
very much demarcation of the Delta’s production forest.
In spite of the fact that the District Regulation of 2000 states that the Kutai
District government is responsible for carrying out the delineation of pro-
duction and protection forest, and the decree of the Minister of Forestry of
2001 that states that district heads are in charge of forming so-called commit-
tees on forest boundary delineation, the delineation of the Delta’s production
forest was actually not organized by the Kutai District government. It was
the forestry service unit of East Kalimantan Province that organized the de-
lineation.50 As the Kutai District government did not organize the delineation,
it consequently did not share its budget for this purpose. However some
prominent officials of the Kutai District government51 eventually signed the
map of demarcated Forest Areas, despite the fact that they had not organized
the delineation and they initially had objected to its results, for they regarded
it against the Kutai District’s policies.52
The TUFPS which organized the delineation was originally a regional
technical implementation unit of the Ministry of Forestry, named the so-called
sub UIM. Together with two other sub UIMs, Balikpapan and Tarakan, they
all fell under higher UIM Region IV which was based in Banjarmasin, South
50 The fact that delineation was not conducted by Kutai District government indicates that
Kutai District did not implement the new decree of the Minister of Forestry of 2001 on
the Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation, but still implemented the pre-decentraliza-
tion decree, the Governor’s Decree No. 492/1991 concerning the forming of a Forest
Boundary Committee in East Kalimantan province. That means the present committee is
still formed by the governor. Interview AN, interim Head of the Technical Unit for Forest
Planning Samarinda of the Provincial Forestry Agency, 2 and 5/12/2011.
51 They are the District secretary, head of the forestry agency, head of the land agency, and
head of a sub-district.
52 See Dinas Kehutanan UPTD Planologi Kehutanan (2005, p.15).
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Kalimantan.53 In 2001, as part of the 1999 decentralization process, the three
sub UIMs were transferred to the Provincial government and later came under
management of the Provincial Forestry Agency. According to a decree of the
governor of East Kalimantan of 2001 the TUFPS is responsible for carrying out
inventarization and delineation.54 The TUFPS covers an area about 6,041,000
ha spread out across five districts. Of this total, 1,887,000 ha are located in
Kutai Kartanegara District.
Since the year it was established the TUFPS speeded up the delineation of
its work area. As a result in 2005 it had delineated 83% of its entire work area
with some areas already marked during previous delineations which had been
started in 1985. Of the total of 81,180.80 ha, the production forest of the Delta
constitutes 93,86% of the entire size of the Delta area. The delineation of the
production forest of the Delta commenced only in 2001 due to priority given
to other Forest Areas on the mainland and the upper Mahakam River, where
there were numerous forest concessions and small settlements which were
perceived to be a threat to the forest concessions.55 This policy of prioritisation
is apparently in line with what Government Regulation No. 33/1970 on Forest
Planning vividly stipulates, namely that delineation of concessionary areas
should be advanced in an effort to enable forest extraction activities.56
In the early days the TUFPS wanted to run the delineation alone yet soon
they realised that it was hardly possible for the Provincial government to do
so: the Provincial Planning Agency (Bappeda) as well as the Regional House
of Representatives consistently rejected their proposals for funding from the
Provincial Annual Budget. There appear to be three reasons for these rejections:
(1) budgets for forest demarcations were usually provided by the Ministry
of Forestry rather than the Provincial government; (2) in the past, the Provincial
Forestry Agency unit had actually declined a budget offered by the Provincial
government, which was regarded as an indicator that the budget of the unit
was adequate; and (3) at the time of the requests, the Provincial government
was prioritizing funding towards a national sporting competition, which East
Kalimantan was hosting in 2008.
Moreover the TUFPS was facing competition for funding from another
division of the Provincial Forestry Agency, which also dealt with demarcation
issues and tended to be given preferential treatment. Due to the historical
53 The UIM IV itself was established in 1984 through a decree of the Minister of Forestry No.
093/Kpts-II/1984. Prior to the forestry department reestablishment, the forestry planning
units were named Brigade Planologi Kehutanan IV (1966-1978) and Badan Planologi Kehutanan
III (1978-1983). See http://bpkh4samarinda.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=8&Itemid=3 (accessed on 20 April 2011).
54 No. 16 of 2001 on the Forming of Organizational Structure of the Provincial Technical Units.
This decree was later superseded by decree No. 03/2005.
55 Interview KK, a Head of the technical implementation unit of the Provincial Forestry Agency
on Forest Fire Prevention, 5/5/2008.
56 General Elucidation of Government Regulation No. 33/1970.
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background of originally being a unit of the central government, and their
distance from the centre of the decision making of the agency they had trouble
competing with the other division. As a result the Provincial government
merely supported them with regular operational budgets, which included a
limited budget for undertaking an inventory of forest resources.57
In an attempt to resolve its budget constraints, the TUFPS eventually sub-
mitted the budget proposal to the Ministry of Forestry. The proposal was
approved on the condition that demarcation would be carried out in collabora-
tion with a regional technical implementation unit of the Ministry of Forestry
the so-called Unit for Forest Area Establishment (Ind. Balai Pemantapan Kawasan
Hutan, hereafter UFAE). The collaboration was possible at that time because
the UFAE is responsible for the delineation of conservation forests.58 However,
according to a senior officer of the TUFPS, this requirement meant in practice
that they were subordinate to the UFAE.59 Recently, due to the passing of a
government regulation in 2007 the TUFPS was no longer able to access the
budget from the ministry, because control over delineation was now fully
returned to the ministry.60
Having arranged the delineation in that way the TUFPS coordinated poorly
with the Kutai district agencies, particularly the district forestry agency. Some
district officials said that they were never invited to engage in discussions on
the delineation of the production forest of the Delta that the TUFPS had organ-
ized. The officials of the local office of the Kutai Forestry Agency raised the
same concern. Two Muara Badak-based forestry officials said:
We had neither coordinated with nor met in the field any staff of either TUFPS or
UFAE.61
In addition, they claim to have never seen any notice board which was
installed by the provincial forestry officials as an indicator that they really
undertook the delineation. An interim head of TUFPS contested these observa-
tions arguing that they always organized a village meeting of five or ten
participants every time they delineated an island. They invited the village and
sub-district officials to those meetings. He added that they did not involve
57 For instance in 2009 the Provincial government provided US$ 9,700 to be managed by the
TUFPS.
58 See a decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 6188/Kpts-II/2002, Article 3(2).
59 Interview Jn, a Head of the Technical Unit for Forest Planning Samarinda of the Provincial
Forestry Agency, 11/3/2009.
60 Government Regulation No. 38 of 2007. Following the enactment of this government
regulation a rumor emerged that the TUFPS would be merged with the UFAE or with other
provincial service units. Interview Jn, 11/3/2009.
61 Interview I and HS, the staffs of Muara Badak Office of Kutai Forestry Agency, 31/7/2008.
In their reports on demarcation (penataan batas) the technical team of TUFPS indeed said
that they carried out demarcation in which they informed the local inhabitants about their
activities. For their reports see for instance Badan Planologi Kehutanan (2004).
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the Kutai District Forestry Agency because regulations state that for a Forest
Area such as in the Mahakam Delta which does not host any forest concession,
the members of a team of forest delineation should all come from TUFPS.62
Apart from the stories told by the field officials, the officials of the TUFPS
undertook the long-awaited delineation between 2001 and 2005. In practice,
the officials of the TUFPS undertook the delineation working together with the
officials of the UFAE as a way to fulfil the requirement of the Ministry of
Forestry. There were three steps that the officials passed to undertake the
delineation. It started with composing a work plan based on the Agreed Forest
Plan, Provincial Spatial Planning (PSP) and the harmonized spatial map of 2001.
After obtaining signatures from some high-level district officials for the work
plan, the officials of the TUFPS went down to the areas that had been listed
in the work plan in advance. The way they organized the listed areas was
not based on administrative territory of villages (desa). Rather they divided
the areas into islands. The primary goal of the field visit was to install markers
in the mapped areas. The distance between two markers was 100 meters. The
markers functioned as provisional boundary markers. Again after obtaining
the signatures of the district officials, the officials of the TUFPS undertook a
second field visit aiming to install permanent boundary markers. Before they
submitted all the maps of the delineated areas to the Minister of Forestry they
had obtained the signatures of the districts officials for a third time. At the
time of writing, the Minister of Forestry has not yet endorsed any of the
submitted delineated maps.63
In spite of several field visits and village meetings which the officials of
TUFPS claimed to have had, the delineation hardly involved the village actors.
As the Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation was not what the decree
of the Minister of Forestry 32/Kpts-II/2001 meant to be because it was not
formed by district head, the delineation missed the signatures of the village
heads or community leaders. As a result it also completely missed the inven-
tarization of any land rights of the villagers over the forest land. These non-
participatory practices have unavoidably hampered the effort to clarify the
legal status of the production forest. In practice the villagers have (re)moved
almost all the permanent boundary markers.
62 Besides the Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation (see page 95 and 96), there is also
a technical team (Panitia Pelaksana Tata Batas) formed by the Head of TUFPS. Only if the
Forest Areas host forest concessions then the members of the team include representatives
from the district forestry agency. Interview AN, 2 and 5/12/2011.
63 Interview Spd, a member of staff of the Technical Unit for Forest Planning Samarinda of
the Provincial Forestry Agency, 11/3/2009, and AN 2 and 5/12/2011.
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5.3.2 Forest protection
As already mentioned, due to the absence of forest rights or permits, in accord-
ance with the laws and regulations, all the forestry agencies or units which
are based in the province or district regardless of belonging to the Ministry
of Forestry, Provincial or Kutai District government, bear responsibility to
protect the production forest of the Delta. From 1983 to 1998, these imple-
mentation units were the so-called Technical Unit for Forest Product Circula-
tion (Ind. Unit Pelaksana Teknis Daerah Peredaran Hasil Hutan, hereafter TUFPC)
and POMF. The TUFPC is another technical implementation unit of the Provincial
Forestry Agency (see Section 4.1 on technical implementation units). The
Provincial government had actually established the TUFPC in 1965 together
with nine other similar provincial forestry technical units.64 In the year of
the establishment the nine technical units covered Forest Areas of 14 million
ha.65
Meanwhile, from 1998 onwards the full responsibility for forest protection
was moved to the Kutai Forestry Agency and several of its local offices and
technical implementation units. The Kutai Forestry Agency was established
in 1995 following the selection of Kutai Kartanegara district as one of 26
districts that hosted exemplary decentralization policy.66 The Kutai Forestry
Agency was the first such district agency in East Kalimantan’s history. The
other thirteen districts formed their agencies from 1999 onwards. Initially in
1995, the work areas of the Kutai Forestry Agency consisted of areas, which
were combined and overlapped with the work areas of three provincial techni-
cal implementation units, namely UPTD Mahakam Ulu, UPTD Mahakam Tengah,
and TUFPC itself. Yet in 1999 the work areas were considerably decreased due
to the administrative fragmentation of the Kutai Kartanegara district into three
64 The official establishment was realised through a decree of the government of East Kaliman-
tan No. 1/DKD 1965. The decree originally gave the agency the name Local Forest Manage-
ment Unit (Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan). In 1987, through the Provincial Regulation of East
Kalimantan No. 04 of 1987, the Provincial government changed the name into Cabang Dinas
Kehutanan (Regional Office of Forestry Agency). The most recent change to the name was
in 2001 when the Provincial government changed it into TUFPC, through the Provincial
Regulation of East Kalimantan No. 16 of 2001.
65 The remaining 3,591,625 ha of the Forest Areas of East Kalimantan were controlled by
Perhutani, a state-owned company. See in Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai (1971, p. 66), and
Magenda (1991, p. 78).
66 The District forestry agency was officially established through the District regulation No.
23 of 1995. The District regulation subsequently was endorsed by a decree of the governor
of East Kalimantan No. 061-III.I-357 of 1995.
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districts and one municipality.67 In 2011 the Kutai Forestry Agency had a
work area of 1,647,622 ha.68
Back to the TUFPC. Over the years its work area continued to be 676,528
ha (see Map 5.1), though in reality many parts of the area have been deforested
and a few parts have been converted into non-Forest Areas.69 Of this area,
about 11,12 per cent (75,200 ha) is mangrove forest, most of which is reported
to be in the Delta. In its earlier period the TUFPC used to have quite a com-
Map 5.1: The work area of Technical Unit for Forest Production Circulation
67 The other two districts are Kutai Barat dan Kutai Timur, while the municipality is Bontang.
68 See in Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) Kutai Kartanegara (2007, p. 206). The present size of
the work area is actually larger than the previous size which was 620,500 ha. It encompassed
404,565 ha of forest concession areas, and 215,935 ha of non-forest concession areas. See
the annual report of the TUFPC of 1984/1985 and 1985/1986.
69 The 2006 annual report of the TUFPC continues to note its work area as a total of 676,528
ha with 75,200 ha of mangrove forest despite the fact that the Provincial government as
well as the Ministry of Forestry have excluded five plots in the Delta from the Forest Area.
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plete organizational structure. In order to manage such huge areas, they
divided themselves into several branches, resorts as well as check points.70
They formerly had three branches, ten resorts and a dozen check points.
Each of the branches and resorts had their own smaller work areas. The branch
which was based in Samarinda and in particular the resort which was based
in Muara Badak sub-district, took responsibility for protecting the production
forest of the Delta. The Muara Badak resort itself was assigned to handle a
work area of 203,550 ha. It was anyway the largest work area that a resort
of TUFPC had at that time. Nevertheless none of the four check points was
situated in the Delta.
In response to devolution to the district level and a decreasing number
of timber companies as of 1986, the organizational structure was simplified
in 2001. The change meant only three primary check points and a few support-
ing check points. Later in 2008, the two primary check points were dismissed
including the one situated in Muara Badak sub-district which used to be
responsible for the production forest of the Delta.
Besides the decreasing number of timber companies, the establishment
of two local offices belonging to the Kutai Forestry Agency was another push
factor for the organizational restructuring of the TUFPC. The Kutai District
government established the local office in 2003 in an attempt to move the
control over nine Forest Areas from the Provincial government to the Kutai
District government.71 One of the two local offices was set up in Muara Badak
sub-district holding responsibility over the entire production forest of the Delta.
The decree of the Kutai District Head endorsing the two local offices states
that the main role of the offices is to assist the Kutai District Forestry Agency
to undertake surveillance, safeguarding as well as control over their respective
work areas.72
The above descriptions of the national, regional and district regulations
concerning the assigned government organizations to protect the production
forest of the Delta show that during all periods there was an authorized body
dealing with forest protection. There may have been some overlap in terms
of duties or responsibilities amongst the agencies, yet it did not lead to a legal
vacuum. Yet the continued existence of government bodies assigned with this
task has apparently not led to a sound protection of the production forest.
In contrast, from the outset the production forest has suffered from pervasive
absence of forest protection.
70 In Indonesian they called Kantor Balai Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan (the Office of Forestry
Management Unit) and Kantor Resort Pemangkuan Hutan (the Lower Office of Forest Manage-
ment Unit).
71 The actual establishment of the local office took place in 2003 whereas its official establish-
ment was a year before, in 2002, through a decree of the District head No. 180.188/HK-265/
2002.
72 Article 4e of the decree of District head No. 180.188/HK-265/2002.
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None of the annual reports of the TUFPC from 1983 to 2008 mention surveil-
lance activities in the Delta. For example in the 1999-2000 report, at a time
when shrimp pond development was flourishing in the Delta, there is not a
single word about the Delta itself. The reports primarily contain information
about the number of officials, office inventories, correspondence, timber trade
inspections, and figures for exported wood. Very few annual reports provide
information about forest resource use or management. The 2002 report briefly
mentions surveillance activities to manage forest fire and forest occupation,
but it does not refer to the Delta as a place where surveillance occurred.73
A former head of the Muara Badak and Samboja forestry resorts acknow-
ledged that during his terms (1985-1989 and 1999-2002) he never visited the
Mahakam Delta, despite it falling under his authority. Instead, he ordered the
staff members employed at the check points to make an inventory of the ponds
located within their respective work areas. Unfortunately none of the staff
eventually submitted a report. Another forestry staff member mentioned that
he had never visited any of the Delta’s islands for surveillance purposes, but
that during a sailing holiday he had visited two islands, noticed the many
new ponds, and reported these to the resort head. The resort head subsequently
submitted the report to more senior management, but no response or action
was taken.74
During the height of pond development (1996-1999) the central office of
the TUFPC undertook one visit to the Mahakam Delta. This visit, in late 1999/
early 2000, was precipitated by an order from the head of the Provincial
Forestry Agency for the technical implementation unit to improve community
supervision about the issue. The order required the officers to provide “guid-
ance” to pond owners, and it appears that officers focused on informing pond
owners about the ecological functions of the Delta’s mangroves, rather than
focusing on the illegality of the ponds.75
Even though the governor’s decree of 2001 and 2005 continued to assign
the TUFPC to carry out forest protection within its work area, when the Decen-
tralization Law of 1999 came to be effectively implemented in 2001, the TUFPC
staff was considerably behind in their protection of the Forest Areas. They
focused intensely on the prevention of any forest product to be illegally trans-
ported and traded. A field staff member of local office of Muara Badak even
managed to stay in the office although he was officially dismissed.76 Yet he
eventually left the office when the Kutai Forestry Agency established a new
local office in Muara Badak sub-district in 2003. Ever since, the TUFPC has
73 See Dinas Kehutanan UPTD. Peredaran Hasil Hutan Samarinda (2003, p. 2).
74 Interview A, 6/3/2009.
75 Interview IB, a Head of the Technical Unit for Forest Product Circulation of the Provincial
Forestry Agency, 28/5/2008.
76 The main reason why the field staff member stayed in the office was because he was
married to a local woman. The head of the local office had asked him to stay in the office
as his wife might cook for the members of staff.
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hardly taken care of the protection of all Forest Areas across the mainland
as well as the Delta’s islands.
Instead of succeeding to pursue the Provincial government to hand over
control over a number of Forest Areas, the local office of the Kutai Forestry
Agency of Muara Badak has been struggling to survive. For many reasons
the officials of the local office avoided surveillance, safeguarding and control
and decided to mostly engage in extension and rehabilitation.77 Instead of
reporting, the officials deliberately ignored the illegal occupations and illegal
timber production. The present writer even had the opportunity to witness
this once. Some illegal loggers who were cutting thick mangrove trees nearby
an oil company’s installation, were seen. A forest ranger who was present
during the visit did nothing for he believed that it would be dangerous to
enforce the law upon them as this might harm him and other officials. As he
presumed that the illegal loggers were backed by the local police he suggested
a larger and stronger team from the Province to enforce law upon the
lawbreakers.78
Not only the local office of Muara Badak hardly carried out forest pro-
tection in the Delta but also two technical implementation units of the Kutai
Forestry Agency The central office of the Kutai Forestry Agency actually has
two divisions which are specifically assigned to deal with forest protection.79
Yet the two divisions have failed to set up any program concerning surveil-
lance, safeguarding or the enforcement of law in respect of the illegal loggers.
Similarly, a special service unit of the Kutai Forestry Agency, to which is
specifically assigned the task to protect the Forest Areas and forest products,
did nothing for the protection.80
5.3.3 Explanatory Factors
There appear to be five prominent factors according to the forestry local
officials, which disabled them from carrying out forest protection. The five
factors can be divided into those that are internal and those that are external
to administrative institution. Internal factors, in this case, include the timber-
oriented forest management policy and attitudes, severe lack of resources of
the forestry units, and administrative competition between the Provincial and
Kutai District government regarding forest authority. Weheras, the external
77 In the course of 2002-2007 the District forestry agency succeeded in replanting mangrove
trees in the Delta sizing about ±206 ha.
78 An observation by Salo Palai village, Muara Badak, August 7, 2008.
79 See for a more complete provision the Decree of the Kutai District Head No. 180.188/HK-
55/Tahun 2001, Article 7.
80 The service unit was officially established in 2004 through the Decree of the Kutai District
Head No. 180.188/HK-71/2004.
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factors include the existing use rights of local inhabitants as well as the import-
ance of shrimp farmers’ livelihoods and economic interests.
Internal factors
(a) Timber orientation
It is not an exaggeration to say that the timber orientation in forest manage-
ment has been one of the most important factors causing the lack of imple-
mentation of forestry legislation in the Delta. This was notably the case
between 1983 and 1998. Basically, timber orientation in forest management
refers to a situation where timber is perceived as the most valuable forest
product. Accordingly, all resources e.g. policies, laws and regulations, budgets,
human resources facilitate timber management. From a narrower point of view,
it can solely lead to timber extraction so that all resources are expected to serve
timber extraction. As already mentioned, timber orientation, at least during
the above mentioned period, was legally justified as can been seen in the forest
delineation.
As far as the Delta is concerned there are maybe two adequate indicators
for the appearance of timber orientation. Firstly, reasons to establish new lower
units. Secondly, the expertise of the staff. The establishment of resorts and
check points is very much in favour of forest concessions. A new resort has
only been formed if there exists a forest concession (Ind. hak pengusahaan hutan
abbrev. HPH) in the area where the resort office would be constructed,81
whereas a check-point would only be established on log truck routes. This
organizational development clearly implies that the organization focused
primarily on protecting forest concessions and ensuring that trees were trans-
ported and sold legally. Therefore, there was never any resort or check point
in the Delta.
Meanwhile apart from forest rangers, officers working at the branch and
resorts were mainly staff with forestry expertise as such cruisers (Ind. tukang
taksir) and scale makers (Ind. tukang ukur). The former is an expert whose job
it is to calculate the number of trees that can be sustainably harvested by a
concession holder. The numbers are used to arrange an annual working plan.
The latter is an expert whose job it is to check if a concession holder has
remained within his quota of trees as set by the annual working plan.
Not only was forest protection in the Delta absent, the officials of the TUFPC
also overlooked the official legal status of the production forest of the Delta.
Many of the officers of the regional and Kutai District government as well
as the field officials wrongly claimed the official status of the Delta area as
81 See Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan Mahakam Ilir (1985, p. 7).
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conversion forest, protection forest or conservation forest.82 More surprising
is that in the organization’s annual reports, the Delta’s production forest is
not marked as part of their area.83
The fact that the Delta has never hosted any forest concession and the
predominance of the unprofitable nypa palm tree are major explanatory factor
for administrative behaviour. A former head of the TUFPC, who ran for Sama-
rinda’s mayor election in 2010, has an explanation for why forest protection
in the Delta is almost absent:
The limited presence of forest protection in the Delta may come from the unprofit-
able nypa trees. The government agencies are not interested in taking care of them.
Therefore if the Delta was dominantly populated by the bakau (rizhopora) the
protection might be seriously carried out or it might even generate contestation
amongst the government agencies concerning management authority.84
(b) Lack of resources
The issue of lack of resources has been heard for a long time. The issue does
not exclusively belong to a particular government sector, or to a particular
period, such as the period before or after booming forest concessions or even
before and after the decentralization era (see Section 3.1 on the lack of
resources before decentralization era). By the term ‘resources’ is meant the
availability of material resources, and manpower.
As already mentioned, since decades the ratio between the number of
forestry officials and the size of Forest Areas has been imbalanced. TUFPC faced
this very same problem, particularly in the case of forest rangers who were
specifically assigned to undertake surveillances as well as safeguarding. A
report shows that at the time pond construction was flourishing in the Delta,
the Muara Badak branch of the TUFPC had only two forest rangers. As such,
each forest ranger was responsible for 101,775 ha.85 This differs substantially
from the traditional ratio, whereby forest rangers usually take up more than
82 This misperception was also held by higher ranking officers, including the former head
of the Provincial Forestry Agency, who commented to the local press that the mangrove
forest’s status was conservation forest but then ‘corrected’ himself saying that it was
production forest. See Kaltim Post, Delta Mahakam, Kewenangan Pusat, 23 September 2003,
and Kaltim Post, Mahakam Jadi Hutan Produksi, 19 May 2004.
83 See Map 5.1, and Dinas Kehutanan Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Timur Cabang
Dinas Mahakam Ilir (1999).
84 Interview IB, 23/7/2008 and 28/5/2008.
85 See in Cabang Dinas Kehutanan Mahakam Ilir (2000). Not only the Muara Badak of the
TUFPC encountered a lack of manpower, but it also happened elsewhere in the Province.
In fact, it had happened since the first time the Provincial Forestry Agency was founded
in 1959. In the period when the issuance of timber concessions suddenly increased (1967-
1973), all regional forestry agencies in East Kalimantan together had only 800 employees,
300 of whom were administrators and 500 technical. Of the 500 technical staff members
only half were available for field work (Daroesman 1979, p. 48). See also Section 3.1, and
Section 3.2.
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fifty percent of the total staff positions. Ideally, a forest ranger is responsible
for 2,000 up to 5,000 ha.86
After the Kutai Forestry Agency established its two local offices in 2003
and as a response TUFPC reduced its lower office considerably and withdrew
its field officials, the ratio was getting worse. The local office of Muara Badak
sub-district employed only seven officials, consisting of five full-time employees
and two temporary employees. Two of the five full-time employees were forest
rangers. In the earlier years of its establishment the total number of staff had
been larger, yet it decreased as the employees decided to move away to places
closer to cities such as Samarinda and Tenggarong.
Similarly, it has long been clear that the amount as well as quality of
equipment was decreasing. In the years (1970-mid 1980s) during the period
of booming forest concessions, when the income from the forestry sector was
abundant, it was reported that the TUFPC had a small budget to purchase
equipment and pay for the running of the office, ie. stationary, electricity and
clean water. Given the small budget they reportedly had been facing a deficit.
The situation was made worse as their only speed boat, which they needed
for the surveillance or patrols across the Delta, was broken. Similarly, they
did not own any means of transport such as motorbikes and cars, forcing them
to use their personal vehicles. As a result their official communication with
other agencies and timber companies was limited for they could not deliver
letters to those offices. To solve the problem they borrowed transport from
the villagers, and in order to be able to do so they had to be well-acquainted
with the villagers. Likewise, the local office of the Kutai Forestry Agency of
Muara Badak mainly used their own equipment, such as mobile phones, motor
bikes or borrowed from others to do their job.
It is likely that the lack of equipment is caused by a financial deficit. The
financial deficit is due to the absence of a budget for running a forest pro-
tection program. The absence originally comes from regulations stating that
a service unit may only receive a budget for running the office and not for
running a program. Meanwhile the budget for running the office was also
limited. Only the head of the local office was financed for undertaking patrols.
He received US$ 1.2 (IDR 10,000) per day for the patrols.87 His entire staff
including the forest rangers would not be paid for patrols. Nowadays the
budget support is better as all members of staff are entitled to receive money
for undertaking patrols.
The lack of budget further affected the extent to which they could carry
out the patrols. During 2001-2008 for instance, the TUFPC, on average, could
only carry out the patrol once a month while the ideal frequency is four times
86 Interview SDU, a Head of Division for Forest Protection of the Provincial Forestry Agency,
22/4/2008, and Skt, a former Head of Muara Badak office of the Technical Unit for Forest
Product Circulation of the Provincial Forestry Agency, 7/3/2009.
87 The amount is valid only during the late 1980s up to the late 1990s.
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a month.88 Since 2009 they have been able to carry out patrols twice a month,
because regulations were issued allowing the agency a budget for running
a program. They apparently included the patrols into the proposed program.
Besides the abovementioned ‘regular’ lack of resources, incidental lack of
resources also affected the forestry officials, who had, for instance, to move
office. As a technical implementation unit and local office, the TUFPC and the
local office of Muara Badak sub-district respectively often became the first
target in budget cuts every time the regional government intended to re-
structure its organization.89 So, they were sometimes asked to use other
buildings. In their new office they soon had to deal with a new shortage, such
as insufficient office space.
(c) Administrative competition
The previous section discussed decentralization several times. So, we know
that through legislation, the central government devolved some forestry affairs
to the Kutai District government. The devolvement did not only allow the
Kutai District government to establish its own forestry agency and lower units,
it has also led to the dismissal of several technical implementation units of
the Ministry of Forestry. However the two occurrences, the establishment of
the Kutai Forestry Agency and the dismissal of the technical implementation
units of the Ministry of Forestry, have taken place at the same time as three
other developments. Firstly, the Provincial government has retained its ten
technical implementation units including the TUFPC simply by changing the
name from regional office into technical unit. Secondly, in 1995 the Provincial
government delayed the delegation of nine Forest Areas of the TUFPC’s work
area to the Kutai District government and promised to devolve them later.
However, the Provincial Forestry Agency up until recently has refused to
transfer the nine areas, arguing that existing forestry law and regulations still
grant them the authority. Thirdly, the Ministry of Forestry established some
new technical implementation units after the dismissal of their former technical
implementation units. Some of the new technical implementation units are
so-called Technical Implementation Units on Watershed Management (Ind.
Balai Pemangkuan Daerah Aliran Sungai abbrev. BPDAS), Technical Implementa-
tion Unit on Natural Resources Conservation (Ind. Balai Konservasi Sumberdaya
Alam abbrev. BKSDA), UFAE and Technical Implementation Unit on the Monitor-
ing of the Utilization of Production Forest (Ind. Balai Pemantauan Pemanfaatan
Hutan Produksi abbrev. BPPHP).
88 Interview Shr, a Head of Sub-Division of the Technical Unit for Forest Product Circulation
of the Provincial Forestry Agency, 4/3/2009
89 A very recent organizational restructure of both the Provincial and Kutai District govern-
ment occurred in 2008. The restructure followed the passing of Government Regulation
No. 41 of 2007 concerning the organizational structure of regional government (see more
in Section 4.1). A rumor has emerged that the TUFPC will probably be merged with other
provincial technical units or may even be dismissed.
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The first two developments have prolonged the conflict between the Pro-
vincial and Kutai District government, contesting who has authority over the
nine Forest Areas. In other words, it is uncertain which level of government
actually holds the authority and responsibility for the Delta’s production forest.
The conflict arose as the two levels of government used different regulations
to support their claim of authority over the production forest. On the one hand,
the Kutai District government referred to two regulations from 1995, which
stipulate the closure of all central and provincial government service units
located at the district level, and orders that their duties and authority be
devolved to newly established district agencies.90 On the other hand, the
Provincial government referred to two Provincial Regulations (peraturan daerah
provinsi) from 1981 and 1987 as well as the Forestry Act of 1999, to argue that
the nine Forest Areas were still under provincial authority.
Initially this administrative conflict started via written correspondence in
2000 and continued up to 2008. As the conflict intensified both parties resorted
to meeting forums and media reports. In several forums, the Head of the Kutai
District asked the governor to devolve the Forest Areas, and the governor
confirmed that he would advise the head of the Provincial Forestry Agency
to organize the transfer. However, the transfer was not realised. Frustration
with the process led the Kutai District Head to send another letter in 2001
announcing that the District government would take over the Forest Areas
by positioning some forestry officials in the areas. As said, it was in 2003 that
the Kutai District government eventually positioned its officials there by
establishing two local offices of which Muara Badak-base is one. The hidden
agenda behind the establishment was to force the Provincial government to
devolve the authority. To date this strategy has failed, and the Provincial
Forestry unit still holds the authority in the area.
As the expectation of establishing the local offices was that the Provincial
government would be willing to transfer the Forest Areas, it is therefore not
surprising that the Kutai District government still feels that the disputed Forest
Areas do not yet belong to its territory.91 Moreover, the conflict of authority
over the areas is only a concrete case of a larger conflict emanating from the
implementation of the 1999 decentralization. Concerning forestry affairs, the
conflict is rooted in the authority to grant forest rights or permits as well as
to issue official documents for transport and trade of forest products. The Kutai
District government perceives that they are able to issue any rights or permits
90 The respective regulations are the Directive of the Minister of Home Affair No. 5 of 1995
and the Provincial Regulation No. 02 of 1995. The provisions of the two regulations that
the Kutai District government had quoted to support their argument are very different
from a higher regulation, Government Regulation No. 19 of 1995 saying that all technical
implementation units of the Ministry of Forestry should be closed.
91 See those arguments in Kaltim Post, Lebih Serius Kelola Delta Mahakam, Pemkab Mohon
Dukungan Pemprov Kaltim’ 28 October 2008, and Kaltim Post, Syaukani: Kami Minta
Kewenangan Itu, 22 September 2003.
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after the passing of the Law No. 22/1999, whereas the Ministry of Forestry
suggests that only part of the forestry affairs were devolved and regarding
permits or rights issuance a district head could only issue permits on collection
of forest products.
The ministry-district conflict spread further to a regional level. Most of
district government across East Kalimantan province perceived that the Pro-
vincial government had no longer any authority over all Forest Areas situated
in the district administrative areas. On the basis of this argument they therefore
suggested to the Provincial government to close all their regional officess as
well as service units. In response to that, the Provincial government refused
to do so, arguing that they still had authority over all Forest Areas situated
across more than one district/municipality. Together with two other districts
the Kutai District government refused the re-establishment of provincial
technical implementation units which had been officially closed in 1995. The
conflict moved from the Province up to Jakarta when both the Provincial
government and some District Governments of East Kalimantan met separately
with some ministry officers in an attempt to mobilize support. The conflict
ended with an oral statement of the Minister of Forestry saying that the
provincial forestry service units were still legal and therefore able to issue the
documents for transport and trading of forest products.92
Based on the perception that the Forest Areas still belong to the Provincial
government, the Kutai District government does not dare to carry out forest
protection through law enforcement as they believe that it may be beyond
their authority and therefore against the laws and regulations. The laws and
regulations give them limited authorization to advise pond owners and under-
take rehabilitation to limit forest damage. Therefore in dealing with forest
clearance for ponds the forestry district officials have not been forbidding the
clearance, but rather controlling the existing situations through rehabilitation.
The careful stance of the Kutai District government can be understood in the
light of a 2003 incident. In that year, a technical implementation unit of the
Kutai Forestry Agency called on the Forest Protection and Forest Product
Protection (Ind. Perlindungan Hutan dan Hasil Hutan abbrev. PH3) carried out
law enforcement over some Banjarese people who entered and occupied Bukit
Soeharto Grand Forest Park illegally. Four years later the head of the Provincial
Forestry Agency sent a letter to the governor explaining that the Kutai Forestry
officials did not have the authority to carry out law enforcement, as the Bukit
Soeharto Grand Forest Park still fell under the authority of the Provincial
government.
Following the above arguments developed by the Kutai District officers,
some Provincial government officers expressed their surprise. They said that
they believed the Provincial government already shared authority and respons-
92 Interview SDU, 22/4/2008.
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ibility for the Forest Areas. They gave two reasons for this view. First, in 1998
the Ministry of Forestry handed a total of nine forestry responsibilities over
to the Kutai District government, and one of these concerned forest protection.
Second, the Delta’s production forest is wholly located within Kutai territory,
and the provincial officers argued that according to existing laws and regula-
tions, this means that the production forest is under the authority and respons-
ibility of a Kutai District government. In addition to the legal arguments, they
suggested that the Kutai District government had to carry out the protection
for they were much closer to the village population. Meanwhile, even though
the head of the Provincial Forestry Agency had sent a letter to his technical
implementation units, saying that they still had authority over the nine Forest
Areas in accordance with existing laws and regulations, the actual behaviour
of the officials of the TUFPC showed they were not convinced by the letter.
Instead of opposing the presence of the officials of the local office of the Kutai
Forestry Agency, they decided to accept and further withdraw most of their
field officers to be merely concentrated in Samarinda city in the end. It seems
that they did so in an attempt to stay away from potential overlap.
Another fierce administrative competition is between the TUFPS, and a
division of the Provincial Forestry Agency called Division on Mapping and
Forest Planning (Ind. Perpetaan dan Tata Guna Hutan abbrev. PTGH). As said
(see page 105-106) the competition is more concerned with access to the
Provincial Annual Budget. The PTGH officials, whose officials used to work
at the TUFPS, were not willing to share the budget with the TUFPS. As the acting
head of TUFPS said:
Some of the officials of the Provincial Forestry Agency obviously know that our
office has staff skilled in inventarization and mapping. Yet, when they were ar-
ranging the annual budget, they did not think that budget for inventarization and
mapping should go to our office. That was because they were afraid of getting
the remnant (Ind. makan ikan asin).93
Personal influence in accessing the budget is evidently important. They pleaded
with their former colleagues who are working at the Provincial Forestry
Agency office but it had no result. However in 2011 they received part of the
budget to carry out inventarization through the help of one of their former
colleagues who is working at the Provincial Planning Agency.
External factors
(a) Long existing local use rights
The fact that villagers had resided in certain locations in the Delta for a long
time before the local officials were appointed in the area, has been mentioned
93 Interview AN, 2 and 5/12/2011.
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as a reason for the officials not to prohibit the villagers to clear the production
forest. Using that argument the officials perceived the pond owners to be
entitled to live in as well as utilize the production forest. This justification did
not only refer to the historical background, but also to the possession of a land
letter that entitles shrimp farmers to hold ponds (see Chapter 8 for the accounts
of the position of the land letter in Indonesia’s land law). Some officials even
considered the land letter equal to the use rights that the oil and gas companies
have obtained from the central government.
The local officials’ understanding of the local rules on land rights were
formed through experiences in the past, when the shrimp farmers argued that
they had land rights, because they and their fellow villagers had resided in
the Delta for generations and inherited the land from their predecessors. They
pursued the officials to prove that their land was located within the Forest
Area. Instead of countering the villagers’ argument with reference to the
forestry laws and regulations which officially state that the Delta’s mangrove
forest is a production forest, the local officials preferred not to react to it. In
a recent meeting taking place in two sub-district offices, a former deputy of
the Kutai Forestry Agency told the shrimp farmers that they would not expel
the shrimp farmers despite their activities being against the existing formal
forestry laws and regulations. In return they were urged to rehabilitate the
degraded production forest for they had caused the degradation.
(b) Shrimp farmers’ livelihood and economic interests
When the officials explained why they had not prohibited the shrimp farmers
to occupy and convert the forest land into ponds, they strongly emphasized
the economic advantages that the shrimp farmers could gain. Due to the rising
price of shrimp exports at the time, the Kutai District officials believed that
the shrimp ponds could generate economic prosperity for the farmers.94 Not
only did the ponds benefit the farmers through the high prices but they also
provided job opportunities for the local villagers as well as migrants. Given
the potential economic advantage of the shrimp ponds, the efforts to label the
farmers as illegal occupiers or initiatives to expel them from the production
forest would be considered as useless.95
94 Yet some of the officials of the Provincial government and the Ministry of Forestry doubted
whether the ponds could generate economic prosperity for they suspected the District
officials of intentionally capitalizing the issue for their personal interests. The issue is related
to the proposal of the Kutai District government to convert the production forest into non-
Forest Area. Interview SBT, a Head of Division for Forestry Planning of the Provincial
Forestry Agency, 21/4/2008, and Gagah Dalimunthe, 2/5/2008.
95 See McCarthy (2006, p. 106) on how the same argument was used in Aceh to not enforce
forest law on illegal loggers. One respondent, the former head of Kutai Forestry Agency
argued that if trying to enforce the law they would be regarded as ‘pahlawan kesiangan’,
which means ‘a fake hero’.
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Besides the economic advantage, the Kutai officials also considered the
investment that the shrimp farmers had made to construct and operate the
ponds. To be able to expel the farmers from the production forest, the govern-
ment would probably have to compensate all expenses. With the limited
budget, the government was unable to do so.
Having prioritised the economic advantage of the shrimp ponds above
the protection of the production forest the village heads favoured to have
investors from outside. As the head of Muara Pantuan village stated:
I like outside investors (people who want to buy land in the Mahakam Delta for
ponds) coming to our village, as they will bring money so that the villagers’
economic position will improve.
The fact that Kutai officials unlikely tell a lie about the economic importance
of the shrimp ponds is confirmed by some research.96 The research points
at two indicators of economic importance namely the number of shrimp
farmers and annual profits. The number of shrimp farmers in the Delta is
larger than of any other profession such as fishermen, traders or government
employees.97 This is not surprising, as, for one thing, shrimp farming has
turned out to be more lucrative than fishing. There appears to be the per-
ception amongst villagers that shrimp farmers earn a moderate income, where-
as fishermen earn very little (Hidayati et al. 2005, p. 60).
5.4 LEGISLATION: IDENTIFICATION OF SOME PROBLEMATIC ISSUES
Rather than describing all the legal problems of the forestry legislation as it
has been applied to the production forest of the Delta, this section will focus
on the legal problematic issues that: (i) affect the implementation of the forestry
laws and legislation; and (ii) have an effect on the rights of natural resource
users, particularly those who had used resources prior to the 1983 designation.
The discussion of the former presumes that the legal problems hampered the
local officials in effectively implementing forestry laws and regulations. It
occurred not only because the provisions of the legal rules failed to clearly
regulate particular matters but also because there was confusion through the
simultaneous existence of contradictory rules. The discussion of the latter issue
examines the extent to which the forest designation and delineation secured
the use rights of the right holders or did the very opposite.
96 To mention some of the research: Bourgeois et al. (2002), Sandjatmiko et al. (2005, p. 73-74),
Bapedalda Kutai Kartanegara and PKSPL IPB (2002, p. III-48), and Hidayati et al. (2005).
97 For instance, a research published in 2002 stated that 2,963 people from seven villages of
the Delta worked as shrimp farmers. This is twice the number of fishermen (1,223). See
Bapedalda Kutai Kartanegara and PKSPL IPB (2002, p. III-48).
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The legal problems of implementation as well as of right holders seem to
be two kinds. Firstly, when the provisions of forestry laws and regulations
are internally vague, incompatible, inconsistent and/or overlapping with one
another. Secondly, when the forestry rules are incompatible, inconsistent and/
or overlap with other rules concerning, for instance, petroleum, fishery, land
and spatial planning. This includes rules which regulate the organizational
structure of forestry management.
5.4.1 Affecting implementation
The abovementioned factors that are internal and external to the administrative
institutions have significantly hampered forest protection in the Delta. Since
1965 up to the present there have been legal rules with which the government
needs to comply for the sake of forest protection. Nevertheless the introduction
of some following regulations and the fact that there have never been any
rights or permits issued in the Delta’s production forest have made the provi-
sions less clear.
Government Regulation No. 33/1970 on Forest Planning (see Section 5.3)
paved the way for later regulations to overlook those production forests where
government never granted any permits or rights, as what happened in the
Delta. The government regulation called for immediate delineation of the
concession forest. The government regulation of 1985 concerning forest pro-
tection actually declined the tendency to favour the concession areas by treating
all the Forest Areas which were to be protected equally. Yet, regulations
concerning the organizational structure of the TUFPC reintroduced the old bias.
The type of terms and conditions of the establishment of resorts and check-
points as well as the way in which staff expertise was prioritised, suggest
favouritism toward forest concessions particularly of trees, which the timber
companies wanted to transport and trade. From 2001, as an impact of the 1999
decentralization, the new organizational structure of the TUFPC has considerably
favoured forest concessions. A governor decree of 2001 states that the functions
of this unit merely concern forest exploitation.98 In an effort to adjust to the
preceding Forestry Law of 1999 which nearly moved the entire obligation of
forest protection to permit holders, the unit was no longer charged with the
protection of concession forest.
Given the strong focus of the regulations on forest concessions, a legal
vacuum emerged concerning to which specific forestry staff or unit the pro-
tection of the production forest, such as in the Delta would be assigned. Not
only the provisions concerning organizational structure generated the legal
vacuum but also provisions concerning people’s participation in forest pro-
tection. The latter has not been followed up by any forestry provision regula-
98 East Kalimantan Governor Decree No. 16/2001.
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ting how people’s participation should take place. This vacuum likely increased
after the Forestry Law of 1999 and its subsequent organic regulations shifted
the obligation of forest protection towards the permit holders. Who then was
expected to be in charge of protection of the Delta’s production forest when
there was no permit holder?
The heads of sub-districts were critically approached by the land holders,
once they refused to support the proposal of land registration arguing that
the land was situated in Forest Area. The land holders, in return, asked the
heads of the sub-district to show them boundary markers as a way to prove
the Forest Area existed (Syafrudin 2005: 87). Regarding this conflict it must
be noted that the forestry laws and regulations did not distinguish between
forest protection for delineated forest and non-delineated forest. Yet, the forest
laws and regulations rely considerably on the delineation process to provide
a definite status for Forest Area. As a result, the local officials were hesitant
to carry out forest protection despite the fact that the Delta’s mangrove forest
had officially been designated as Forest Area. Accordingly, the presence of
specific provisions which would have enabled the local officials to refuse the
proposal of the land holders despite the fact there had not been delineation
or boundary markers, could have helped.
Provisions concerning forest management authority are rather confusing.
They affect the Ministry of Forestry, Provincial and Kutai District government
the most when carrying out forest protection in the Delta. As already men-
tioned, both the Provincial Forestry Agency e.g. TUFPC and the Kutai District
government e.g. Forestry Agency concomitantly claimed to have management
authority over the nine Forest Areas which included the Delta’s production
forest. Both sides based their opinion on particular laws and regulations to
support their respective claims. In general the Kutai District government have
based its claim on laws and regulations concerning decentralization, whereas
the Provincial government have based its claim on laws and regulations
concerning forestry as well as decentralization. The forestry rules were not
only based on national laws and regulations, they also took into account an
international declaration.99
For their claim the Kutai District government mentioned Government
Regulation 8/1995 concerning the Transfer of Some Government Affairs to
26 Districts/Municipalities and the directive of the Minister of Home Affairs
No. 5/1995. It is important to underline that the government regulation of
1995 did not order the closure of any technical implementation units of the
Provincial Forestry Agency, rather it ordered the closure of any technical
implementation units of the Ministry of Forestry.100 The Kutai District govern-
99 The international declaration is the 1983 World Forestry Conference. One of the important
points made during this conference was that forest management should be strongly inte-
grated into watershed management rather than fixing it with administrative division.
100 See Article 5 (3) of the Government Regulation No. 8/1995.
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ment therefore referred to a provincial regulation and decree of the head of
Provincial Forestry Agency.101 One article of the provincial regulation states:
Following the establishment of the Kutai Forestry Agency any technical implementa-
tion units of the Provincial Forestry Agency must be closed as part of the
devolvement of authority to the Kutai District.
Another article of the decree of the head of Provincial Forestry Agency states
that if the provincial technical implementation units would be closed, the entire
work area would have to be handed over to the Kutai Forestry Agency
together with their staff, equipment as well as funds. After the conditions
required by the regulations, ie. the establishment of the Kutai Forestry Agency
in 1995 and the closure of the Regional Office of Mahakam Ulu of the Pro-
vincial Forestry Agency in 2001, were realized, the Kutai District government
also believed that the TUFPC should be closed.
As mentioned earlier, instead of fulfilling the promise to the Kutai District
government of handing over the nine Forest Areas and implementing what
was written in the regulations, the Provincial government still argued that
the TUFPC had a legal basis to exist and therefore the nine Forest Areas
remained their work area. There is one main and two supporting pieces of
legislation that are raised as justification. The main piece of legislation concerns
the organizational structure of the Provincial government, which determines
the legal basis for the TUFPC. The two supporting pieces of legislation concern
forestry matters handed over to district and ecosystem-based forest manage-
ment.
In response to the Kutai District government’s argument that the TUFPC
should have been closed because it did no longer have a legal basis, the
Provincial government in contrast pointed out the TUFPC still had a legal basis,
which could be found in a Provincial Regulation of 2001. One article of the
regulation states that two previous Provincial Regulations on the organizational
structure of the Provincial government are still in force. Given that the two
previous Provincial Regulations were the legal basis for the establishment of
the TUFPC, the Provincial Forestry Agency interpreted the article as a recent
legal basis for the existence of TUFPC. Furthermore, the change of its name from
local office to technical implementation unit did not mean that the local office
had been closed; in essence it was still there despite the change of name.
Another legal argument that the Provincial government raised was that
they were not supposed to hand over the nine Forest Areas because some of
them were located on the border of district and city. They were both located
in Kutai Kartanegara district and Samarinda city. Following the 1999 law on
decentralization and its subsequent regulations, any Forest Areas located on
101 Provincial Regulation No. 02/1995 and Decree of the Head of Provincial Forestry Agency
No. 5223/579/DK-IV/1998.
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such borders would fall under the authority of the Provincial government (see
Section 5.2).102 The Provincial government actually made an undue
generalization in raising the argument because not all the nine Forest Areas
are located on the border. In the case of Mahakam Delta, it is in fact located
entirely in the Kutai District administrative territory. Nor is another argument,
which prematurely concluded that the Forest Areas could not be handed over
because the Bukit Soeharto Grand Forest Park is included in the nine Forest
Areas, valid. This argument was based on legislation that held that any grand
forest park is still under the authority of provincial government.103 Again,
the argument relied on a generalization for the size of the Bukit Soeharto
Grand Forest Park takes up only 58,200 ha of the 676,528 total work area of
the TUFPC.104
Apart from misleading interpretations of the provisions by the Provincial
and Kutai District government, the laws and regulation on which their argu-
ment is based are correct. However, seeing that the abovementioned legis-
lations have led to conflicting claims there must be an inconsistency (see
Section 1.3.2). The inconsistency is most visible in the provincial legislation.
Whereas the 1995 provincial regulation followed the 1998 decree of the head
of the Provincial Forestry Agency in supporting the hand-over, the 2001
provincial regulation instead suspended it.
5.4.2 Effect on the resource users
Prior to the years of the designation of the Delta’s mangrove forest as Forest
Area, several forms of use had already occurred. Two main resource uses were
land utilization and oil and gas extraction. Earlier resource uses included
coconut plantations and additionally a few shrimp ponds. Together with rattan
gathering, coconut plantation had appeared already in the period of the Kutai
Sultanate (late 15th century-1844). In the late 1960s the first oil and gas ex-
traction appeared, which started to operate effectively in the early 1970s. Land
use for shrimp ponds sporadically commenced in the second part of 1970s
and gradually increased in the early 1980s.
Different regulatory rules, both formal and informal, were applied to each
of those main resource uses. Only after the New Order (1966-1998) land use
started to be governed by national formal rules. Prior to it, from the period
102 Law No. 22/1999 as superseded by Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Autonomy. To name
some of the subsequent regulations: Government Regulation No. 25/2000 and the Decree
of the Minister of Forestry No. 051/Kpts-II/2000.
103 Government Regulation No. 62/1998 and the Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 05.1/
Kpts-II/2000.
104 The Bukit Soeharto Grand Forest Park was founded in 1991 when the Minister of Forestry
designated it through a decree No. 270./1991. Its current size was smaller that its original
size which was 61,850 ha. See Dinas Kehutanan UPTD. Peredaran Hasil Hutan (2006, p. xiv).
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of the Kutai Sultanate, customary, sultanate and colonial rules simultaneously
governed resource use. Unlike the rules on land use, oil and gas extraction
had been ruled by national laws and regulations from the moment it started.
Given that these main resource uses existed prior to the forest designation,
the question arises as to how the forest designation affected prior resource
uses in terms of rights security? The designation and delineation apparently
affected the land resource users and oil and gas resource users differently.
In accordance with the Government Regulation No. 28/1985 as superseded
by No. 45/2004 on Forest Protection Total E&P Indonesie, an oil and gas
contractor, could operate despite the enactment of those two Government
Regulations. Nevertheless, the two Government Regulations and subsequent
implementing ministerial decrees required the company to adjust itself to those
enacted regulations (see Section 5.2). Later, the Ministry of Forestry decided
that a forest use permit issued by the Minister of Forestry would be the only
way for the company to adjust to the enacted regulation.105 That permit
would enable the company to use the production forest land, as well as to
cut trees if necessary. Not only did the company thus obtain certainty regard-
ing its operations, they were also ensured that they would be able to use the
forest until their contract ended. However although those abovementioned
regulations stated clearly what the company was supposed to do after the
designation and delineation, they have not obtained the permit yet.106 At
the time of this research the company employees were arranging a proposal
that would be submitted to the Ministry of Forestry.107 Yet they arrange the
permit only after 40 years of operating in the Delta, and 25 years after the
enactment of the 1985 Government Regulation.
Despite the fact that the Government Regulation No. 28/1985 and No. 45/
2004 explicitly guaranteed the legal security of oil and gas extraction, the
ministerial regulation of 2006 further ensured this by formulating a policy,
which favored mining and petroleum. As mentioned before (Section 5.2), the
policy included mining e.g. oil and gas extraction on the list of strategic non-
forest resource use. The list excludes aquaculture as well as agriculture. Those
provisions rendered the coconut and shrimp farmers whose lands were located
inside the designated and delineated production Forest Area, illegal. The
provisions prohibit access, utilization and use of the Forest Area unless a
105 The Ministry of Forestry regulated forest use permits in several decrees and regulations.
In chronological order they are No. 55/Kpts-II/1994, No. 41/Kpts-II/1995, No. 614/Kpts-II/
1997, No. 720/Kpts-II/1998, and 14/Menhut-II/2006. Recently the forest use has been more
strongly regulated through the enactment of Government Regulation No. 24/2010.
106 On an official website of the UIM, Total E&P Indonesie is not currently on the list of
companies which have obtained a permit. See http://UFAE4samarinda.net/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=13&Itemid=16 (accessed on 28 April 2011).
107 Interview Fm, a staff of the Directorate for Forestry Planning of the Forestry Ministry, 6/4/
2009.
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permit has been issued by either the Minister of Forestry, governor or district
head.
However apart from their illegal status, the designation does not totally
neglect the land users. According to regulations concerning forest planning
and demarcation, a committee established by a district head, should take care
of the right claim by third parties, when carrying out the demarcation of a
designated forest.108 The rights claim of third parties could concern rights
to land or rights to crops and buildings on the land. Only if the rights claim
is resolved, the designated forest can be mapped and endorsed as definite state
forest land (Fay and Sirait 1999; Fay and Sirait 2005, p. 8).
However to understand legal security of the farmers’ land rights is not
simple. Even after the designation had officially taken place and the delineation
had nearly been completed, the legal impact on the land-holders still remained
an issue because the officials missed some requirements. One of the missed
requirements was that they should have taken into account the interests of
the people who live inside and around the Forest Areas. Is the 1983 and 2001
designation legally valid if neither of them were based on the required truthing
check? Could the fact that the committee on forest boundary delineation did
not publicly announce the provisional demarcation nor obtain consent and
acceptance from the people mean that the delineation does not have any legal
binding and that therefore the Forest Department has not obtained jurisdiction
over the Delta’s mangrove forest? If the Ministry of Forestry disregards them
as illegal occupants, what would be its legal argument given that the farmers
have an ownership document proving their rights over the land? Yet if they
are legal occupants, would it mean that they are allowed to register their land
with the land agencies to get land entitlement?
Despite the fact that the TUFPC delineated 93,86% of the production forest
of the Delta, and given that the Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation
did not resolve the private land right claims, in my view the mangrove forest
is yet unlikely to be state property. It still belongs to private land. It should
be added that the fact that the Committee did not settle the claims of the third
parties is related to reports by the technical team of the TUFPS which on the
one hand stated that the team discovered shrimp ponds for which their owners
had land letters (surat penggunaan lahan), yet on the other hand that the team
did not recognise the land letters as possessory evidence (see Section 8.2 on
possessory evidence). Moreover, the technical team of the TUFPS thought that
the shrimp farmers would only settle temporarily in the Mahakam Delta. As
a result, the reports made by the technical team advised the Committee on
108 The members of the committee comprise of district agencies dealing with issues of develop-
ment planning, land and forest, the service units of the Ministry of Forestry, heads of sub-
district, village heads and local elders.
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Forest Boundary Delineation to not necessarily take the shrimp ponds out of
the Forest Area.109
The claim of state property over the Delta’s mangrove forest is even weaker
given the TUFPS has not yet submitted all of the delineated results to the
Minister of Forestry for official endorsement. A verdict of Tenggarong district
court of 2003 which has been upheld by a verdict of Samarinda appeal court
of 2006, stating that the land letter is a legal land ownership document, has
further weakened the ownership rights of the Ministry of Forestry over the
production forest (see Chapter 8 for an account of the land letter).
A recent decision of the Constitutional Court of 2012 as mentioned above
(Section 5.2, p. 98) which determined that Article 1(3) of Law No. 41/1999
on Forestry is against the Constitution, confirms the view that the Production
Forest of the Delta does not belong to state property. That is the case because,
according to the decision, the step of designation is not (yet) sufficient to claim
a particular area as a Forest Area unless it proceeds to the three other steps
namely delineation, mapping and endorsement. This is formulated well in
their own strong statement:
It should have not have occurred that areas on which many people’s livelihood
is dependent, were declared as state forest only by designation.110
5.5 INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE AND RESOURCE USERS
It is obvious that the abovementioned five internal and external factors have
constrained the officials to carry out delineation and protection, and the
problematic legal issues will eventually shape the way the government officers
interact with the users. All the factors combined have created a mixed feeling
of empathy, respect, fear as well as pragmatism among the officials. They are
empathic and respectful vis-a-vis the shrimp farmers who have been living
in the Delta for decades, and have spent a lot of money to establish the ponds.
They fear that thousands of shrimp farmers will get angry if they are asked
to leave the production forest. These feelings have not only arisen out of the
consideration for the shrimp farmers, they have also derived from the legal
and administrative problems as well as the personal interests of the officials.
The rangers feared that they would get harmed, if they enforced the law on
the illegal loggers. The Kutai District government was afraid and hesitant to
issue local regulations that aimed at enforcing the law over the shrimp farmers
as it might have been beyond their authority. They also feared that the villagers
109 See for instance in UPTD Planologi Kehutanan Samarinda (2002, p. 12) and Badan Planologi
Kehutanan (2004).
110 See verdict No. 45/PUU-IX/2011, p. 158.
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might consider to establish a new separate district if they disappointed the
villagers.
Among street-level bureaucrats the feelings of empathy, respect and fear
were mixed up with a sense of pragmatism as they considered their personal
interests as civil servants. They have to ensure that their planned activities
are running well as part of their accountability to superiors, despite being
neglected and looked down upon by their fellow officials who work at the
office of the Kutai Fishery Agency (for a similar experience of fishery field
officials see Section 7.3).
Having recounted and considered the abovementioned factors, government
officials, and particularly street-level bureaucrats, have developed some be-
haviors in relation to the forest delineation and protection. Firstly, on one hand
they tend to conceal their original purpose and the legal impact that their
activities might have on the land holders, and on the other hand they tend
to persuade the shrimp farmers or land holders not to be afraid of losing their
use rights because of the activities of the officials. Secondly, they tend to find
ways around existing laws and regulations to accommodate the shrimp
farmers. Thirdly, they tend to not enforce the law but at the same time legit-
imate the actual forest resource use.
The field officials of the local office of the Kutai Forestry Agency tend to
avoid discussion about the legal status of the Delta’s ponds when they are
conducting routine jobs such as assisting local people to plant mangrove trees.
When pond owners or pond guards ask about the land’s legal status, the
officers have been reported as saying that it is not within their authority to
answer such questions, because their job only deals with technical matters.
When officers of the TUFPS were undertaking the long-awaited demarcation
of the protected area, they deliberately avoided confrontations with land
owners and pond workers. During the officers’ work, whenever land owners
or pond workers inquired about the purpose of the officers’ visit, they avoided
explaining the actual purpose of their activity, and instead claimed they were
simply measuring and mapping the area. The officers even persuaded owners
and workers that their activity would not affect the existence of the ponds,
by saying that they would not measure the ponds themselves, but only the
surrounding areas.
Not only did the officials avoid confrontation with the pond owners, they
even involved the pond owners by asking them to assist with the demarcation.
They hired the pond owners or other local inhabitants for US$12 (IDR 100,000)
per day in the hope that they would not obstruct their work.111
In an attempt to avoid the economic and social cost caused by a rigid
implementation of the laws and regulations, the government officers found
ways around the laws and regulations. As a field officer of the local office
of the Kutai Forestry Agency said:
111 Interview AN, IF and Spd, 2/12/2011.
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Aturan harus disiasati yang penting tujuan tercapai. Soalnya kalau aturan betul-betul
dipatuhi akan susah karena kondisi setiap tempat berbeda (we must trick the law in order
to meet our goals. It will soon get difficult if we implement the laws rigidly as
the real situation is different).112
He mentioned the rehabilitation projects as an example, when making the
above comment. In most cases the officials deliberately broke the laws to be
able to respond to the farmers’ demands or to make the law adaptive (see
Section 3.1b on adaptability). They said that the growing mangrove seeds
without plastic bags or polybags are accepted whilst the law states otherwise.
They promised the farmers to lobby their superiors to convince them to allocate
some money to the farmers even before they had started to plan the seedlings
of new mangrove tress. They made these promises despite knowing that the
law requires the farmers to have grown the seeds in advance in order to get
a payment.
By not enforcing the law but providing legitimacy to the land holders the
officials built up a relation with the shrimp farmers. A field officer of the Kutai
Forestry Agency in Muara Badak sub-district, who is also a forest ranger,
reported that he saw many instances of people cutting mangrove trees in the
vicinity of Total installations. Although he confirmed that he knew this was
illegal, he did not take any action. His explanation for this inaction was that
he was borrowing a boat from a local fisherman and believed that if he
detained the loggers and confiscated their chainsaw, they could potentially
harm the boat owner in retribution, as they would recognize to whom the boat
belonged.113 Afraid of being attacked by the shrimp farmers is another excuse
why the forestry officials did not prevent the pond opening. To describe the
situation in the Delta, they often called it ‘Texas’.114
Being aware of the obligation to financially compensate the land holders
if they would be asked to leave the forest, the Kutai Forestry Agency officials
vividly pleaded to not expel the land holders from the production forest. In
exchange they urged the land holders to replant the deforested areas of the
production forest. This kind of legitimacy did not only derive from the socio-
economic conditions, but also from the situation that the forest occupants
interpreted the law as if their use rights (see Section 8.2 for the accounts of
use rights) were equal to legal rights or permits of natural resources use.
A former head of the TUFPC gave an interesting interpretation of the law.
According to him, the ponds in the Mahakam Delta are not illegal for three
reasons. First, he perceives the cultivated rights or permits as equal to timber
or mining concessions; according to this point of view, the legal status of the
land resource use is similar to the legal status of a forest or mining concession.
112 Interview I, 7/8/2008.
113 Interview Gnw, a forest ranger of Muara Badak office of Kutai Forestry Agency, 7/8/2008.
114 In Indonesia, the term ‘Texas’ refers to a situation where rules do not exist.
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Second, when constructing the ponds, the local people only cut palm trees.
Palm trees are not included in the Ministry of Forestry’s list of “forest
products”, which means that the land owners were not violating any formal
rules. Third, the palm trees cut by the local people are not sold. Thus the
people are not engaged in any kind of illegal forest trade.115
5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Both legal factors and non-legal factors have influenced law-making as well
as the implementation of law on forestry management in the Delta’s production
forest after the 1983 designation. One of those legal factors, the status of the
Delta’s mangrove forest as a production forest, has considerably influenced
any subsequent policy initiatives aimed at overcoming problems in the Delta.
For the Kutai District government, the legal status has narrowed down its
jurisdiction, as it does not have the authority to enforce the law in respect of
forest occupants, and fears a conflict between the Kutai and the Provincial
government. As a result, as appeared in the circular letter mentioned in Section
5.1, the Kutai District government has only been able to carry out limited
activities such as prevention and rehabilitation.
Two other legal problems are the lack of clarity and incoherence within
the legal norms on forestry management. A lack of clarity has made the local
officials hardly count the Delta’s mangrove forest as a state-owned forest that
should be protected in accordance with law and regulation. This could occur
as the law does not clearly regulate protection in a production forest like in
the Mahakam Delta, with regard to which the government has never issued
any rights or permits. This may be the case because the Delta’s production
forest is not interesting because it does not have valuable commercial trees.
Another factor adding to a lack of clarity is that the law and regulations do
not clearly regulate what should be people’s involvement in the forest pro-
tection. In the end, neither regional and local government officials nor local
people carry out any form of forest protection of the Delta’s production forest.
Next to the problems regarding the legal status of the Delta’s mangrove
forest there appears to be administrative competition mainly between the
Provincial and Kutai District government. The fact that the different govern-
ment units have raised similar as well as different legal foundations for their
respective claims, indicates there is a degree of incoherence within the forestry
laws and legislation (see Section 1.3.2 on coherence). The incoherence has
emerged from two sources. Firstly, laws and regulations of the different
departments do not refer to each other. Secondly, recent laws and regulations
115 Interview IB, 27 and 28/5/2008. In this regards the former official provided perceived
security from which shrimp farmers obtained tenure security (see Section 1.3.3 on tenure
security).
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are not compatible with the previous ones. Interestingly, unlike other com-
mercial Forest Areas, the administrative competition about the Delta does not
lead to a competition between the two levels of government for real control
on the field. By contrast, the competition results in a lack of protection and
delayed delineation.
Meanwhile the Agreed Forest Plan of 1983 itself, apart from its contribution
to eventually confirm the size of the Forest Area, had already brought forward
a further lack of clarity for existing land uses. For a place like the Mahakam
Delta, which the Agreed Forest Plan entirely designated as Forest Area, the
plan has generated a serious problem because there is a long tradition of other
resource use in the area. The present problems regarding tenure by villagers,
is actually a logical effect of the desk study method of the Agreed Forest Plan.
Missing truthing checks as well as failing to involve other related regional
agencies, particularly regional land agencies, has led to an Agreed Forest Plan
which does not reflect well the real ecological and land use activities on the
field. The 2001 revision blatantly repeated the desk study method despite the
fact that resources might have enabled them to carry out truthing checks. Also,
they had been informed about the immense forest occupation that had been
taking place. As a result, instead of securing legal clarity with regards to the
forest occupations, the renewed designation left thousands of land holders
in uncertainty as far as forestry laws and regulations were concerned.
The uncertainty (see Section 1.3.2 on certainty) is still there even though
regional government officials nearly completed the forest delineation in 2005.
In fact, the delineation failed to define the borders, the size or inventory of
the production forest or settle any private land claims. Due to the poor compli-
ance of the forest delineation with the forestry laws and regulations, there is
left the large legal question of whether the Delta’s mangrove forest is presently
under state jurisdiction.
Alongside the lack of clarity and incoherence of the forestry legislations,
there have been factors that internal and external to the administrative institu-
tions that have contributed to the reluctance of the Kutai officials, the admin-
istrative competition and failing compliance. Interestingly, the internal and
external factors have provided legitimacy to actual resource use on one hand
but generated new legal uncertainty concerning tenure on the other hand. The
legitimacy resulted from respect and empathy of the regional and district
officials, whereas the legal uncertainty has been the result of pragmatism and
fear.
In the end, neither the legitimacy nor legal uncertainty has had a positive
impact on the fate of the mangrove ecosystem. They have both contributed
to a depletion of the mangrove forest. The legitimacy gave more tenure security
to the land holders so they continued opening new ponds and recently sold
some to outsiders. At the same time legal uncertainty continues to hinder the
forestry agency officials in exercising state jurisdiction over the Delta’s pro-
duction forest.
6 The treasure of oil and gas: offshore and
onshore mining
‘Total’s first principle is to respect the law and regulations’.
(Juli Rusjanto, Total’s Head of Operations).
6.1 INTRODUCTION
On 28 August and 1 September 2011 members of the so-called Kutai Karta-
negara District’s Committee on Conflict Resolution (KKDCCR) gathered in the
office of the District government. The meetings were also attended by a.o. some
officials of Kutai agencies and offices, the official of the Port Administration
Office, and local police officers. During both meetings, they discussed the
functioning of ten tidal traps, locally called julu, which were installed across
a river in Sepatin village of Anggana sub-district.1 The disagreement started
when a boat of Total crashed into one of the tidal traps. Suggesting that the
installation of the tidal trap had violated the law on fishery and public naviga-
tion, the company sent separate letters of complaint to the regional police office
and the Kutai District government. In the letter sent to the regional police
office, the company reported that there had been a legal violation in the
Mahakam Delta, which had disrupted their extraction operations. With legal
violation they specifically referred to the fact that the tidal trap installation
was not in accordance with a circular letter of the District Head from 2004
that forbids the instalment of any fishing gear which could obstruct public
navigation and/or which is too close to installations of oil and gas companies
(see below). According to Total’s employees, the tidal trap gears were closely
situated to their Gathering and Testing Satellite (GTS) G and TN G19. Meanwhile
in a letter sent to the District government, in case KKDCCR, the company
employees asked the officials to find a solution to the case, preferably through
law enforcement.
Even though the meetings rested on the decision to take legal action, the
KKDCCR actually failed to determine to which extent the instalment of the tidal
trap had violated the law. Some participants of the meeting, in particular the
1 A tidal trap is a passive trap, which relies on the tide. A net, tied around poles, is dropped
in the water during high tide and pulled up during low tide with trapped fish in it. Usually
one long julu comprises of many julus which belong to a number of owners. It can therefore
be larger than 50 meters long and four meters wide.
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company’s employees, argued that the instalment had violated District Regula-
tion No. 03/1999 concerning Fishing within the Administrative Area of Kutai
Kartanegara District, and a circular letter of the District Head from 2004
concerning the prohibition of gear instalment along a public shipping lane.2
Both regulations prohibit any fishing gear instalment which could endanger
public interest/a public shipping lane. The 2004 circular letter specifically
added oil and gas exploration to the list of things that are not supposed to
be endangered by any fishing gear instalment. In addition to these two legal
documents, it was also suggested that the tidal trap instalment had violated
another District Regulation: No. 36/2000 concerning Fishery Enterprise in Kutai
Kartanegara District. This regulation requires that every traditional fisherman
and farmer have a so-called registration letter on fishery in order to be allowed
to fish and cultivate shrimp.
However, some participants of the meeting, notably the officials of the
Kutai Secretariat, doubted that the tidal trap owners had really violated the
regulations mentioned. The doubt rose when during inspection those par-
ticipants did not see any clear boundary marks indicating a marine zone
division. Given the absence of boundary marks, it was unclear whether the
tidal trap instalment was situated on the public shipping lane or inside the
fishing grounds. In addition, when the company employees were asked by
the regional local officials which areas would have to be free from any fishing
gear instalments, they could not answer that question.
Doubts as to the legitimacy of legal sanctions rose further when the par-
ticipants of the meetings also found that the company’s off-shore installations
likely violated the law as well. It was apparent that the company did not hold
any permit issued by a Port Administration Office, a regional technical imple-
mentation unit of the Ministry of Public Transportation (see Section 4.2 on
technical implementation unit). An official of the Regional Agency therefore
appealed to the participants to pay attention to the matter, saying:
Before we come up with a decision whether to carry out legal sanctions or not,
it is good to advise the company to arrange and obtain the permit ahead. The tidal
trap owners will otherwise fight back by arguing the company had violated the
law as well.3
Besides questioning as to whether the tidal trap had been installed illegally
or not, the participants of the meetings also drew in the question as to whether
the fishermen were sufficiently informed on related existing fishery regulations.
This view suggested that the legal violation committed by the tidal trap owners
had happened simply due to a lack of knowledge among the fishermen of
2 No. 100/287/Pem.A/VI/2004.
3 This was said during the meeting of 28 August 2009.
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the prevailing law. According to this point of view, the trap owners could
not fully be blamed for breaking the law, if they had indeed done so.
Even though the participants of the meetings could not find satisfying
answers to the question of (il)legality of the tidal trap instalment, and at the
same time questioned the (il)legality of the company’s installations, the meet-
ings ended in the decision to carry out legal sanctions over the tidal traps.
This decision seems to have been taken with an eye on the interests of the
oil and gas extraction company, which boosted the revenue of the District
substantially. In the introduction of a third meeting on 7 September 2011, the
head of the KKDCCR emphasised that the company is the largest contributor
to regional revenue. Any disturbance in its operations would therefore certainly
imply a decline of the District’s annual budget.
All stakeholders in the Mahakam Delta have long perceived the oil and
gas extraction as an important source of income. Therefore, any discussion
concerning the Delta usually ends with the conclusion that extraction activity
should be sustained. That also explains why legislation and its implementation
mostly favour oil and gas extraction. In the Mahakam Delta, the story about
oil and gas extraction is a story about a resource use which most of the time
is prioritised by state officials. Yet, given its commercial nature, its story is
about vulnerability at the same time. The degree of certainty with which the
company can run the extraction very much depends on the extent to which
they can benefit other stakeholders, notably in terms of financial payments.
This chapter does not discuss the drafting or content of the oil and gas
laws and regulations in a way as detailed as is the case in Chapter 5, 7, 8
and 9. With reference to the above tidal trap case this chapter examines the
extent to which prioritization of oil and gas resource use has affected the
drafting process as well as content of the legislation concerning oil and gas
extraction. Has the prioritized status also affected the implementation of the
law and/or the way in which local officers interact with private users? To
what extent could the prioritized status have led to (in)consistence and (in-
)coherence in relation to other sectoral regulations?
It should be underlined that the prioritization is not the only factor that
may have influenced the drafting, content and implementation of the oil and
gas legislation. Another factor is the fact that, according to the legislation,
extracted and transported oil and gas should be regarded as state property,
whereas contractors can only undertake exploration and exploitation. This
state ownership over the extracted and transported petroleum is often used
to effectively implement legislation on oil and gas resources.
6.2 LAW MAKING AND LEGISLATION: MAIN LAWS AND PROVISIONS
Rather than focusing exclusively on the legislation concerning the relationship
between state agencies and oil and gas resource users, this chapter focuses
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more on oil and gas legislation related to other resources users, notably land
and fishery resource users. Departing from the main idea of this chapter,
namely that oil and gas use has been prioritized, this chapter tries to figure
out the extent to which the prioritized policy has affected the use rights of
farmers and fishermen. Nevertheless, it is first necessary to turn to the descrip-
tion of the designation of state mining zone (Ind. wilayah kuasa pertambangan
or wilayah pertambangan) or work area (Ind. wilayah kerja) in the Mahakam
Delta. The designation is a legal instrument for the government to be able to
apply oil and gas laws and regulations across the Mahakam Delta including
the issuance of rights over the oil and gas resources. Only if the Ministry of
Mining, presently the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, has deter-
mined an area as a state mining zone or work area and has awarded a con-
tractor, then formal rules on oil and gas apply.
One important background detail, which needs to be mentioned, is that
in 2001, Law 22/2001 on Oil and Gas superseded Law 44 Prp/1960. Two
changes occurred when the central government enacted Law 22/2001. First,
the right to control mining resources was transferred from Pertamina to the
central government, e.g. the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. Second,
a new supporting division of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
the Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Activities (Ind. Badan Pelaksana
Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi, henceforth Executive Agency) was
introduced to take over some of the tasks traditionally performed by Pertamina
(see Section 4.2 on the supporting division).4 These tasks included representing
the government in negotiating PSCs and supervising the operational manage-
ment of oil and gas contractors.
In relation to the administration, the changes ended a 30 year-period (1971-
2011), during which Pertamina held mining rights and economic rights com-
bined. As the Law 21/2001 introduced liberalization in the oil and gas sector,
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources now shares the economic rights
with a contractor (Patmosukismo 2011, p. 116). This explains why a contractor
such as Total recently handled complaints from local pople in the way which
will be described in the next sections as well as in Chapter 7 and 8.
6.2.1 The making of a mining zone or work area
Before describing formal procedures on determining state mining zones and
work areas, I will first explain the two terms. The two terms, state mining zone
and work area, have, in fact, the same meaning. They are areas that, based
on surveys sponsored by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,
contain mineral reserves. The term ‘state mining zone’ has been used since
4 The Executive Agency was established through the enactment of Government Regulation
No. 42/2002.
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the enactment of Law No. 44 Prp/1960 on Oil and Gas and was replaced by
the term ‘work area’ following the enactment of Law No. 22/2001, which
superseded Law No. 44 Prp/1960. In other words, the term ‘work area’ can
also be defined as an area where oil and gas exploration and exploitation can
take place.5 During the period of Law 44 Prp/1960, the state mining zone
was divided into: the state mining zone of Pertamina and the state mining
zone of Pertamina’s contractors.6
Provisions concerning the designation of state mining zones are not as
detailed as in the forestry sector. Under Law No. 44 Prp/1960 on Oil and Gas
and Law No. 8/1971 on Pertamina, it is clear that the Minister of Mining
should declare (penunjukan) state mining zones before handing them over to
Pertamina, a state-owned oil company.7 According to Law No. 22/2001, the
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources shall declare the work areas before
they are offered to companies to be explored and exploited.8 To prepare the
designation, the Minister of Mining has to carry out a general survey to figure
out the potential reserves of oil and gas in particular areas. The Ministry of
Mining can pass on the task of the general survey to particular companies.9
According to the abovementioned laws and regulations the designation
of state mining zones or work areas is not necessarily followed by ground
demarcation or delineation. It suffices to mark the boundaries of the zones
or areas on paper; there is no need for actual boundary marks on the ground.
However, over the designated zones and work areas, the state is already able
to exercise its jurisdiction in which it determines who will obtain rights to
explore and exploit oil and gas resources in those zones or areas.
This is still the case despite the fact that, according to the current oil and
gas legislation, all the land in Indonesia has been arbitrarily designated ‘legal
administrative mining zones’ (Ind. wilayah hukum pertambangan Indonesia).10
A legal administrative mining zone is defined as an area where mining ac-
tivities could be carried out. Such definition means that the whole of Indonesia
is basically a legal administrative mining zone. It could encompass more land
than merely Indonesia, because it could also apply to areas beyond the
Indonesian maritime borders (Abdurrahman 1979, p. 105, Saleng 2004, p. 84)
due to development of mining extraction technology. In any case, the legal
5 Article 1(16) of Law No. 22/2001.
6 By way of illustration, in 1974 the Minister of Mining awarded Pertamina state mining
zones consisting of 224,000 km² (Tim Sejarah 1985, p. 87).
7 See Article 5 (2) of Law No. 44 Prp/1960 and Article 11(1) of Law No. 8/1971. Law No.
8/1971 has been superseded by Law No. 31/2003 concerning the change of legal status
of Pertamina from a fully state-owned into a semi state-owned company.
8 Article 12(1) of Law No. 22/2001, and Article 2(2) of Government Regulation No. 35/2004
concerning Upstream Oil and Gas Activities.
9 Article 11,12 and 13 of Government Regulation No. 35/2004.
10 See Article 1(15) of Law No. 22/2001, and Article 1k of Law No. 11/1967 on Basic Provisions
of Mining.
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administrative mining zone does not automatically become a state mining zone
or work area, only if the areas are expected to deposit oil and gas resources
based on a general survey. According to Law No. 22/2001, work areas are
located within a legal administrative mining zone.11
As for the general survey, there are no provisions concerning local people’s
involvement in the survey. This is different from Law No. 4/2009 on Coal
and Mineral Mining which stipulates that people’s opinions must be heard
before the mining zone is finally designated (Sudrajat 2010, p. 61).12 To con-
duct a general survey of potential oil and gas extraction, the regulations require
that the Ministry of Mining consults with provincial governors ahead of when
the work areas are located. The consultation does not need approval from the
governors, but it should notify the governors that there are particular areas
within the province which may deposit oil and gas and which would probably
be designated as work areas.13
The absence of people’s engagement in the general survey or in the making
of a mining zone could probably be linked to the status of oil and gas as
‘strategic mining’ as stated in Law on Basic Provisions of Mining No. 11/1967.
Oil and gas are regarded as strategic for the state economy and therefore are
considered to affect the livelihood of the greatest number of Indonesian people
(Saleng 2004, p. 86). Oil and gas are also important sources of energy and state
revenue as well as raw materials for the chemical industry (Simamora 2000,
p. 81).
The exercise of state jurisdiction over oil and gas resources in the Mahakam
Delta commenced later than on the mainland: in the mid-1960s.14 In 1967
the Indonesian central government e.g. the Minister of Mining awarded to
the company Japan Petroleum Exploration (hereafter Japex) a large offshore
area of the Mahakam Delta, including the small island of Bunyu, adjacent to
Tarakan Island. The area comprised of 34,125 km², and was called the Maha-
kam-Bunyu block (Idham 1974, p.125, de Janvry and Loiret 1992). The award
included an exploration contract between Japex and the state-owned company
Pertamina. Based on this contract, from 1966 onwards Japex undertook an
exploration of the work area, but failed to discover any oil (Idham 1974, p.125).
In 1970, Japex (now renamed Inpex Corporation) handed over the work area
to the French company Total E&P Indonesie, with an agreement between Inpex
Corporation and Total E&P Indonesie that the latter would be the operator and
each company would have a 50% share.
11 Article 1(16) of Law No. 21/2001.
12 Sudrajat (2010).
13 Article 2 (2 and 3) of Government Regulation No. 35/2004.
14 On the mainland, petroleum exploration commenced in the latenineteenth century (Lindblad
1988, p. 32; Lindblad 1989, p. 53; Magenda 1991, p. 10). In 1888 the Sultan of Kutai granted
a large concession to a Dutch engineer, J.H. Menten, which was later split into three
concessions, situated in the Sanga-Sanga district (Wortmann 1971, p. 6; Idham 1974, p. 119).
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Up to 2011 Total has been awarded four production sharing contracts (PSC)
by the Indonesian government: Mahakam PSC (1970); Tengah JOB PSC (1988);
Saliki PSC (1997); and Southeast Mahakam PSC (1998), covering an area of
5,962km². In accordance with laws concerning foreign investment15 each of
the PSCs is valid for thirty years with the option of renewal for another twenty
years.
On what legal grounds did Japex and Total obtain the contracts according
to Indonesian law? As the contracts were signed before 2001, the way they
obtained the contracts was mainly ruled by Law No. 44/1960 on Oil and Gas
and Law No. 11/1967 on Basic Provisions of Mining. According to the Oil
and Gas Law of 1960, the companies were contracted by a state-owned oil
company, in this case Pertamina.16 The Minister of Mining at the time
appointed the contractors. Not only was it governed by legislation, the relation
between Pertamina and its contractors was also governed by a contract (kontrak
kerjasama or perjanjian karya). Pertamina signed different types of contracts with
Japex and Total, a ‘contract of work’ with the former and a PSC with the
latter.17
As a contractor in production sharing, Total basically has two rights: to
carry out exploration and exploitation in a specific work area, as stipulated
in the contract, and to get reimbursement of all operational costs (popularly
named cost recovery) as well as share the profits. In this respect, as a con-
tractor, Total is entitled to obtain economic rights (see footnote 18). Thus, Total
is not entitled to either mineral rights or mining rights (Saleng 2004, p.159).18
Cost recovery is generally defined as including all expenditures that contractors
15 Law No. 1/1967 as has been replaced by Law No. 25/2007.
16 Pertamina actually originates from a merger between PN Pertamin and PN Permina, two
other state-owned oil and gas companies. The merger was detailed in Government Decree
No. 27/1968. See Tim Sejarah (1985, p. 85); Simamora (2000, p. 30), and Hasan (2009, p.
73).
17 Basically, contracts between a state and an oil and gas company are based on two schemes.
The first is a concession, and the second is a contract. A PSC is one type of contract besides
a service contract. A PSC is known as a concept adopted from adat law (Simamora 2000,
p. 59, Hasan 2009, p. 54). Indonesia formally applied a PSC just when the central govern-
ment founded Pertamina in 1971. However, in practice, the PSC had been practiced as of
1966 when Permina signed a contract with the Independent Indonesian American Oil and
gas Company Organization (IIAPCO). Before that Indonesia applied another type of contract,
called ‘contract of work’. In practice, the ‘contract of work’ had been gradually changed
into a PSC because it was perceived as disguised concession. The concession itself was
a Dutch government legacy which was abolished by the Oil and Gas Law of 1960 due to
state sovereignty reasons (Salim 2005, Hasan 2009).
18 Conceptually, mineral rights (kuasa mineral) are rights to control oil and gas resources.
According to the Indonesian oil and gas law, these rights belong to the state and are closely
related to the country’s sovereignty. The state awarded the executive with mining rights
(kuasa pertambangan) to administer, namely to regulate and supervise, oil and gas exploration.
To carry out oil and gas exploration and exploitation, the executive established a state-
owned company and granted it economic rights (kuasa usaha pertambangan). See Patmosukis-
mo (2011, p. 41 and 115-117).
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have made to carry out the exploration and exploitation. More specifically,
cost recovery should not exceed 40% of the value of the extracted oil and gas.
The revenue from selling the oil and gas, which excludes cost recovery, is
shared between the Government of Indonesia and the contractor. Revenue
on oil is divided 85:15 between the Government of Indonesia and the contractor
respectively, while revenue on gas is shared on a 65:35 basis.
In this particular case, however, Pertamina enjoyed broader rights than
the contractors. Pursuant to the Oil and Gas Law of 1960 and Law No. 8/1971
on Pertamina, the Indonesian government awarded Pertamina so-called rights
to carry out mining (kuasa pertambangan). With these rights Pertamina was
entitled to carry out all activities associated with mining, namely undertaking
a general survey, exploration, exploitation, refinery, transportation and sale
(Ascher 1999, p. 60; Salim 2005, p. 63). Yet, according to Simamora giving such
kuasa pertambangan did not mean that the state also granted Pertamina the right
to control oil and gas resources (mineral rights).19 The kuasa pertambangan
allowed Pertamina to carry out mining activities but not to control or own
the oil and gas resources (Tim Sejarah 1985, p. 36; Simamora 2000, p. 78-79).
Those rights were still with the state, because Pertamina only had mining rights
(Hasan 2009, p. 72-73; Patmosukismo 2011, p. 41).20
Despite the limited scope of the kuasa pertambangan, it paved a way for
Pertamina to play a role as a regulatory and supervisory body. The fact that
Pertamina in reality evolved to be a regulatory and supervisory body suggests
that the rights that the government awarded to Pertamina were not merely
economic rights, but were combined with mining rights (see footnote 18).
6.2.2 Some main provisions
Related to Land Resource Use
According to the 1960 and 2001 Acts on Oil and Gas, rights to explore and
exploit oil and gas resources (economic rights) do not include rights over land.
If the land, which is to be used by contractors, is privately owned or state land
that is being cultivated, the Act stipulates that contractors shall acquire the
land through purchase, exchange, compensation, recognition, or another form
of exchange, in negotiation with the land rights holders (pemegang hak atas
19 See also General Elucidation of Law No. 44/1960.
20 State ownership over resources would end only if the extracted resources are at the point
of export or sale. See the Indonesian Constitutional Court verdict No. 002/PUU-I/2003
concerning judicial review on Oil Gas Act No. 22/2001, p. 153. See also Simamora (2000,
p. 97), and (Hasan 2000, p. 55).
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tanah) or users of state land (pemakai tanah negara).21 For the process of acquir-
ing land the contractors, working supposedly on behalf of the government,
need a letter of authorization from the Executive Agency.
Government Regulation No. 35/2004 on Upstream Oil and Gas Activities
broadly defines the concepts of land rights holders and users. These terms
do not only include those who have certificate and possessory evidence (on
possessory evidence see Section 8.2), but also those who have actual control
over particular state and private land.22 The regulation gave different names
to those two groups, using the words ‘owner’ or ‘holder’ (pemegang) for those
who have written evidence, namely certificate and possessory evidence, and
‘user’ (pemakai) for those who have no written evidence. In this book, I use
the word ‘possessor’ to refer to those who have written evidence of land rights
but not a certificate. Those who have a certificate, I call ‘land owner’. I realize
that this is different from some Indonesian literatures which call those who
have possessory evidence, ‘land owners’.23 Following the concepts defined
in previous literatures, I here understand ‘possession’ as actual control over
a piece of land or other form of natural resources with or without someone
necessarily having a legal right. Yet ‘possession’ may have legal consequences
when someone possesses land for a long time with or without the owner’s
permission and acts like the owner. In this respect, someone would obtain
ownership of land through prescription (Bruce 1998; FAO 2002).24
According to Law 11/1967 on Basic Provisions of Mining and Law 22/2001
on Oil and Gas no land owner/holder can refuse to sell his land to contractors
or to receive compensation. There have been legal scholars who argue that
the provision indicates that a land owner/holder is only obliged to hand over
the land to the contractors if the contractor commits to do two things (Salim
2005, p. 251). First, he needs to present the valid original or copy of the PSC
to the land owner/holder, explain the objective and point out in which areas
the extraction would take place. Second, he needs to acquire the land that
21 These provisions can also be found in Presidential Directive No. 1/1976 concerning syn-
chronization of land affairs with respect to forestry, mining, transmigration and public
works, Government Regulation No. 35/2004, and the decree of the head of the Executive
Agency No. KEP-0113/BP00000/2007/S0.
22 Elucidation Article 62(1) Government Regulation No. 35/2004.
23 An example of this literature is Sutedi (2007, p. 79, 129 and 130).
24 There is literature which perceives ‘possession’ as similar to ‘holding’ (see Bruce 1998 for
instance). Yet, I here distinguish between these two terms, for I understand ‘holding’ or
‘holdership’ as what Indonesian land law as well as practices recognize as ‘garapan’ or
‘penyakapan’. Indonesian land law uses the term ‘holdership’ to refer to a contract between
an owner and user (penggarap) in which they agree on sharing the benefits of utilizing the
land. See Law No. 2/1960 on Contract of Sharing of Benefits and Government Regulation
No. 224/1961 on Land Distribution and Compensation. Yet, recent Indonesian land law
regulations use the term without linking it to the mere sharing of benefits. It now refers
to a situation where someone utilizes land with or without the owner’s permission. See
the Letter of the Head of National Land Agency No. 2/2003.
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would be used or at least provide a guarantee that the land would be acquired
at a later stage. The land can only be acquired with the consent of the land
owner/holder. Deliberate consultation (musyawarah) between the contractor
and land owner/holder is strongly suggested to acquire the land succesfully.
A third party consultation is not needed.
As to what should be done if the consultation fails, Law 1967 on Basic
Provisions of Mining and Law 2001 on Oil and Gas differ. According to Law
2001 on Oil and Gas, an attempt to come to an agreement can be made with
the help of a third party. The third party consists of a team or committee
established by the regional government. A lower regulation by the Head of
the Executive Agency of 2007 concerning guidance for a PSC contractor in
acquiring land seems to have interpreted the provision of Law 2001 on Oil
and Gas differently.25 According to this document, the contractor can invite
the heads of the sub-district to mediate the dispute in case the consultation
has failed. If the mediation fails too, the contractor can invite the district head/
mayor or governor to mediate. If all government officials fail, the contractor
can report the dispute to the Executive Agency, asking for necessary follow
up. Thus, rather than stipulating the mediation to take place with the help
of a local team or committee, the lower regulation relies on individual govern-
ment officials to settle the dispute.
Unlike Law 2001 on Oil and Gas and the 2007 regulation, Law 1967 on
Basic Provisions of Mining neither suggests the establishment of a local team
or committee nor does it stipulate to bring the dispute to higher government
levels, if the consultation has failed. Instead it states that the Minister of Mining
will take a decision on the dispute. If the land owner/holder does not accept
the decision of the Minister, district courts will make the final judgment. This
means that the dispute will be settled through a judicial process.
With an eye to the side of the land owner/holder, he/she is required to
present three documents to be able to obtain compensation. First, land docu-
ments, e.g. a certificate in the case of a land ownership and a land letter (surat
tanah) in the case of a land possession. Second, a letter declaring that the land
is not disputed. Third, an identity card and family card (kartu keluarga). Only
after a land owner/holder has presented all the necessary documents, the
contractor provides compensation.
If the land owner/holder can present the necessary documents, and the
consultation leads to an agreement on the amount or type of compensation,
the land rights will be transferred from the land owner/holder to the govern-
ment. That means the land is now state property.26 As far as the oil and gas
legislation is concerned, the acquired land becomes state land because the
contractor will account for the expenses of land compensation as cost re-
25 See the decree of the head of Executive Agency No. KEP-0113/BP00000/2007/S0.
26 This is different from Law 1960 on Oil and Gas which states that the land shall be returned
to the original owner/holder after the PSC expires.
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covery.27 After the acquired land has become state land, the contractor is
required to apply for the use rights from the National Land Agency (Salim
2005, p. 251).
Related to Fishery Resource Use
It is interesting that, whereas the oil and gas regulations address land use
specifically, they do not do so with regards to fishery resource use. The regula-
tions only concern the protection of the coastal environment by prohibiting
any oil and gas exploration and exploitation in areas with a nursery and/or
coral reefs.28 This ‘gap’ may come from the perception that the sea is open
access. Therefore, the oil and gas legal framework mostly uses policy rules
to refer to fishery regulations instead of using legislation.
On a national level, the first policy rule concerning petroleum-fishery
resource use was put in place in 1975, two years after Total started its first
exploitation, when a circular letter of the Directorate-General for Fishery of
the Ministry of Agriculture No. E.V/2/4/15/1975 concerning the Prohibition
to Sail or Fish in the Ficinity of Oil and Gas Platforms was passed. The circular
letter stipulated that within a radius of 500 meters from the installation it was
forbidden to sail or to fish, and that within 1 mile sailing and fishing were
restricted. Ships or boats were totally prohibited to enter the inside area, yet
in the restricted area ships or boats were still allowed to pass by as long as
they did not drop their anchor in the area.
After the 1975 circular letter was in force for 29 years, the Deputy Head
of Kutai District reiterated its content in 2004 by issuing a new circular letter
No. 1000/287/Pem.A/VI/2004, which prohibited the installation of a fishing
gear across a public navigation zone. According to the circular letter, the
KKDCCR had noticed that in some coastal areas of Kutai the fishing gear instal-
ments had endangered public navigation zones. Interestingly, even though
the 1975 circular letter did not mention oil and gas platforms as places that
had been endangered by the fishing gear installations, the 2004 circular letter
included the platforms as places that shall not be endangered by such installa-
tions.
27 For the list of expenditures that cannot be included in cost recovery see the decree of the
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources No. 22/2008 concerning the list of expenditures
that cannot be reimbursed by contractors.
28 The provision is stated in Government Regulation No. 17/1974 concerning the Implementa-
tion of Monitoring of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Exploitation.
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Related to Forest Resource Use
Law 1960 on Basic Provisions of Mining introduced the principle that mining
use had to be prioritized in case it conflicted with another resource use. This
provision was subsequently reiterated by a 1976 President Directive:
The Minister of Mining and governors have to avoid overlapping with other
resource uses when issuing a mining permit. Yet if the overlapping can not be
avoided the mining permit issuance should be prioritized.29
The above principle further influenced subsequent regulations on oil and gas
and forests. Government Regulation 1985 on Forest Protection is an example.
This regulation guaranteed the continuation of mining exploration and exploita-
tion which had existed before a forest designation was undertaken.30 As
mentioned before, for the continuation of such oil and gas extraction, the
contractor was required to have a forest permit use from the Minister of
Forestry (see Section 5.2).
6.3 LEGISLATION: IDENTIFICATION OF SOME PROBLEMATIC ISSUES
Whilst forestry legislation was made compatible with already existing oil and
gas regulations, this is not the case the other way around. Petroleum regula-
tions which were enacted after 1983, the year of the forest designation for the
Mahakam Delta, seemed to be unaware of the difference between forest and
non-forest area. In Law 2001 on Oil and Gas and its following implementing
regulations there is no article which stipulates that for land, which is situated
inside forest area, there is no right to compensation given that the land is state
property. The provisions of the oil and gas regulations are aimed to apply
to the whole of Indonesia, regardless of whether the area is located inside or
outside a forest area.
In the case of the Mahakam Delta the vagueness of the provisions casts
doubts on whether Total’s employees and officials of the Ministry of Mining
and the Executive Agency truly acknowledge the 1983 forest designation or
not. Some behaviour shows acknowledgement of the designation, whereas
other behaviour shows denial. Looking at the Forest Area as state land and
recent arrangements to obtain a forest use license from the Minister of Forestry
are two examples showing that the company’s employees acknowledge the
designation. Meanwhile the common perception that all land which is located
in the Mahakam Block belongs to the Ministry of Mining points rather to a
29 Section II (11) President Directive No. 1/1976. See also Abdurrahman (1979, p. 115) and
Saleng (2004, p. 94).
30 Article 7(2) Government Regulation No. 28/1985.
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denial. This claim of ownership mainly emerged when Pertamina was at its
most successful period (1968-2002). In the mid 1980s, Pertamina persuaded
a company, which intended to construct large-scale shrimp ponds on two
islands of Muara Badak sub-district, to cancel its plan. Pertamina suggested
that the land of the islands belonged to them. However, Pertamina advised
the company to apply for use rights on the condition that the company would
allow Pertamina to take back the land any time Pertamina needed it, with no
obligation for Pertamina to pay compensation to the company.31
Even if the oil and gas regulations and the behaviour of Total’s employees
and central government officials to some extent acknowledge the jurisdiction
of forestry regulations over the Mahakam Delta, this is not the case for the
jurisdiction of fishery regulations. In the tidal trap nets case as described
earlier, few of the participants of the meetings were aware of the fishery
regulations which actually allow tidal trap owners to fish within 0-3 miles,
known as the traditional fishing zone (see Section 7.2). The lack of clear
acknowledgement leads to uncertainty amongst the fishermen, as they are
told that on one hand they are allowed to fish within the 0-3 mile zone, but
on the other hand they are not allowed to do so if there are oil and gas plat-
forms within the traditional zone. The uncertainty of the fishermen’s rights
increases when regulations concerning public navigation are taken into con-
sideration as well. Given that there are no marks signing the boundaries yet,
separating the fishing area from the zones of public navigation and work area
of the oil and gas extraction, certainty is almost impossible to obtain (see
Section 1.3.2 on certainty).
The effort to reduce the uncertainty through issuing the 1975 and 2004
circular letters was not very successful. The situation might derive from the
fact that the circular letters are policy rules. From the point of view of the
hierarchy of legislation, the circular letters have weak legitimacy (see Section
4.3). The fact they are only circular letters had another implication for the
extent to which the letter was publically legally binding. It is true that in terms
of the content, the circular letters were meant to be generally binding (Ind.
mengikat secara umum), not just to a particular individual. Yet, the form of a
circular letter which in public administration practices became a legal instru-
ment to carry out administrative duties, meant that the circular letters were
merely publically binding in an indirect way.
Given its weak legal binding it is not surprising that the subsequent regula-
tions, whether on oil and gas or fishery, did not conform to the two circular
letters. Law 2001 on Oil and Gas and its subsequent regulations do not have
any provisions concerning the forbidden and restricted areas. The same applies
to the Fishery Law No. 31/2004, and its subsequent implementing regulations.
31 The names of the two islands are Letung and Lerong. Interview MK, a Head of Section
for the Fishery Resource Survaillance of the Kutai Fishery Agency, 11/8/2008.
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None of the Kutai fishery regulations issued in the course of 1978-2000 recall
the 1975 circular letter (see Section 7.2).
Though the oil and gas regulations are incompatible with forestry pro-
tection regulations, this does not seem to apply to land regulations. As already
mentioned, this is due mainly to the exclusion of land rights from mining
rights. As a result, any plot of land which is located within the work area of
a PSC is under the jurisdiction of land regulations. These stipulations provide
certainty to land owners/holders in the sense that their rights over land are
acknowledged. In addition, the land owners/holders are also authorized to
exercise their rights such as to utilize, sell, rent, inherit or grant their plot of
land. Nevertheless, in terms of procedural law, as was discussed in Section
6.2, the land owners/holders still suffer from legal uncertainty concerning the
process of consultation. The uncertainty has emerged from two sources. Firstly,
on the one hand the law and regulation require the establishment of a commit-
tee, if the consultation has failed. Yet on the other hand, the law and regulation
state the team is unnecessary. Secondly, Law 2001 on Oil and Gas maintained
the private nature of the consultation by stipulating that the participation of
the regional government is only required when the consultation has failed.
The decree of the Head of the Executive Agency of 2007, an implementing
regulation of the Law of 2001 on Law and Gas, has changed the private nature
of the consultation as it allowed contractors to invite village heads and sub-
district heads to the consultation as facilitators.
The private nature of the consultation decreased further, when Total was
allowed to invite local police and military officers to the consultation meetings.
As one of the nine national vital objects of East Kalimantan, Total’s installations
can be protected by local officers as a back up.32 A national vital object is
defined as an area/location, building/installation or enterprise which influ-
ences the livelihood of the majority of people in the area and the national
interest, or functions as a strategic source of state revenue.33 A middle-ranking
employee of Total revealed that the presence of local and military officers has
made the consultation meetings more effective.34 Apart from the difference
concerning the time when government officials should be invited and which
forum the dispute should be brought to, if the consultation fails, all oil and
gas regulations mention the state courts as the ultimate forum for land dis-
putes.
The above descriptions of some of the problematic legal issues show the
legal restrictions and vagueness that Total’s employees and central government
32 Those provisions are stated in the Presidential Directive No. 63/2004 concerning the Security
of a National Vital Object, and the decree of the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources
No. 1762/K/07/MEM/2007 concerning the Security of National Vital Objects within the
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.
33 See Article 1 (2) of Presediential Directive No. 63/2004.
34 Interview DH, a Head of Support Operation Department of Total E&P Indonesie, 14/9/2009.
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officials may encounter whilst exercising use rights over the oil and gas
resources. Whereas some regulations prioritize oil and gas extraction, there
are also forestry, land and fishery regulations which (partly) restrict it. Equally,
the forestry and land regulations provide the oil and gas resource users a
degree of certainty by allowing the use of forest land and introducing an
acquirement mechanism. Yet, at the same time, it is unclear which area of land
can be acquired and how the consultation process should be conducted. Given
these restrictions and vagueness, it is therefore interesting to know to which
extent and how the oil and gas regulations have achieved their main goals.
Reviewing the implementation of the oil and gas regulations may help to figure
out an answer to this question.
6.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW BY NATIONAL AND REGIONAL OFFICIALS
Even though forestry law prescribes that any contractor should have a permit
from the Forestry Minister in order to use the Forest Areas, 26 years after this
provision was passed Total or Virginia Indonesia Company (Vico) Indonesia
still do not hold a permit.35 Officers of the Provincial Forestry Agency sent
official letters to both Total and Vico Indonesia asking whether they held a
permit or not. Total did not reply, while Vico Indonesia responded that they
did not need a permit because they had been operational before the so-called
Agreed Forest Use was declared in 1983.36 In other words the company
argued that they were not affected by the forest regulations concerning forest
permit use. The argument goes actually against Government Regulation 1985
which had specific provisions about mining exploration and exploitation
commencing before 1983.
As both companies resisted, the Provincial Forestry officials did not pursue
the matter. A higher-ranking official of the Provincial Forestry Agency, when
asked why the agency was not willing to conduct an inquiry, stated:
There is a risk of losing our position if we conduct the inquiry. For us, Total and
Vico are giant companies that have huge influential power.37
35 This information was provided by two higher-ranking officials at the Provincial Forestry
Agency, and by an official at the Ministry of Forestry. When I visited the Ministry of
Forestry in 2009 to confirm this information, two of Total’s employees were also visiting
the ministry to request terms and conditions for arranging the permit. It appears that Total
may have started to arrange a license.
36 Interview SBT, 11/3/2009.
37 In Ind. ‘Ada resiko bila pejabat akan mengurus masalah izin pinjam pakai ini karena bisa kehilangan
jabatannya karena Vico dianggap sebagai perusahaan besar yang memiliki pengaruh’. Interview
SBT, 11/3/2009.
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The officer instanced a recent case where a giant coal mining company illegally
trespassed a concession area of a timber company. Having asked the coal
company to temporarily halt the operations while the local police was carrying
out an investigation, the chief of the Provincial Police Office was suddenly
replaced.38 The officer speculated that the coal company had been behind
the replacement. Another high-ranking official suggested that Total and Vico
were able to use the Delta’s production forest without a permit because they
possessed strong national backing. In the course of 1968-2002 the national
backing was mostly provided by Pertamina who had been appointed the kuasa
pertambangan by the central government (see Section 6.2). Having such a
powerful authority Pertamina took the responsibility to build relations with
government officers as well as with communities. Pertamina handled all
matters concerning licences or permits that contractors needed, and land
acquisition. Therefore, at the time, contractors could fully concentrate on
extraction activities whilst Pertamina dealt with all administrative and social
matters. As Khong (1986, p.163) points out, in that time Pertamina was a
powerful institution as it was not only a company, but also a regulatory body.
Given that the Executive Agency, as the replacement of Pertamina, does
not enjoy the same authority as Pertamina and lacks human resources, since
2002 Total has had to arrange its own permits or licenses.39 This can be
illustrated by a case when Total’s employees tried to arrange a forest permit
use at the Ministry of Forestry and suggested that the ministry should take
action against the shrimp farmers who had been illegally occupying the
production forest, the official of the ministry asked Total to solve it by pro-
viding compensation to the shrimp farmers. Even more surprising for the Total
employees was that the ministry officials advised Total’s employees to ‘forget’
(memutihkan) about all prior plots of forest land that had been used by Total
without a permit.40 Here the term ‘forget’ meant to pretend that Total had
never used any plots of Forest Land in the Delta’s production forest. This
38 The coal company is Kaltim Prima Coal, which operates internationally. The timber com-
pany is PT Porodisa which obtained a timber concession license in 1968. PT Porodisa had
reportedly accused Kaltim Prima Coal of illegally occupying its concession of 37,000
hectares, which is located in East Kutai District. Kaltim Prima Coal occupied the area
without a permit from the Minister of Forestry or approval from PT Porodisa. See several
reports of Kaltim Post, ‘Porodisa Siap Beber Penyerobotan KPC’, 14/4/2008; ‘KPC Bantah
Rambah Lahan Porodisa’, 11/4/2008; and KPC Hentikan Kegiatannya’, 7/8/2008.
39 Total and Vico Indonesia are under the supervision of the Executive Agency of Kalimantan
and Sulawesi region. At the time of field work, this regional office only had six officials
including several part-time employees. These officials are responsible for supervising around
40 contractors. Interview YH, a Head of Division for Administration Matters and License
of the Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Activities of the Regions of Kalimantan
and Sulawesi, 15/12/2009.
40 Interview DH, 14/12/2009.
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pretension enabled Total to apply for a permit without being bothered by the
fact that they had already used parts of the production forest illegally.41
Even though the forestry regulations qualify most shrimp farmers of the
Mahakam Delta as illegal forest occupants, Total was still able to acquire the
land they needed. This diverts from their first principle which is ‘to respect
the law and regulations’. Total did not strictly comply with the forestry regula-
tions. According to those regulations, they should have rejected the land rights
of the shrimp farmers by arguing that the ponds were located within pro-
duction forest. Total’s stance to this matter is properly summarized by a
middle-level employee of Total, who said:
Even though the pond owners are illegal in accordance with forestry regulations,
yet we cannot be blatantly legal-minded by expelling them. Besides, the pond
owners are legal for they are members of registered villages and furthermore they
have land letters issued by sub-district heads.
Saleng (2004, p. 201) found the rise of a dual or ambiguous legal culture
amongst mining companies. The mining companies practice strict enforcement
when they are dealing with security procedures, work safety as well as traffic
lights. However, they often disobey formal rules and even the provisions of
contracts, when they encounter claims from community members. They behave
in this way since their priority is that their operations are kept running.
However, even though Total’s employees acknowledged the land rights
of the shrimp farmers, they still argued that the compensation they paid to
the land holders should not include the land price. This implies they only
acknowledged farmers’ rights to get compensation for their expenses, but not
for their land rights. They added that the land belonged to the state, and they
could not buy state land from a private party by using state money. Thus the
compensation only included the expenditures of the shrimp farmers for the
construction and cultivation of the ponds, namely for dikes, huts, and breeding.
This list of expenditures actually refers to a Decree of Kutai District Head No.
180.188/HK-630/2008 concerning the Basic Amount of Compensation.42
The above description looks contradictory, as the decree of the head of
the Executive Agency of 2007 states that land acquisition should constitute
a transfer of land rights from the original land owner/holder to the state.
41 Interview R and R, employees of Total E&P Indonesie who were in charge for service claim
and land acquisition, 17/12/2009 and 21/1/2010. Interview DH, 14/12/2009.
42 Yet, there are different views with regards to the status of land holders with land letters.
Total’s officials regarded the occupants of the Delta production forest as legal on account
of the land letter. Yet, a company like Mahakam Sumber Jaya, a coal mining company which
has a mining concession area in Samarinda and Kutai District, viewed those who occupied
forest areas as illegal despite having a land letter. See ‘MSJ Siap Berikan Kompensasi Soal
Tuntutan 300 Petani Pelita Makmur 3’, Kaltim Post, 6/5/2010, and ‘Bupati Kukar Resmikan
Tambang Batu Bara PT Mahakam Sumber Jaya’, http://www.kutaikartanegara.com/
news.php?id=710, downloaded on 10/6/2011.
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Accordingly, there cannot be a transfer of land rights if the land is already
perceived as state land, even if the price of the land is not included in the
compensation. Moreover, in practice, Total marked the land for which com-
pensation had been paid, to indicate which areas now belonged to the Execut-
ive Agency/Total (see Picture 6.1). The marks seem to be meant to distinguish
between the compensated land and the surrounding land which was still
privately owned.
Picture 6.1: A land boundary mark owned by the Executive Agency/Total E&P
As mentioned before, the involvement of Kutai agency officials, local police
and military officers in the Mahakam Delta has led to consultations being run
more effectively. Through the active involvement of the officials and officers
the consultation has moved from the private into the public sphere. Total
needed the Kutai agency officials because the villagers perceived them as
neutral and, most importantly, as people with authority.43 In this process
the land owners/holders usually accepted the amount of compensation that
Total offered them.
The fact that Total offered a fairly high sum in terms of compensation is
another reason why Total could easily acquire land. Total paid around US$
43 Across Indonesia many oil companies have employed professional security personnel due
to the tense relation with the local people in the work area of the company (Saleng 2004,
p. 100-101).
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950 (IDR 10 million) per hectare and the price would go up to US$ 1,800 (20
million IDR) per hectare, when Total needed the land urgently.44 The amount
of compensation is about the same as what Vico paid for land holders in inland
Muara Badak, while the Kutai District government could only offer around
US$ 177 (IDR 1,500,000) per hectare. At such a high price, it is not surprising
that many shrimp farmers sold their land to Total, particularly after pond
productivity decreased sharply in 2003 (Rachmawati 2003, p. 61; Hidayati et
al. 2004, p. 61; Noryadi et al. 2006).
Making a profit from land acquirement is also an important reason for
local officials and officers45 to be willing to engage in consultations. For every
time they were present at the consultation meetings they received a lump sum
from Total. They preferred the meetings to take place in Samarinda, where
they received a larger payment.46 For, according to the regulations, the more
remote the meeting place from the offices of the officials, the higher the pay-
ment. For sub-district officials and officers, attending the meetings was even
more attractive, because they received a fixed share of the compensation.47
The fixed share constitutes of 2.5 % of the total amount of compensation for
each land transaction. Of this share, 1.5% goes to the sub-district head (camat)
in his formal role of authorized local notary (Ind. Pejabat Pembuat Akta Tanah).
The remaining 1% goes to the sub-district office. Yet, in practice, the full 2.5%
was usually given to the sub-district head in the hope that he/she would share
it with the members of the Sub-District Leaders Consultation Forum (Musya-
warah Pimpinan Kecamatan, abbrev. Muspika) as well as with the village
heads.48 In some cases village heads demanded a larger share of up to US$
9,500 (10 millions IDR) for each land transaction.49
Based on the provisions mentioned in Section 6.2 it could be concludeded
that Total does not have a strong legal backing to forbid fishermen to fish in
the areas in close proximity of the oil and gas installations. This is not only
44 The amount of compensation offered by the two oil and gas companies is higher than the
amount that coal and oil palm companies offered to land holders who lived inland. The
coal companies offered an amount ranging from US$ 1,000 to US$ 1,300 (11 to 14 million
IDR) while the oil palm companies could only offer US$ 110 (2.5 million IDR). Interview
Hrs, a village head of Saliki, 9/2/2010, and EM, a Head of a technical section of Sepatin
village, 10/2/2010.
45 I use the term ‘local officers’ to refer to local police and local military officers. For more
see Chapter 8.
46 Interview Hdt, an employee of Total E&P Indonesie, 16/12/2009.
47 A lump sum for participating in consultation meetings or a fixed share of land transactions
are only two examples of financial benefit that the local offials and officers could receive
from the oil and gas companies. It also happened that periodical payments to a number
of high-ranking officials of the Kutai District government were made by Total for serving
the company with administrative matters. Interview AR, an employee of Total E&P Indo-
nesie, 15/12/2011.
48 The members of Muspika consist of the sub-district head, and chief of sub-district-based
military and police officers.
49 Interview RNP, Rd and Rn, officers of Local Police Office of Aggana sub-district, 1/7/2008.
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because the circular letters are legally weak, but also because the letters are
not harmonized with the fishery regulations which allow the fishermen to fish
in the traditional zone (see Section 1.3.2 on harmonization). In the tidal trap
net case Total’s employees did not accuse the tidal trap owners of illegally
entering mining zones, because they did not claim them as exclusive territories.
Total’s middle-level employee whom was mentioned earlier, said that Total
could not forbid fishermen to fish in the vicinity of their installations given
that there is open access to the sea. On Total’s notification boards that were
installed nearby the installations, was only written, ‘Sub-marine pipeline, do
not anchor, do not dredge!’, or ‘Sailing at full speed is prohibited to avoid
beating of the waves!’. It is clear that these notices did not refer to any notion
of possession of the surrounding areas by Total or even the Executive Agency.
Taking that into consideration, the Executive Agency of the Kalimantan-Sula-
wesi Region suggested that Total would not prioritize legal enforcement on
the fishermen as it could generate unexpected resistance.
In fact, the main concern of Total when asking fishermen to stay away from
their installations is security. Security, as said, contributes to ensuring that
their operations are kept running. For example, security officers of the oil and
gas companies – who could be local officials hired by the companies on a part
time basis – made sure that there were no unstatic gears installed in Zone II
of the Fishing Ground Division (see Section 7.2), before the companies carried
out seismic explorations.50 When an official of the Port Administration Office
of the Ministry of Public Transportation questioned whether Total had obtained
a permit to install their installations, there was an emotional response from
the Executive Agency officials saying Total’s operations had to continue
because of compliance with an agreement with international buyers. In addi-
tion, they said, ‘Total was not criminal and, more importantly, that the Kutai
District government would loose revenue if the extraction activities faced any
further delay’.51 Given that the Kutai District government partly depends
on the revenue made on petroleum, most officials agreed that oil and gas ex-
traction should be prioritized.52
6.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
If the volume of oil and gas production in the Delta would be the only in-
dicator with which to assess the effectiveness of oil and gas regulations, one
could say that the regulations were effectively implemented. To give a concrete
example: at the time of writing, Total undertakes 30% of all Indonesian gas
50 Interview Agg, a staff of Muara Badak office of Kutai Fishery Agency, 3/12/2011.
51 Interview YH, 15/12/2009.
52 Interview RBS, a former Head of Kutai Environmental Agency, 24/4 and 7/5/2008. See
also Simarmata (2010, p. 191).
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production and 9% of all oil production. Together with Vico Indonesia, which
mostly operates onshore, Total provides 45% of Indonesian gas production.
These figures are interesting, given the legal ambiguity which the oil and gas
resource users have faced in the Mahakam Delta, both in terms of overlap
as well as restrictions. At this point it is important to realize that some oil and
gas, fishery and forestry regulations actually facilitate oil and gas resource
users in exercising their exploitation rights. Even if those regulations are legally
weak and contain internal contradictions, favouritism of oil and gas resource
use in the implementation of the law has successfully removed some of the
weaknesses and contradictions.
Favouritism of oil and gas resource use originally comes from a common
awareness that it contributes significantly to state revenue. The importance
of this income has often led government officials at different administrative
levels as well as legal officers to prioritize the interest of oil and gas companies,
despite the lack of a strong legal argument. The decisions are sometimes
ultimately made to ensure that oil and gas extraction are kept running.
Yet, oil and gas resource use has also been favoured because the oil and
gas companies benefited the officials and officers themselves in real terms.
The willingness of the local officials and officers to engage in the consultation
meetings as well as in dispute settlement might have been more due to the
direct financial benefits than to the more distant knowledge that oil and gas
resource use provide a substantial contribution to state revenue. This argument
is confirmed by the increasing levels of jealousy among officials and officers,
about the question of who should be invited to which meeting. They even
chose distant places to meet and fixed the amounts of their shares to earn more
money. To them as well as to land owners/holders who expected to receive
large amounts of compensation, the oil and gas resources have constantly
looked like treasures with a constant supply of cash money.

7 The sea: open or exclusive?
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The productivity of the shrimp ponds of the Mahakam Delta started to
decrease in 2001, after a remarkable period of four or five years of good
harvests. As a result some people returned to their former profession of fishing.
Yet, they soon realized that there was less fishing ground available than before
due to the growing number of oil and gas platforms, which occupied some
of the traditional fishing grounds. These developments led the former shrimp
farmers to seek an opportunity to earn money elsewhere. They regarded the
petroleum exploration as a source of money of which they sought to obtain
a small part for themselves. They believed that the oil company, as a rich
business had the moral obligation to share a small part of its fortune with the
less fortunate villagers. This belief led to devising a trick. They installed a tidal
trap (julu) in the vicinity of the companies’ platforms1 on the assumption that
one day the companies’ transport would crash into their gear. This would
suffice to claim compensation for the damage they caused.
As the trick initially succeeded, the number of new gear installations
gradually increased. The Kutai District Team on Dispute Settlement which
was actively involved in settling disputes concerning fisheries had observed
this trend. In order to control the situation, the team introduced a regulation.
However, instead of forming a whole new set of norms, the new regulation
largely referred to existing legal norms and only added one small provision
which was specifically meant to control the increase of gear instalments. It
states that any gear installation in the vicinity of the companies’ platforms
is prohibited (see Section 6.2 on an earlier account of the new regulation).
It was not the first time that the Kutai District government added a new
provision to its regulations to enhance its control over fishery resource use.
It happened before in 1999 and 2000. In some aspects, as we will see below
(see Section 7.4), the new provisions contradicted the provisions of national
fishery regulations. However, due to a variety of factors the Kutai District
1 Mini trawls and tidal traps are the most common fishing methods in the Mahakam Delta.
Other types of gears, that are used more rarely in the Mahakam Delta are trammel net
(gondrong), shore-operated stationary lift net (bagan), pot (bubu) and hook and line (pancing).
See Sandjatmiko et al. (2005, p. 114-120) and Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Karta-
negara (2008b, p. 13).
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government was not really able to exercise control over fishery resource use.
Some research done in 2002, 2003 and 2008 revealed the widespread in-
efficiency in the implementation of the Kutai fishing regulations and policies
in the Mahakam Delta.
The abovementioned ambiguity, whereby the Kutai District government
on paper continued to gain greater control over the fishery resource use, whilst
in reality this control was not effectively implemented has traditionally been
a feature in the Kutai fishery regulation system. The situation has resulted
in only a few fisheries in the Mahakam Delta complying with formal fishery
regulations. Within that situation, dispute settlements over natural resources
use led by the Kutai District government are characterized by an ad hoc
approach and most of the time depend on a situational bargaining relation
between companies and fishermen or farmers.
At the same time, in the locations where the regulations were meant to
serve the interests of oil and gas extraction (see Chapter 6), the prohibition
of gear installations nearby companies’ platforms was also meant to diminish
open access to fishery resources. Particular forms of fishery resource use were
restricted to ensure that forms of non-fishery resource use could be run without
being endangered by fishery resource use, notably catching fish. This policy
has certainly affected fishing which has long practiced open access which co-
exits with common and private property.
7.2 LAW-MAKING AND LEGISLATION: MAIN LAWS AND PROVISIONS
Unlike the case of forestry but similar to regulation of oil and gas resource
use in the Mahakam Delta, the state has not exercised control over fishery
resource use through a territorial strategy.2 As is generally the case across
Indonesian waters, formal state control over the use of fishery resource in the
Mahakam Delta has been run through a combination of input and output
control. Input control has placed restrictions amongst others upon the number
and size of fishing vessels (fishing capacity control), the maximum amount
of time fishing vessels are allowed to fish (vessel usage control). Output control
has been conducted through direct limitations on the total amount of fish
leaving a fishery, which in other words, equals the total amount of fish that
2 Territorial strategy in essence is a spatial organization of state control by physically de-
lineating particular geographic areas or zones as state property followed by the passage
of state jurisdiction over the delineated areas/zones. The passage of the jurisdiction sub-
sequently implies the exercise of state rules which determine how and by whom the
resources within the delineated areas/zones could be used. For an extensive account of
territorial strategy see Vandergeest and Peluso (1995, p. 387); Kumar and Choudary (2006).
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can be caught (Pope 2002, p. 76).3 In a simple formulation Satria and Matsuda
(2004) point out that state control over fishery management in Indonesia has
always occurred through licenses and zone restrictions. As a result the state
never practiced a territorial strategy in exercising control over fishery resource
use.
The way in which the state exercises formal control over fishery resource
use in the Mahakam Delta has remained unchanged, despite the introduction
in 2007 of exclusive rights through territorial use rights in Indonesian fishery
legislation after the enactment of Law No. 22/2007 on Coastal Zones and Small
Island Management.4 This is mainly due to a lack of implementing regulations
of the law. Moreover, the implementation of the law has encountered the acute
problem current in Indonesian public administration that respective depart-
ments have their own laws which leads to sectoral manner (Patlis et al. 2001,
p. 28; Patlis 2005, p 451-452; Waddell 2009, p. 190). The most recent challenge
to the implementation of the law is a verdict of the Indonesian Constitutional
Court which declared thirteen articles of the law void.5
According to Saad (2003) the absence of a territorial strategy in fishery
resource management is inevitable due to the application of the common
property doctrine in Indonesian fishery laws. Under the common property
regime anyone is free to fish in Indonesian marine territories once they have
obtained a fishing permit on the condition that they fish in permitted fishing
zones as well as use proper gear and vessel (Saad 2003, p. 95 and 99). Hence,
unlike in forestry management, in fishery management the state does not
delineate particular marine areas as state or private property to determine who
would be allowed to utilize fishery resource in the designated areas.
After independence, the common property doctrine in fishery affairs was
first regulated in the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 607/Kpts/UM/
3 Referring to state control over fishery management has often been used to contest notions
in which it was incorrectly concluded that Indonesian fishery management falls under an
open access regime (Bailey 1997, p. 234; Saad 2003, p. 95 and 105). According to the opposite
view, Indonesian fishery resource management is open access de facto, but not de jure (Satria
and Matsuda 2004, Patlis 2007, p. 205).
4 Territorial use rights are defined as the exclusive rights of a person or community to the
use of fishery resources within a certain area (Christy 1982; Christy 1997, p. 42). In Law
No. 22/2007 the introduction of the concept of territorial use rights can be seen in coastal
water use rights (Hak Pengusahaan Perairan Pesisir, abbrev. HP3). A former legal scholar
who became a bureaucrat suggested that the introduction of exclusive territorial rights in
the law is a breakthrough for it has released the Indonesian fishery rule regime from the
open access doctrine. See further, Saad at http://lautmenyapa.blogspot.com/2008/11/hak-
pengusahaan-perairan-pesisir.html (accessed on 15 July 2010).
5 See verdict of the Indonesian Constitutional Court No. 3/PUU-VIII/2010. The verdict was
made in response to a judicial review application of several NGOs and fishermen who
had argued those provisions were in contradiction with the 1945 Constitution.
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9/1976 on Fishing Zones Division (Saad 2003, p. 97).6 The decree basically
regulated the division of fishing zones, and the types and sizes of vessels and
gear which could be used. The decree divided the Indonesian marine territory
into four fishing zones. Zone I (0-3 nautical miles from the coast) was meant
for small-scale fishermen; boats with an inboard engine of more than 5 Gross
Tonnage and trawl were prohibited. Zone II-IV were meant for large-scale
fishing with a larger size vessel and engine. Apart from regulating the division
of fishing zones and types and sizes of vessel and gear, the 1976 Decree also
implicitly stipulated the requirement of a fishery permit to be allowed to fish.
The way the 1976 Decree administered fishery resource use has largely
inspired subsequent fishery regulations including Law No. 9/1985 on Fish-
eries.7 The decree has also impacted local regulations of East Kalimantan
Province and Kutai District concerning fisheries. The following sections
describe the extent to which this principle from the 1976 Decree has affected
the main provisions of subsequent fishery regulations in later decades. Besides
describing some main provisions, the following sections also seek to examine
how the local fishery regulations have been formulated. For this purpose
special attention will be paid to the drafting process of six Kutai regulations
which took place in the course of 2004-2009.
7.2.1 Some Main Provisions
Even though independent Indonesia had its first own-produced Fisheries Law
in 1985, state control over fishery management had been officially exercised
since the 1950s. A Government Regulation on the Partial Devolution of Govern-
ment Affairs concerning Marine Fisheries, Forest and Small Timber Plantations
to Regional Government in 1957 stated that regional governments could issue
fishery permits.8 During the 1970s, the Ministry of Agriculture passed eleven
decrees concerning fisheries. Given that those eleven decrees applied the
common property doctrine, they only regulated the division of fishing zones,9
types and size of gear, fishery levies, seasonal closures as well as fishery
conservation (Saad 2003, p. 96-97).10 From literature on fishery it can be con-
6 The decree has been amended by the Decree of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
No. 392/1999, and recently by the Regulation of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries
No. PER.02/MEN/2011. In the recent regulation, the marine zones are divided into three
fishing zones as an attempt to adjust to the provision of Law No. 32/2004 on Regional
Autonomy. The issuance of the decree aims at protecting small-scale fishermen from large-
scale fishermen who usually use large boats. By specifically allocating Zone I to small-scale
fishermen, the decree intended to refrain large-scale fishermen from entering Zone I. See
Bailey (1988), Bailey (1997), Tribawono (2002), and Jhamtani (2003).
7 The 1985 Law on Fisheries has been replaced by Law No. 31/2004.
8 Government Regulation No. 64/1957.
9 See the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 01/1975, and No. 123/1975.
10 See the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 327/1972, and No. 35/1975.
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cluded that quota, seasonal closures, gear restrictions, taxes or licenses have
become the most accepted means in government policies to resolve over-
exploitation of fishery resource use (Keen 1983, p. 199-201; Smith and Pana-
yotou 1984, p. 351). The means of control of fishery management as stipulated
in those eleven regulations have been reasserted and reproduced by later
fishery regulations including by the East Kalimantan Province and Kutai
District fishery regulations.
In East Kalimantan the exercise of state control over fishery resource use
during the 1960s through to the early 1970s was even more visible compared
to the situation at the national level. During a period of State Emergency (1957-
1963) local military officers issued some fishing permits. Under the New Order
regime, in 1969 the Provincial government enacted Regional Regulation No.
DPRGR-Prop/08/PD/1969 concerning Fishery Permits. The regulation provided
legal certainty to any fisherman who held a fishing permit issued by the
Provincial government. Interestingly, in 1973 the Head of the Provincial
Fisheries Agency issued a decree stating that all former fishing permits which
had been issued by other provincial agencies other than the Fisheries Agency,
were no longer valid from the day the decree was officially issued.11 In 2005,
on the basis of the decree, in the case Seven Fishermen v. PT. ITCI Kartika and
the Ministry of Public Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia, the Supreme
Court’s decision was in favour of PT. ITCI Kartika and the Ministry of Public
Transportation. The judges argued that the fishery permits that the seven
fishermen had obtained from the colonial rulers in 1931 which was later
supported by a permit issued by a local military officer in 1960, and a letter
issued by a head of an urban-quarter (lurah) in 1984 were no longer valid in
accordance with the 1973 Decree.12 Another Provincial Regulation issued
during the period was the Decree of the Governor of East Kalimantan No.
75/1973 concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Shore-Operated Stationary
Lift Nets.
In an attempt to implement the 1976 Decree, the Kutai District government
promulgated Regional Regulation No. 18/1978 concerning Fishing within the
Administrative Territory of Kutai District. Kutai Regulation No. 18/1978
reiterated two matters that had been stated in the 1976 Decree, namely that
the fishing territory would be divided into four fishing zones, and that any
use of fishery resources should be undertaken through a Fishery Business
License (FBL) and a license for using a vessel. Another important provision
in the 1978 Kutai Regulation concerns fishery sanctuaries where fishing was
11 The Decree is number 2002/3/1973, dated 1 February 1973.
12 This case arose when PT. ITCI Kartika used the fishing zone of the seven fishermen which
was located in Balikpapan Seberang sub-district as a log pond without prior consultation
with the fishermen. The timber company did not believe they violated the law as they
obtained a permit to use the area from a Regional Agency of the Ministry of Public Trans-
portation. See Supreme Court Verdict No. 1300 K/Pdt/2005.
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totally forbidden. The Kutai Regulation designated eleven fishery sanctuaries,
but none of these were located in the marine part of the Mahakam Delta
(Hartoto 1997, p. 78; Sumaryono, Kreb and Budiono n.d., p. 3). In an effort
to protect the fishery sanctuaries the Kutai District Head subsequently issued
a decree concerning a Sub-District Committee on Fishery Resources Conserva-
tion.13 The members of the committee comprised of local police, a military
officer, a village head and a sub-district head. The committee was authorized
to carry out supervision and surveillance in the fishery sanctuaries as well
as to detain those who illegally fished in the sanctuaries.
Meanwhile on the national level the 1985 Fisheries Law was enacted, followed
by regulations of implementation.14 Yet with regard to substance, the change
was not significant as all means of control mentioned in those regulations were
still based on the former fishery regulations. What had been done successfully
by the new fishery regulations was the organisation of norms into a structured
order. In addition, the regulations provided some further detail such as adding
two other types of fishery permits, the length of validity of the fishery permits,
obligations of permit holders as well as sanctions. Besides the two preceding
fishery permits (FBL and a license for using a vessel), the Fishing License (FL)
and a license for transporting the catch were introduced.15 With regard to
sanctions, the regulations stated that any fisherman who fished on a large scale
without a permit could receive a maximum of 2.5 years imprisonment or a
maximum fine of IDR 250,000,000-IDR 500,000,000 (equal to US$ 2,940-US$
5,880),16 whereas small-scale fishermen could receive a maximum of six
months imprisonment or a maximum fine of IDR 5,000,000. An implementing
government regulation also set a maximum fine of IDR 250,000,000 (equal to
US$ 2,940) for any non-compliance with the provisions on gear type and size,
fishing zone, quota as well as fish disease prevention.
Meanwhile, the 1985 Law on Fisheries and its subsequent implementing
regulations also introduced a few new provisions. Firstly, they contained
13 No. 79/1978 as has been replaced by a Decree of the Head of the Kutai Fisheries Agency
No. E.1.5234/137A/SP/V/2009.
14 Some of those implementing regulations are Government Regulation No. 15/1990 on
Fisheries Business as has been amended several times and recently superseded by Govern-
ment Regulation No. 54/2002; the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 815/Kpts/
IK.120/11/90 on Fisheries Business; and No. 815/Kpts/IK.210/1990 on Fishing in Indo-
nesia’s Fishery Territory and Exclusive Economic Zone.
15 In brief FBL is given to allow anyone to maintain a fishery business either by capture, farm,
collect or preserve fish. FBL is given to any fishing boat which bears the Indonesian flag
and will be used for fishing. Meanwhile FL is a part of FBL. Any fishing boat, either using
an Indonesian or a foreign flag, is allowed to transport a catch with this license. The 2002
Government Regulation No. 54/2002 made a change to the fishery permits by reducing
its number from four to three. This change of fishery permits remained until a new Fishery
Law was enacted in 2004. In terms of length of validity, FBL is the only type of fishery
permit which does not have a time limit, while a Fishing License and license for boat which
is used to transport the catch, expire.
16 US$ 1 is equivalent to IDR 8,500.
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provisions on aquaculture – an issue that the previous fishery regulations had
missed. Secondly, with regard to state protection of small-scale fishermen and
fish farmers, the new fishery regulations assigned government the task to keep
records of small-scale fishing and aquaculture in the hope that the recorded
information could be used to carry out control and supervision.17 In addition,
those regulations defined small-scale fishermen and aquaculture farmers as
the group of people who had a boat of less than 5 Gross Tonnage or who
cultivated fish in an area of no more than 2 ha for inland aquaculture, 0.5 ha
for sea water, and 4 ha for brackish water. The new law also prohibited
‘destructive and monopolistic’ gears in an effort to limit large aggressive types
of equipment.
The Kutai District government reacted to the changes on the national level
by dissolving the 1978 Regional Regulation and replacing it with Kutai Regula-
tion No. 3/1999. In drafting this regulation, Kutai District government was
assisted by some lecturers from the Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Science,
University of Mulawarman, in Samarinda, the Provincial capital. The provisions
of the Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999 are actually a mix between provisions taken
from the 1978 Kutai Regulation and the 1985 Fisheries Law. Reiterating what
had been stated in the 1985 Law, Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999 prohibits the
use of destructive and monopolistic gears as well as catching breeding fish
and trading fish eggs. In addition, the Kutai Regulation reiterates that the use
of permitted gears should be in accordance with the rules on a fishing zone
division.
Similar to the 1978 Regulation, the 1999 Kutai Regulation regulates fish
sanctuaries as well. Yet the 1999 Regulation reduces the number of sanctuaries
from eleven to nine. As was the case in the 1978 Regulation, the 1999 Regula-
tion does not include any part of the Mahakam Delta in the list of designated
sanctuaries. All the nine fish sanctuaries are situated up-stream from the
Mahakam River. Any fishery resource use is prohibited in the sanctuaries
unless it does not harm or destruct its fishery resources. The 1999 Regulation
added another prohibition which existed neither in the 1978 Regulation nor
in the 1985 Fisheries Law, stipulating that the installation of gear which could
possibly endanger a public shipping line (Ind. alur pelayaran) would be pro-
hibited.18 Anyone offending this rule could receive a maximum of three
months imprisonment or a maximum fine of IDR 1,000,000 (equal to US$ 115).
It is interesting to note that the 1999 Regulation does not have a single
provision concerning fishing permits on capturing fish as had been stipulated
in the 1985 Fisheries Law and its subsequent implementing regulations. Rather
the 1999 Regulation introduces a new fishing permit. It is said that any fisher-
17 See 1985 on Fisheries, the Elucidation of Article 10 (2), Government Regulation No. 15/1990
on Fishery Business, article 14(3) elucidation and General Elucidation, and Government
Regulation No. 54/2002 on Fishery Business, article 6 (3) and General Elucidation.
18 Article 8 of the Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999.
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man who wishes to fish outside his village or sub-district should obtain a
written letter from the village head and sub-district head of where the fishing
grounds are situated.19 This provision is not only confusing, it is also in
contradiction with the 1985 Fisheries Law and its subsequent implementing
regulations which did not recognize fishing territory based on administrative
boundaries. Nevertheless, the above provision is unlikely to be enforceable
given that it is not accompanied by any sanctions.
Meanwhile, through Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy districts
in Indonesia were given a much higher degree of regional autonomy. In order
to implement this far-reaching law as soon as possible, the Kutai District
government promulgated the regulation concerning the Authority of Kutai
District government.20 In particular with regard to marine affairs, the Kutai
Regulation was inspired by a provision of the Law on Regional Autonomy
which granted broader authority to provincial and district/municipal govern-
ments to manage their respective sea territories.21 The Law on Regional Auto-
nomy of 1999 together with a subsequent government regulation gave the
district and municipal government full authority to supervise and monitor
any exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of marine resource
use taking place within 0-3 nautical miles from the coast (Tribawono 2002;
Saad 2003). The provision affected central government jurisdiction over the
sea, which now applied to 12 nautical miles and beyond, leaving 0-12 nautical
miles under district (0-3) and province jurisdiction (3-12) (Saad 2003, p.110-112).
Like the Law on Regional Autonomy Kutai Regulation No. 27/2000 granted
broad authority to Kutai District government in managing fishery affairs. The
Kutai District government has the authority to issue a permit on both capture
and fish farming. At the same day of the promulgation of the Kutai Regulation
concerning the Authority of Kutai District government, two other Kutai regula-
tions concerning fisheries were promulgated. The two Kutai regulations are
respectively No. 34/2000 concerning Quality Control of Milkfish Fry22 and
Fish Seeds, and No. 37/2000 concerning Organoleptic23 Quality Control.
In addition, it enacted Kutai Regulation No. 36/2000 on Fishery Business,
which due to its broader scope, could be considered as the most important
of the above three regulations. Kutai Regulation No. 36/2000 regulates both
19 Article 3 and its Elucidation.
20 No. 27/2000 as has been amended by Kutai District Regulation No. 11/2008.
21 Article 10(2 and 3) of Law No. 22/1999.
22 Milkfish fry (Ind. benur) is the larvae of milkfish (Ind. bandeng) which grows in hatcheries.
Milkfish fry has been developed to substitute wild-caught fry. See http://www.larvalbase.
org/MiniEssay.htm and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milkfish (downloaded on 18 July
2012).
23 The term ‘organoleptic’ points to the sensory properties of a particular food or chemical
as experienced by the senses, including taste, sight, smell, and touch to detect signs of
disease or contamination. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organoleptic (downloaded
on 18 July 2012.
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capture and aquaculture making it the first Kutai Regulation since the 1960s
to regulate fishery resource use comprehensively. Nevertheless, in terms of
norms most of its provisions repeated what had been stipulated in the1985
Fisheries Law and its implementing regulations. To give an example, it recalled
that every applicant of a fishery permit should provide in advance a location
permit, an environmental impact assessment, a certificate of company establish-
ment, a tax registration number, a business plan and a letter of declaration
explaining that the applicant is willing to establish a branch office in the capital
town of Kutai Kartanegara District. The last condition is that the applicant
holds the so-called Small Scale Fisheries Registration Certificate (Ind. Tanda
Pencatatan Kegiatan Perikanan abbrev. SSFRC), which is valid for one year with
the possibility of renewing it for another year.
Even though most of the provisions of the 2000 Kutai Regulation on Fishery
Business are similar to higher national legislation on fishery, it also invented
some new provisions which the higher national legislation did not stipulate.
Firstly, the Kutai Regulation sets almost the same requirements for obtaining
a FBL as a SSFRC. Three of the requirements are permit location, business plan,
and letter of recommendation from the Kutai Fisheries Agency. Secondly, it
restricts the length of validity of a FBL to thirty years with the possibility of
another twenty years of extension. Later in 2008 national fishery legislation
adopted the invented norm by revising the length of validity to sixty years
including one extension.24 Thirdly, it elevated SSFRC to the same status as
FBL.
Meanwhile the enactment of two other Kutai regulations in 2000 enhanced
government formal control over fishery resource use. Apart from controlling
the capturing of fish and aquaculture, the Kutai District government now
extended its control to any transported and traded fish seeds, particularly
shrimp and milkfish seeds, and processed-fish product. The examination is
aimed at preventing the rise of pests and diseases that may affect the fish.
A laboratory, operated by the Kutai Fisheries Agency, is expected to carry
out an examination of the transported and traded fish seeds and processed-fish
products in an attempt to measure whether they meet the quality standards.
The Kutai Fisheries Agency issues a certificate when someone or a legal body
meets the criteria.
The drafting and enactment of Kutai regulations on fishery resource use
from 2004 onwards show a new dynamic when compared with the previous
periods. Not only the dynamic differs, but also the volume. During 2004-2009,
Kutai District government initiated four Kutai Draft Regulations, one Draft
Regulation of the Kutai District Head and one circular letter. Prior to that
period, in 2003 the Kutai District government had only issued the Circular
Letter concerning Illegal Ponds and Digging Machines (see Section 5.1 for an
24 See the Regulation of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries No. Per.05/Men/2008
on Capturing Fish Business.
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account of this letter). Agencies involved in the drafting process in this period
varied, and so are the subject matters which are regulated. The Kutai Fisheries
Agency is no longer the only agency which initiated draft regulations on
fishery because other agencies took initiatives as well. The reasons for drafting
and enacting the Kutai regulations are diverse, ranging from technical and
incidental to substantial and future-oriented. The diversity of reasons eventual-
ly translates into various subject matters and goals of the enacted and drafted
regulations.
7.2.2 Law-Making in Kutai District
The following section describes the six initiatives of regional law-making of
fisheries regulations in Kutai District. It pays attention to reasons, input gather-
ing methods as well as substance. In terms of the initiating agency the six
initiatives could be divided into three groups. The first agency to initiate the
drafting of regulations was Kutai Fisheries Agency. This agency undertook
three initiatives which resulted in the Draft Regulation on Fisheries Levy, the
revision of Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999 on Fishing, and the Draft Regulation
on Fisheries and Marine Management of the Mahakam Delta. Secondly, some
regional law-making was initiated by other agencies beside the Fishery Agency.
This included the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishery Business. Thirdly, some
regional law-making was the result from a joint collaboration. This applies
to the Decree of the Kutai District Head on the Prohibition of the Installation
of Gears on Public Shipping Line, and the Draft Regulation of the Kutai District
Head on Standardized Pond.
Initiated by the Kutai Fisheries Agency
Since 2005, the Kutai Fisheries Agency has experienced quite a stable leader-
ship. A few years before 2005, most of the staff was opposed to their former
head which led to resistance.25 Apart from the issue of leadership, another
issue arose at the time, namely that their head did not have a degree in fishery.
Interestingly, the new head who was appointed in 2005 did not have a degree
in fishery either. He is a forester by training and has spent most of his time
working at the Kutai Agricultural Agency. His longstanding work at the
Agricultural Agency which office is located right next to the office of the
Fisheries Agency apparently helped him to be smoothly accepted by the staff
of the Fisheries Agency. With an increased budget from an equivalent of ten
thousand dollars to a million dollars per year, the new head successfully
25 Interview Mnt, a staff of Division for Control and Survaillance of Kutai Fishery Agency,
19/8/2009.
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stabilized the internal office politics of the Fisheries Agency.26 In any case,
with such annual budget it is not surprising that during 2005-2009 the Fisheries
Agency was able to yield three Kutai Draft Regulations, even if none of them
were eventually enacted.
Where did the demand for these three Kutai Draft Regulations come from?
Only one draft was demanded by the fishing communities, whereas the other
two drafts derived from outside these community groups. The demand to make
the Draft Regulation on Fishery Levy originated from a call made by the
Secretariat Office of the Kutai District government in 2005 asking all agencies
to explore as many of their potential local revenue sources as possible.27
Incidently, a senior staff member of the Fisheries Agency joined a 2005 com-
parative study trip of the Kutai District government in Banyuwangi District
in East Java. During the study trip the senior staff member was informed that
in Banyuwangi District there was a local regulation concerning a Local Fish-
eries Levy. On the basis of the information and in response to the call of the
Secretariat Office, a year later, a legal drafting team was appointed by the head
of the Fisheries Agency to prepare draft regulations for Kutai District.28
The influence from other districts in Java was also the reason for the
Fisheries Agency to draft the Regulation on Fisheries and Marine Management
in the Mahakam Delta. It started with the participation of the Fisheries Agency
staff in two workshops on mangrove rehabilitation held by Total E&P Indonesie
in 2006. A year later, the head of the Fisheries Agency attended a workshop
organized by the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs. Coincidently, the
head of the agency had a conversation with a delegation from Cilacap District
of Central Java Province. He was informed that Cilacap District had a local
regulation on managing Segara Anakan, an area which still has a large area
of mangrove forest.29 Following this example, the head asked his staff to draft
26 In 2005 the Kutai Fisheries Agency managed an annual budget of US$59,000. In the follow-
ing years, this rose to US$ 470,000 (2006), US$ 1,760,000 in 2007 and US$ 3,760,000 in 2008.
In 2009 and 2010, the amount dropped to US$ 2,825,000. The rise and fall of the annual
budget automatically followed the rise and fall of the annual budget of the Kutai District.
27 The call was made due to the small contribution of local revenue to the Kutai annual budget.
Between 2001-2005, Kutai earned a local revenue of a mere US$ 2,576,000 (approx.) each
year. In 2011 the total sum increased significantly to US$ 11,240,000. See ‘APBD Kukar 2011
Didominasi Dana Perimbangan Diprediksi Mencapai Rp 3,446 T. Kaltim Post, 6/1/2011.
28 The appointment was made through issuing the Decree of the Head of Kutai Fisheries
Agency No. A.3/523.800/117/III/2006. Indeed, besides being assigned to draft a regulation
on Local Fisheries Levy in Kutai District, the team was also assigned to revise four existing
regulations concerning fisheries.
29 Segara Anakan is a unique lagoon which lodges the largest mangrove forest in Java. The
lagoon hosts some endangered fish species. Due to fast sedimentation and illegal logging,
by 2008 the mangrove forest of Segara Anakan had drastically decreased from 2,900 ha
in 1984 to less than 800 ha. In this respect the Mahakam Delta resembles Segara Anakan
as the latter also faced ongoing environmental degradation as well as conflict between
different resource users. See at http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/12/14/17274064/
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a regulation for managing the Mahakam Delta. However, he did not officially
establish a legal drafting team, nor did he make the necessary budgetary
arrangements.
Meanwhile demand had risen to revise Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999 on
Fishing as the implementation of the regulation had turned out to be ineffect-
ive. Many small-scale fishermen had complained about large-scale fishermen
who used prohibited gears such as trawl nets in the 0-3 nautical mile zone.
Not only did the large-scale fishermen use prohibited gears, they also used
trawl during the day which is against a traditional fishery custom, prescribing
trawl shall be used at night (Hidayati et al. 2005). Beside the use of trawl, there
were complaints about other destructive fishing practices, such as the use of
chemical, poisonous and explosive substances. The small fishermen had
actually tried to curb the destructive fishing practices by warning and some-
times expelling the destructive fishermen, but the latter contested the legitimacy
of the small fishermen to undertake action. Being aware of not having adequate
legal legitimacy, the small fishermen asked the officials of the Fisheries Agency
to revise the prevailing legislation in order to allow them to take action against
those breaking the law.
It seems that the diverse reasons for drafting the abovementioned regula-
tions have affected the extent to which the drafting processes involved target
groups, notably fishing and farming communities. The drafting committee
of the Regulation on Local Fishery Levy and on Fisheries and Marine Manage-
ment of the Mahakam Delta hardly listened to the input from target groups.
To prepare the drafts the appointed members of the legal drafting team relied
heavily on their own knowledge. They conducted four or five internal meetings
to share knowledge internally. They did not gather or consult with the field
officials who had more adequate knowledge about the fishing and farming
communities. In the case of the Draft Regulation on Fishery Levy, the team
gathered input from outside by conducting two comparative studies, one in
Banyuwangi District of Central Java, and one in Pasir District, a southern
district of East Kalimantan province. Those two comparative study trips took
place in 2006.
Each of these study trips offers some interesting stories. The agency chose
Banyuwangi District because one of the senior staff members had visited the
region in 2005. However, during the 2006 comparative study they were sur-
prised to be informed that to be able to collect fishery levy, the Agency should
first construct a so-called fish market (Tempat Pelelangan Ikan abbrev. TPI)
and fish port (Pangkalan Pendaratan Ikan abbrev. PPI). At that time, the Kutai
District government had neither. Having learned about this condition, the
luas.segara.anakan.tinggal.kurang.dari.800.hektar (accessed on 26 July 2011), and Christian
Reichel, Urte Undire Fromming and Marion Glaser (2009).
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Fisheries Agency changed its priorities and took the first steps to build the
two required public facilities.
The comparative study trip to Pasir District took place towards the end
of 2006 (22-26 December).30 The fact that the last two days of the study
coincided with the Christmas holidays rise the question of how effective the
study was.
Meanwhile, those drafting the Regulation on Fishing gathered inputs from
outside by carrying out a comparative study trip, consulting related ministries
and the Legal Bureau of the Provincial government, as well as holding serial
discussions with fishing and farming communities. In addition, the appointed
Legal Drafting Team held five internal meetings. All abovementioned activities
took place in 2008. Again, the comparative study trip went to Java, in this
particular case to Pati, another District of Central Java Province. Meanwhile,
consultation with ministries and the Legal Bureau of the Provincial government
was aimed to get input concerning three matters. First, how to properly revise
Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999? Second, how to make a local regulation in a
short period of time? Third, how to draft a local regulation which would not
contradict (see Section 1.3.2 and Section 4.3 on contradiction) with higher
national regulations? Initially, the Agency also wanted to ask lecturers from
the Faculty of Marine Science and Fisheries, University of Mulawarnan, for
assistance, but the idea was cast aside when a senior officer of the agency said
it was not necessary as he had enough experience to be involved in the drafting
of Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999.31
Initially, it was proposed to gather input from fishing and farming com-
munities in two ways, namely by a survey and a series of discussions. Yet
the survey was cancelled due to time constraints and the fact that the model
that was supposed to be used to develop a questionnaire for the survey,
disappeared. Due to budgetary restraints, the Fisheries Agency could only
organize one discussion in each of the six sub-districts. The available budget
for each sub-district was only US$ 1,000. Each meeting lasted for two to two
and half hours with around thirty participants on average. At the meetings,
the Fisheries Agency officials circulated a copy of Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999.
The participants were asked to read a copy of the regulation before they could
propose which provision(s) needed revision.
Even though there were no systematic minutes of the six discussions, the
team members assumed that they would take into account the input from the
participants of the meetings. However, an official of the Kutai Fisheries Agency
who was the secretary of the team commented:
If the input from the fishermen and farmers differs from the agency’s view, the
team will use the agency’s view. That is because the agency’s view is scientific while
30 See ‘Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara (2007).
31 Interview Mnt, 7/8/2008.
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the input from the fishermen and farmers is unscientific given they are less-well
educated.32
Of the three initiatives during 2005-2009, two ended up as Kutai Draft Regula-
tion. The two drafts are the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishery Levy, and the
Kutai Draft Regulation on Fisheries and Marine Management in the Mahakam
Delta.
In essence, the content of the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fisheries Levy is
a continuation of what was stipulated in the two 2000 Kutai Regulations. As
already mentioned, these two regulations required that any transported and
traded shrimp and milkfish seeds as well as processed fish products had to
undergo a quality test. The products that would pass, would receive a certi-
ficate issued by the Fisheries Agency. These two regulations did not oblige
fishermen, farmers or traders to pay a levy if they passed the test and received
the certificate. The Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishery Levy stipulated that any
quality test followed by a certificate should be completed with a levy payment.
Yet the draft regulation led to confusion because it introduced a new name
for the word ‘certificate’ which had not been used in the previous two regula-
tions.33
Even though the drafting of the Kutai Regulation on Fisheries and Marine
Management in the Mahakam Delta was triggered by a coincidental meeting
between the head of the Kutai Fisheries Agency and the delegation from
Cilacap District, the increasing awareness of the Kutai District government
officials of the environmental deterioration of the Mahakam Delta affected
the making of the draft significantly.34
Concern for protection as well as conservation in the fishery management
of the Mahakam Delta is strongly reflected in the draft. The draft suggests
that fishery management of the Mahakam Delta shall be on the basis of the
carrying capacity of the environment. It points out that the goal of fishery
management of the Mahakam Delta is to ensure the sustainability of fish
production. The draft regulation formulates comprehensive prohibitions and
restrictions in order to meet that goal. Concerning the capture of fish, the draft
lists the gears that are totally prohibited in the Delta and forbids the use of
chemical, poisoned and explosive substances. At the same time it lists environ-
mentally-friendly gear that is advised to be used. Concerning aquaculture,
the draft stipulates traditional shrimp ponds (Ind. budidaya tambak tradisional)
as the only model that could be developed in the Mahakam Delta though there
are several conditions. Semi-intensive shrimp farming is still allowed under
32 Interview Mnt, 7/8/2008.
33 The Kutai Draft Regulation on Local Fisheries Levy introduced the so-called Certificate
for Transported Fish, whereas the two existing Kutai Regulations respectively introduced
the so-called Certificate for Quality and Certificate for Organoleptic Examination.
34 For an account of the increasing awareness of the Kutai District government officials about
the environmental deterioration of the Mahakam Delta see Section 9.2.
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strict conditions. With regard to a fishing permit, the draft formulates stricter
conditions for a permit application and even mentions the possibility of putting
a halt to issuing new permits, if necessary.
In addition to those prohibitions and restrictions, the Kutai Draft Regulation
on Fisheries and Marine Management of the Mahakam Delta states that the
district government would designate marine protected areas in the Mahakam
Delta where any installation of static or passive gear is prohibited. To make
sure that environmentally-friendly fishery management would be effectively
implemented in the Mahakam Delta the draft proposed the establishment of
a management body, a proposal that had been strongly advocated over the
previous five years (Bourgeois et al. 2002, p. 95; LAPI ITB and Bappeda Kutai
Kartanegara 2003; Hidayati et al. 2005, p. 160; Syafrudin 2005).
The way of law-making in these three initiatives differed from one another.
There were different reasons for drafting the initiatives, and most importantly,
factors that are internal and external to the administrative institutions hindered
a follow up. For example, the drafting process of the Regulation on Fisheries
and Marine Management of the Mahakam Delta ceased prematurely, when
the Agency Head who had initially been the motivating factor behind the
process, lost his personal interest in the regulation. The halting of the drafting
process was also connected with the situational mood of the Fishery Agency
officials who at time of the drafting process were in high spirits given they
had just moved to a new office.35 It explains why there was no division within
the Fisheries Agency which was willing to take responsibility for continuing
the drafting.
Meanwhile the fishing community continued to exert pressure on the
continuation of the drafting of the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishing. Yet, after
a one-year program was run in 2008, the drafting process of this regulation
too ceased. A lower member of staff of the agency who was in charge of the
draft and who acted also as a Secretary of the Legal Drafting Team actually
set up a program proposal for 2009. Through the program he projected a final
draft would be accomplished in 2009 which was to be sent to the Legal Bureau
of the Kutai District government. He believed that the process in the Legal
Bureau would not take long given the Secretary of the Fisheries Agency was
known to be capable of lobbying the Legal Bureau officials. Yet the superior
of the lower member of staff rejected and later fully cancelled the program
proposal. This superior was thought to have done so, because he was about
to move to another agency and he probably felt that he would not benefit from
the program proposal.36
Ideas to continue the formulation of the Draft Regulation on Fishing rose
again in 2010. In the same way as the previous year, the lower member of
35 Interview Sji, a Head of Division for Control and Survaillance of Kutai Fishery Agency,
11/8/2008.
36 Interview Mnt, 19/8/2008.
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staff prepared a program proposal. Yet this time it was unclear whether his
new superior had passed the program proposal on to the Head of Division,
another higher superior.37 He suspected that his new superior was not in-
terested in the program proposal simply because he was not happy with his
new position as he used to be assigned to another division of the Agency
where his main task was to handle issues related to the marketing of fish
products.38 Recognising that the drafting process was stagnant the Agency
Head suggested to the lower member of staff to continue the process by only
inserting minor points of revision such as adding the new name of the District
to the draft.39 Yet the lower member of staff refused to do so, given there
was no budget allocation for the minor revision.
In the same year as the composing of the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishing
commenced, a proposal to continue the making of the Kutai Draft Regulation
on Fisheries Levy appeared. The proposal came from another division of the
Fisheries Agency.40As there were two proposals for drafting regulation at
that time, the Agency Head decided to prioritize the Kutai Draft Regulation
on Fishing. It is not clear why the Agency Head came up with that decision,
yet the membership composition of the Legal Drafting Team suggested that
the Agency Head came up with a compromise. The Legal Drafting Team was
comprised of staff from four various divisions of the Agency. Not only did
they have to revise Kutai Draft Regulation No. 3/1999 on Fishing, the Team
also had to revise three other Kutai Regulations, No. 34, 36 and 37 of 2000.41
Initiated by Another Agency
The Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishery Business was initiated by a newly
established agency called Bureau of Natural Resources. The Bureau was the
result of a reorganization of the Kutai District government in 2008. The Bureau
had effectively started running in 2009. According to a Decree of the Kutai
District Head one of the duties of the Bureau was to formulate policies concern-
37 ‘Superior’ here means a Head of Section. Apart from a Head of Section, the lower members
of staff had two other higher superiors, a Head of Division and the Agency Head (see
Section 4.1 on how the section, division and agency are located in regional government
structure). The section, to which the lower members of staff were assigned, was the Fisheries
and Marine Surveillance, under the Division of Coastal, Small Island and Fishery Resources.
38 The new Head of Section has an educational background in economics. As far as the lower
member of staff is concerned, his superior is supposed to be a strong leader since his section
deals with surveillance matters. The lower member of staff found that his new Head of
Section did not have sufficient leadership capacity.
39 The minor update is the change from Kabupaten Kutai Tingkat II into Kabupaten Kutai
Kartanegara.
40 The name of the division was Bisa Usaha Perikanan dan Kelautan.
41 The composition and tasks of the members of the Legal Drafting Team were described
in the Letter of the Kutai Fishery Agency Head No. C.4/523.2/138.A.9/IV/2008.
The sea: open or exclusive? 171
ing natural resources.42 Two others duties of the Bureau were to establish
coordination among Kutai agencies around the issue of natural resources
management as well as to take stock of the problems related to natural
resources.
The officials of the new bureau seemed to regard drafting regulations as
one of their favourite activities in their first year in office. The bureau aimed
to make three Kutai Draft Regulations, one of which was the Kutai Regulation
on Fishery Business.43 To start the legislation making process, a Legal Drafting
Team was established by the Kutai District Head.44 There were eleven officials
in the team, one from the Fisheries Agency, one from the Legal Bureau and
the remaining nine from the Bureau of Natural Resources itself.
However, the formal intention of the Bureau of Natural Resources to engage
with other related agencies in the drafting process was disturbed by the
behaviour of the bureau officials both in establishing and running the team.
The bureau never informed the Fisheries Agency and Legal Bureau that their
staff had been included in the drafting team. The appointment of the two
agencies as members of the Legal Drafting Team was made by the bureau
without asking the two agencies for consent. In addition, the bureau did not
involve the other two agencies in the drafting process from an early stage.
They involved the two agencies only after the bureau had already prepared
a rough version of the Draft Regulation on Fisheries Business. The officials
of the Fisheries Agency were surprised to find out that they were not involved
in the first round of drafting. They were not only surprised by the late notifica-
tion, but also because they thought that the Natural Resource Bureau was only
supposed to make a draft regulation concerning natural resources in general.
The Kutai Draft Regulation on Fisheries Business had diverse objectives.
It was said that the prevailing Kutai Regulation concerning fisheries, and in
particular Kutai Regulation No. 36/2000 on Fishery Business, were out of date
and that large-scale natural resources extraction formed a new threat to fishery
resource use. The Kutai Regulation No. 36/2000 was considered out of date
and needing adjustment, since the new Fishery Law No. 31/2004 and Govern-
ment Regulation No. 54/2002 had been enacted.45 However, the Kutai Draft
Regulation on Fishery Business seemed to contain very general goals. Apart
from the two above objectives, the making of the Kutai Draft Regulation was
also said to be undertaken to generate the use of renewable resources, local
revenue as well as to create conducive environment for investment. However
the Kutai Fisheries Agency officials suspected that the abovementioned reasons
42 The decree is No. 31/2008, Article 33.
43 The other two Kutai Draft Regulations respectively concerning Animal Husbandry and
Health, and the Utilization of Non-Timber Forest Products.
44 The decree is No. 180.188/HK-207/2009.
45 See the minutes of a seminar held on 29 June 2010 on the making of the Kutai Draft
Regulation on Fishery Business.
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were fake. As a new agency, the Bureau of Natural Resources needed to create
programs and activities in order to secure their budget. The bureau officials’
motive to get funds rather than genuinely being interested in the new regula-
tion can be concluded from the fact that they set up a three-year program to
make the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishery Business, which according to the
Fisheries Agency officials, is longer than necessary.46
As said, only after they prepared a rough draft, the Bureau of Natural
Resources invited the two other agencies at a first meeting where all eleven
members of the team were present. This took place in 2009. Having experience
in making regulations, the team members from the Fisheries Agency shared
two things during the meeting. Firstly, they let the other team members know
that the Fisheries Agency had prepared two draft regulations concerning
fisheries. Secondly, they shared their past experiences of the difficulty of
pursuing discussion sessions with the Legal Bureau about the draft regulations
that particular agencies had submitted. They specifically referred to their
experience with the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fisheries Levy which had not
been granted any discussion time since 2006. They also reminded the team
members that the Secretariat Office of Kutai District government had recently
tightened their control on any submission of a draft regulation concerning
levy. The tighter control had emerged after the Minister of Home Affairs
annulled two Kutai Regulations given they were in contradiction with higher
national regulation concerning local tax and revenue.47
However, even though the team members were informed about the pre-
vious initiatives of the Fisheries Agency, there was no willingness to figure
out the similarities and differences between the rough drafts prepared by the
Bureau of Natural Resources and the two draft regulations previously prepared
by the Fisheries Agency. Being told that the Kutai Fisheries Agency had
prepared two draft regulations concerning fisheries, the Head of the Bureau
of Natural Resources simply commented:
Any agency could take an initiative to draft a regulation as long as it is for the
sake of the people.
46 The Kutai Fisheries Agency officials suspected that the three-year program was intended
to enable the officials of the Bureau of Natural Resources to conduct more travelling. A
larger budget for travelling has recently emerged as source of additional income.
47 The two regulations which were nullified were Kutai Regulation No. 12/2001 on Permits
for Foreign Workers, and No. 2/2001 on Permits for Local Mining. The former was officially
nullified in 2004 while the latter was in 2008. The common reason for the nullification of
the local regulations is because they added extra levies to some activities on which the
Central Government also collected levies. See http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/pdrd/
pdrd_list2.php?kdpemda=2003 (accessed on 18 August 2010).
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One of the heads of the sub-division of the Bureau of Natural Resources
reiterated the above pragmatic notion during the regional law-making process.
He said:
It would not be a problem if our bureau is preparing regional draft regulations
even though other agencies or offices have prepared or are preparing similar drafts.
We have two options if such situation emerges. Firstly, we will ask other agencies
or offices to incorporate the contents of their regional draft regulations in ours,
or secondly we just discontinue preparing our drafts, and let other agencies or
offices continue theirs.48
Although they suspected a narrow interest of the Bureau of Natural Resources,
the Fisheries Agency officials still expected and reckoned that the Bureau of
Natural Resources would be more likely to be successful in pursuing the draft
regulation. This was mainly because the Bureau had a closer formal line with
the Kutai Secretariat Office as well as the Kutai District Head. Moreover, the
Bureau had informal political access to some members of Kutai House of
Representative since the Head of the Bureau was close to several members
of the Kutai House of Representatives.49
Following an administrative tradition in regional law-making, the Bureau
of Natural Resources consulted with the Provincial government and two
ministries notably the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Marines
and Fisheries Affairs. Once again, they did not engage the two other district
agencies in the consultation despite having promised to do so. The Bureau
had another chance to get input from the two ministries when the Bureau
invited two officials of the two ministries as speakers during a one-day seminar
held by the Bureau in June 2010 (see footnote 45). Together with the officials
of the two ministries, the Bureau also invited lecturers from the local university
and the University of Indonesia.
The Bureau of Natural Resources did fulfil its promise to involve the
Fishery Agency when they organized two comparative study trips to Riau
48 Pragmatism, which can turn into competition in regional law-making also emerged in the
making of an academic draft of the natural resources management of the Mahakam Delta.
In 2011, the Bureau of Natural Resources arranged the making of the academic draft. The
Bureau kept on re-arranging this, despite the fact that they knew that the Provincial
government was arranging a draft as well. The head of the sub-division as mentioned above
said that it is good that the Provincial government steps ahead so that the bureau knew
what the Provincial government wished to have, and it would help the Kutai District
government to determine what should be the content of the district policy. Interview Thd,
a Head of Sub-Division of the Bureau of Natural Resources Administration of Kutai District
government, 9/12/2011.
49 The close relation of the Bureau Head with some parliament members originates from the
time when he used to be an activist in two prominent youth organizations. Traditionally
the two youth organizations have produced successful politicians as well as high-ranking
government officials.
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Province in 2011. During the first trip, joined by officials from the Kutai Fishery
Agency, the Bureau of Natural Resources of Kutai District, and the Legal
Bureau of the Provincial government, they met the officials of Riau Provincial
government. During the second trip, some members of the Kutai House of
Representatives joined. The second trip was initially set up to meet the govern-
ment of Riau Island Province. Yet, due to miscommunication, they changed
the trip to Pekanbaru city of Riau Province.50
The expectation of the Kutai Fishery Agency concerning the law-making
came true. The failure of the Kutai Fishery Agency to propose the Kutai Draft
Regulation on Fishery Levy since 2006 turned out into a success of the Bureau
of Natural Resources to propose the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishery Business
to become Kutai Regulation No. 15/2011 on Fishery Business.
Not only did the Bureau of Natural Resources succeed in proposing the
regulation, the regulation contains provisions concerning a fishing levy. As
already said, in 2006, the Kutai Fishery Agency ceased to make the Kutai Draft
Regulation on Fishery Levy when they were told that Kutai District is required
to have the so-called fish market and fish port to be able to collect a fishery
levy. At the time of the enactment of Kutai Regulation No. 15/2011, the two
required public facilities had not been constructed yet.
Thus, by having provisions on a fishery levy, Kutai Regulation No. 15/2011
has broadened and superseded Kutai Regulation No. 26/2000. Nevertheless,
the rest of the content of Kutai Regulation No. 15/2011 resembles No. 26/2000.
In that respect, its primary legal objective, namely to supersede the old regula-
tion, is achieved. Meanwhile, to its other original objective, namely to couple
increasing threats from other large-scale natural resources use to fishery
resource use, has been responded by making a new separate Kutai Draft
Regulation on Fishery Resources Conservation. As had happened when of
the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fisheries Business was made, the Bureau of
Natural Resources formed a Legal Drafting Team in which an official from
the Kutai Fisheries Agency and Legal Bureau were included. For this law-
making initiative, the Bureau of Natural Resources held two consultations with
the Ministry of Marine Affairs, and with the Faculty of Fishery and Marine
Science of Mulawarman University, and met with related Kutai agencies and
local offices of the Kutai Fishery Agency.
Initiated by Joint Collaboration
Kutai District collaboration in regional law-making initiatives concerning
fisheries was usually suggested by the Kutai Kartanegara District’s Committee
on Conflict Resolution (KKDCCR). This made sense, given that KKDCCR members
came from various agencies of the Kutai District government. Such varied
50 Interview M (a staf of Kutai Fishery Agency) and H (a staff of Bureau of Natural Resources
Administration of Kutai District government), 8/12/2011.
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composition of members enabled the KKDCCR to establish collaboration among
the agencies. The following two initiatives of regional law-making are instances
of such collaboration.
The drafting of the Circular Letter of the Head of Kutai District government
on the Prohibition of the Installation of Gear on Public Shipping lanes came
at a time when the number of gear installations in the vicinity of companies’
platforms increased.51 Some Kutai bureaucrats including field officials had
long suspected that the reason behind the emerging gear instalments was not
purely for fishing. Instead they suspected that it was a trick to get compensa-
tion from the company. As two of the officials said:
Once fishermen found out that a company was planning to undertake activities
in a particular area of the sea of the Mahakam Delta, they would quickly install
a tidal trap nearby the area where the activity would take place. By doing so, they
expected the companies’ transportation would crash into the installed gear one
day, which would be a reason to ask compensation from the company.52
Due to the growing number of such tidal trap installations, a new name for
tidal trap emerged i.e. julu jebakan.53 As the emerging tidal trap installations
caused conflicts, the KKDCCR became more actively involved. Their active role
in the whole affair led to the KKDCCR suggesting that the Kutai District govern-
ment needed to make a particular rule dealing with that matter. They sug-
gested introducing a circular letter, which eventually resulted in Circular Letter
No. 100/287/Pem.A/VI/2004 on the Prohibition of the Installation of Gear
on Public Sipping lanes. The fact that the KKDCCR played an important role
in this initiative can be seen in the first few sentences of the circular letter.
The start of the letter states that observation of the KKDCCR, ie. that in many
parts of the District’s marine water the gear instalments had endangered public
shipping lanes, is a consideration to draft the circular letter.
As already mentioned in Section 6.2, the 2004 Circular Letter actually
recalled what had been regulated in both Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999 and
the 1975 Circular Letter of the Directorate General for Fishery of the Ministry
of Agriculture. The 2004 Circular Letter actually combined the content of the
two previous Kutai Regulations so that gear instalments were not only pro-
51 Interview ED, a Head of Bureau of Governance of Kutai District government, 8/12/2011.
52 Interview Sun, a staff of Kutai Environmental Agency, 18/6/2008, A, 19/6/2008, and ES,
30/1 and 1/7/2008. See also Simarmata (2011). However, this accusation was disputed
by some fishermen and confirmed by village government officials saying that the number
of tidal trap instalments near platforms increased due to a growing number of platforms.
Given that platform constructions occupied fishing zones, fishermen became more limited
in the areas, where they could still fish. Interview, Amr, a Secretary of Sepatin village
government, 19/2/2010.
53 For the local people of the Mahakam Delta the name refers to any tidal trap which is
consciously installed to be crashed into by companies’ ships in order to be able to claim
compensation.
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hibited on public sailing lanes as stipulated in Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999
but also in the vicinity of companies’ platforms as stipulated in the 1975
Circular Letter.
Similarly, the Draft Regulation of Kutai District Head on Standardized
Ponds was born from the experiences of the KKDCCR. With regard to fishery
disputes, the KKDCCR had long encountered a common pattern whereby shrimp
farmers complained that company activities had contaminated the water in
the ponds and damaged pond constructions. For any loss resulting from the
contamination and damage, the farmers asked the company for compensation.
The success of earlier complaints for compensation actually inspired other
farmers to behave similarly so that the number of complaints increased
gradually.
In response to the growing number of complaints the KKDCCR had to think
of a way to control them. The team therefore decided that it was best to select
complaints that really needed settling, which meant that they could refuse
complaints that did not meet approved formal criteria. The team eventually
came up with a definition of a ‘standardized pond’. The basic idea was that
only the complaints of farmers whose shrimp ponds met the criteria of a
‘standardized pond’ would be taken into account. Like other fishery policies
and regulations of the Kutai District, the standard definition aimed at develop-
ing sustainable shrimp ponds which at the same time added to local income.
After half a year of occasional meetings, the KKDCCR organized several
further more regular meetings. To make use of all insights that had arisen
during the meetings, two lecturers from the Faculty of Fishery and Marine
Science of Mulawarman University were brought in to digest and write the
remarks down in a draft concept paper. Once the draft was finished the
KKDCCR carried out some activities to get input from outside. First they asked
feedback from the Bogor Agricultural Institute who had carried out some
research as well as served consultancies in the Mahakam Delta. Second, they
consulted with the Ministry of Marines and Fisheries Affairs. Third, they
carried out comparative studies in two districts in Java.
The KKDCCR did not deem necessary to consult with the shrimp farmers
or even the punggawas for input on the concept paper, as they regarded the
scientific input from academics as more reliable. Besides, in their view the
concept paper contained rather technical matters which the farmers would
probably find difficult to understand. What the farmers needed to do at the
time of interviewing, was to develop their ponds in accordance with the
‘standardized pond’. In any case, the KKDCCR felt that they already knew what
the farmers were thinking for they had met the farmers many times.54
After the concept paper was completed, the KKDCCR asked the Legal Bureau
of the Kutai District government to convert it into a legal text. They opted
54 Interview FI, a lecturer at the Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Science of Mulawarman
University, 1/3/2010.
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for a Regulation of the Kutai District Head instead of a Kutai Regulation. Yet
as of 2009 the drafting process of the regulation stagnated due to two factors.
First, the Deputy Head of Kutai District was detained by Indonesia’s Com-
mission on the Eradication of Corruption in 2008 for corruption charges,
making it difficult to ask for his signature.55 Second, some key actors who
used to actively engage in the formulation of the concept paper had been
moved to other agencies, which did not deal with the issue of the Mahakam
Delta. As a result, they could no longer engage in the drafting process. Mean-
while, officials who took over the position of the previous key actors were
not as concerned about the issue of the Mahakam Delta as their predecessors.
Following its title, the provisions of the Draft Regulation of the Kutai
District Head on Standardized Ponds chiefly determine the standards for ponds
with regard to the following three matters: location, construction and manage-
ment. With regard to location, the draft regulation stipulates one thing which
is in direct contrast with what has actually been happening on the ground:
it forbids all ponds which do not comply with land use planning. An instance
of non-compliance is if a pond is located along a green belt (sabuk hijau).
Concerning construction, the draft regulation states that the size of an ideal
shrimp pond can not exceed 2 hectares. In addition, the pond shall not be
badly constructed to avoid it from being easily damaged by sea waves. Last,
the draft regulation prohibits the use of chemical fertilizer in an attempt to
prevent environmental destruction.
Looking at the content of Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999, the three Kutai
Regulations of 2000, the 2004 Circular Letter, and Kutai Regulation No. 15/
2011, we can conclude that the scope of Kutai District government’s formal
control over the management of fishery resource use expanded over time. They
added new provisions which were not part of the national legislation by
increasing input control. They limited fishing zones where fishing could take
place. They increased control over fishing by requiring fishermen to obtain
permits from local authorities as well to pay fishery levy. The enhanced scope
of formal control raises the larger question to what extent the Kutai District
government has been able to effectively exercise control in practice. The
following section deals with that question.
7.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW BY REGIONAL AND LOCAL OFFICIALS
To examine the extent to which the Kutai District government has effectively
implemented fishery regulations, this section will focus first on control, notably
control over fishery permits, and then discuss the issue of gear restrictions.
55 At that time the Deputy Head of Kutai District actually acted as District Head after the
formerly appointed Kutai District Head had been detained on account of corruption charges
in late 2007. See footnote 95.
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As the Kutai fishery regulations have eventually turned the SSFRC from a mere
recording instrument into a permit, the description of control over the permit
also includes an account of the SSFRC. Another matter that will be examined
is the development of environmentally-friendly shrimp ponds, something that
is not yet regulated but for which the Kutai District government has been
developing a regulation since 2002. In describing the extent to which the Kutai
fishery regulations have been effectively implemented, an account of the factors
that have influenced implementation is also given.
7.3.1 Control
The term ‘ineffectiveness’ has been widely used and mentioned by a number
of research reports and forums when trying to connect the Kutai fishery
regulations/policies with the ‘real’ problems or issues. Some researchers even
said that the government is absent in the Mahakam Delta or it is a place where
no government regulations exist (Timmer 2010, p. 711; Timmer forthcoming,
p. 29). The ineffectiveness has been strongly associated with government
incapability to implement and enforce the law (Bourgeois at al. 2002, p. 2 and
27; Rachmawati 2003, p. 34; Hidayati et al. 2004, p. 79).
Some research reports base their findings and conclusions on the peoples’
perspectives obtained from surveys. A survey held in 2002 found that 45%
of the fishermen and farmers who lived in four villages of the Mahakam Delta
knew nothing about the existing policies.56 The most striking answer was
that 81% of this group had no idea about the government’s role in the Maha-
kam Delta. In line with the answers of the respondents, the report says:
Despite a long list of actual or planned activities, it is important to mention that
until now, the government has had little control over what happens in the Delta.
Most of the aquaculture developments have taken place at the initiative of migrants
and local people, without much government intervention… It means that the above
government activities have had little visibility and little impact.
One year later, another piece of research reaffirmed the 2002 findings discover-
ing that of 324 households in the Mahakam Delta 73.3% confessed to know
nothing about formal rules on mangrove. Only 13% said to know about the
existing formal rules (Rachmawati 2003, p. 82). A recent piece of research,
funded by a multi-stakeholder project, reiterates the 2002 findings. Having
held a survey in three main villages in the Mahakam Delta, the research found
56 The survey was conducted by the French research institute CIRAD, collaborating with some
local NGO activists. Total E&P Indonesie and Inpex supported the research financially.
The survey included 100 household respondents who worked as fishermen or shrimp
farmers. See Bourgeois et al. (2002, p.15).
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that between 40% and 80% of the respondents did not see any effect from the
activities carried out by the Kutai Fisheries Agency. As a result, when they
were asked whether the Kutai District government should continue their
activities in the Mahakam Delta, the majority said they should not (PMD
Mahakam 2008, p. III36-58). To a large extent the discrepancy between the
Kutai fishery regulations and policies on one hand and the real problems on
the other, is actually visible.
With regard to the FBL, only two permits were issued up to 2008 (Dinas
Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara 2008a, p. 34-35). These two permits
were neither concerning the capture of fish nor aquaculture. They were permits
on seeds of and breeding milkfish and collecting crab in areas which were
not located in the Mahakam Delta.57 A Kutai Fisheries Agency official
revealed that no fisherman or farmer from the Mahakam Delta has applied
for a fishery permit.58 Large-scale fishermen who came from upstream of
the Mahakam River (Muara Muntai, Samarinda) and South Kalimantan (Hida-
yati et al. 2005, p. 52-62) only had ship certificates without a fishery permit.59
Regarding permit non-compliance, the Kutai Fisheries Agency even confessed,
as can be found in their annual reports, that control of permits was not effect-
ive yet, given there was still a great number of fishermen, farmers and traders
who had no idea about the permit.60
Nevertheless, the imposition of the SSFRC had worked pretty effectively
during 1995-1997, when 500 fishermen and pond owners obtained a SSFRC.
However, after the authority to issue a SSFRC was transferred to the sub-district
head in 2001, only a few SSFRC’s have been reported.61 To address the decreas-
ing compliance, the Kutai Fisheries Agency set up a program on boat registra-
tion in collaboration with the Kutai Public Transportation Agency, in 2007
and 2008. The aim of the program was to help fishermen to obtain a boat
certificate as a way to proceed to applying for a SSFRC. This two-year joint
program led to the issuance of 1,700 boat certificates. Nevertheless, only 100
SSFRC’s were reported to have been issued in 2008, so the registration program
hardly achieved its aim (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara
2009, p. 49). The number of issued SSFRC’s is particularly low when compared
57 The first FBL was given to CV. Undayana and the second to PT. Bone Teknik. The first
was located outside the Mahakam Delta, while the second was located in the hinterland
of the Mahakam Delta.
58 Interview Sfd, a Head of Division of Kutai Fishery Agency,17/6/2008.
59 Interview SH, a Head of Anggana office of Kutai Fishery Agency, 30/7/2008. The large-scale
fishermen have larger vessels with a machine capacity of no less than 100 horse power,
whereas the local fishermen of the Mahakam Delta have vessels with a machine capacity
of no more than 32 horse power (Hidayati at al. 2005, p. 59).
60 See Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara (2008a, p. 36) and Dinas Perikanan
dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara (2009, p. 50).
61 The transfer of authority was officially carried out through Decree of Kutai District Head
No. 180.188/HK-537/2001 on the Transfer of Authority of Kutai District Head to Sub-District
Heads.
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to the number of vessels being used in the Mahakam Delta which is estimated
at approximately 6,000 (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara
2008b, p. 35; Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara 2009, p. 39).
Meanwhile, the Kutai Fisheries Agency intention to carry out quality control
over transported and traded milkfish and processed-fish products met its goal
to some extent, despite the fact that the test laboratory had not yet been
constructed, forcing the Kutai Fisheries Agency to rent the Province’s labor-
atory. In the course of 2007, the Kutai Fisheries Agency issued 164 Certificates
for Quality, while in 2008 the number decreased to 124 (Dinas Perikanan dan
Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara 2008a, p. 2; Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai
Kartanegara 2009, p. 45).
Going back to the 1970s the implementation of the 1976 Decree on Fishing
Zones Division prohibiting the use of trawl in Zone I was not effective given
that many small and large-scale fishermen still operated and used trawl in
the zone. Large-scale fishermen fished in Zone I because the shallow waters
were richer in shrimps (Bailey 1988, p. 34; Tribawono 2002, p. 68). As a result,
conflicts between small and large-scale fishermen arose (Bailey 1988, p.13 and
36; Jhamtani 2003, p. 27). To prevent conflict, the Central Government then
promulgated a total ban for the use of trawl across Indonesian marine waters
except in the Arafura Sea (Bailey 1988, p. 13; Jhamtani 2003, p. 27).62 Neverthe-
less due to the widespread use of trawl at that time, the Central Government
implemented the policy gradually and it only came into full force in 1983.
In the Mahakam Delta, in the early years, the implementation of the trawl
ban seemed to be effective, which resulted in a gradual shift in fishery resource
use from capturing fish to aquaculture. Some researchers even view the trawl
ban as a significant trigger of the initial establishments of ponds (Bapedalda
Kutai Kartanegara and PKSPL IBP 2002, p. III-66, and Hidayati et al. 2005, p.
63). Moreover an active involvement of local military officers had enabled the
implementation of the ban to run effectively.63 Yet, in general and in the years
after reformation era, the implementation of the regulation ceased to be effect-
ive, despite various efforts such as dissemination of the regulation, the intro-
duction of new recommended gear as well as the establishment of a provincial
and district inter-agency team (Herlindah 2008, p. 7-8).
The use of the trawl net in the Mahakam Delta re-emerged after the fall
of the authoritarian New Order Regime in 1998 (Buorgeois et al. 2002, p. 36;
Hidayati et al. 2004, p. 77; Hidayati et al. 2005, p. 53-59; Sandjatmiko et al.
2005, p. 115; Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara 2008b, p. 13).
62 The ban was stated in Presidential Decree No. 39/1980 on the Eradication of Trawl Fishing.
Later the Presidential Decree was followed by Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No.503/
Kpts/Um/7/1980 concerning measures to carry out the first ban on trawl use, and Pres-
idential Directive No. 11/1982.
63 In 1983, local military officers mobilized the fishermen to gather at the Governor’s office.
The Governor urged the fishermen to develop ponds as an alternative to trawling. Interview
Smr, an elder of Muara Badak Ulu village, 11/8/2008.
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From this time onwards, many local fishermen reverted back to using trawls
after they had failed to compete successfully with later immigrants in
aquaculture development (Hidayati et al. 2005). Compared to the Mahakam
Delta the use of trawl in the upstream areas of the Mahakam River is limited
because efforts to enforce rules on the use of trawls have been more effect-
ive.64 In the course of 2001-2005, Kutai District was even the region in which
trawl was most used compared to other districts across East Kalimantan. The
use of trawl increased around 20.2% each year during that period (Herlindah
2008, p. 9-10). Given that approximately 50% of the fish production of the Kutai
District came from three sub-districts of the Mahakam Delta (Anggana, Muara
Badak, Muara Jawa) it can be assumed that most of the trawl use took place
in the Mahakam Delta (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara
2008b, p. 8).
It is important to note that the use of the trawl in the Mahakam Delta re-
emerged despite the fact that the Kutai Fishery Agency supported the establish-
ment of the so-called Community Group for Surveillance (abbrev. CGS, Ind.
Kelompok Pengawas Masyarakat).65 Since 2008, across Kutai Kartanegara 48 CGS
have been established.66 Eleven of them are located in some villages of the
Mahakam Delta.67 Pursuant to the Decree of the Minister of Marine Affairs
and Fishery of 2001,68 a CGS is a community-based organization whose mem-
bers consist of community leaders, religious leaders, adat leaders, fishermen
and fish farmers (petani ikan). In practice, the members of the CGS are elected
in a village meeting. A village regulation is made to endorse the elected CGS’s
members which is then submitted to Kutai Fishery Agency for registration.
Concerning authority, the CGS can only report (melaporkan) to the PPNS,
the district fishery agency or the local police and military officers if they
64 Interview Mnt, 7/8/2008. Stronger enforcement of the ban on trawl use up-stream of the
Mahakam River was due to over-fishing caused by a wide use of trawl. The strong enforce-
ment then led the up-stream fishermen to come down to the Mahakam Delta. In the
Mahakam Delta they found that the prohibition of trawl use hardly existed (Hidayati et
al. 2005, p. 62).
65 A CGS is different from a Sub-District Committee on Fishery Resources Conservation (see
Section 7.2). The members of the latter are the Leaders of the Sub-District Consultation
Forum whereas the members of the former are local inhabitants. Concerning authority,
the latter is authorized to carry out prosecution, whereas the former can only do reporting.
Interview MK, 6/12/2011.
66 Seehttp://humas.kutaikartanegarakab.go.id/read/news/2012/6338/pokmaswas-menjaga-
kelestarian-sumber-perikanan.html (downloaded on 15 July 2012).
67 Nationwide there were 1,419 CGS’s in 2010, 48 of which were in East Kalimantan. Kemen-
terian Kelautan dan Perikanan (2010, p. 139-140). Another figure said that the number of
CGS’s in East Kalimantan was 113, with 45 in Kutai Kartanegara. See ‘DKP Kaltim Op-
timalkan Peranan Pokwasmas’ (http://www.kaltimprov.go.id/kaltim.php?page=detailberita
&id=4433, accessed on 28 July 2011).
68 No. KEP.58/MEN/2001 concerning Guidance for a Community-Based Monitoring System
on Marine and Fishery Resource Management
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suspect or witness a violation of law. However, in practice the CGS also
expelled (mengusir) those are not complying with the law.69
In relation to efforts to control the use of destructive fishing, the Kutai
Fishery Agency installed warning boards in some places. The signs issued
warnings such as ‘Stop!! Illegal Fishing’, written in large print. The small print
reminded people that the use of chemical and explosive gear was prohibited
and that they could receive a punishment of maximum ten years imprisonment
and a fine of IDR 2 billion (US$ 235,000).
7.3.2 Development
The policy of the Kutai Fisheries Agency to develop environmentally-friendly
shrimp ponds in the Mahakam Delta which lasted from 2002 up to 2009 was
widely perceived as ineffective, despite the fact that the Agency had funded
several pilot projects as of 2002 and had undertaken several training sessions
and comparative studies.70 All pilot projects of environmentally-friendly
shrimp ponds had ended tragically with shrimp farmers cutting the trees,
which had been planted near or inside their ponds, after two or three years.
Shrimp farmers did so because they found that the productivity of their ponds
did not increase while they were told that the planting of the mangrove trees
would increase their pond productivity. The pilot projects often failed because
the Kutai Fisheries Agency arranged pilot projects that only targeted planting
mangrove seeds around or inside shrimp ponds, without any follow-up. The
Agency never arranged activities to maintain the ponds where mangrove seeds
had been planted. This happened exactly to a pilot project located in Muara
Pantuan village, which was pioneered by the Provincial Fisheries Agency in
the 1980s. Due to the decentralization of 1999, the Provincial Fisheries Agency
handed over a 3 ha shrimp pond to be owned and managed by the Kutai
Fisheries Agency. Yet, ever since the Kutai Fisheries Agency hardly paid
attention to it with the exceptional glance from a senior field staff member
of the Kutai Fisheries Agency. The senior field staff member could keep an
eye on it, because he held a 1.3 ha pond, which was located next to the pilot
69 Interview Mnt, 19/9/2009.
70 For a place like the Mahakam Delta which has a mangrove forest, the most environmentally-
friendly type of shrimp pond is known as a silfo-fishery. The term refers to the use of a
forest area for aquacultural purposes. There are generally two types of silfo-fishery which
in Indonesian are popularly known as empang and komplangan. The basic difference between
the two types is that in the former mangrove and pond are in the same place, while in
the latter mangrove and pond are split and separated by a dike (Bappeda Kutai Kartanegara
and LAPI ITB 2003, p. VI-7-8). The Kutai Fisheries Agency is at the time of writing in favour
of the komplangan.
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project.71 A local academic who had been hired by the Fisheries Agency to
carry out many research projects, commented on the planning management
of the Kutai Fisheries Agency:
The Agency did not set up serial activities. They usually set up completely new
activities or repeated the former ones. If arranged activities were completely new,
they preferred to ask new parties to implement the arranged activities to prevent
any criticism of the discontinuation of some other activities. The Agency simply
did not have the capacity to set up comprehensive activities.72
7.3.3 Explanatory factors
The Kutai Fisheries Agency on the one hand claimed that programs and
activities that they carried out met their 2000-2010 primary goal, namely to
improve the skills of its officials to be able to carry out control over fishery
resource use as well as to develop fishery business, in an attempt to generate
income for fishing and farming communities.73 However, the Agency on the
other hand, also admitted to not having yet fully achieved its goals due to
some unexpected setbacks. This leads to the question why the multitude of
programs and activities of the agency have not (yet) resulted in and have
contributed so little to an effective implementation of the fishery regulations
and policies.
The next section describes some factors that have hindered the implementa-
tion of the many policies, programs and regulations of the Kutai Fisheries
Agency. Similar to factors pointed out by local forestry officials which stopped
them from carrying out effective forest protection in the Mahakam Delta (see
Section 5.3), the next section describes prominent factors as related by local
fishery officials. The factors are divided into (a) factors that are internal and
(b) factors that are external to the administrative institutions. Factors that are
internal to the administrative institutions, in this case, include a lack of
71 The senior field staff member used to be head of a fish port in Muara Pantuan village. When
the fish port was closed he chose to remain in the village while taking care of the 3 ha
shrimp pond of the Provincial Fisheries Agency. Later the Provincial Fisheries Agency cut
the budget for maintaining the shrimp pond. The senior staff member continued to maintain
the pond with his own money. When it was handed over to the Kutai Fisheries Agency,
including the maintenance, he insisted on a compensation from the Kutai Fisheries Agency
of IDR 7,000,000 to IDR 10,000,000 (US$ 825 to US$ 1,170) ie. the amount that he had spent
to maintain the shrimp pond. The Agency refused his request and decided to rent ponds
from other villagers.
72 Interview IS, a lecturer at the Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Science of Mulawarman
University, 15/2/2010.
73 See Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara (2007, p. 20-21), and http:
//www.kutaikartanegarakab.go.id/index.php/gov/dinas_perikanan_dan_kelautan (accessed
on June 23, 2010).
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resources, problems with the budget spending mechanism, other agencies’
concerns, leadership and the local officials’ perception of fishermen and
farmers. Whereas, factors that are external to the administrative institutions
include the fishermen’s and farmers’ expectations of formal rules and local
power.
Internal factors
(a) Lack of resources
In the first five years of their presence starting in 2000, the Kutai Fisheries
Agency managed a relatively small annual budget of approx. 10.000 US$ (see
Section 7.2.2, footnote 26). Yet during the second five years the annual budget
increased significantly to some 100.000 US$ each year.74 The annual budget
was to serve 36,515 fishery households covering an area of around 244,557
ha.75 In the second five years, the agency did not encounter a budget shortage.
For the last four years, the agency was not even able to spend the allocated
budget fully.76Apparently, the annual budget was not allocated proportionally,
so that some programs lacked a budget, important infrastructures were not
available yet, and some field officials suffered from severe budget shortages.
Most of the Kutai Fishery Agency officials still pointed to a lack of budget
as one of the reasons for the ineffective implementation of fishery regulations
and policies. They specifically pointed to the CGS’s. In practice, the Kutai
Fisheries Agency could only prepare a budget for establishing a CGS, together
with a budget for providing supporting equipment such as a boat. They could
not finance the daily operations of a CGS.77 Meanwhile, a CGS needed approx-
imately US$ 2,350 per month to be able to carry out regular surveillance.78
The budget shortage that the 48 CGS’s of the Kutai District encountered could
have actually been solved from 2009 onwards by allocating part of the annual
village budget (Ind. Alokasi Dana Desa) to surveillance. Yet, sometimes particu-
74 The increase of the agency’s annual budget was linked to an increase in the Kutai annual
budget. Due to the enactment of Law No. 25/2000 on the Financial Balance, the Kutai annual
budget increased significantly as of 2001. It was the first time in 2001 that the Kutai annual
budget reached hundred million dollar (US$ 150 million). It was US$170 million in 2002,
US$ 273 in 2003, US$ 264 million in 2005, US$420 million in 2006, US$488 million in 2007,
US$ 550 million in 2008, US$ 499 million in 2009, US$ 444 million in 2010, and US$ 344
million in 2011.
75 The number of fishery households is nearing 50% of total fishery households in East
Kalimantan. See in Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara (2009).
76 For instance in 2007 the agency could only spend US$132,000 of the total budget of US$
183,000, whereas in 2008 they could spend US$ 220,000 of a total of US$ 368,000.
77 According to the decree of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of 2001 concerning
Guidance for a Community-Based Monitoring System on Marine and Fishery Resource
Management, district and municipality governments could provide donations (bantuan)
to the CGSs to buy equipment.
78 The number is based on an estimate made by a field official of the Kutai Fisheries Agency.
Interview Agg, 8 and 9/2/2010.
The sea: open or exclusive? 185
lar CGS’s found it difficult to access the annual village budget when some of
their members had not voted for the elected village head.79
Due to a budget shortage, the Kutai Fisheries Agency’s plan to construct
a laboratory for quality control of transported and traded milkfish and pro-
cessed-fish products could not be realized. As a result, the agency did also
not construct check points for surveillance over the transported and traded
products. This implied that the Agency could only do a small number of
quality control tests, given they had to rent the laboratory of the Provincial
Fisheries Agency (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara 2009,
p. 47).
The field officials of the Kutai Fisheries Agency who were based in the
sub-district and village suffered more from a budget shortage and dislocation.
The lack of resources led to two problems in particular. Firstly, there was no
budget to make regular village visits, especially because there were limited
funds to pay for the transportation to cover the distance of 120km between
the Agency and the villages. Secondly, there was no budget to pay for support-
ing equipment. Given the agency’s central office could only provide funds
for two village visits per year, the field officials could only hope to be invited
to cooperate with Total E&P Indonesie, which could enable them to carry out
more frequent village visits.80 A research project supported by Total E&P
Indonesie during 2005-2007 had enabled the field officials of Anggana, Muara
Badak and Muara Jawa sub-district fishery offices to visit villages in the
Mahakam Delta twice a week. Opportunities to carry out village visits arose
also when the field officials were involved in dispute settlements, whereby
they could get a chance to travel around the villages. Since the Agency’s central
office did not provide their branch offices with a boat, the field officials often
borrowed fishermen’s boats.81 Likewise, the Agency’s central office did not
provide the field officials with motorcycles for daily activities. As a result the
field officials used their own motorcycles or took them from the agency’s
central office without permission.82
Not only the budget shortage and the lack of supporting equipment were
a concern, a lack of resources also affected the number of skilled officials. One
recent example is the fact that the agency at the time of writing only had one
Pegawai Penyidik Negeri Sipil (abbrev. PPNS), a civil servant authorized to carry
out investigations over a potentially legal case.83 The only PPNS that the
agency had was also the treasurer of the agency. The double position made
79 Interview Agg, 8 and 9/2/2010.
80 Interview Snt, a staff of Anggana office of Kutai Fishery Agency, 30 June 2008.
81 Interview Agg, 8 and 9/2/2010.
82 An official of Anggana local office of the Kutai Fishery Agency took a motorbike from the
Agency’s central office without getting formal approval from the office. The Agency’s central
office did not take any action and actually let the local official use it until present.
83 See the Decree of the Minister of Home Affair No. 6/2003 concerning Pedoman Pembinaan
Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil di Lingkungan Pemerintah Daerah.
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it impossible for him to carry out investigations. Meanwhile, other officials
of the agency refused to undergo PPNS training, arguing that they could not
spend three months away from their families for the training. As a result, the
Agency involved provincial PPNS, local police and military officers to undertake
the investigations on the condition that the Agency members had all their
expenses paid. Traditionally the Agency only has a regular budget for surveil-
lance (pengawasan) and not for investigation. As a result, investigation is usually
paid for by redirecting the budgets of other activities, such as extension (pem-
binaan). Meanwhile, the annual budget for surveillance usually consists of one
or two trips for the whole 18 sub-districts of the Kutai District.84
The weak capacity of the field officials has also been linked with the low
SSFRC record. Not only did they have a weak capacity, the field officials were
also considered as badly-motivated by the agency’s central office. The Agency’s
central office suspected that the sub-district officials (kecamatan) were reluctant
to take care of recording the number of SSFRCs since it does not generate
income unlike, for example, permit applications. Moreover, the transfer of
issuing SSFRCs from the district head to the heads of the sub-districts in 2001
had not been followed by a budget increase to the sub-district offices. To deal
with the matter, the Agency Head repeatedly reminded the field officials
recording the SSFRCs. He did so when the field officials visited the agency’s
central office to collect their salary.85
(b) Planning and budgeting procedure
The planning and budgeting procedures have also contributed to ineffective
implementation of the fishery regulations and policies. Existing planning
procedures impeded the formation of a serial program while budgeting pro-
cedures impeded fruitful field visits.
In 2009 the Kutai Fisheries Agency proposed an annual budget of IDR 90
billions (US$ 1,060,000) to the Development Planning Agency of the Kutai
District government. The Development Planning Agency who is in charge of
preparing Kutai Annual Budget, refused the request deciding that the Kutai
Fisheries Agency would only receive IDR 24 billions (US$ 282,000). In response
to the significant reduction, the Kutai Fisheries Agency deleted some of the
proposed programs and activities to meet the limits of the Development
Planning Agency. Proposed programs and activities were cancelled just before
a deadline given by the Development Planning Agency. The deadlines were
originally set by the Development Planning Agency, which informed other
agencies only very late. Due to limited available time, processes to cut budgets
and cancel programs and activities did not widely involve divisions and units
within the Kutai Fisheries Agency, as occurred when the proposed budget
was first drafted. Instead, the final steps of the process would exclusively
84 Interview MK, 6/12/2011.
85 Interview Shrn, a Head of Kutai Fishery Agency, 1/2/2010.
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involve the Agency Head together with officials who were in charge of
planning. In practice, it was the Agency Head who took the final decision
about which program or activity would continue or be cancelled.86
Another factor that hindered the forming of serial program was the self-
interest of high-ranking officers, who were the decision makers in their respect-
ive division or unit. In many cases, the high-ranking officers would not be
enthusiastic about the proposed programs or activities suggested by their staff,
simply because they were about to move to another agency and did not think
that they would gain any benefit from the arranged programs or activities.
A similar behaviour could be seen amongst the senior staff, who were about
to retire.
Some Kutai Fisheries Agency officials complained that the rigid official
procedure for budget planning and spending left them insufficient time to
carry out village visits. Budget rules determined that an official of the agency’s
central office could spend a maximum of three days away travelling (Ind.
perjalanan dinas). For field officials the travelling allowance was even shorter:
one day. Under the formal procedure of budget planning and spending, Kutai
Fisheries Agency officials usually proposed on Monday and Thursday a budget
for travelling twice a week. When they received money on Monday, they
would travel on Tuesday and Wednesday. On Thursday they proposed another
budget to be used for travelling on Friday, Saturday and Sunday if necessary.
Hence, they actually only had two days for each journey. Nevertheless this
was actually a system for the Agency to save some money so that they could
pay their 106 (2008) part-time staff members.87 By proposing three days of
travelling but spending it in only two days, they could allocate money for
paying their part time staff members. Thus, on one hand, some Kutai Fisheries
Agency officials were complaining about not having sufficient days for village
visits, yet, on the other hand, some benefited from it.
(c) Other agencies’ concerns
Some Kutai Fisheries Agency officials also connected their failure to achieve
effective implementation with the minimal concern and self interest of other
agencies.88 The Kutai Fisheries Agency officials blamed the Kutai Forestry
86 Interview Mnt, 19/8/2009, and M, 6/8/2009.
87 In that year, the Kutai Fishery Agency employed 101 full-time staff members. In Kutai
District it is common that some agencies and offices have more part-time officials than
full-time officials, which is also the case at the Kutai Planning Agency, Education Agency
and Secretariat Office. In 2007, the Kutai District employed 10,523 officials including around
9,000 part-time officials. This means that of the total population in Kutai District 2,08%
number are employed by the government – the largest percentage in East Kalimantan
Province (Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Daerah Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara 2008,
p. 17-18).
88 At the same time other agencies blamed the Kutai Fisheries Agency for only caring about
pond development, and less about the environment and land use.
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Agency officials for not being concerned with rehabilitation of the Mahakam
Delta. Moreover, they blamed the Kutai Forestry Agency for reluctantly sup-
porting the idea to rezone the Mahakam Delta. They were reluctant because
re-zoning meant a reduction of the size of the Forest Area. The Kutai Fisheries
Agency officials suspected that the Kutai Environmental Agency was reluctant
to support the idea of establishing a new management body for the Mahakam
Delta. Again, the reluctance was probably closely related to the self interest
of the Environmental Agency officials, who worried that the new management
body would take over some of their roles.
The Kutai Fisheries Agency officials mentioned a recent case to show how
other agencies deliberately dramatized the deforestation of the Mahakam Delta.
The Kutai Fisheries Agency suspected that other agencies intentionally used
pessimistic deforestation figures of the Mahakam Delta in order to secure
programs on mangrove replanting. The worse the deforestation, the longer
the reforestation program would be. This explanation helped the Kutai Fish-
eries Agency to understand why the Kutai Environmental Agency kept using
the 2002 research report, saying that deforestation has reached 85% of the land
of the Mahakam Delta. It also explains why the Kutai Development Planning
Agency, at a workshop in late 2009, mentioned that deforestation of the Maha-
kam Delta added up to 120,000 hectares (see Section 2.2 on the figures of
deforestation of the Mahakam Delta).
Suspicion and blame of other agencies inevitably affected any effort to
coordinate with other Kutai District government agencies. An attempt was
made with a multi-stakeholder team, the so-called Team for Integrated and
Sustainable Management of the Mahakam Delta (TISMMD).89 Beside civil
society members, all related Kutai agencies were represented in the TISMMD.90
The TISMMD had difficulty establishing coordination among the Kutai agencies.
Meanwhile, once the TISMMD was able to organize joint meetings, decisions
could not be made, as the agencies sent their junior staff members who were
not authorized to take a decision.91 Consequently when the Kutai agencies
allocated their respective budgets in respect of the Mahakam Delta, instead
of merging the different budgets into one, the agencies used and spent their
own budgets separately.92
Not only with other agencies, the Kutai Fisheries Agency also encountered
serious internal problems of coordination. With regard to the SSFRC, alongside
weak capacity, a lack of coordination among field officials led to fewer SSFRC
applications than hoped for (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara
89 The Team was officially established through the Decree of the Kutai District Head No.
180.188/HK-458/2001 on The Establishment of a Team on Integrated and Sustainable
Management of the Mahakam Delta.
90 The civil society members were companies, NGOs and academics.
91 Interview HT, a former Secretary of Kutai District government, 31/1/2010.
92 Interview RBS, 24/4 and 7/5/2008.
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2009: 50). With regard to law-making, the lack of internal coordination was
an even greater problem. The making of the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishing
as a revision of Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999 on Fishing hardly took into
account the previous making of the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishery Levy.
As a result, the Legal Drafting Team of the initiative overlooked what had
been produced by the Legal Drafting Team of the Kutai Regulation on Fishery
Levy.
(d) Leadership
There exists a strong belief among Kutai District government officials that the
extent to which the Kutai District government is concerned with the Mahakam
Delta environment is influenced by persons who occupy leadership positions
both in the secretariat, agencies and offices (see Section 4.1 on the difference
between secretariat, agency and office). If leadership is in the hands of people,
who are personally concerned with the environment or social issues, policies
concerning the Mahakam Delta are better implemented. The opposite situation
occurs, if the people are less concerned. A former Head of Kutai Environmental
Agency said:
One of the factors that has added to the destruction of the environment of the
Mahakam Delta is that only a few Kutai higher or lower officials were concerned
about the environment. There are mostly short-terms views in seeking how environ-
mental destruction should be resolved.93
The local officials made a comparison between the period before and after
2001-2005 to point to the importance of the individual or personal concern.
The period of 2001-2005 was seen as period when some important positions
were occupied by persons who were highly committed to the Mahakam Delta’s
environment. Three key positions that were occupied by concerned high-
ranking officials at that time were the Head of the Environmental Agency,
the Head of the Fisheries Agency and the Head of the Government Bureau
of the Secretariat. This resulted in the undertaking of various activities, such
as mangrove replanting, organisation of workshops, formulation of legislation,
and carrying out (comparative) research. Initiatives to formulate legislation
on the management of the Mahakam Delta even led to the establishment of
a Special Committee of Kutai Parliament in 2005.94
Yet, the way the positions were filled ended in 2005 following the election
of 2004. The elected Kutai District Head ‘toppled down’ around 400 high and
93 Interview RBS, 24/4/2008.
94 The Special Committee of Kutai Parliament was dismissed after delivering a report in a
plenary session of the Kutai Parliament. In its report, the committee recommended two
things. First, to establish a special management body for the Mahakam Delta. Second, to
develop sustainable shrimp ponds. Interview MA, a member of Kutai House of Representat-
ive, 14/6/2008.
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middle ranking officials without giving them a clear new position.95 The
former Head of the Environmental Agency was one of the victims of what
she called a ‘political government’.96 Her new position as an advisor of the
Kutai District Head left her unable to be involved in the Mahakam Delta any
longer. The Head of the Government Bureau of the Secretariat could also be
no longer involved, as he was moved to another agency in 2009.97 Their suc-
cessors were less concerned with the issue of the Mahakam Delta.
External factors
To understand why fishery regulations and policies were not effectively
implemented, the Kutai Fisheries Agency officials also pointed to the behaviour
and life of the fishing and farming communities. They perceived the failure
of environmentally-friendly shrimp ponds as caused also by bad attitudes of
the fishermen and farmers.
As said, a lack of budget was mentioned as a factor preventing the Kutai
Fisheries Agency officials from effectively enforcing rules on destructive
fishing. Yet, they pointed also to the importance of fish capture for the live-
lihood of the small-scale fishermen of the Mahakam Delta. The fishery officials
were reluctant to ask fishermen not to use trawls, given that fishermen were
dependent on fishing for their subsistence. It is therefore that the fishery
officials felt they had to come up with alternative ways of generating income,
if they wanted to be successful in enforcing the law upon the small- scale
fishermen.98
95 ‘To topple down’ is in Indonesian popularly called pe-non-joban. It should simply be
understood as taking away an assignment from a civil servant, even when he or she
officially still holds the position of civil servant. A worse implication of pe-non-joban is that
someone’s name disappears of the list of the agency where someone was last registered.
The act of pe-non-joban came into being after the elected Kutai District Head and Campaign
Team were hostile to the 400 officials given that they attended a meeting held by the acting
Kutai District Head. The elected Kutai District Head refused to acknowledge the acting
Kutai District Head, whom was appointed by the Governor. At that time, the elected Kutai
District Head urged all Kutai District government officials to not go to office by way of
protest. The 400 officials rejected the invitation and continued to go to work due to reasons
of professionalism. The massive pe-non-joban actually de-stabilized the Kutai District
government, because many positions were not occupied. It got worse from 2005 onwards,
when the Kutai District Head was detained by Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commis-
sion in 2007. As already said (see footnote 55), one year later, the Deputy Head of Kutai
District was detained as well by Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission. .
96 The former Head of the Kutai Environmental Agency found two basic elements of political
government. First, that selection and appointment were based on favoritism. Second, that
people who were selected and appointed were those, who used to support the elected
district head. Interview RBS, 24/4, and 7/5/2008.
97 In 2009, the former head of the Government Bureau was moved to the Office of Civil
Registration and Population. Yet, in 2010 he was promoted to a higher position to become
an assistant to the District Head.
98 Interview Sji and MK, 11/8/2008.
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On the whole, the Kutai District government officials perceived the in-
habitants of the Mahakam Delta as tricky, stubborn as well as short-sighted
and money-oriented. One official even perceived the inhabitants as
cannibals.99 In addition, they also regarded the fishermen and farmers as
poorly-educated people. As mentioned before, when the Kutai Fisheries Agency
rented their ponds, the farmers would let their ponds be used as a trial for
environmentally-friendly shrimp ponds. The agency even had to pay the
farmers to plant mangrove around and in their ponds. Often the farmers
planned as many mangrove trees as possible, so they would earn more money.
For each seed of mangrove tree they planted, farmers would receive US$ 0.03
and the amount would go up to US$ 0.05, if the planted seeds grew. As a result
the seeds were planted too closely together.
The Kutai Fisheries Agency officials found that the fishermen and farmers
of the Mahakam Delta favoured instant means to catch and cultivate fish,
despite potentially causing environmental damage. Their traditional practices
hampered the introduction of new technologies as well as knowledge of
environmentally-friendly shrimp ponds (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai
Kartanegara 2009, p. 62-63). To illustrate how rooted the tradition was, the
local fishery officials said that they had invited many experts from national
and local universities to meetings with the villagers, but that they still could
not change the socially-embedded practice.
In addition, the Kutai Fisheries Agency officials mentioned two other factors
that made the implementation of regulations and policies ineffective. First,
fishermen’s and farmers’ expectations of the implications of complying or not
complying with the laws and regulations. Second, the village political
dynamics.
The officials observed two other reasons why the fishermen and farmers
were not willing to register their fishing activity to either the agency office
or sub-district office. First, they found that they were not going to be punished
for not having a SSFRC. In addition, the Kutai Public Transportation Agency
did not forbid them to use their boats, if they did not have a boat certificate.
Second, the fishermen and farmers were afraid of having to pay tax if their
fishing activities were officially registered. The fishermen perceived the SSFRC
as a kind of permit, which would make their business subject to tax
collection.100
Meanwhile the reason why many fishermen, and in particular fishermen
from outside, continued to use destructive gear despite the fact that a few
fishermen had been prosecuted, was that the punishment stipulated in Kutai
Regulation No. 3/1999 was not very severe. Instead of imprisonment, fisher-
99 Interview ES, a head of technical section of Aggana sub-district, 30/6 and 1/7/2008. Some
researchers also associated the fishermen and farmers with particular character-traits, such
as greed. See Hidayati (2004, p.101-102).
100 Interview Shrn, 1/2/2010, and Sfd, 17/6/2008.
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men favoured to pay a fine which was less than the profit they made on
fishing. Because they could earn more money than the amount of the fine,
they decided to continue using destructive gear (see Section 1.3.2 on adequacy
of legislation). This explains why the warning boards displayed sanctions
stipulated in Law 2004 on Fisheries, rather than the sanctions stipulated in
Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999, which were milder. Moreover, it was sometimes
difficult to enforce the rule forbidding the use of destructive gear, as in some
villages elected village heads had bravely promised to voters to hinder any
enforcement, if he or she was elected.101 The situation, where local political
power hinders formal rules to work, also occurred when fishermen who were
allegedly carrying out destructive fishing, were the relatives of a member of
the CGSs or sub-district head. To deal with the situation, the officials conducted
sudden investigations so that the suspected fishermen would be caught
unaware.102
It is apparent that the factors affecting the implementation of the Kutai
fishery regulations are manifold. The factors range from the governmental
system to individual interests and actions. It is true that the ineffective imple-
mentation has been caused by the government system (staffing, planning,
budgeting and coordination), but individual concerns and interests of local
officials also contributed. We also found a remarkable variation and ambiguity
in administrative attitudes. On one hand, the local officials perceived the
fishermen and farmers as tricky, short-sighted and stubborn, yet, on the other
hand, the local fishery officials were sympathetic to the fishermen and farmers
given their poor economic conditions. This ambivalent attitude can, to some
extent, be explained by ambiguities in the agency’s strategies and policies,
which have translated into different roles played by the local fishery officials.
7.4 LEGISLATION: IDENTIFICATION OF SOME PROBLEMATIC ISSUES
There are at least three main problematic legal issues at stake in fishery man-
agement in the Mahakam Delta. First, the excessive formal control of the Kutai
District government over fishery management, which eventually turns to be
in contrast with higher national fishery regulations. Second, vagueness or a
lack of clarity in regulating other non-fishery resources. Third, incoherence
among the Kutai fishery regulations due to incompatibility. Each of these three
legal issues affect tenure security of the various resource users.
101 Interview Mnt, 19/8/2009.
102 Interview Iw and Akh, staffs of Kutai Fishery Agency, 8/12/2011.
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7.4.1 Excessive formal control
As already mentioned (Section 7.2) the Kutai District government has the
tendency to enhance formal control of fishery resource use through input
control as reflected in some Kutai regulations. It started with Kutai Regulation
No. 3/1999 and continued in 2000 and 2004 through respectively Kutai Regula-
tion No. 36/2000 and the 2004 Circular Letter No. 100/287/Pem.A/VI/2004.
The intention to widen the scope of formal control can also be seen in the Kutai
draft fishery regulations. In the name of sustainability of biodiversity and
conservation, the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishery and Marine Management
of the Mahakam Delta imposes strict prohibitions and restrictions on the type
of gear, pond construction and fishing zones. The Kutai District government
wanted to exercise specific control over shrimp ponds through imposing
‘standard shrimp ponds’, as reflected in the Draft Regulation of Kutai District
Head on Standard Ponds.
As already described (Section 6.2 and Section 7.2), the implementation of
the new regulatory norm that gear installation was no longer allowed in the
vicinity of a company’s platforms abolished the pre-existing rights of small-
scale fishermen to fish in Zone I. The implementation of this new norm has
been strongly linked with other excessive rules, which transferred three re-
quirements of a FBL to the application for a SSFRC. One of the three require-
ments is that one should obtain a location permit first issued by the Kutai Land
Bureau. During a meeting on the tidal trap case as described in Section 6.1,
a high ranking official of the Kutai Fisheries Agency pointed out that the
installation of ten tidal traps in GTS G and TN G19, which is situated in Sepatin
village, was illegal given that the owners of the tidal traps had not obtained
a location permit.103 Not only the Kutai Fisheries Agency officials held this
perception, the head of the neighbourhood (see Section 4.1 on neighbourhood)
did so too.104As a result the SSFRC changed from a means of supervision to
a means of control.
7.4.2 Overlooking non-fishery resource use
Fishing legislation, both national and local, has intensively regulated fishing
resource use in the Mahakam Delta over the last few decades. Yet, it has not
adequately regulated how non-fishery resource use activities, namely oil and
103 The meeting was held on 7 September 2009.
104 A head of a neighbourhood of Sepatin village sent a letter to the Head of the Kutai Fisheries
Agency, asking him for clear information (petunjuk) on the formal rules on installing a tidal
trap. He made the request, as he saw an increase in installments of tidal traps by outside
inhabitants. The new tidal trap installments covered almost half of the river, which disturbed
regular shipping activities.
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gas and sailing taking place across sea and marine waters, should exist along-
side fishing. The situation is different with regard to legislation on aquaculture
or shrimp cultivation, which has limited links with land use. Pursuant to the
legislation, applicants of FBLs and SSFRCs should have obtained a so-called
location permit (see Section 8.2 on permit location) ahead of applying for a
permit. Above all, a FBL can only be issued if there are clear rights over land
that is to be used for aquaculture. Another provision states that small-scale
farmers who carry out aquaculture on their private land will not be required
to pay a fishery levy.
As said, there have been fishery regulations which manage to bridge fishery
resource use and non-fishery resource use. These regulations are (i) Kutai
Regulation No. 3/1999 on Fishing; and (ii) The Circular Letter of Directorate
General for Fishery of the Ministry of Agriculture No. E.V/2/4/15/1975, which
was later implemented by a letter of the Special Directorate (Sub Direktorat
Khusus) of Kutai District No. Pal-902/VI/2.d/75. A Circular Letter of the Kutai
District Head No. 1000/287/Pem.A/VI/2004 recalled the content of the two
previous letters from 1975. The former letter bridged fishing and sailing,
whereas the latter letter bridged fishing and sailing as well as petroleum
resource use.
Yet, the above regulations have suffered from the following weaknesses.
First, they are so general that it is unclear which sailing lanes and petroleum
platforms they mean. Until the time of writing, the Kutai District government
has not further elaborated either Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999 or the 1975 and
2004 circular letters, thus keeping the provisions general in nature. With regard
to the fishery-sailing relation, several fishery regulations have been made
separately to deal specifically with the type of gear that is prohibited to stop
it from endangering a public shipping lane. At the time of writing, shore-
operated stationary lift nets (bagan) and fish aggregating devices (rumpon) were
the only types of gear mentioned.105 However, as already said, since 2000
shore-operated stationary lift nets in East Kalimantan were permitted again
after a twenty-five year ban. This ban was included in the Decree of East
Kalimantan Governor No. 75/1973. One of the two reasons for the ban was
that the shore-operated stationary lift nets were seen as a potential danger
to public shipping lanes. After the Letter of East Kalimantan Governor No
523/1133/Proda.2/EK was passed in 2000, the ban was officially lifted. The
letter allowed fishermen to install shore-operated stationary lift nets on strict
conditions, such as having a license from either the Governor or District/
Municipality Head and install the nets within 0-3 nautical miles from the coast.
105 For more detailed provisions of the two decrees, see the Regulation of the Minister of Marine
Affairs and Fisheries No. PER.02/MEN/2011 concerning Fishing Zones and the Use of
Fishing Gear in Indonesia’s Fishery Territories, and the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture
No. 51/Kpts/IK.250/1/97 on the Installment and Use of Fish Aggregating Device.
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However, with regards to the fishery-sailing relation, the Kutai fishery
regulations did not refer to the 1975 Governor Decree nor to the 1997 Minister-
ial Decree. In the case of the Mahakam Delta, this could be the result from
the fact that the tidal trap, the most common gear in the region, was not
mentioned in the regulations.
Second, for the regulations that managed to bridge fishery with non-fishery
resource use there is no higher legislation as a legal foundation. No national
fishery regulation has included any stipulation on sailing or petroleum resource
use. Due to their binding force, the enforceability of the abovementioned three
letters is weak (see Section 4.3 and Section 6.3 on the binding force of policy
rule).
Third, the regulations narrowly regulate fishing when encountering sailing
or petroleum resource use. Yet, the other way around, the way in which sailing
or petroleum resource use should be regulated, when they occur in the same
area as where fishing takes place, does not seem to be stipulated anywhere.
Considering the principles of legal drafting, such technique of legal drafting
is correct. Yet, since neither petroleum nor shipping regulations, at the time
of writing, have any provisions on fishing, there is still a lack of coherence.106
The incoherence brings forward an imbalance, which sometimes appears as
discrimination of different resource users with prohibitions and obligations
for fishermen, whilst those involved in sailing and petroleum resource use
are not subject to the same rules. Rules on compensation are unlikely to lift
the imbalance, given that the compensation scheme does not really concern
fishing rights which have temporarily or permanently disappeared when the
companies’ activities were taking place. Some officials from both the Executive
Agency and Total E&P Indonesie have never recognized the rights of fishermen,
arguing that sea and marine resources are open access.107 Therefore, as is
the case regarding compensation over land, compensation over fishing would
only apply to expenses of fishermen rather than to the opportunity to exercise
their fishing rights.108
106 There is not single provision in a regulation on Shipping which either explicitly or implicitly
stipulates prohibition of installing fishing gear, which could endanger public shipping lanes.
See Law No. 21/1992 on Sailing, replaced by Law. No. 17/2008, and Government Regulation
No. 82/1999 on Water Shipping, replaced by No. 20/2010. Meanwhile, Government Regula-
tion No. 17/1974 concerning the Implementation of Monitoring Offshore Oil and Gas
Exploration and Exploitation is the only regulation on petroleum regulatory rules. Neverthe-
less, this Government Regulation has an article relating to fishing, which states that petro-
leum resource use cannot be carried out in area with a nursery ground and/or coral reefs.
107 Interview DH, 19/12/2009.
108 The Decree of Kutai District Head No. 180.188/HK-630/2008 concerning the Basic Price
of Compensation Lists. Apart from compensating damaged boats or gear, Total E&P
Indonesie usually offered fishermen, who could no longer fish (temporarily or permanently),




There are only a few instances of incompatibility between the different Kutai
fishery regulations. In fact, only Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999 on Fishing and
the 2004 Circular Letter of the Kutai District Head contradict each other. The
incompatibility between these two regulations emerged when the 2004 Circular
Letter added oil and gas platforms as areas where gear installation was for-
bidden (see Section 6.2 and Section 7.2). Oil and gas platforms were not
included in Kutai Regulation No. 3/1999. Public shipping lanes were the only
object that this regulation explicitly mentioned as a forbidden area for gear
installations.
A former head of section on fishery resource surveillance of the Kutai
Fishery Agency, acknowledged that the 500 meter forbidden zone is located
within the 0-3 miles zone in which small-scale fishermen are allowed to fish
as existing fishery regulations clearly state (see Section 7.2). Thus the imple-
mentation of the 2004 Circular Letter has decreased fishing grounds for small
scale fishermen. Even though no fisherman who has broken the rules has ever
been detained, the security officers of the oil and gas companies still warned
and asked them to stay away from the zone.109
The above regulations also state that gear installation which could endanger
public interest is prohibited as well. However at the time of writing there were
no subsequent regulations defining ‘public interest’. Even though Presidential
Directive No. 63/2004 concerning the Security of National Vital Objects classi-
fied a ‘national vital object’ – which included oil and gas extraction – as
anything concerning the livelihood of the majority of people and national
interest, there are as yet no regulatory rules, dispute settlements, or court
decisions which explicitly explain what is meant by ‘public interest’. Nor have
the Executive Agency or Total E&P Indonesia used the 2004 Presidential
Directive to accuse fishermen or farmers of having broken the law.
7.5 INTERACTION BETWEEN THE STATE AND RESOURCE USERS
Various factors have shaped the interaction between the Kutai District govern-
ment officials and the fishery and aquaculture resource users in the Mahakam
Delta. Similar to what happened in the case of the forestry regulations (see
Section 5.5), the local officials had mixed feelings of sympathy, respect as well
as pragmatism in interacting with the local resource users. However, one
should say that two other attitudes of the local officials can be discerned, which
specifically arise in the implementation of fishery regulations. The first concerns
oil and gas resource use where the local officials are required to impose
regulations repressively. The second is their attitude as ‘defender’ of the shrimp
109 Interview MK, 6/12/2011.
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farmers, when the local users are accused of breaking the law by other regional
agencies.
As mentioned before, local fishery officials showed empathy when they
did not enforce the law on those who used damaging gear, taking into con-
sideration the economic subsistence of small-scale fishermen. Sympathy also
played a role, when the fishery local officials settled disputes between fisher-
men or farmers and Total E&P Indonesie. In dispute settlements concerning
environmental pollution, the local fishery officials always expected the com-
pany to be willing to pay compensation to the fishermen or farmers, even when
investigation proved that the companies’ operations had not caused the en-
vironmental pollution, which fishermen or farmers suggested. In a way, the
officials acted in this manner to prevent resistance from fishermen or farmers
after the dispute settlement, but the motive was mixed with a sense of human-
itarianism. For the local fishery officials, the sum that the company donated,
would be nothing in comparison with what the company has earned from
the Mahakam Delta.
Pragmatism also caused the local fishery officials to overlook formal fishery
legislation, when they favoured the realization of planned programs and
activities. For instance, in dealing with aquaculture farmers, the Kutai Fisheries
Agency officials continued to supervise the farmers by organising a high
number of meetings on how to develop environmentally-friendly shrimp ponds
as well as mangrove replanting, despite them being aware of the illegality
of the ponds in the Mahakam Delta.110 The Kutai Fisheries Agency even offi-
cially rented several ponds, to demonstrate how to farm an environmentally-
friendly pond, turning illegal pond owners into formal occupants. With regard
to the legal status of the land of the pond, local fishery officials would rely
on information given by the village head. The following comment from an
official of the Kutai Fisheries Agency reflects the pragmatism.
If our agency questioned the legal status of the land, it would only stop the govern-
ment from ever doing anything. It would be useless for our agency to continue
discussing the land’s legal status, and it would take a lot of time. Moreover, it
would make our agency do nothing.111
The field officials of the Kutai Fisheries Agency often practiced pragmatism
when they found themselves in a dilemma, with the fishermen and farmers
being very sceptical about the programs of the Kutai Fisheries Agency on one
hand, whilst they continued to demand programs, on the other. The solution
was often that they continued with the programs and activities, whilst knowing
full and well that they were rather meaningless. Similarly, in various meetings
110 Interview Shrn, M, SR and DS, 11 and 12 June 2008.
111 Interview Mnt, 12/11/2008.
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the field officials kept reminding the fishermen of the fishery regulations,
despite knowing that the fishermen would not adhere to them.112
Meanwhile in settling disputes, the local fishery officials could be repressive
instead of showing sympathy to the fishermen and farmers. This occurred
when the pressure to prioritize the continued operations of the companies
combined with a negative, paternalistic approach stereotyping the fishermen’s
and farmer’s attitudes as stubborn and backward. In such situations, the local
officials could bluntly apply legal norms. A statement of a senior official of
the Kutai Fisheries Agency during a meeting in 2009, saying that all tidal trap
instalments without a location permit were illegal, is a perfect instance of it.
Actually, the provision requiring the SSFRC applicant to have a location permit
ahead of applying for the SSFRC is actually incorrect given that a permit loca-
tion would only be given to a legal body which needs land to carry out its
business activities.113 A SSFRC applicant is an individual who does not need
land for his/her fishing.
In the end, the repression of fishermen and farmers by local fishery officials
went hand in hand with favouritism of petroleum companies. In some cases,
favouritism led to the local fishery officials deliberately ignoring the legal
incompliance of companies. For instance, the local fishery officials did not ask
whether the companies’ platforms were really located outside public shipping
lanes, for which they needed a permit issued by the Port Administration Office
of the Ministry of Public Transportation.
Meanwhile, the local fishery officials shifted their role as defenders of the
shrimp farmers when the latter were contesting information and policy by
the village government and sub-district government when they were not
willing to process land letter applications. As of 2009, the village government
and sub-district government officials refused to process the application of a
land letter if the proposed land was located in Forest Areas. This occurred
after the officials of a regional technical implementation unit called the Unit
of Forest Area Establishment of the Ministry of Forestry and the officials of
the office of the District Head told the village government and sub-district
officials to not issue land letters on land, which is located inside Forest Areas.
They were told in a meeting attended by the Kutai District Head.
In response to the situation where the validity of land ownership of the
shrimp farmers was questioned, the local fishery officials argued that the land
ownership was valid. By way of argument, the local fishery officials showed
old official documents, which had been issued and produced by the local office
112 Interview Snt, 30/6/2008.
113 See a Regulation of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs/Head of National Land Agency No.
2/1999 on Location Permit. Article 2 (1).
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of the Kutai Fishery Agency, in a interview that I conducted in 2011.114 The
fishery local officials showed a so-called Shrimp Pond Registration Certificate
(Ind. Tanda Bukti Pendaftaran Usaha Pertambakan). The document primarily
contains personal data of the shrimp pond owners as well as the size of land
and year the land is reclaimed.115
By showing the old document, the local officials argued that land owner-
ship of the shrimp farmers was legal. In an effort to delegitimize the claim
of Forest Areas – in addition to the legal argument by showing the old docu-
ments – the local officials suggested that there might be a conspiracy behind
the order to not serve the land letter applications. They suspected that the oil
and gas company had lobbied the higher officials to raise the rules on the
Forest Areas in the hope that the company would only need to pay a small
amount of compensation to the shrimp farmers for they would not be the
owners, but merely the users (see Section 6.4).
7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As pointed out by the 2002 research report, plenty of programs and activities
have been carried out by the Kutai District government in and for the Maha-
kam Delta. Not only did they enlarge their programs and activities, the Kutai
District government also extended their formal control over fishery resource
use which initially started in 1999. Yet, due to a number of factors that are
internal and external to the administrative institutions, in spite of the long
list of actual and planned programs and activities as well as the excessive
formal control, the implementation of fishery regulations and policies has not
been very effective. Using the definition of effectiveness as set out in Section
1.3.1, the lack of effectiveness is indicated by the fact that the fishermen and
shrimp farmers hardly behaved as the legal rules prescribed with regards to
fishery permits and the use of destructive gear.
When discussing prominent factors that have left the implementation
ineffective, we can not simply say that the lack of effectiveness has been caused
by government inability. Rather than corresponding to one factor, it is the
result of a complex amalgamation of factors. One cannot solely speak of
inability, because the Kutai District government officials partly did not do
everything to implement fishery regulations and policies because they were
empathic to the poor economic conditions of the fishing and farming commun-
114 Interview MT (a resident of Sepatin village), HTR (a Head of Muara Badak office of Kutai
Fishery Agency), Agg and Whd (a staff of Muara Badak office of Kutai Fishery Agency),
3/12/2011.
115 The local office of the Kutai Fishery Agency issued the certificates in a way to implement
the policy of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Provincial government to boost the
development of small-scale aquaculture (Ind. Tambak Inti Rakyat) after the ban on the use
of trawl in 1980 (see Section 7.3).
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ities. Their reluctance to strictly follow certain provisions of the regulations
also derived from their perception of the huge income disparity between the
petroleum companies and the fishermen and farmers.
Moreover it is incorrect to say that the exercise of state control over fishery
resources in the Mahakam Delta has always or wholly been weak or absent.
In this region, where the concept of a ‘national vital object’ exists, the Kutai
District government officials together with local law enforcers have occasionally
exercised effective control on fishing. In this regard, the state did not only
exercise ordinary control as stated in the national fishery regulations, but also
excessive control, as stipulated in some of the Kutai fishery regulations. It is
important to underline that repressive behaviour of the local officials and
officers usually derived from the importance of petroleum extraction for the
state on one hand, and their prejudices about fishermen’s and farmers’ atti-
tudes, on the other.
To some extent, the root of the formal and actual excessive state control
over fishery resources use as can be seen in the Mahakam Delta is laid down
in national legislation. National legislation, notably on fisheries, has long
required fishery resource use to respect non-fishery resource use. Not only
has this legislation restricted fishing rights, it has also abolished rights which
are legally recognized.
With regards to the process of drafting legislation, the Kutai Fishery Agency
officials perceived fishermen and farmers as objects, as can also be seen in
the implementation of the law. Given that they are less-well educated, the
officials believed that the fishermen did not need to be engaged in law-making.
Through this opinion, most draft and enacted regulations have been made
overwhelmingly with input from the outside. Personal concerns and interests
of officials coinciding with pursuing legal legitimacy in the eyes of higher
government units have turned regional law-making into something much more
concerned with outsiders than with the inhabitants as stakeholders of the
Mahakam Delta.
8 The status of the forest: how legal is forest
land use?
8.1 INTRODUCTION
When mangrove forest in the Mahakam Delta was increasingly converted into
shrimp ponds during the period 1997-2002, some pond owners came to the
District Office of the National Land Agency (DONLA) to apply for a land title
with the eventual aim to obtain a land certificate. Knowing that most of the
Mahakam Delta is state forest, the DONLA officials refused to process the
applications. They refused the applications, despite being aware that some
of the land to which the pond owners applied was not located in the Forest
Area but in the 6,000 ha of non-forest area over which they were actually
allowed to issue land certificates. Given that few parts of the Mahakam Delta
are non-forest area, the DONLA officials were supposed to figure out in which
area the applied-for land was located, before deciding on refusal or acceptance.
Even when the pond owners brought them letters that were officially signed
by village heads and sub-district heads, the DONLA officials still refused to
process the applications. The overarching reason why the DONLA officials
refused to consider the applications was that they were afraid of being accused
of taking part in the deforestation of the Mahakam Delta.
When a local journalist asked whether the Kutai Land Office (2000-2009),
a supporting division of Kutai District government, had issued any land
certificates in the Mahakam Delta, the former Head immediately answered
that his institution had never done so. He said:
As we clearly know that the mangrove forest of the Mahakam Delta is a Protected
Forest, we never issued any land certificate in the area. If, in fact, there are pond
owners who hold a certificate, I can assure you that they must be illegal land
certificates.1
The illegality of land possession (see Section 6.2 for the reason why I use the
term ‘possession’ in this book) in the Mahakam Delta has long been discussed.
Nevertheless, the discussions on illegality have not led to law enforcement
in case of illegal land possession. Instead, the discussions moved to adminis-
trative justifications self-defence, where the concerned provincial and district
agencies argued that they did not provide any support or legitimacy to man-
1 ‘Tidak Ada Sertifikat’. Kaltim Post, 14/6/2004.
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grove conversion. In fact, the officials have been unwilling to further figure
out whether the alleged issuance of land certificates in the Mahakam Delta
really had taken place or not. The officials’ responses to queries about the
issuance of land certificates were without adequate knowledge of how many
land certificates on the Production Forest had actually been issued. They,
therefore, merely responded to rumours.2
The DONLA officials had often used legal arguments in refusing the land
title application, saying that the Production Forest of the Mahakam Delta was
not under their jurisdiction. Yet, it should be noted that through this argument,
the officials accordingly considered any land possession in the Mahakam Delta
as illegal. However, the former Head of the Kutai Land Office, whose statement
was quoted earlier, did not call the land possession illegal, because the pond
owners still had use rights, even when they did not have ownership rights.
Not only regional and local government officials have had this opinion, so
have central government officials and companies’ employees. Legal pro-
fessionals such as judges and solicitors have similarly regarded land possession
in the Mahakam Delta as legal.
Like many millions ha of land possession in Forest Areas across Indonesia,
land ownership and land possession in the Production Forest of the Mahakam
Delta have a history of questions on legality (Fay and Sirait 1999). The unclear
legal framework on land ownership and land possession in Forest Areas has
resulted in continually changing behaviour of local officials in treating land
owners or land possessors. Their behaviour has varied according to time and
situation. However, there seems to be a pattern in their behaviour that the
closer they are to land possessors, the more they tend to perceive the pos-
session as legal.
This chapter discusses how formal and semi-formal rules govern land
possession in the Mahakam Delta. Emphasis is on the formal and semi-formal
rules concerning state land which is occupied and cultivated by private parties.
The way in which regional and local government officials as well as legal
professionals have dealt with legal matters surrounding this type of land
possession is also discussed.
2 The Head of the Provincial Environmental Agency told a local journalist that they would
take the necessary measures to stop the issuance of land certificates in the Mahakam Delta.
Yet, when he was asked whether land certificates really had been issued in the Mahakam
Delta, he simply said, ‘I do not know, but it seems that many pond owners have land
certificates, since control is weak’. See ‘Dilarang Keluarkan Sertifikat Tanah, Dampak
Kerusakan Delta Mahakam’. Kaltim Post (N.d.).
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8.2 LEGISLATION: MAIN LAWS AND PROVISIONS
Chapter 5 and 6 extensively discussed forestry and petroleum laws and regula-
tions, and included short accounts of land regulations. Chapter 5 on forestry
regulations (Section 5.2) mentioned a few things about land possession when
forest delineation processes were described. In sum, it was stated that the
Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation, which was carrying out forest
delineation, was to make an inventory of all instances of land ownership and
land possession, and buildings and crops that existed on the forest land that
was to be delineated. If the inventory found either land ownership or pos-
session, the committee had to resolve any rights claims of the owners or
possessors, notably by providing compensation. Only if the right claim had
been wholly resolved, then the Ministry of Forestry could claim that a particu-
lar Forest Area now belonged to the state, for it would be free from any private
property rights. Chapter 6 (Section 6.2) informed us on the rules regarding
the process of land acquisition, which guided oil and gas companies in their
negotiations with land possessors. It was said that any petroleum company,
which would acquire land for extraction, had to provide compensation to any
land owner or holder, who owned or used this land. The companies also had
to provide compensation to land owners or possessors, who could not exercise
their rights over their land temporarily due to the companies’ extraction
activities.
Yet, since those two chapters discussed the rules on land from a specific
angle, they could not provide a broader picture of land regulations. This,
therefore, leaves the following basic question: how do land regulations actually
regulate land in a specific situation like in the Mahakam Delta? The question
is, more specifically, how formal and semi-formal rules govern the use of forest
land for non-forest use, which is carried out by private parties who do not
have a land certificate as evidence of ownership.
8.2.1 The origin of the recognition of possessory evidence
Indonesian land law recognizes three types of land ownership evidence and
land possession (Ind. bukti hak), namely a written document, a testimony and
a self-declaration. Of the written documents, a certificate is regarded as the
strongest type of evidence of ownership (Perangin 1986, p. 108; Parlindungan
1999, p. 127; Soerodjo 2002; Harsono 2007, p. 478,).3 A certificate is also the
only form of ownership evidence that provides a land title as recognized by
3 See Soerodjo (2002).
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land law.4 Other forms of written evidence of ownership include tax receipts,
sale receipts, notary deed of land transaction, and a letter of rights issued by
a government official.5 Those different types of written evidence could be
named forms of ‘possessory evidence’. Yet, as provisional evidence, possessory
evidence should be complemented by other forms of evidence (Aryanto 2006,
p. 26). To what extent does formal land law recognize possessory evidence?
In general, it could be said that the origin of the recognition of possessory
evidence came from their function as provisional support that was needed
for two purposes, namely to issue land titles and licenses for other natural
resources use, and to provide compensation in case of land acquisition (penga-
daan tanah). Although ending up with different final processes, land titling,
a license issuance or land acquisition turned possessory evidence into a means
of determining whether the holder was entitled to a land title, license or
compensation.
Possessory evidence has not only been used in public law, but also in
private law. Law 1996 on Land Mortgage over Land and Related Properties
is one such example. In principle, the law stipulated that only registered and
certified land could be proposed as mortgage. Yet, the law would allow a
mortgage, in which the land was unregistered and uncertified on the condition
that those who would like to borrow money from a bank would apply for
a certificate, shortly after they and the bank had officially signed a bank loan
contract.6
With regard to land titling, regulations on land conversion (konversi tanah)
treat possessory evidence as a recognized written document, besides the
certificate which is required to apply for land conversion.7 It is stipulated that
possessory evidence could be either a tax assessment (Ind. Surat Pemberitahuan
Pajak Terutang abbrev. SPPT), a letter of declaration signed by a village head
4 The recognized land titles are ownership rights, long-lease rights (hak guna usaha), building
rights (hak guna bangunan), use rights (hak pakai), lease rights (hak sewa), land reclamation
rights (hak membuka tanah), and rights to collect forest products (hak memungut hasil hutan).
There are also several temporary land rights, such as hak gadai, hak bagi hasil, hak menumpang
and hak sewa tanah pertanian, which the BAL suggested to be abolished in the future due
to their exploitative character. Besides those rights, hak pengelolaan is a new land right, which
is not stipulated in the BAL but became a new official land right in 1965 (Parlindungan
1999, p. 86 and 104).
5 In this regard land law is subject to Indonesia’s Civil Law Code (Article 1866), which
determines that a written document, testimony, persangkaan, letter of declaration and pledge
are forms of legal evidence.
6 Article 10 of Law No. 4/1996 on Land Mortgage over Land and Related Properties. See
also Effendi (2009).
7 Part II of BAL is the foundation for all legislation on land conversion. It was further
elaborated by two organic regulations, namely the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture
and Agrarian Affairs No. 2/1962 and the Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs No. Sk.
26/DDA/1970 on Penegasan Konversi dan Pendaftaran Bekas Hak-Hak Indonesia Atas Tanah.
In Indonesia, land conversion is defined as any policy or action to convert former land
rights into land rights as recognized in the BAL (Harsono 2007).
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and sub-district head, a receipt of a land transaction (sale, grant, exchange)
or a decree issued by authorized officials awarding a particular right to some-
one. If someone does not have a complete set of possessory evidence or no
evidence at all, he or she may still apply for conversion by providing a letter
of self-declaration stating that the land belongs to him or her, supported by
a testimony of those who have knowledge of the ownership history of the land
in question (Ilyas 2005; Harsono 2007, p. 494-495, Sabillah 2008, p. lxvi-ix).
Likewise, regulations on land registration require possessory evidence for the
application for a particular land title. It is stipulated that all those applying
for a land title should present either written or unwritten evidence to prove
their actual control (Ind. dasar penguasaan) over the applied-for land.
Concerning land acquisition, although higher land regulations stipulate
that only certificate holders are entitled to compensation, some lower land
regulations stipulate differently.8 Lower land regulations state that possessory
evidence should be presented by those who apply for compensation.9 Regula-
tions on land acquisition, which is not for public interest but for private
development, stipulate the strict need for possessory evidence. The Decree
of the Executive Agency of 2007 concerning land acquisition in the petroleum
sector, for instance, emphasises the requiirement that any land possessor
should present a land letter signed by the village head and sub-district head
(see Section 6.2).
Not only for land conversion, registration and acquisition, Indonesian land
law also uses possessory evidence for license issuance. The provisions can be
found in legislation concerning a Land Reclamation License (LRL). According
to Abdurrahman (1995, p. 99), the LRL derived from Land Reclamation Rights
as stipulated in the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law. Land Reclamation Rights them-
selves originated from adat customary law, where they are referred to as forest
reclamation rights (Parlindungan 1986, p.121, Harsono 2007). Forest reclamation
rights were granted by an adat community leader, either to a member of the
community, or to an outsider, to clear a piece of forest for agriculture and
further utilize it. In the subsequent regulations, Land Reclamation Rights were
converted into a license instead of rights, as already indicatively existed in
the BAL (Article 46). This marked a shift in regulation of Land Reclamation
Rights, whereby the authority moved from the customary adat community
to state administration (Azam 2003:12).10
8 The higher legislations are Presidential Regulation No. 36/2005 as amended by Presidential
Regulation No. 65/2006 on Land Acquisition for Development in Public Interest, and the
Regulation of the Head of National Land Agency No. 3/2007.
9 See Article 51 (1 b and d) of the Regulation of the Head of National Land Agency No. 3/
2007.
10 Reclamation is not completely new, for it had existed during Dutch colonial rule. In 1896
and amended in 1925, Dutch colonial rule enacted regulations concerning land reclamation.
The regulations stated that any land reclamation should be on the basis of a license issued
by a village head or sub-district head. The license was given for a particular size of land
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After the enactment of the BAL, legal norms on LRL first appeared in a
Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs of 1972.11 The Regulation author-
izes a head of sub-district to issue a permit called a Land Reclamation License.
According to the regulation, the maximum size of a piece of land that a sub-
district head could give a LRL for was 2 ha, whereas a head of district/mayor
could grant a LRL for an area between 2 and 10 ha. The regulation also stated
that in issuing the license, a head of sub-district should take into consideration
the advice from the village head. In practice, however, this advice turned into
a standard land letter (see Picture 8.1) which was also popularly known as
a leges letter or segel letter (Simarmata 2010b, p.124). Due to problems caused
by the issuance of LRLs, in 1984 the Minister of Home Affairs instructed to
abolish the authority of heads of sub-districts to issue a LRL.12
Apart from its official role as provisional evidence of land possession, some
scholars have suggested other sociological and administrative explanations
for why possessory evidence still exists and is still recognized by Indonesian
land law. One explanation is the slow process of land titling organized by
national, regional and local land agencies. Another scholar suggests that the
government is aware of the plurality of normative orders of Indonesian land
law (Fitzpatrick 1997, Fitzpatrick 2007; Warman 2010; Safitri and Moeliono
2010, p. 15). There is even the suggestion that the pervasive existence of
customary land law, in which possessory evidence has increasingly been used,
has made the formal land registration system dysfunctional (Haverfield in
Lindsey 1999, p. 57).
As said, regulations on other natural resources use also include rules about
possessory evidence. The regulations chiefly stipulate that possessory evidence
is needed to carry out land acquisition as well as to issue licenses. The next
sub-section will examine what forestry regulations say about possessory
evidence.
8.2.2 Possessory evidence in Forest Areas
As said (Section 5.2), pursuant to current forestry legislation concerning forest
delineation, members of the Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation are
assigned to make an inventory of existing private land rights and resolve any
and time period. Any offence was charged with imprisonment or a fine. At that time, the
license was popularly known as cap singa (literally translated as ‘lion brand’). See Wiradi-
putra (1951, p. 4-6), and Susanto (1980, p. 29-32).
11 Regulation No. 6/1972 on the Transfer of Authority to Issue Land Titles. It has been
superseded by the Regulation of the Head of National Land Agency No. 3/1999 concerning
the Transfer of Authority on the Issuance of Land Title on State Land and its Annulment.
12 The instruction dated from 22 May 1984. Problems arose because the issuances often
concerned the same plots, and the licenses were sold to others instead of being used by
the applicants. See Simarmata (2010a:10).
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Picture 8.1: Land letter
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rights claims.13 The norm implies that the definite status of Forest Area can
only be gained, if there are no longer any existing private land rights (Fay
and Sirait 1999; Fay and Sirait 2005, p. 8). Nevertheless, the norm does not
further specify the term ‘private land rights’. Thus, it is necessary to look at
other forest regulations, which contain provisions concerning the matter.
First, we could go to the Forestry Law of 1999 to find out what forestry
regulations say about private land rights. Like other Indonesian legislation
on natural resources, the Forestry Law stipulates that private land rights are
identical to land rights as stipulated in the BAL. The law refers to ownership
rights (hak milik), long-lease rights (hak guna usaha) and use right (hak pakai)
as examples of private land rights.14 The law emphasizes that those who lose
their land rights because of forest designation and delineation, are to be
compensated (Article 68 (4).15 Thus, in this respect, following the logic of the
BAL and some other lower land regulations, we might think that the law
requires implicitly that someone has to present a certificate to prove his or
her ownership over a particular piece of land.
Thus, on the basis of systematic interpretation it could be assumed that
‘land rights’, in the way that the abovementioned forestry regulations under-
stand the concept, include land which is proved by possessory evidence.
However, some forest policy experts suggest an opposite interpretation of ‘land
rights’ in these forestry legislations. According to them, the way ‘land rights’
is meant, includes land title based on certificates only, and therefore excludes
possessory evidence (Fay and Sirait 1999, p.14; Fay and Sirait 2005, p. 8; Fay,
Sirait and Kusworo n.d, p.12). The proponents of this view refer to the insight
of some legal staff members of the Ministry of Forestry, who insisted that a
certificate is the only written land title document that forestry regulations
include (Fay and Sirait 1999, p. 14; Fay, Sirait and Kusworo n.d, p. 12).16
In sum, it appears that private land rights stipulated in forestry legislation
on forest designation and delineation include possessory evidence. Yet, this
only seems to apply to possessory evidence, which existed before delineation.
What applies to private land rights which come into being, after delineation
13 The owners of forest concessions were also asked to resolve rights claims. Such provision
is not mentioned in forestry legislation, but it is stipulated in President Directive No. 1/1976
concerning Synchronization of Agrarian Affairs, Forestry, Mining, Transmigration and Public
Sector Works.
14 General Elucidation of Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry. See also Article 2(1) of the Regulation
of the Minister of Forestry No. P. 26 /Menhut-II/2005 on Guidance for the Management
of Private Forest.
15 Same provision can be found in Article 22(2) of the Government Regulation of 2004 on
Forestry Planning. Meanwhile, the law defines private forest as forest in which private
land titles exist (Article 1 (5) and General Elucidation).
16 Given that the officials of the Ministry of Forestry merely recognized certified land titles,
of 108 million ha or 90% of all delineated forest area it is unclear whether it is considered
as private land or not (Fay and Sirait 2005, p. 10).
The status of the forest: how legal is forest land use? 209
is completed? And in the specific case of the Mahakam Delta, what applies
if delineation did not assess and resolve land right claims?
8.2.3 What rights does possessory evidence include?
Given that the BAL does not recognise that the possessor of possessory evidence
has any kind of formal land right (Sihombing 2005; Supriadi 2007, p. 23),
subsequent lower land regulations have constructed the relation between the
possessor of possessory evidence and land. The lower regulations regard
possessory evidence as the foundation of rights (Ind. alas hak),17 which proves
someone’s actual control over as well as the relation with particular land
(Effendi 2009, p. 35-36). This brings us to the following questions: what rights
does the possessor of possessory evidence actually have, and from which
normative order do such rights come?
Attempts to figure out what rights the possessor of possessory evidence
has, lead us to its origin. Originally, the land with possessory evidence was
customary adat land, even if in some cases the land rights can presently not
be identified with a particular customary adat norm, given the land rights did
not develop in a relatively coherent adat law community (Fitzpatrick 2005,
p. 131; Bedner 2011). Land with possessory evidence originated from Land
Reclamation Rights. As said, the rights were granted by an adat community
leader either to a member of the community, or to an outsider, to clear a piece
of forest for agriculture and further utilize it. Pursuant to adat law, Land
Reclamation Rights allowed its owners to use and alienate (sale, rent, inherit)
land (Susanto 1980, p. 31; Wignjodipuro 1982, p. 201-202; Kartasapoetra et al.
1985, p. 91-92).
Currently, instead of naming these rights Land Reclamation Rights, village
inhabitants favour the name cultivation rights or ‘use rights’ (hak garap, hak
pakai). The term means that the possessors are only entitled to use (memakai)
the land (Sihombing 2004, p. 80). The name seems appropriate, because the
land is actually owned by other parties, whether state or private. When the
possessors of land with possessory evidence transfer their land, they merely
transfer use rights, instead of ownership rights (Effendi 2009, p. 57).
In practice, however, the possessor of possessory evidence often behaves
like the owner, who could transfer and use the land. Thus from a practical
point of view, the land does not belong to the state anymore, since it seems
17 Literally, alas hak refers to all written documents, except a certificate, which prove someone’s
possession or control (penguasaan) over particular plots of land. As said above, all written
documents can be used as the basis for land holders to either register their land, apply
for a permit or obtain compensation.
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now to be privately owned.18 Unofficial as well as official rules and actors
justify the practice to alienate land. Pursuant to the 2004 Government Regula-
tion on Land Registration, notaries and sub-district heads can endorse the
transfer of land with possessory evidence, on the condition that the possessor
provides a letter from DONLA stating that the land is not certified yet, ahead
of the transfer (Article 39 [1b]). The other provision of the Government Regula-
tion is even more tolerant in that it includes any deed of land transaction
signed by either a village head, adat chief or notary as evidence for land
registration.19
Indonesia’s Supreme Court through a number of verdicts has long recog-
nized possessory evidence to prove ownership (Ind. bukti hak). In this respect,
the Supreme Court has not only accepted possessory evidence as valid evid-
ence, but it has also applied adat law to settle land disputes. For specific forms
of possessory evidence, like a land letter signed by a village head, the Supreme
Court has established stable case law (Ind. yurisprudensi tetap). The judge-made
rule states that the court can not dissolve any document on land that a village
head has composed.20 The recognition of possessory evidence by the Supreme
Court actually derived from another verdict of the Supreme Court, which
stated that adat law should be applied to the transfer of land. In this verdict
the Supreme Court stated that adat-based land transactions, in which the rights
transfer occurs at the moment of the transaction, are recognized. At the same
time, the official registration of the transaction in accordance with rules on
land registration is a mere administrative procedure.21
8.2.4 Formal local rules on possessory evidence
In the East Kalimantan region, regulations on possessory evidence were largely
aimed at administering the use of state land by a private possessor. From a
legal point of view, the regional regulations were formed in an attempt to
implement the Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs of 1972 on the
Transfer of Authority to Issue Land Titles. Nevertheless, the regulations were
also set up, because regional governments were dealing with widespread
occupation of state land – both Forest Area and non-forest area – mostly by
18 Given that the land possessor actually behaves like the owner, some land law experts have
concluded that possessory evidence resembles a certificate (Sutedi 2007, p. 79 and 129-130).
19 See Government Regulation No. 24/1997, the Elucidation of Article 24 (1), and Article 60(2)
of the Regulation of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs/Head of National Land Agency No.
3/1997 on Land Registration.
20 This was also the case in, for instance, the verdict of the Supreme Court No. 361 K/Sip/
1958. See Ali (1979, p. 172-176).
21 Supreme Court Verdict No. 123/K/Sip/1970. See also Effendi (2009, p. 4). For the recent
use of adat law in settling a land dispute in East Kalimantan, see the Supreme Court Verdict
No. 28 PK/TUN/2006.
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migrants and local people. The grand-scale occupation had been triggered
by the opening of Forest Areas to the cultivation of cash crops, which were
in demand due to the increasing price of exported cash crops. The occupation
was mostly undertaken by migrants from South Sulawesi and South Kaliman-
tan.22
A second motive for the large-scale occupation was land speculation, in
which new immigrants and local people competed for new plots of land or
reclaimed land that had long been abandoned. They hoped that companies
or government projects would possibly want to use the land they occupied,
so that they would obtain compensation.23 Some government projects, such
as transmigration, and private company projects, which needed land, had been
hampered considerably by the occupation. In Samarinda city, due to the
uncontrolled new occupation, the mayor of Samarinda municipality released
a circular letter asking the heads of urban-quarters (lurah) to not issue new
land letters.24 Given this background, the regulations on the use of state forest
land, which was supported by possessory evidence, were primarily aimed
at controlling land use, so that the public and private projects could run
without interruption.
At the provincial level, in addition to regulation, an administrative docu-
ment was also composed to govern possessory evidence.25 In contrast with
the drafting of other regulations, which barely involved non-state actors, the




At the provincial level, there are three regulations, which to some extent deal
with the occupation and use of state land. Two specifically concern possessory
evidence, while the third concerns compensation for land acquisition.26 Only
the first two are described because the third one I have no access to. The first
22 For accounts of the opening of forest land to migrants from South Sulawesi see Daroesman
(1979); Vayda et al. (1980, p.182); Poffenberger and McGean (1993); Vayda and Sahur (1985)
and Vayda and Sahur (1996), and to migrants from South Kalimantan see Lindblad (1988);
Magenda (1991); Knapen (2001).
23 For accounts of this type of land occupation see Vayda and Sahur (1996); Hidayati, Djohan
and Yogaswara (2008); Simarmata (2010b); Urano (2010, p. 211).
24 Interview PI, a retired staff the Provincial Office of the National Land Agency, 11/3/2008.
For a similar story in Muara Badak sub-district of Kutai District see Hidayati, Djohan and
Yogaswara (2008, p. 59).
25 By referring to administrative document I mean a form which applicants for a permit or
rights required to fill out.
26 The third local regulation is the Decree of the Governor of East Kalimantan No. 183/1977
concerning the guidance for the compensation of land acquisition for the projects of regional
government in East Kalimantan.
212 Chapter 8
two regulations are respectively the Decree of the Governor of East Kalimantan
of 197427 and the Decree of the Governor of East Kalimantan of 1995.28
As said, the initiative for the first two regulations stemmed from the
observation that private parties had started using state land without recognized
formal land titles in an uncontrolled manner. The regulations, therefore, aimed
at controlling the land use. The 1974 decree contained very simple provisions.
It stated that any occupation and use of state land for agriculture, husbandry
and fishery purposes should be taken through a LRL issued by a sub-district
head, as stated in the Regulationof the Minister of Home Affairs of 1972.29
Occupation and use of state land without a license would be considered as
unlicensed use of state land, which could face criminal charges, as stipulated
in a law of 1960.30
The expiry date of an LRL was not determined, but the decree stipulated
that if its possessor did not use or abandoned the land for three consecutive
years, the land would automatically become state land. For any prior land
use, which had taken place before the decree was promulgated, the occupants
or users were required to register their land with DONLA via a village head
and sub-district head to be awarded a LRL. In implementing the regulation,
the Provincial government issued a subsequent policy, requiring farmers to
organize themselves in local peasant associations (kelompok tani) rather than
acting individually. Members of the peasant groups, which were officially
recognized by village heads and reclaimed the forest, would be granted 2 ha
each (Vayda and Sahur 1985, p. 101, 1996, p. 31; Hidayati et al. 2008).
As only a small number of LRLs were issued and the occupation of state
land was still pervasive, we may conclude that the implementation of the 1974
27 Decree No. 237/1974 on the Cultivation of State-Owned Agricultural Land.
28 Decree No. 31/1995 on the Guidance to Control Land Letters and Control and Ownership
over Buildings/Plans on State Land.
29 Some norms in the 1974 Governor Decree and subsequent regional regulations included
stipulations on how to obtain possession rights over land, that had applied in former
territory of the Kutai Sultanate since the middle of the nineteenth century. The norms were
formed by the Kutai Sultanate (1605-1950), after the Sultan officially declared himself to
be the owner of all land and resources in the Kutai Sultanate. Since, any land use in the
Kutai Sultanate should be on the basis of a license issued by a village head (petinggi/demang)
in the name of the Sultan. Likewise, the norms were applied to mining extraction and the
collection of forest products (Kanwil Depdikbud Kalimantan Barat 1990, p. 119-120 and
132). Nevertheless, such norms of land possession are unlikely to have applied to the Dayak
indigenous groups as their members could convert forests into farms without necessarily
getting a license from a village head or adat chief. In addition, once the forest has been
converted into a farm, it is considered to be permanently owned, even when its owner
temporarily abandons it. The abandoned land does not automatically return to the commun-
ity. For detailed accounts of adat rules on land possession of the Dayak indigenous groups
see Vargas (1985); Potter (1998); Bakker (2009); Urano (2010).
30 The criminal charge was three months imprisonment and/or a fine of maximum 5,000 IDR.
See Article 6(1) of Law No. 51 Prp/1960 on the Prohibition of Land Use without Prior
Permission of the Right Holder or His Representative.
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Decree largely failed. Rather than creating uniformity in possessory evidence
as well as reducing land conflicts, the Decree was followed by two develop-
ments. Firstly, village heads hardly carried out a thorough examination of the
applications for land letters as they skipped some measures, required by the
1974 Decree. This occurred, because outsiders who acted as land speculators,
were able to bribe village heads. In addition, village heads issued land letters
to family and relatives. Secondly, the ‘name’ of land letter signed by village
heads and later by sub-district heads varied from one place to another, despite
the content being the same.31
These practices inevitably led to an abuse of power by many village heads.
More than one land letter could appear for the same plot of land. Another
common practice was that the applicants were not those who had used the
land for several years, before they applied for a land letter. They were often
indeed land speculators who reclaimed the forest or started cultivating the
land, shortly before applying for a land letter (Petocz et al. in Vayda and Sahur
1996, p. 24 and 25; Simarmata 2010a, p.11). Worse than that, there were also
people, who came to the village heads and presented a rough sketch of the
area, which they claimed they had reclaimed. As village heads hardly ever
carried out a ground check, they signed the land letters without really knowing
the location or condition of the particular plot of land. This tempted some
people to reclaim the forest area, only after they obtained a land letter.32
In the Muara Badak sub-district, where the oil company VICO acquired
plots of land in the 1970s and 1980s, many land speculators came to VICO
asking for land compensation by only bringing rough sketches of maps with
them. They were not actually the real owners of the claimed land. Given that,
at the time, the land claimed was still heavily forested, the company hardly
ever undertook any field visits. The absence of the field visits then tempted
some land speculators to increase the size of the land on paper in an attempt
to gain more compensation. As a result, the company often found that the
land was still occupied or used, when they were about the start a project.
When in certain cases the real possessor contested the company’s claim over
31 Some of the the various names of the land letter are: self-declaration letter of land possession
(surat pernyataan penguasaan hak atas tanah), self-declaration letter to have a plot of land (surat
pernyataan memiliki sebidang tanah), letter of forest reclaim (surat pembukaan hutan), clarification
letter (surat keterangan), self-declaration letter ( surat pernyataan), self-declaration letter of
land ownership/possession (surat pernyataan pemilikan/penguasaan tanah), self-declaration
letter of land use and land utilization (surat pernyataan penggunaan dan pemanfaatan
tanah),clarification letter of ownership/possession over buildings/plans existing on state
land (surat keterangan penguasaan dan pemilikan bangunan/tanaman di atas tanah negara),
clarification letter of land (surat keterangan tanah), clarification letter of possession of cultiva-
tion of land (surat keterangan pemilikan tanah garapan) or self-declaration letter of land
possession (surat pernyataan penguasaan tanah).
32 Interview ED, 9/6/2008.
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the land and asked the company to show the rough sketches of the maps, the
company was unable to do so.33
As a result, many private companies which ran government projects, went
up to the regional government, reporting that their projects had temporarily
ceased. The complaints raised by the private companies were further voiced
by district and municipality governments in several coordinating meetings
with the Provincial government. The regional governments’ inability on one
hand, and the speed at which land letters were issued by village heads on
the other, made effective implementation of the provincial regulations hardly
possible.
In response to the above developments, the Provincial government was
in favour of making a new provincial regulation, instead of systematically
evaluating what went wrong in the existing regulations. The new provincial
regulation was primarily based on oral reports delivered by district and
municipality governments during meetings held by the Provincial government.
In one coordinating meeting, the Provincial Office of the National Land Agency
(PONLA) was assigned to draft a Governor Decree. After the PONLA completed
a draft decree, it was discussed in several meetings attended by various
provincial agencies. It was also discussed in a meeting, where all DONLAs were
invited.
The drafting process was completed by the issuance of the Governor’s
Decree of 1994 on the Guidance to Reorganize Land Letters with regards to
Control and Ownership over Buildings/Plans on State Land, which was
followed by a Governor’s Directive a week later.34 It took only a year, before
the Provincial government decided to revise the 1994 Decree, which led to
a Governor Decree of 1995. Similar to 1974, the 1995 Decree ordered lower
government officials, notably village heads, to undertake the registration of
any use of state land by private parties. Yet, whilst the 1974 Decree formalised
the registration with the LRL issuance, the 1995 Decree led to a land letter
issuance. Yet, it stipulated that the land letter could be used to apply for a
LRL. Because the 1995 Decree did not have a provision on sanctions, state land
occupation or use without a LRL was no longer a criminal offense in contrast
with the 1974 Decree.
Other provisions that differ between the 1974 and 1995 Decree concern
restrictions to as well as the prohibition of land letter issuances. The 1995
Decree states that a land letter is only valid for three years and it does not
prove any formal land rights as recognized by Indonesia’s land law. However,
a land letter can be used as a supporting written document to apply for a
particular formal land title. Any application for a land letter should be pro-
33 Interview IY, KA and Abd, staffs of Muara Badak sub-district, 17/3/2009.
34 Governor’s Decree No. 97 A/1994, and Governor’s Directive No. 03/1994 on Guidance
to Control Land Letters with regard to Control and Ownership over Buildings/Plans on
State Land.
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cessed unless: (i) the land is in dispute; (ii) the land is situated in a protected
zone or green belt; (iii) its size exceeds the maximum allowed size for land
ownership; (iv) it is absentee land possession; (v) the land is considered subject
to public interest (kepentingan umum); and (vi) the land is on the list of land
that is to be used for other government purposes.
The procedure to obtain a land letter is another important provision in
the 1995 Decree. The head of the neighbourhood (rukun tetangga) has to give
a letter of introduction (surat pengantar), which the land possessor needs to
bring to the village government office. To be able to get the letter of intro-
duction, the land possessor can either present written documents or explain
to the head of the neighbourhood how they obtained the land, in case they
do not have sufficient written documents. After receiving the letter of intro-
duction, the village head has to assign a member of staff to carry out a ground
check. If during the ground check someone raises objection to the land claim,
the village head should facilitate a dispute settlement. If the settlement fails,
the dispute can be brought up to higher government units to be settled by
sub-district heads and the DONLA. If this level of dispute settlement also fails,
the disputing parties are recommended to proceed to court.
If there is no any objection from anyone else, the village government is
allowed to register the applied-for land in the Village Land Registration Book.
In addition to the registration, the village head has to provide the applicant
with a land letter.
(b) Administrative Document
Meanwhile, due to the ending of the authority of the sub-district to award
LRLs in 1984 and before the enactment of the 1995 Governor Decree, those who
were occupying and using land without possessory evidence sought for another
form of written possessory evidence. The form had to be legally stronger than
the land letter signed by the village head. Some stakeholder meetings as well
as training sessions hosted and organized by the PONLA tried to respond to
this need. The meetings were attended by the staff of PONLA and DONLA, other
concerned provincial agencies, some sub-district as well as village heads. In
these meetings, the different parties agreed on two important changes, namely
to introduce a uniform land letter and to change to it from a clarification letter
(surat keterangan) into a letter of self-declaration (surat pernyataan).35 With
35 The name of the new land letter is Letter of Self-Declaration concerning Land Possession,
which is, again, popularly known as ‘land letter’ (surat tanah). Three other uniform docu-
ments are ‘letter to declare that there is no dispute’ (surat pernyataan tidak sengketa), ‘letter
to declare the transfer of land rights (surat keterangan untuk melepaskan hak atas tanah) and
‘report of ground check’ (berita acara peninjauan tanah/perwatasan). The ‘report of ground
check’ is needed to apply for a land letter, whereas the ‘letter to declare that there is no
dispute’ and the ‘letter to declare the transfer of land rights’ are needed for land trans-
actions. Except the ‘report of ground check’, the other three documents are signed by the
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regard to the content, the new uniform land letter was no different from the
old one. However, the change from a clarification letter to letter of self-declara-
tion implied that the village heads were no longer responsible for the reliability
of the information in the land letter. The change meant that the responsibility
now went to the land possessor. Consequently, the land possessor would be
charged for any fake information in the land letter. The change was deliberate-
ly aimed to increase the reliability of the information in land letter. Moreover,
removing the responsibility from the village head would prevent possible
sanctions for providing fake information in land letter.
To some extent, the land letter and the associated land documents resemble
possessory evidence, as stipulated in Indonesia’s land law. Yet, the change
from declaration letter to letter of self-declaration created a greater distance
between the land letter introduced by the 1995 Governor Decree and the land
letter formed as a result of the meetings. In the former, the village head is the
highest official and the one who signs, whereas in the latter, this role is
ascribed to the sub-district head. The signature from the sub-district head in
the land letter is something that the land possessor hoped for, because they
sought a legally stronger written possessory document. Moreover, that kind
of form fitted with regulations on land registration and acquisition, which
require a land letter signed by the sub-district head.36
In an effort to let regional and local officials know about the content of
the 1995 Governor’s Decree, the Provincial government organized some short
meetings in several districts and sub-districts where they also circulated the
format of the declaration letter. By conducting the meetings, the Provincial
government officials expected that the officials of village and sub-district
governments would further socialize the decree to a wider audience in their
respective villages or sub-districts. However, the expectation was not met, as
the local officials did not really make an attempt to increase awareness of the
new declaration letter. As a result, only very few of the village and sub-district
government officials whom I interviewed, knew much about the 1995 Governor
Decree. When the Head of Anggana sub-district showed a bundle of land
regulations that his office had been referring to, the 1995 Governor Decree
was not included. In practice, sub-district governments circulated the format
of the letter of self-declaration in the villages, before it was copied by the
village government.
Learning about the above efforts to govern the use of state land by private
parties where possessory evidence is recognized, we soon realize that neither
of the 1974 nor of the 1995 Governor Decree it is clear whether they were
enacted with regard to both forest and non-forest area or merely with regard
to non-forest area. As a research report points out:
sub-district head, while all four documents require signatures from the land holder, head
of neighbourhood, village head and two witnesses.
36 Interview Kmd, a retired staff of Muara Badak sub-district, 18/8/2009.
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The 1995 Governor Decree does not distinguish between forest and non-forest area,
instead it generally classifies each as state land. It is in contrast with reality, where
there is obviously a division between forest and non-forest area. Each of the areas
is under different authorities.37
In the list in the 1995 Decree, where the conditions for refusing the application
of a land letter are mentioned, ‘being a Forest Area’ is not included. This then
brings us to the questions which in essence resemble previous questions: are
the Provincial Regulations applicable to a Forest Area? Do they merely apply
to the approximately 6,000 ha of non-forest state land or to the 81,180.80 ha
of Production Forest of the Mahakam Delta as well?
District Level
As of the 1990s Kutai District government has been clear in regulating land
with possessory evidence, particularly in cases of land acquisition. Not only
did they recognize possessory evidence, Kutai’s District also created, by
regulation, a detailed classification of land on the basis of different types of
evidence. The regulation governed the compensation for land as well as crops
and buildings which existed on the land, including costs already spent. The
details of the provision can be found in the Decree of the Head of Kutai District
of 1993.38 The Decree was deliberately formed to implement the Governor
Decree of 1977 as already mentioned.
Several types of land based on ownership and possessory evidence were
clearly distinguished by the 1993 Decree of Kutai District Head. Firstly, it
distinguished as well as recognized private customary adat land from private
land rights. The holder of private land rights has a land certificate. According
to the decree, private customary land is land which was continuously or
temporarily occupied and used by individuals in accordance with local rules.
This definition of private customary land led to three categories of private
customary land. One of the three categories is land, which was occupied and
used after the enactment of BAL in 1960.
The aim of formulating categories was to determine different rates or
amounts of compensation that land owners or possessors would obtain. For
instance those, who owned or held certified agriculture land, would obtain
compensation amounting to 100% of the minimum price, as determined by
the decree, whereas those who held cultivated land supported by possessory
evidence would only obtain 40%. Meanwhile, those who had neither a certi-
ficate nor possessory evidence would only obtain 20% of the basic price.
37 Hidayati et al. (2008, p. 26-27).
38 No. 083/1993 on the Minimum Amount of the Compensation for Land and Crops in Kutai.
It has been superseded by the Decree of the Head of Kutai District Government No. 180.188/
HK-630/2008.
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Location and recent physical condition of the land are two other factors in
determining the amount of compensation.
The most interesting part of the 1993 Decree is a provision on forest land
as well as land which was used for pond construction. The provisions state
that the level of compensation for forest land and pond land should be deter-
mined by engaging Kutai agencies which deal with forest and fishery affairs.
Yet, the decree notes that the compensation should still be subject to its pro-
visions. However, the decree’s table of minimum amounts based on area
division, does not determine clearly the minimum amount for frontier forest
land, like the Mahakam Delta. Apart from the fact that the minimum amount
for owning a plot in a forest like the Mahakam Delta is not listed, the mention
of forest land in the decree seems to have strengthened forestry regulations
on forest delineation. The Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation could
have used the minimum amounts, as stated in the decree, to provide compen-
sation for those who occupied and used forest land. Not only did it strengthen
the forestry regulations, the 1993 Decree also implicitly legitimized ownership
or possession over land in Forest Areas.
After the 1999 Decentralization, the Kutai District government regulations
have, on the one hand, strengthened the recognition of possessory evidences,
yet on the other hand they have slowly put it aside. The Kutai Regulation of
2000 on Location Permits still implicitly recognizes the existence of possessory
evidence, when it asks companies which have already obtained a Location
Permit to also provide compensation for those who only have possessory
evidence (Article 7d).39 The Kutai District government just recently explicitly
recognized possessory evidence, by issuing two Circular Letters of the Kutai
District Head in late 2010.40
Yet, even though the two Circular Letters recognize the existence of land
rights, supported by possessory evidence, they have some remarks about it.
Firstly, unlike the national and provincial land regulations, one Circular Letter
regards the land letter not as provisional evidence of land ownership. Instead,
it regards it merely as a document, which informs us of the physical dimen-
sions as well as the possessors of the land. Moreover, with regard to land
acquisition, the second Circular Letter advises that those who have land
certificates should be prioritized for obtaining compensation. The change to
the Kutai regulations might be related to the requirement that the Audit Board
of the Republic of Indonesia (Ind. Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan) sets, which states
that land compensation can only be given to those who have land certificates.
39 No. 32/2000.
40 The two Circular Letters are respectively No. 590/651/A.Ptn-Prc/SE on Guidance of Land
Administration and No. 590/652/A.Ptn-Prc/SE on Land Acquisition for Small-Scale Public
Projects.
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That means that any compensation for land acquisition to those who have
possessory evidence given by government agencies is unjustified.41
8.3 LEGISLATION: IDENTIFICATION OF SOME PROBLEMATIC ISSUES
Through our examination of national forestry, provincial and district regula-
tions on possessory evidence, we are brought to the central question: is
possessory evidence which was issued over the land in the Production Forest
of the Mahakam Delta, really legal? The question is central not only because
the answer to the question would determine whether the forest occupation
and use was legal or not, but it would also determine whether the actions of
petroleum companies together with the Executive Agency and many other
public services, which were provided by the provincial and district agencies,
were legally justified or not.
By referring to the account in Sections 5.2 and 5.4 we now can easily
answer the above question. Many legal and socio-legal arguments support
the conclusion that possessory evidence which was issued in the Forest Area
of the Mahakam Delta is legal. From a legal point of view, the legality is not
merely due to a decision of the 2012 Constitutional Court which basically
stated that in order to determine Forest Areas, the Ministry of Forestry has
to carry out the four cumulative steps, but also due to the previous national
and regional regulations and court decisions which had stated that possessory
evidence in Forest Areas is legal. In a situation where the Ministry of Forestry
has carried out the steps of designation, forestry regulation concerning
planning and demarcation recognizes the possessory evidence when they asked
the so-called Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation to settle any arising
land rights claims from third parties (see Section 5.2 and Section 5.4).
The Decree of the Kutai District Head of 1993 concerning the Minimum
Amount of Compensation for Land And Crops in Kutai, case law from the
Tenggarong District Court and Samarinda High Court decisions in 2003 and
2006 recognized the legality of possessory evidence in Forest Areas regardless
of the steps of forest establishment that have been taken. In other words, on
the basis of these statutory rules and court decisions possessory evidence in
the Forest Areas of the Mahakam Delta is still legal despite the fact that the
Minister of Forestry has designated the Forest Area.
The legal answer to the above question has become especially clear after
the 2012 Constitutional Court verdict. As said in Section 5.2 and Section 5.4,
pursuant to the verdict the mangrove forest of the Mahakam Delta is not yet
41 Interview Mjd, a Head of Sub-Division of Bureau on Land Administration of Kutai District
Government, 18/6/2012. Nevertheless, he then added that the Audit Board of the Republic
of Indonesia recently did not apply the requirement as they were told that only 10% of
the land in the Kutai District had been certified.
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a Forest Area and as a result it is not yet state property. As I mentioned in
Section 5.4, in my view, the fact that the technical team formed by the Head
of TUFPS did not assess the existence of any private rights and the so-called
Committee on Forest Boundary Delineation did not settle the claims of the
third parties during the delineation and mapping of the Forest Area of the
Mahakaham Delta, has made state claims over the Forest Area weaker.
However, even though the above accounts confirm the legality of
possessory evidence in Forest Areas, its should be underlined that the picture
of Indonesian law on this matter is still not fully clear yet, as there remain
some case laws and legislation that contest the above accounts of the legality
of possessory evidence. Concerning case law, as said (Section 5.2), the Supreme
Court cassation verdict of 2006 stated that particular areas were already
officially Forest Area, despite the fact that the Ministry of Forestry had not
yet taken all the steps of the process.
After the 2006 Supreme Court verdict, the Minister of Forestry made one
letter and issued one regulation that both stipulated that the four steps of forest
establishment are not cumulative, but optional. Yet, one should not forget that
the legislation which states that land law and therefore possessory evidence
does not apply to Forest Areas has a long history. It goes back to the 1970s
when the central government issued the Presidential Directive of 1976 concern-
ing the synchronization of land affairs with respect to forestry, mining, trans-
migration and public works. The Directive appeared in order to resolve a
conflict of jurisdiction between the ministries. As they were dealing with the
issues of mining, forestry, transmigration and land, they laid claim on the same
areas. In relation to the non-application of land law in Forest Areas the Direct-
ive stipulates that the possessors of forest concessions are not required to have
particular land rights when they use forest land to exercise their rights of forest
utilization. Only if the concession holders use the forest land for any activities
which are not directly related to these main activities, they are required to
apply for particular land rights with the Minister of Agrarian Affairs/Head
of National Land Agency. The provisions are obviously different in the case
of oil and gas regulations whereby contractors are required to have use rights
(hak pakai) when they use land within their work area (see Section 6.2).
In East Kalimantan, the issuance of the Directive was followed by meetings
attended by related provincial agencies. The Provincial Forestry Agency and
PONLA came to the agreement that the Provincial Forestry Agency had juris-
diction over Forest Areas and PONLA over non-forest areas.
Not only those who occupy and use the Production Forest of the Mahakam
Delta have encountered legal issues on tenure, but also those who occupy and
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use the surrounding 6,000 ha of non-forest area.42 On the one hand, they were
not regarded as land owners, given that they do not have certificates. There-
fore, the land belongs to the state. This means that, in case of payment of
compensation to the land holder, the land price would not be included. Yet,
on the other hand, formal rules regard land possessors as owners in as far
as they are allowed to transfer and use their land as mortgage. To some extent,
the lack of clarity is deeply rooted in an unclear definition of state land.
Pursuant to a Government Regulation of 1953,43 land of which the ownership
is based on customary law, either individual or communal, is not state land
(Soemardjono 2007, p. 61-62). Yet, some Supreme Court decisions and legal
scholars suggest that communal land rights together with tanah wakaf and forest
land is included in the state land definition. According to this view, only
individual customary land rights are excluded from state land (Harsono 2007,
p. 290). Some legal professionals and government officials even regard indi-
vidual customary adat land rights to be part of state land, leaving private land
rights recognized by formal land law as the only type of land rights excluded
from state land.
8.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW BY REGIONAL AND LOCAL OFFICIALS
As referred to in Section 8.1, the fact that officials of the DONLA refused to
process any application for land certificates for the Mahakam Delta, arguing
that the Forest Area was not under their jurisdiction, does not mean that they
regarded the occupation and use of the Forest Area as completely illegal.
Chapter 5 and to a lesser extent Chapter 6 describe the complex factors, causing
the local officials to not effectively implement the laws and regulations. This
includes, for example, the motivation of the local officials or what Lipsky (1980)
names ‘street-level bureaucrats’, when they interacted with fishermen and
farmers.44
This section, therefore, specifically looks at the extent to which local officials
perceived the occupation and use of the Forest Area as legal or illegal. Besides,
the description also includes the perception of legal professionals and private
companies. This book argues that perceptions eventually affect the way, in
which local officials and legal professionals implement laws and regulations
on land.
42 Of 6,000 ha of non-forest area of the Mahakam Delta, only 891 ha have been certified. This
land certification resulted from a project on land consolidation and redistribution held by
the District Office of the National Land Agency in 1986 and 1991 which took place in Sepatin
and Muara Pantuan village of Anggana sub-district.
43 No. 8/1953 on the Control over State Land.
44 Lipsky (1980, p. 3) defines street-level bureaucrats as public service workers who interact
directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in
the execution of their work.
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8.4.1 Regional and local government officials
Although not many, yet a number of government officials, in particular the
officials of the regional technical units of the Ministry of Forestry as well as
the National Land Agency, strictly perceived the occupation and the use of
the Production Forest as illegal. In the eye of these officials, the land possessors
were simply squatters (perambah hutan) and therefore illegal.45 In a meeting
held in mid-2007, DONLA officials warned the officials of the Kutai Fishery
Agency to not continue to provide services to the fishermen and farmers of
the Mahakam Delta, for they were illegal occupants.
However, the officials never openly called the land possessors illegal
occupants when they had face-to-face meetings with them. In two meetings
aiming to ‘socialize’ relevant laws and regulations concerning the Mahakam
Delta in August 2008, some representatives of the shrimp farmers of the
Mahakam Delta were present. The DONLA officials did not call them illegal
occupants, but they quoted an article of the Forestry Law of 1999 prohibiting
any illegal occupation and use of Forest Areas.46 The quotation of the Forestry
Law was meant to explain why the DONLA refused to issue land certificates
on the Mahakam Delta. However, during these occasions the DONLA officials
did not call a land letter an illegal document (Tim Sosialisasi Kawasan Delta
Mahakam 2008, p.18).
Even though these regional and local officials did not openly call the land
possessors illegal occupants, the way they implemented the formal land law
still indicated that they regarded these land possessors as illegal, or at least
having limited rights. For the local officials, the illegality and limits affected
the way the land possessors could exercise their rights as well as the obliga-
tions imposed on them. In the Mahakam Delta, two concrete examples of
repercussions of perception can be shown, one on land acquisition and the
other one on tax (Hidayati, Djohan and Yogaswara 2008, p. 57). With regard
to land acquisition, the local officials excluded the land price from the com-
pensation. This meant that they only included those expenses incurred by land
possession for business development (for example the construction of ponds
and huts, and seeding of shrimps). They preferred to refer to any compensation
45 Interview GBD, a staff of Regional Technical Implementation Unit of Watershed Manage-
ment of the Ministry of Forestry, 2/5/2008, Shr, a Head of Division of the Ministry of
Forestry, 6/4/2009, and SDU, 22/4/2008.
46 The two meetings for ‘socialization’ were held in Anggana and Muara Jawa sub-district.
They were organized by a committee which was officially established by the Head of Kutai
District government. The main aim of the meetings was to respond to the long-standing
farmers’ query of whether there were formal rules which prohibited the opening of ponds
in Forest Areas. The committee expected that socialization would inform the farmers about
the existing formal rules, so that the remaining forested parts of the Mahakam Delta could
be preserved. See Tim Sosialisasi Kawasan Delta Mahakam (2008), and interview ED and
KA, a Deputy Head of Kutai Fishery Agency, 9/6/2008.
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money they paid to the land possessor as a ‘donation’ (in Indonesian, variously
uang keperdulian, pengganti jasa, pengakuan atas jerih payah, imbalan or sikap
kasihan pemerintah).
The legal concept on compensation may influence the local concept on
compensation or the other way around. For Buginese, the traditional conception
of compensation merely encompasses pioneering labour and/or expenses in
clearing land (Ind. ganti rugi merintis, in Buginese passelle ma’bela).47 In the
Mahakam Delta the traditional concept appeared, when the land possessor
did not take into consideration whether they had certificate or possessory
evidence when they were negotiating the amount of compensation they wished
to obtain from the companies.
In administrative practices, elsewhere in East Kalimantan, local officials
made a price distinction between land with a certificate and land with
possessory evidence. The latter is further divided into: land with a title deed
(akta) and land with a land letter (surat keterangan tanah). The category deter-
mines the land price. For land with a certificate, compensation would be 100%
of the going market rate, while cultivated land with a title deed would be
compensated for 90% of the going market rate, and compensation for cultivated
land with a land letter would be based on a tax rate (Ind. Nilai Jual Objek Pajak
abbrev. NJOP). On average, NJOP is 30% of the going market rate. This, for
example, applies to land with a land letter, which is authorized by a sub-
district head. The tax rate for cultivated land which is authorized by a village
head or head of an urban neighbourhood would be less than 30%. Recently,
across the Province, a common flat rate of NJOP on cultivated land has been
introduced. For cultivated land which has been cultivated for one or two
seasons, the compensation is approximately between IDR 2,300 (US$ 0.27) up
to 2,750 (US$ 0.32) per m². Cultivated land which yields good harvests is priced
at IDR 4,500 per hectare.48
Meanwhile, the officials of the Kutai Regional Revenue Agency and the
District Office of the Directorate General of Tax of the Ministry of Finance
were not willing to collect tax on land and buildings.49 These two government
offices did not think they had the authority to collect tax on land and buildings
from the pond owners, given that their business was illegal (Hidayati et al.
2008, p. 115).
Recent developments, as already said in Section 7.5, suggest that as of late
2009, some village governments and the sub-district government of Muara
Badak have been very selective or even refused to process any land letter
47 See Vayda and Sahur (1996, p. 19).
48 Personal communication with Abdullah Madjidi, 10 and 19/6/2011, and 18/6/2012.
49 Pursuant to Law No. 12/1985 on Tax on Land and Buildings, tax on land and buildings
is state tax imposed on the land and or buildings. The tax on land and buildings is material
in the sense that the amount of tax payable is determined by the state of the object, ie. the
land and or buildings. Circumstances or subject (the payee) do not determine the amount
of tax.
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registration, as requested by the officials of the Secretariat Office and the
technical implementation unit called the Unit of Forest Area Establishment
of the Ministry of Forestry, in a meeting in 2009. Only if the land possessor
applies for a use permit with the Minister of Forestry, the village and sub-
district officials can respond to the application of the possessor.50 However,
as the land possessors came to the sub-district office of Muara Badak in the
course of 2009-2011, and asked the officials about the policy, the officials told
the land possessors to keep using their land. For those who did not have
possessory evidence yet, the officials told them the same with the condition
that the officials would not process any land letter applications.51
The officials’ suggestion to land possessors and those who did not have
possessory evidence resembles the suggestion of some members of Kutai’s
House of Representatives to some villagers of Nilam, Saliki village of Muara
Badak sub-district in 2011. In a hearing, the members of Kutai’s House of
Representatives said, ‘Please keep on using the land and reclaiming new plots
of land. We can take care of the land letters later. If you need funds to buy
seeds and fertilizer, please feel free to send us proposals’.52
However, the bulk of the Kutai District government officials perceived the
occupation and use of the Production Forest of the Mahakam Delta when
supported by a land letter, as legal. A very basic argument, which the officials
pointed at, was that the land possessors owned the land letter, which could
clearly function as official evidence of someone’s rights over a particular plot
of land. Therefore, for example, a local official suggested that the land letter
was equal to a timber or mining concession (see Section 5.3). Although they
considered the land possession as legal, they differed in their ideas on how
50 In telling land possessors that they are not allowed to process the land letter application,
the officials of village and sub-district governments showed the land possessors a map
of the Agreed Forest Land Use Plan that the officials of the Unit of Forest Area Establish-
ment of the Ministry of Forestry had given them in 2009. Interview Nur (a Head of Section
for Governance of Muara Badak sub-district) and Secretary of Muara Badak sub-district
office, 13/12/2011.
51 After the 2009 meeting and the Unit of Forest Area Establishment of the Ministry of Forestry
gave a map of the Agreed Forest Land Use Plan, the Muara Badak sub-district office
received many questions from land possessors particularly from those who resided in Saliki
village. Since the map did not exactly indicate the boundaries of the Forest Area clearly,
the sub-district officials found it difficult to answer when the villagers asked whether the
land they had been using was inside the Forest Area or not.To cope with the situation,
the sub-district officials sent official letters twice to the Unit of Forest Area Establishment
of the Ministry of Forestry in 2009 and 2011. In the letters, they asked the Unit of Forest
Area Establishment to carry out field visits to mark the forest boundaries (pelacakan/penin-
jauan batas). However, they never got any replies to their letters. As a result, one day the
Secretary of the Muara Badak office phoned the office of the Unit of Forest Area Establish-
ment but only got the answer that the Unit could not do anything, since the authority on
forest establishment still belonged to the central government, i.e. the Ministry of Forestry.
Interview Nur and Secretary of Muara Badak sub-district office, 13/12/2011.
52 Interview MT, 3/12/2011.
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that related to the legality of the Forest Area. Some said that, as the land
possession was legal then as a consequence the legality of the Forest Area
should be questioned. Yet, others said that the rights of both the Forest Area
and the land possessor were legally recognized, for they had different kinds
of tenure rights.
The local officials, who perceived the land possession as legal but not the
Forest Area, used the prior long-standing period of residence of the local
inhabitants as the main argument. The argument chiefly stated that the occupa-
tion and use was legal, given the fact that the land possessors had resided
in the Mahakam Delta for generations, even before the forest designation came.
A former Head of Muara Badak sub-district experienced this, when he dis-
seminated the 1995 Governor Decree on the Guidance with regard to Control
Land Letters and Control and Ownership over Buildings/Plans on State Land
to some local residents. When he quoted the decree to explain that building
shrimp ponds in the Protected Zone was prohibited, the participants imme-
diately pointed at the date of the enactment of the Decree to prove that the
Decree came after they had settled in the Mahakam Delta.53
Both the officials of the Provincial Forestry Agency and Kutai Forestry
Agency emphasized the length of time that the local inhabitants had resided
in the Mahakam Delta to conclude that the occupant could not be named a
squatter. The acting head of the TUFPS, as mentioned in Section 5.3, commented:
The shrimp farmers have been in the Mahakam Delta for a long time before the
Forest Area was designated. We cannot blame the shrimp farmers for being in the
Forest Area because they have never been told about the existence of the Forest
Area. Besides, the government carried out the delineation of the Forest Area very
late. Thus, legally speaking we may say that the shrimp farmers are illegal but
first let us see the history of their settlements there.54
A middle-ranking official of the Kutai Forestry Agency added to the above
comment:
We cannot name the pond owners illegal occupants given they were born there.
We therefore did not give them any status.55
Even though the local officials did not explicitly pointed this out, their refer-
ence to the long period of residence of the land possessor seems actually a
recognition of local rules concerning land. Although the officials did not
perceive the local inhabitants of the Mahakam Delta as a customary community
53 Interview Sbd, a former Head of Muara Badak sub-district, 17/3/2008. For how this
argument was similarly used by forest settlers in Kutai National Park of East Kutai see
Vayda and Sahur (1996) and Arnscheidt (2009, p. 350).
54 Interview AN, 2 and 5/12/2011.
55 Interview AM, an Interim Head of Division of Kutai Forestry Agency, 24/4/2008.
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(masyarakat adat), they still seemed to believe in the existence of local rules
(see also Section 5.3).56
For local officials, who recognized the long residence of the local in-
habitants, it was obvious that the land price had to be included in any compen-
sation of land with possessory evidence. The reason they put forward was
that the land possessors also had a land title, although it was not being sup-
ported by a certificate. Nevertheless, in line with those local officials who
believed that the land price should be excluded from compensation, they also
suggested that the land price for certified land should be higher than land
with possessory evidence.57
Meanwhile, local officials who regarded the Forest Area and land possessor
as legal suggested that the state has ownership rights, whereas land possessors
have use rights. The officials of the sub-district governments developed this
insight in an effort to justify their issuances of land letters in the Mahakam
Delta. The head of Anggana sub-district claimed that his signing of land letters
did not constitute an act of violating existing laws and regulations. He pointed
at two reasons to justify his view. Firstly, he claimed that, in his perception,
signing the document did not mean that land possessors had ownership rights.
Instead, land possessors were only granted the rights to use the land. As the
existing laws and regulations only forbade granting ownership rights, he
believed that he did not break the law. Secondly, he claimed that by signing
the document he did not “issue” or authorize any license or rights, because
his role in signing the document was only that of a witness.58
However, such interpretation was disputed by an officer of Muara Badak
sub-district, who acknowledged that the signing of a land letter by a sub-
district head means that he or she does issue and authorize a permit, or at
least provides a strong recommendation. Interestingly, this official stated that
she did not believe that signing land documents was a violation of existing
laws and regulations. She gave two reasons for this. First, there had been no
objection from superior officers from either the Kutai District government or
the National Land Agency, nor was there any reminder from the officials not
56 For an account of how local rule formed land rights in the Mahakam Delta see Simarmata
(2010b). In governing fishery resource use, the officials of the Kutai Fishery Agency some-
times assumed that local rules were stronger than formal rules. In 2004 the officials of the
Kutai Fishery Agency asked the fishermen’s local association of Muara Badak sub-district
to form local rules, which prohibited the use of trawl nets in shallow waters, arguing that
fishermen would probably be more willing to comply with local rules instead of formal
rules. Interview Agg, 8 and 9/2/2010.
57 Interview Kmd, 18/8/2009.
58 Interview ATH, a Head of Anggana sub-district, 26/7/2007. Other officials of Anggana
and Muara Badak sub-district have developed similar interpretations. Interview ES, 30/6
and 1/7/2008 and Kmd, 18/8/2009.
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to sign the document.59 Second, the practice continued because the officials
felt they had built a consensus with the local villagers. Beside those two
reasons, the official stated:
If we ask the land possessors to comply with all legal requirements, the process
will take a long time. Moreover, the land possessors will possibly protest, asking
why the government officers had not informed them in advance about the require-
ments. Besides, we also feel that strictly imposing the existing laws and regulations
would sometimes be culturally improper, when the applicants are older men or
community leaders.60
Field officials referred to two other arguments for not calling the land posses-
sors squatters. The first is the absence of earlier notification. The second is
a lack of law enforcement with regards to occupation and utilization of the
Forest Area. In this respect, the officials blamed the officials of TUFPC for not
taking earlier precautionary and repressive action, before the scale of the
occupation had become as large as in 2010.
8.4.2 Legal professionals and private companies
This sub-section will discuss a land dispute between two land possessors
notably two big punggawas in the Mahakam Delta. It will shed light not only
on the case itself but also on the perception of the legal professionals included,
i.e. the solicitors and judges. The case is known as Haji Maming and 57 other
plaintiffs vs. Haji Latief and Haji Onggeng.61
Not only did the dispute result in violence and intimidation, it also led
to the involvement of some important politicians as well as military and police
59 This claim was refuted by a statement from a high-ranking officer of the Kutai District
government, who stated that they had warned the sub-district head several times not to
sign any land letters for land located within a Forest Area. He added that sub-district heads
claimed they had difficulty following this directive, because land owners would ask them
to point out the physical signs of the borders of the state forest, which they were unable
to do.
60 Interview Nur, 19/3/2009.
61 Haji Maming was aged 73 and Haji Onggeng 29, when the case was in process in 2003.
Haji Maming and Haji Onggeng actually had family ties, since Haji Onggeng’s wife had
kinship ties with Haji Maming. Due to the family relationship, some mediation efforts had
been initiated before and during the court sessions. In November 2002, the Kutai District
government officials held a mediation meeting in the office of sub-district government,
in which local military and police officers were present as well. The dispute settlers pro-
posed the two conflicting parties to come to a solution by equally sharing the disputed
land. The Tenggarong District Court advised the parties twice to have an out-off-court
settlement. Yet, all mediation efforts were fruitless, for Haji Onggeng consistently refused.
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officers.62 Haji Onggeng was accused of hiring and sending some local army
officers to the disputed land in order to intimidate Haji Maming’s men, pre-
tending it to be a regular military training. Meanwhile, Haji Maming was
accused of sending some local bandits from Samarinda city to the disputed
land, who confiscated the digging machines rented by Haji Onggeng and
damaged his property. The Head of Kutai District government even officially
asked the two disputing punggawas to calm down.63 The dispute was tried
twice by Tenggarong District Court. The first trial took place from January
to August 2003 and the second trial from November 2003 to January 2005.64
The first trial resulted in the refusal of the Haji Maming file (in Dutch niet
onvankelijk verklaard abbrev. NO), as the Court found that the legal status of
Haji Maming as a plaintiff was unclear. The High Court of Samarinda needed
two years to examine the case, before it eventually reached a decision in April
2007.65 The following is a brief account of the case.
H. Maming and 57 other plaintiffs filed a case with Tenggarong District Court,
accusing Haji Latief together with Haji Onggeng of illegally occupying 500 ha of
land in Muara Pantuan village, Anggana sub-district. The illegal occupation was
said to have started in November 2002. According to the plaintiffs, they themselves
had cleared up the forest land in 1984 and began to grow around 500 trees of
various crops, mainly coconut and lemongrass, as of 1992. They had cleared up
the forest land by forming a local peasant organization, which they had asked Haji
Maming to chair. In 1994 Haji Maming obtained a Letter of Forest Reclamation
signed by the former village head (1991-1999). The letter declared that the land
was controlled and owned by Haji Maming. For the illegal occupation, Haji Maming
and other plaintiffs sued the defendants for tort (in Dutch onrechtmatige daad).
Haji Latief and Haji Onggeng denied the allegation, saying that, when they began
to clear up the forest land in 1994, they found the land was fully covered with nypa
trees. There were no crops, as the plaintiffs had claimed. To support his claim of
ownership over the disputed land, Haji Onggeng presented a number of land letters
signed by the village head and sub-district head. The land letters stated that the
way Haji Onggeng had become the owner of the disputed land was by clearing
up a forest, similar to what Haji Maming had done. One request that both the
62 Haji Maming was known to be close to the Deputy of the District Office of the Indonesian
Police Department. Haji Onggeng was close to a high officer of the District Office of the
Indonesian Army. Haji Onggeng was also known to have a close relation with the former
Head of Kutai District government, as during his leadership Haji Onggeng took care of
some of his shrimp ponds. Haji Onggeng’s lawyer, who used to be a member of the
Provincial House of Representatives, first introduced Haji Onggeng to the Head of Kutai
District government.
63 The call was made in a Circular Letter No. 100/175/Pem.A/IV/2003, dated 14 April 2003.
See also in Section 5.1.
64 The verdict of the first trial is No. 03/Pdt.G/2003/PN.Tgr, and of the second trial is No.
44/Pdt.G/2003/PN Tgr.
65 Verdict No. 132/PDT/2006/PT.KT.SMDA.
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plaintiffs and defendants made to the courts was to decide whether the land letter
they presented was valid. In that way, it would become clear which person legally
owned the disputed land, thereby making the other party’s land letter automatically
invalid. In addition, the plaintiffs requested the court to also fine the defendants
an amount of approximately US$ 7 million (IDR 58,037,500,000) as compensation.
During the court sessions neither the solicitors of the plaintiffs, defendants
or judges asked whether the disputed land was located inside or outside a
Forest Area, even though the solicitors and judges undertook a field visit
(pemeriksaan setempat) of the disputed land together. The solicitors perceived
the disputed land as privately owned and had two reasons for that. Firstly,
their clients showed a land letter, which proved their property rights over
the land. The land letters proved that the possessors held a particular land
title, which the solicitors of the plaintiffs called use rights (hak garapan).66
Secondly, during the field visit they discovered that there were no forest trees,
but instead some crops.
When the judges examined which party was the actual original holder of
the disputed land, they probably presumed that the disputed land was not
situated in a Forest Area, despite the fact that they thought the land belonged
to the state.67 Thus, they thought that the land was state land, which was
not situated in a Forest Area and used by private parties. With regard to the
land letter, the judges undoubtedly recognized it as legal evidence of land
possession.68
In spite of recognizing the land letter as possessory evidence there appeared
to be different views among the solicitors and judges in deciding whether land
with a land letter is either state or private. The lawyers of the plaintiffs
regarded the land as privately owned. However, the solicitors of the defendants
and judges regarded it as state land. This meant that the possessor of the land
66 Interview BR, a practice lawyer, 28/8/2009, and SB, 2/9/2009.
67 A senior official of Anggana sub-district expressed his disappointment to the court for not
inviting the official of Kutai Forestry Agency as a witness during the court sessions. He
envisaged that, if the official of the Kutai Forestry Agency had been a witness to the court,
this official would have made the decision that both disputing parties had illegally occupied
and used the forest land. Further, such verdict could have been used by government officials
to enforce the law with regard to any illegal occupation and use of the Forest Area. Inter-
view ES, 30/6/2008.
68 In their verdict of the second trial, the judges eventually accepted the land letter presented
by the defendants. The judges came to the decision, as the plaintiffs could only present
one letter, which stated Haji Maming as the possessor of the disputed land, while the other
57 plaintiffs could not present a similar land letter. In addition, according to the judges,
the rough map of the disputed land, which the plaintiffs showed, was not authorized, given
it was not issued by either the DONLA or PONLA. Meanwhile, the judges thought that
the land letter presented by the defendants was convincing, given it was signed by the
village head and sub-district head. Throughout the hearing, the judges refused the requests
of the plaintiffs. The Samarinda High Court of East Kalimantan simply upheld the decision
of the Tenggarong District Court without making additional notes.
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letters would only be granted use rights, and, therefore, only be granted
compensation for the expenses, but not for the price of land. To give a concrete
example of how this view affects the way the case is handled, a solicitor of
the defendant explained that every time his office handled a land dispute
involving a company and the community, they would first figure out whether
the disputed land was located in a Forest Area or not. If yes, they would advise
their clients to not pay any compensation for land to the community members
making rights claims, given they were illegal occupants.69
As said, pursuant to the Government Regulation and the Decree of the
Head of the National Land Agency of 1997 on Land Registration, notaries and
sub-district heads are allowed to make a title deed on land transactions, even
if it is only supported by possessory evidence. The formal rules have been
effectively implemented in the Mahakam Delta. As Land Deed Officials (Pejabat
Pembuat Akta Tanah), sub-district heads of the Mahakam Delta did make title
deeds for any land transaction by asking the land possessor to sign two
necessary documents, namely a letter declaring the land to be free from dis-
putes and a letter of land title transfer.70 Some companies, like VICO, also
registered the land they acquired with a notary, besides the letter of land title
transfer.
As already said, the 1996 Law on Land Mortgage over Land and Related
Properties stipulates that non-registered and non-certified land is accepted
as a mortgage on the condition that the land is prepared for a land titling
application shortly after the loan agreement is signed. However, in the Ma-
hakam Delta these provisions were only partly complied with. Two state-
owned banks, Bank Rakyat Indonesia and Bank Pembangunan Daerah, did
not require borrowers with a land letter to arrange land titling shortly after
receiving the loan. In other words, the bank considered the land letter as
sufficient. In addition to the land letter, the banks did require some other
documents, such as a feasibility study, field visit report, identity card, and
letter certifying the level of income (Bourgeois et al. 2002, p. 50; Hidayati et
al. 2008, p. 63).
As already described in Section 6.4, like many local officials and legal
professionals, the employees of Total E&P Indonesie recognized the land letter
as one of several empirical facts that give legitimacy to occupants of land in
the Forest Area. The company’s officials were aware that, in accordance with
forestry regulations, the land possessors were illegal. However, they found
69 Interview SB, a practice lawyer, 2/9/2009.
70 According to Article 5(3) and 23(2) of Government Regulation No. 37/1998 on the Regula-
tion of Official Certifiers of Title Deeds, in regions where the number of Official Certifiers
of Title Deeds is not sufficient, the Head of the National Land Agency can appoint a sub-
district head and village head as temporary Official Certifiers of Title Deeds. In regions
which have only one notary and a temporary Official Certifier of Title Deeds, the sub-district
head and village head can appoint their respective deputy and secretary to make deeds
on land transaction.
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that some villages of the Mahakam Delta were officially registered as adminis-
trative villages and above of all, that the land possessors had land letters.71
The company with approval from the Executive Agency, therefore, required
land possessors to present land letters to be able to obtain compensation.
Nevertheless, with regard to the amount of compensation, they made a dis-
tinction between land located in and outside the Forest Area. The amount for
the former would be primarily based on the NJOP, whereas for the latter on
the market price. This practice was different from VICO’s, which did not make
a distinction between forest and non-forest area. VICO would normally negotiate
with the land holder about the amount of compensation in each case.
As said in Section 6.4, the long practice of land acquisition by companies
in the Forest Area of the Mahakam Delta has gained support from the Ministry
of Forestry when in 2009 an official of the Directorate of Forestry Planning
of the Ministry of Forestry advised two employees of Total E&P Indonesie to
provide compensation to the forest occupants whose land would be acquired
by the companies.
8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
On the basis of the previous accounts, one may say that Indonesian legislation
and case law recognize possessory evidence and therefore those who have
possessory evidence have land rights. Both public and private laws recognize
possessory evidence so that those who have it are allowed to register their
land, obtain permits and compensation, use it as a mortgage, as well as to
transfer their land. Thus, in that regard the rights of land possessors are similar
to rights of ownership. In practice, therefore, some officials and legal pro-
fessionals perceive land possession similar to land ownership. Nevertheless,
as the rights that the land possessors have over their land do not resemble
the rights that the BAL and implementing regulations recognize, public admin-
istration practices treat land possession and land ownership differently. In
land acquisition, the different treatment is very visible.
Yet, in the case of the Production Forest of the Mahakam Delta where actual
control of state is severely absent on the one hand, and local users have long
resided before official forest designations on the other, government officials
show two contrasting co-existing behaviours. The majority of the central,
regional and local government officials whom I interviewed regarded the forest
occupants in the Mahakam Delta as against the law. Yet, in practice, they did
71 In many cases which concern the legality of forest occupation, the regional and local officials
or even private actors questioned the accusation of forest occupancy by raising the fact
that the villages in which the accused illegal forest occupants were living were officially
registered. Based on that argument, they would say that the forest occupancy is actually
legal. Interview DH, 14/12/2009.
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not show this perception when they had face-to-face meetings with the forest
occupants.
The regional and local officials largely raised social legitimacy rather than
legal legitimacy when looking at the legality of the land possessors or forest
occupants. The officials were aware of the illegality of the land possessors from
a legal point of view, but they found that the formal rules were not adequate
and did not have external consistence through which the rules were not
compatible with the external situation (see Section 1.3.2 on adequacy and
external consistence). One may add that the local officials could have pointed
to the factors of usefulness and desirability, when illustrating that the formal
rules were not adequate. As said in Section 1.3.1, the extent to which a law
is socially useful and desirable will influence its implementation. Not only
the regional and local officials raised the social legitimacy of the land posses-
sors, but also the company employees, legal professionals and members of
the regional house of representatives.
From a legal point of view, the contrasting co-existing behaviours in looking
at the legality of the land possessors should come to an end after the 2012
Constitutional Court decision. Even though in accordance with some legislation
and case laws saying that the mangrove forest of the Mahakam Delta is Forest
Area, yet the 2012 Constitutional Court decision has dismissed the constitu-
tionality of the state claim over the mangrove forest. As a result it is now still
private land.
9 Law-based management of space
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Many initiatives aimed at addressing the devastating environmental and social
problems of the Mahakam Delta eventually led to spatial management as the
ultimate solution. The initiatives suggested to (re)design the spatial (land use)
planning of the Mahakam mainland and the Mahakam Delta, and to establish
a management body alongside. The initiatives departed from the assumption
that the existing spatial plan was inadequate to cope with the devastating
environmental and social challenges. At some level, ideas to revise spatial
planning for the Mahakam Delta derived from the perception that spatial
management did not exist in this area, given that all resource users seemed
to be free to carry out resource use regardless of the location.
Chapter 5, 7 and 8 of this book have extensively described how rights
issuance and formal control over resource use did not occur in accordance
with prevailing formal rules. The chapters explain why users were able to use
the resources in almost any area of the Mahakam Delta rather than particular
designated areas. The circumstances eventually tempted some local bureau-
crats, researchers and local residents to think that there was no spatial plan
yet for the Mahakam Delta. The insight is in line with the idea that, generally
speaking, the Mahakam Delta lacks a full system of government and rules
(Bourgeois et al. 2002; Timmer 2010). Therefore, initiatives which proposed
new or redesigned spatial planning for the Mahakam Delta, often implied the
idea of establishing a new body that would implement a new spatial plan.
From a spatial management point of view, Chapter 5-8 discussed the
granting of rights, as one way through which control over resource use was
exercised. Looking at another area of spatial management, this chapter focuses
on the making of maps and zones. In that way, this chapter identifies another
cause which has prevented right granting in the Mahakam Delta from being
in accordance with existing formal rules, and which has led to confusion in
dispute settlements.
To start, this chapter will present in Section 9.2 various major and minor
spatial planning projects developed by different government agencies. The
term ‘major spatial plan’ here refers to spatial planning of an area which covers
large parts of the Mahakam mainland and Mahakam Delta. This includes an
Agreed Forest Land Use Plan, State Mining Zone (SMZ), and Provincial Spatial
Plan. Meanwhile, a ‘minor spatial plan’ refers to spatial planning regarding
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a small part of the Mahakam Delta. This includes fishing zones/grounds and
shipping lanes. Besides those already existing spatial planning projects, new
or redesigned spatial planning proposals are also described. This includes the
Detailed Spatial Planning of the Mahakam Delta (DSPMD) and two very recent
initiatives on spatial planning, namely the provincial strategic zone (kawasan
strategis provinsi) and the district marine protected area (Kawasan Konservasi
Laut Daerah abbrev. KKLD).
Section 9.3 will discuss the extent to which spatial planning has been
implemented by the central, provincial and district government through zoning
programs and arrangements. The next section (Section 9.4) deals with some
legal problems which emanate from the prevailing spatial planning projects
and their realization. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks.
9.2 VARIOUS SPATIAL PLANNING PROJECTS IN THE MAHAKAM DELTA
9.2.1 Officially declared spatial planning
As of the late 1960s the state has enacted some laws and regulations which
have included stipulations concerning zoning in the Mahakam Delta. In the
1960s alone, both the central government e.g. the Ministry of Mining, and the
Provincial government set up zones for mining areas and fishing grounds
respectively. To implement the Law of 1960 on Oil and Gas, in 1967 the
Minister of Mining designated 34,125 km² of the northern part of the eastern
coast of East Kalimantan as a SMZ (Section 6.2). This popularly-called Maha-
kam-Bunyu SMZ included the Mahakam mainland and the Mahakam Delta.
Likewise, as part of implementing national legislation, in the second half of
the 1970s, the government of East Kalimantan Province and Kutai District
reiterated the Fishing Zones Division of the national fishery regulations (see
Section 7.2). As described in Section 7.2, besides reiterating the Fishing Zones
Division, the Kutai Fishery Regulation of 1978 on Fishing within the Adminis-
trative Territory of Kutai District designated eleven fishery sanctuaries. As
neither the fishing grounds nor sanctuaries fully excluded non-fishery resource
use in the zones, conflicts between oil and gas companies and fishermen
emerged immediately. To settle the conflicts, the Directorate-General of Fish-
eries of the Ministry of Agriculture, followed by the Governor and Kutai
District Head, issued Circular Letters which introduced a certain degree of
exclusion of fishing in the vicinity of the platforms of oil and gas companies.
The planning of the Mahakam Delta changed considerably in the 1980s
following the 1983 forest designation. Whereas the spatial planning of oil and
gas resource was not well-connected with the preceding fishery resource spatial
planning, it was well lined up with the forest designation. The forest designa-
tion supported by some subsequent forest regulations determined that non-
forest resource use, including the use which had existed prior to the designa-
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tion, could still take place within the designated forest subject to a number
of conditions. The forestry regulations listed oil and gas resource use as per-
mitted forms of non-forest use, yet they excluded aquaculture particularly in
the Production Forest or in any Forest Area situated on islands of less than
10 km² (see Section 5.2).
At the start of 1991, the Provincial government led by the Provincial
Development Planning Agency, started to make a Provincial Spatial Plan
(henceforth PSP). Due to the 1983 forest designation, which had declared the
entire area of East Kalimantan as Forest Area, the making of the PSP met with
resistance from the Ministry of Forestry. The following quote from a presenta-
tion of the Provincial government illustrates the uncomfortable situation that
the Provincial government found itself in:
The PSP aimed to cover the whole administrative territory of East Kalimantan, yet
Forest Areas existed where forestry regulations were applied.1
As this seemed impossible to realize following resistance from the Ministry
of Forestry, the Provincial government decided to only turn the entire con-
version forest as stated in the 1983 forest designation into non-forest area. One
significant legal consequence from introducing the ‘non-forest area’ would
be that the building of offices, residential areas and estate plantation would
not necessarily need a permit from the Minister of Forestry any longer.2 The
permit for the use of the non-forest area could now be obtained from either
the Governor or District Head/Mayor. The reason why the capacity to issue
a permit was transferred to them, is that a non-forest area is under the juris-
diction of the agencies responsible for land such as the National land Agency
and its regional offices, PONLA and DONLA. The Provincial government
eventually issued the PSP in 1993. It came into force officially in 1995, after
the Provincial government obtained approval from the Minister of Home
Affairs in the same year.3
As already described in Section 5.2, the Ministry of Forestry objected to
the 1993 PSP, given that they found it incompatible with the 1983 forest desig-
nation. One point of incompatibility that they considered important concerned
the use of the term ‘non-forest area (Ind. bukan kawasan hutan)’, over which
they thought that the jurisdiction of forestry agencies could cease to apply.
The Provincial government did not resist against this objection, and revised
1 The presentation was entitled, ‘Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Provinsi Kalimantan Timur
2009-2027 (Spatial Plan of East Kalimantan Province 2009-2027)’. Presented at a consultation
made by a Task Force of the Draft PSP with the Center for Gazettement and Forest Area
Use Plan (Pusat Pengukuhan dan Penatagunaan Kawasan Hutan), the Ministry of Forestry,
on 15 January 2008.
2 Interview HI, 26/6/2008.
3 The Provincial government endorsed the 1993 PSP through Provincial Regulation No. 12/
1993. The Minister of Home Affairs approved of the PSP through Letter No. 63/1995.
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the 1993 PSP in 1999 by dropping the disputed term and changing it into Non-
Forest Cultivation Area (Ind. Kawasan Budidaya Non-Kehutanan abbrev. KBNK).4
Although in essence there was not a distinctive difference between the two
terms, the Ministry of Forestry still felt they kept their territorial control by
using the term KBNK. After the revision, the 1999 PSP divided the space of East
Kalimantan into three main zones, namely Forest Cultivation Area (KBK)
(49.93%), protected zones (26.52%) and KBNK (23.55%).
There is no clear division yet between a KBK, protected zone and KBNK in
the territory of Kutai District due to the long delays in drafting the Kutai
Kartanegara Spatial Plan (KSP). At present, with regard to the size, the table
below shows the differences between the KSP and the 2001 Agreed Forest Plan.
Table 9.1: Kutai Kartanegara Spatial Plan according to the PSP and 2001 Agreed
Forest Plan
PSP 1999 (ha) 2001 Agreed Forest Plan (ha)
Protected zone (358,402.99) Forest Area (2,637,657)
Forest Cultivation Area (1,321,841.54) Other Use/APL/KBNK (88,653)
Non-Forest Cultivation Area (891,519.74)
Total: 2.571.764.27 Total: 2.726.310
Meanwhile, as said, the PSP included five plots in the Mahakam Delta as KBNK,
spread over five different small islands. The five plots originally came from
a survey held by the PONLA in the late 1970s and early 1980s and rediscovered
by the RePPProT in the 1980s (see Section 5.2). The two surveys found that
the plots were used for residence, coconut plantations and a small number
of shrimp ponds.
It should be noted that at the time the 1993 and 1999 PSPs were endorsed,
the land use of the Mahakam Delta was different from the 1970s and 1980s,
in the sense that the number of residential areas, plantations and shrimp ponds
had increased. It was reported that in 1996 shrimp ponds in the Mahakam
Delta covered 15,000 ha. If compared to a 1986 figure of only 420 ha, this is
a tremendous increase. Between 1992 and 1994, the residential area increased
from 73 ha in 1992 to 125 ha in 1996 (Kusumastanto et al. 2011, p. 22; LAPI
ITB and Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara 2003, p. II-5). These figures
even exclude land that was used by oil and gas companies for installations,
office buildings as well as housing. By 2005, the oil and gas companies opera-
4 The revision was made through Decree of Governor No. 050/K.443/1999. The dispute on
those terms is actually surprising, since Law No. 24/1992 on Spatial Planning did not
recognize the term non-forest area as the 1993 PSP introduced. The law only recognized
the terms ‘protected zone’ and ‘cultivation zone’.
Law-based management of space 237
ting in the Kutai District combined, had used 2,834 ha of land or 2.5% of the
total land area of the Mahakam Delta (LAPI ITB and Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai
Kartanegara 2003, p. IV-28; Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara 2005, p. 9). Yet, it
is unlikely that the 1993 and 1999 PSP took into consideration the vast changes
in land use.
In the tidal trap case as described in Section 6.1, Total E&P Indonesie sent
a letter to the provincial police office, reporting that the owners of ten tidal
traps had been endangering public shipping lanes. The company based its
allegation on laws and regulations concerning sailing. Pursuant to shipping
regulations, the central government e.g. the Ministry of Public Transportation
is assigned to map public shipping lanes.5 In order to produce the map, there
is first need for a topographical survey. The shipping regulations define a
public shipping lane as a marine area that has to be safe for sailing. However,
the shipping regulations only prohibit the activities that can disable
navigational devices to a limited extent. Any offender of the provision can
face imprisonment or a fine.6
9.2.2 Proposed spatial planning
There have been some proposals aimed at redesigning the spatial planning
of the Mahakam mainland, in addition to a proposal that suggested small
conservation zones in the Mahakam Delta. A third, recent proposal deals with
both the terrestrial and marine areas of the Mahakam Delta.
Redesigned spatial plan
Ideas to form a new spatial plan for the Mahakam Delta have existed for more
than a decade. Although motivated by similar concerns about environmental
depletion and conflicts among users, the various ideas provide different
solutions on how to solve the problems of spatial planning in the Mahakam
Delta. Earlier initiatives implied that there should be protected or conservation
areas in the Mahakam Delta. However, recently policy-makers have no longer
held that protected or conservation areas are necessary for the Mahakam Delta,
despite their concern about sustainable management.
The initial idea of forming a new spatial plan for the Mahakam Delta dates
back to the early decentralization period in 2000. An inter-sectoral meeting
was held in Jakarta in November 2000 led by the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences to discuss the continued environmental degradation of the Mahakam
5 Article 12 of Law No. 21/1992 on Shipping as replaced by Law. No. 17/2008 (Article 119[2]
and 187 [1]), and Article 3 of the Regulation of the Minister of Public Transportation No.
68/2011 on Marine Public Shipping Lane.
6 Article 11 and 100 (1 and 2) of Law No. 21/1992, and Article 139 of Law No. 17/2008.
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Delta. One of three follow-up activities which resulted from the meeting, was
to review and reorganize the spatial planning arrangement of the Mahakam
Delta. Two other recommendations were to establish protected areas and
rehabilitate the deforested mangrove forest of the Mahakam Delta (Kusumas-
tanto et al. 2001, p. 8). In the course of 2001 the wish for a new spatial plan
for the Mahakam Delta was repeatedly voiced during some stakeholder gather-
ings in Jakarta and Balikpapan. After several meetings, two participatory
workshops held in mid-2002 and organized by a research team whose research
was jointly funded by Total E&P Indonesie and Inpex, successfully pressured
the Kutai District government into converting the ideas into concrete action.7
At a workshop which was attended by the First Assistant of the Kutai District
Head, the participants of the meeting agreed to prioritize two actions, notably
designing a land use scheme and creating a new permanent management body,
whose members would consist of stakeholders’ representatives (Bourgeois et
al. 2002, p. 94).
Meanwhile the Head of Kutai District government had established an ad
hoc task force, the so-called Task Force on Integrated and Sustainable Manage-
ment of the Mahakam Delta.8 The Task Force was assigned six tasks, namely
policy formulation, law enforcement, public awareness, data collection and
analysis, coordination, and recovering the basic ecological function of the
Mahakam Delta. The Task Force’s organization consisted of an advisory body,
steering committee, working group, and facilitator. The Kutai District Head
chaired the advisory body, while his deputy chaired the steering committee.
All related Kutai agencies, sub-districts and village governments sat in three
thematic working groups together with private companies, NGOs, and univer-
sity lecturers, the latter playing a role as facilitator as well. The recovery of
the basic ecological function of the Mahakam Delta – one the Task Force’s main
tasks – had to be done in accordance with the existing spatial plan.
The Kutai District government was also supposed to make the Detailed
Spatial Plan of the Mahakam Delta (DSPMD).9 Yet, to reduce the government’s
7 During an international workshop in 2001, stakeholders of the Mahakam Delta could
compare their knowledge on the Delta’s issues with that from other South-East Asian
countries. Besides discussing the current environmental condition of the Delta, the parti-
cipants also discussed possible sustainable management options. Six months after the
international workshop, a smaller follow-up meeting was held in Balikpapan. Here the
Head of Kutai District government and the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries signed
a memorandum of understanding. See Badan Lingkungan Hidup Provinsi Kalimantan Timur
(2011).
8 The Kutai District Head issued the Decree No. 180.188/HK-458/2001 to establish the Task
Force.
9 Pursuant to Law No. 24/1992 as replaced by No. 26/2007 on Spatial Planning, spatial
planning encompasses general and specific/detailed spatial plans. General spatial planning
comprises of national, regional and district spatial planning, while specific/detailed spatial
planning could be island spatial planning, spatial planning for strategic zones, and the
detailed spatial planning of a district/municipality.
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cost of such plan, Total E&P Indonesie eventually proposed to bear the costs
of doing so. However, this suggestion led to such suspicion about the objectiv-
ity of the plan (Hidayati et al. 2008, p 76), that a consultancy agency from
Bandung was hired to make the plan. After about two years, the draft DSPMD
was finally accomplished.
The draft DSPMD had to balance several different interests. Firstly, a balance
had to be found between the environment and human resource use. Secondly,
it had to find a balance between various different resources use, namely
housing, shrimp farming, and oil and gas exploration and extraction. In other
words, the draft DSPMD had to facilitate various uses, so that they could take
place alongside each other. Nonetheless, the draft also remarked that due to
the relatively greater economic and social importance of the oil and gas ex-
ploration for the state, it had to be prioritized and treat other resource use
as secondary (LAPI ITB and Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara 2003,
p. I-1-2).
Having taken into account the abovementioned concerns, the draft DSPMD
divided the space of the Mahakam Delta into three main uses or zones, namely
a protected zone, KBK and KBNK. The ‘protected zone’ chiefly consists of the
river and green belt. The KBK is concentrated in areas where mangrove trees
are still growing. The KBNK, on the other hand, is located in areas where
housing, shrimp ponds and oil and gas explorations exist. In terms of size,
the first two zones cover approximately 40% of the total size of the Mahakam
mainland and Mahakam Delta combined, leaving 60% for the KBNK. The table
below illustrates the division in detail.
Table 9.2: Projected Land Use Plan of the Mahakam Delta
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Total size 109,702.038 100 100%
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The idea was that areas that were designated as residential would be also be
suited for the development of public facilities (such as schools, health clinics,
religious convention places, sport and recreational facilities, markets and public
areas, roads and electric installations). It was envisaged that any resource use
in the Protected Zone and KBK was prohibited, unless it would not change
the natural function of the zones. As a result, resource use was only possible
in the KBNK. The draft DSPMD did not only determine the spatial division, it
also stipulated the rules on right granting as well as how to exercise rights.
In addition, the draft DSPMD suggested ways on how to implement the Draft
effectively. For instance, it recommended guidance for field officials to prevent
confusion amongst them, the installation of boundary marks, and, last but
not least, to encourage stakeholders to be actively involved in rehabilitation
(LAPI ITB and Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara 2003, p. V-4-5). The draft
DSPMD went even further by suggesting technical matters, such as criteria for
ideal pond construction (LAPI ITB and Bappeda Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara
2003, p. VI-3-6).
Meanwhile, apart from taking into account an equal balance between users
as well as a conducive climate for investment, the draft DSPMD was also
required to fit with a Draft Kutai Spatial Plan (DKSP), which was also being
formulated.10 Like the draft DSPMD, a recent DKSP (2007-2027) primarily
divided Kutai District into a protected zone (28.67%), KBK (39.21%) and KBNK
(32.13%).11 It is clear that the draft DKSP proposed a different division than
the draft DSPMD regarding the respective KBK and KBNK allocations. The DKSP
divided the Mahakam Delta into a protected zone, production forest and
aquaculture zone.
With regard to development, the DKSP divided Kutai District into five
centers of economic growth. Each center had its own distinctive potential and
environmental carrying capacity. Development was prioritized and advanced
in those five economic centers. Economic growth in those centers was expected
to trickle down to adjacent regions, ensuring more equality among regions.
The DKSP considered the Mahakam Delta as an important region and
therefore gave it more attention than other areas of the Kutai District. Firstly,
the DKSP designated that two of the abovementioned five centers of economic
growth were placed in the Mahakam Delta. They were Muara Jawa and Muara
10 Since its foundation in 1959, Kutai District had never had its own spatial planning. There-
fore, its development had been run through broader guidance from national and provincial
spatial planning. The 1999 decentralization, which bestowed more power on district
governments to make their own plans, apparently did not help the Kutai District govern-
ment to realize their long-awaited spatial planning. The Kutai District government did not
even accomplish this, when Law No. 26/2007 on Spatial Planning set a deadline for every
district/municipality to have their own new spatial planning ready by April 2010. Since
2001 until recently, two attempts have been made to draft the DKPS: for the period of 2001-
2011 and 2007-2027.
11 See Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (2006, p. 4-10-25).
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Badak sub-district. Secondly, the DKSP adopted the Mahakam Delta as a
strategic area, thereby allowing for prioritization of the spatial plan (Badan
Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah 2006, p. 5-27). Great opportunities for
development, on one hand, and environmental degradation on the other hand,
were reasons why a spatial plan for the Mahakam Delta had to be prioritized.
Although its environment is in a critical state, the DKSP still projected part of
the Mahakam Delta as KBNK. Oil and gas, and fishery were envisaged as
favorite sectors, which would receive support from other sectors such as
agriculture, plantation, tourism, education and health.
Concern over the environmental depletion of the Mahakam Delta continued
when in 2005 the 1999 PSP was revised. As a result, the Mahakam Delta was
categorized as a provincial strategic zone, due to its depleted environmental
condition as well as economic opportunities.12 A ‘provincial strategic zone’
is defined as a zone that due to its important economic, social, cultural and
environmental character is given priority for spatial planning. Applying the
same definition, a Government Regulation of 2008 on National Spatial Planning
determined that the Mahakam River which is a bigger area than the Mahakam
Delta was a national strategic zone.
As said the draft DSPMD, DKSP and Draft Revised Provincial Spatial Plan
proposed new designs of spatial planning of the Mahakam Delta. Whilst the
1999 PSP and 2001 Agreed Forest Plan only set aside around 6,000 ha for KBNK,
the new designs proposed an area of 65,000 ha, more than ten times its size.
This means that the proposed spatial planning suggested to convert around
60,000 ha of KBK into KBNK. The 60,000 ha was actually included in the 171,746
ha and 1,385,203 ha that the Kutai and Provincial government respectively
proposed for forest conversion.13 The proposal for the forest conversion was
submitted to the Ministry of Forestry in 2006, after thirteen District Heads/
Mayors had agreed on the Draft Revised PSP earlier that year. Yet, at the time
of writing, the Ministry of Forestry still rejects the proposal, arguing that the
Ministry recently converted over one million hectares of Forest Area in East
12 Opportunities for economic growth, and underdevelopment or isolation are two other
considerations to decide whether particular areas should become provincial strategic zones.
See Provinsi Kalimantan Timur (2006, p. 64).
13 The thirteen districts/municipalities of East Kalimantan had similar reasons, when they
proposed forest conversion. They argued that many parts of the Forest Area had been
occupied, even before the Forest Area existed. This inevitably turned into conflicts between
local people, the government and forest concessionaires. They also pointed at the vast
development of some cities and their need for new land, as another reason for forest
conversion. For a place like the Mahakam and Bulungan Delta particularly, the district
government argued that they needed the forest conversion, because the status of Forest
Area of the Delta did not allow them to control the vast development of shrimp ponds.
It was assumed that if the proposed areas were converted into KBNK, the district govern-
ments would be able to exert control, for the area would fall under their authority (Kronol-
ogis Pembahasan 2007).
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Kalimantan and that the Provincial and District governments have only
awarded one-fourth to private companies (Kronologis Pembahasan 2006).
Another proposal
In 2009 the Kutai Fishery Agency started to develop a conservation zone for
mangrove crab (Scylla sp.). The idea came from the fact that the number of
mangrove crabs had declined due to large-scale conversion of mangrove forest
and overexploitation. A research project funded by the Kutai Fishery Agency
and run by local academics showed that during the period of February to
August 2009, crab production had gone down from 19,950 kg to 12,760 kg
(Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara 2009, p. I-5). For a suitable
area of crab conservation the researchers recommended Letung and Berau
Kecil Island of Muara Badak sub-district. They recommended an area of around
3,900 ha (Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kutai Kartanegara 2009, p. IV-42).
In accordance with the Law of 2004 on Fisheries and Government Regula-
tion No. 60/2008 on Conservation of Fishery Resources, conservation of fishery
resources aims at protecting endangered species, preserving biodiversity,
keeping the ecosystem in balance, and establishing sustainable fishery resource
use. A fishery conservation area can be divided into several zones, notably
a primary zone, sustainable fishery zone and utilization zone. Fishery resource
use is allowed in any zone, except in the primary zone. According to a formal
procedure, the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries is authorized to
endorse fishery conservation, after receiving a proposal from the governor,
district head or mayor. Once the plan is endorsed, a committee needs to be
formed to carry out delineation.
Meanwhile, even though the 2009 research on the assessment of area
for crab conservation was eventually carried out, different views arose on the
significance of fishery conservation for the Mahakam Delta. A middle-ranking
officer, who was in charge of conservation affairs, was reluctant to carry out
the research at the beginning, arguing that in case of large-scale environmental
depletion as in the Mahakam Delta, people needed real action rather than
discussing concepts. Another practical reason, at which she pointed, was that
she was new in her job, and therefore did not sufficiently comprehend the
planned activities of her predecessor.14
9.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES REGARDING SPATIAL PLANS
This section examines the extent to which spatial planning is visible on the
ground, so that government officials can properly implement policies as well
14 Interview MEA, a head of Section for Conservation Issue of Kutai Fishery Agency, 19/8/
2009.
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as settle disputes between users, and so that users know in which particular
area they can or can not exercise their rights. It also examines the extent to
which officials comply with the declared spatial planning
The tidal trap case described in Section 6.1 is a perfect example to illustrate
the extent to which all declared spatial planning proceeded to delineation in
order to produce maps or boundary marks on the ground. The participants
of meetings held in late August and early September 2009, who represented
the Kutai District government, asked an official of the Port Administration
of the Ministry of Public Transportation if traffic lights (Ind. rambu-rambu) had
been installed to indicate the public shipping lanes. He could only respond
that traffic lights had been installed in a few spots. However, he could not
be certain if any traffic lights were located in the areas where the tidal traps
were installed. Since that he could not give a convincing answer about the
traffic lights, other participants of the meetings doubted whether the tidal traps
were really located inside the public shipping lanes, as Total E&P claimed. A
retired head of section on fishery resource surveillance of the Kutai Fishery
Agency revealed that the traffic lights of shipping lanes did not exist in the
field. What actually existed in the field were the traffic lights of Total E&P
which they needed for the navigation of their transportation.15
Meanwhile, the Kutai District government officials strongly requested from
the Total E&P Indonesie employees to deliver information on all the company’s
platforms and installations, where fishing was prohibited. The request came
up, as the company’s employees could not present the maps of the prohibited
and restricted areas. The idea was that if the information was available, it could
be used to settle upcoming disputes. The employees could not present a map
of their work area, which was attached to their PSC, either. On the ground,
instead of installing boundary marks lining off the prohibited and restricted
areas, the company had merely installed notification boards, which did not
indicate the areas. Safety had therefore been the primary reason for installing
the notification boards. Moreover, as said, the company had not installed
boundary marks, because they did not believe they had exclusive rights over
the sea (see Section 6.4).
As said, both the designation and delineation of the Forest Area of the
Mahakam Delta were hardly communicated to land holders. The officials of
the TUFPS concealed their original purpose and the legal impact that their
activities might have on the land holders (see Section 5.5). As a result, villagers
removed most of the boundary marks, leaving the Forest Area to be hardly
visible on the ground (Syafrudin 2005, p. 75). Likewise, hardly any notification
boards could be found on the ground indicating it was Forest Area, as many
field officials have long suggested. The idea to install notification boards came
later in 2008, when a team formed by the Kutai District Head held two meet-
15 Interview MK, 6/12/2011.
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ings with villagers to publicly announce the existence of the Forest Area.
However, as the boundary marks were installed in the interest of securing
oil and gas extraction, the installation of the boundary marks was only done
on two islands where the company’s installation and platforms were located.
Not only has the lack of boundary marks invited land holders to challenge
the existence of the Forest Area, it has also caused some regional and local
government officials and the employees of state-owned companies to behave
as if there is no Forest Area in the Mahakam Delta. In the 1980s, Pertamina
warned a private company which wished to construct 2,000 ha of shrimp ponds
on two islands of Muara Badak sub-district, that the two islands were located
within a state mining zone. Nevertheless, Pertamina was willing to award use
rights to the company, on the condition that the company had to return the
land, once Pertamina wanted to extract oil and gas in the area, without having
to compensate the company in return.16 Around the same year, the Provincial
Fishery Agency bought three hectares of land from a villager of Muara Pantuan
to be used as a demonstration plot. In 1987 and 1991 respectively, the National
Land Agency sponsored land titling projects, which freed land holders from
any fee. The land titling projects resulted in 891 ha of certified land.17 The
land purchase nor land titling took into account the prior existence of the
Production Forest. Likewise, lawyers and judges who engaged in the land case
trial, perceived that no Forest Area existed in the Mahakam Delta, because
they found no trees growing on the disputed land during a field visit (see
Section 8.4).
9.4 LEGISLATION: IDENTIFICATION OF SOME PROBLEMATIC ISSUES
It is generally recognized that different resource uses can jointly take place
in the same area through partial utilization by different users. Indonesia’s law
on natural resources has actually adopted the recognition of different resource
uses in the same area as a legal principle which, for instance, can be seen in
forestry regulations. Indonesia’s forestry law allows various different uses of
forest resource in one particular area. For instance, authorities could issue a
forest extraction permit in a Forest Area over which a permit for bee cultivation
was already granted.18 The application of the principle can result in coinciding
regulations and natural resources use, without necessarily turning to incoher-
ence. Legally speaking, the simultaneous existence of various forms of resource
16 Interview MK, 11/8/2008, and HI, 19/8/2009.
17 This land certification resulted from a project on land consolidation and redistribution held
by the District Office of National Land Agency in 1986 and 1991 which took place in Sepatin
and Muara Pantuan village of Anggana sub-district.
18 See Article 27 and 48(3) of Government Regulation No. 6/2007 concerning Forest Manage-
ment, and the Formation of Forest Plans and Forest Utilization.
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use, which are governed by different regulations have a legal basis through
the Decision of the People’s Consultative Assembly No. IX/2001 on Agrarian
Reform and Natural Resources Management. Nonetheless, the Decree re-
commends synchronization as a necessary requirement to avoid disjunction
between the different regulations on natural resources use (Patlis in Reso-
sudarmo 2005, p. 240).
In contrast, spatial planning may turn to conflict under the following three
conditions. Firstly, the regulations of different sectors do not mutually refer
to one another in order to achieve what is called co-ordination in public
administration literature. Secondly, designation and delineation aimed at
implementing spatial planning do not take into account existing forms of
resource use. Thirdly, there are hardly any boundary marks on the ground
to indicate the delineation and designation.
As said, some national regulations have managed to refer to other regula-
tions in relation to spatial planning. For instance, the forestry regulations refer
to oil and gas regulations which were passed earlier (Section 5.2 and 5.4), and
so do the fishery regulations to shipping regulations (Section 7.2 and 7.4).
However, the regulations only included one-sided references. For example,
forest regulations provide tenure security for oil and gas companies, but not
the other way around, given that oil and gas regulations refer to land regula-
tions on land, which in accordance with forest regulations are not enforceable
in Forest Areas. Nor do shipping regulations refer to fishery regulations, when
it concerns fishing zones. As a result, tenure security in one sector can coexist
with insecurity in another sector.19
The fact that the oil and gas regulations did not refer to the 2001 Agreed
Forest Plan, shows the disrespect of the oil and gas companies to the forestry
spatial planning. As said in Section 6.4, Vico perceived itself not to be affected
by the Agreed Forest Plan, given that they had been in the area before the
designation had been issued. To some extent Pertamina also maintained the
perception that it was not subject to the forestry regulations, when it claimed
to be the owner of two islands in the Muara Badak sub-district. At present,
when dealing with newly emerging land claims by local residents, Vico thinks
that once it has acquired land from local holders through compensation, the
government has granted them the acquired land (Hidayati et al. 2005, p. 43).
One important reason why cross-referencing has not been realized so that
uncertainty remains with regard to particular spatial planning is the prioritiza-
tion of particular sectors. Fishing zones and Agreed Forest Plans might not
be fully implemented, given that they are supposed to advance oil and gas
19 Other authors regarded the non-mutual respect of the sectoral regulations as confusing.
In this respect they also referred to the absence of a cadastral survey. In the cases that the
sectoral departments were able to provide maps, confusion still arose given that their maps
were based on different scales and detail. As a result, it is difficult to know the real status
of land (RePPProt 1990, p. 50 and 185-186).
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extraction. Similarly, the fishing zones have to consider public shipping lanes.
It is true that the practice of prioritization respects rights by providing com-
pensation to right holders, yet it has also led to barriers which restricted the
ability of particular spatial planning projects to effectively achieve their goals.
For example, the fishing zone could not protect the small-scale fishermen due
to the presence of oil and gas installations in Zone I (Hidayati et al. 2005).
Due to the fact that the sectoral regulatory regimes and spatial planning
lack cross-references, it is important to raise the question to what extent the
above proposed spatial plans have addressed the one-sided references and
attempted to provide a solution? The latter question is not solely concerned
with the coordination between government agencies, but also with the extent
to which fishermen and shrimp farmers are involved. To what extent has the
proposed spatial planning been based on actual resource use in the Mahakam
Delta versus an ideal-type or vested interests?
The absence of boundary marks on the ground has made compliance with
the declared spatial planning with regards to right granting and control more
difficult. As said, on some occasions the village heads were asked not to issue
a land letter, if the land was located inside the Forest Areas. However, when
village heads tried to implement the instruction, land holders spontaneously
asked the village heads to show them the boundary marks indicating the
borders of the Forest Area. Not only did the village heads fail to show the
boundary marks, they were also unable to install marks as they did not have
the authority to do so.
9.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is apparent that in the case of the Mahakam Delta the depletion of the
environment and the conflicts over resource use do not result from an absence
of formal spatial planning. Both for the Mahakam mainland and the Mahakam
Delta a spatial plan exists. However, uncontrolled right granting which has
generated environmental destruction and social conflicts, and a lack of cross-
references in the existing regulations have tempted some key actors and
scholars to believe that no spatial plan exists for the Mahakam Delta. This
perception led to the suggestion of forming a new or redesigned spatial plan
for the Mahakam Delta. Legal problems, such as the absence of cross-references
in the existing sectoral regulations, and the absence of boundary marks are
actually the most important reasons for people to disrespect the rights that
have been granted in the making of spatial planning. Moreover, dispute
settlement has been hampered considerably given that government officials
have hardly ever been able to confirm in which zones the conflicts precisely
took place, so that they could not determine if there had been a lack of compli-
ance or not. In addition, the responsible government officials have not been
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able to properly implement policies, because they themselves did not work
in accordance with existing spatial plans.
Given that the makers of new or redesigned spatial planning have incorrect-
ly assumed that hardly any spatial planning exists for the Mahakam Delta,
we have reason to fear that such new plan might not be in accordance with
and not even refer to existing spatial planning. Therefore a new spatial plan
could easily lead to further problematic overlap.

10 Administrative implementation of law:
a cause for concern
This final Chapter consists of two parts. The first part presents the key findings
on legal inconsistency and incoherence in legislation (see Section 10.1) as well
as on bureaucratic behaviour in law-making (see Section 10.2) and implementa-
tion of law (see Section 10.3). The second part sets out how the findings of
this book contribute to the theoretical considerations set out in Section 1.3 and
makes a number of suggestions for future research (see Section 10.4).
It is important to underline that the key findings explain the extent to
which the substance of the laws and regulations and the processes of making,
implementation and enforcement have provided legal security to the right
holders, and clarity on authority and legality to the regional and local govern-
ment officials. The processes of making, implementing and enforcing law are
analysed in this book by taking a close look at the behaviour of a number of
regional and local bureaucrats. This is done in the context of decentralization
whereby this chapter suggests that decentralization has shaped the interpreta-
tions of the stakeholders, which eventually affected the way in which adminis-
trative power on resource management was exercised. To some extent, this
book observes that decentralization also affected the working environment
within the government agencies.
The second part of this chapter describes the contribution of this book to
a wider theoretical debate within socio-legal discourse on the role of the
bureaucracy in legal processes concerning natural resources management. In
line with the theoretical contribution, there will be some suggestions for further
research.
10.1 LEGISLATIVE INCONSISTENCIES AND INCOHERENCE
As already said (see Section 1.3.2) inconsistency occurs when there are contra-
dictions between legal principles or legal rules, whereas legislation is in-
coherent when (sets of) legal principles and legal rules are not mutually
interdependent or do not fit together. Inconsistency can appear in two ways:
(sectoral) legislations contradict each other or are incompatible.1 Meanwhile,
1 Concerning the second manifestation it is important to underline that incompatibility in
this respect refers to a condition whereby a particular legislation constrains the validity
of other legislation so that it leads to inconsistency (Hage 2000, p. 373-374).
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there are two types of incoherence: the absence of mutual referencing between
sectoral laws, or disharmony between statutory and case law.
10.1.1 Inconsistency
A good example of inconsistency in sectoral legislation is in the area of fishing
zones, oil and gas platforms and shipping lanes. Fishery regulations aim at
protecting small-scale fishermen, allowing fishing in Zone I (0-3 nautical miles
from the coast) (Section 7.2). However, this is inconsistent with regulations
which prohibit or restrict the use of the area in the vicinity of oil and gas
platforms, as they limit the possibilities to fish in Zone I (Section 6.2; Section
7.4). A similar issue applies to the regulations on shipping lanes, which pro-
hibit the installation of gears in public shipping lanes (Section 7.2; Section 7.4).
This contradiction rests in the uncertainty of fishing rights of small-scale
fishermen and above all impedes fishery regulations in meeting their desired
goal, namely the protection of small-scale fishermen.
A similar problem occurs in regulations concerning management authority
over the nine Forest Areas. On one hand, regulation on decentralization
stipulates that all nine Forest Areas that are located in the administrative area
of the Kutai District should be handed over to the Kutai District, but on the
other hand regulation on forestry and the organizational structure of the
regional government stipulates the opposite, stating that some of the Forest
Areas are still under the authority of the Provincial government (Section 5.2).
As said in Section 5.3, these contradictions in the sectoral legislation dis-
couraged the Kutai Forestry Agency officials from enforcing the law, e.g.
protecting the forest.
Meanwhile, incompatibility may generate inconsistency when lower regula-
tions add new provisions which are not mentioned in the higher regulations.
In the Mahakam Delta this occurred when the Kutai Regulation on Fishery
Business of 2000 included a provision that changed the nature of the Small
Scale Fisheries Registration Certificate (SSFRC) from a mere record to a permit
(Section 7.4). As shown in the julu case (Section 7.4), an official of the Kutai
Fishery Agency referred to the provision in accusing the julu installation of
being against the law. Another example of such incompatibility is the 2004
circular letter in which the original provisions of the Kutai Regulation on
Fishing were extended (Section 7.4). The extension restricted the small-scale
fishermen in exercising their formal fishing rights.
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10.1.2 Incoherence
Absence of mutual-referencing
Even though sectoral legislation does show a level of mutual-referencing
concerning the resource management of the Mahakam Delta (Section 5.4;
Section 6.3), there are few pieces of sectoral legislation that mutually support
each other (Section 6.3; Section 9.4). Due to the absence of mutually-supporting
legislation certain sectoral legislation has lost its legitimacy. In the Mahakam
Delta, this occurred in the case of the forestry rules when resource users and
even government officials rejected the legitimacy of the Forest Area. This
confirms one of the assumptions as set out in the conceptual background
(Section 1.3.1): due to the illegitimacy, the implementation of the forestry law
and regulations was ineffective.
It is obvious that the absence of mutually referencing or mutually support-
ing sectoral legislation generates uncertainty: instead of creating unity, the
sectoral legislation creates overlap so that some legislation cancels each other
out. In the case of the Mahakam Delta, one good example is the management
of marine resources. Central to this issue is that each government department,
which has a spatial plan, claims authority over its respective work areas.2 Each
government agency claims to have a spatial plan that they propose to be taken
into account in settling cases. As Yusuf (2003, p. 64) has pointed out, the
difference between spatial plans causes confusion among private parties who
have applied for a permit location, since they do not know what is legal or
not.
Disharmony between statutory and case law
As said (Section 1.3.2), disharmony can occur between statutory and case law.
In the Mahakam Delta case, a good example is that both Tenggarong District
Court and Samarinda High Court acknowledged the possessory evidence that
the plaintiffs and defendants presented (Section 8.4). In this respect, the courts
complied with the 1957 precedent on possessory land evidence (Section 8.2).
However, forestry legislation did not acknowledge the possessory evidence.
In the Mahakam Delta, the non-recognition in the forestry legislation of
possessory evidence resulted in the absence of a settlement of third parties’
rights (Section 5.4) as well as the refusal by the village and sub-district officials
to process land letter applications (Section 8.4). This disharmony between
statutory and case law certainly brings about inequality amongst the possession
2 In the discussions on coastal resource management, it is often said that each sector has
its own legal basis which pursues different goals (Idris 2001, p. 19; Patlis et al. 2001, p. 28;
Arnscheidt 2003, p. 53-55; Patlis et al. 2005; Patlis 2005, p. 451-2; Waddell 2009, p. 190).
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holders: despite the fact that they all had possessory evidence, the law treated
them unequally.
10.2 ADDRESSING THE BEHAVIOUR OF BUREAUCRATS IN LAW-MAKING
This concluding chapter agrees with socio-legal scholars who argue that
implementability and enforceability are not solely related to the implementation
of law, but to law-making as well.3 Nonetheless, because this book only ex-
amines the making of draft regulation, this concluding chapter cannot examine
the extent to which the content of these draft regulations affects the effective-
ness of implementation.
In an effort to examine how regulations and policy rules on resource
management were made in Kutai District,4 this Chapter proposes to look at
three specific parts of the process. Firstly, reasons to make draft regulations.
Secondly, coordination among and within the local agencies. This also includes
the coordination with higher government levels. Thirdly, the involvement of
affected people in the process. Accordingly, the type of law-making that this
Chapter discusses is one in which the District legislators are not involved.
10.2.1 Reasons for law-making
As far as the local officials are concerned, the reasons they gave for making
regulations varied. They ranged from carrying out an assigned task, pursuing
local revenue or settling a conflict, to copying other regions’ regulations, or
responding to ineffective implementation of law. However, one should add
one other important reason. The fact that the largest amount of the budget
which was allocated for regulation making went to the pockets of the local
officials through allowances shows that the officials also had personal financial
interests. In addition to the allowance, for higher ranking officials, regulation
making appeared to be an opportunity to develop close personal relations with
local legislators. It is also important to highlight what incentivized the officials
to make a regulation. These reasons vary as well, ranging from a brief talk
with someone, a superior’s oral instruction, observing a particular local situ-
ation, to individual complaints by a regulated group. According to the inter-
views, the initiative was never prompted by a systematic evaluation of the
implementation of law. Since local officials’ motives were mostly based on
3 For the accounts of this argument see Seidman (1978a); Seidman (1978b); Seidman and
Seidman (1994); Van Rooij (2006), and Arnscheidt, Van Rooij and Otto (2008).
4 The opportunity to closely observe the processes of law-making has a reason during field
works in the Fishery Agency therefore the conclusions on law-making in the final chapter
are based on finding in this sector only.
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their individual experiences, they were hardly ever written down. As a result,
it often occurred that a draft regulation was already redundant when one
particular agency had prepared a draft regulation, despite the fact that other
agencies had arranged similar drafts.
10.2.2 Intra- and inter-agency coordination
Among the Kutai District administrative officials, there is a tendency to per-
ceive coordination as a matter of ‘listing names’ and getting legitimacy. The
former means the inclusion of names of officials of other agencies/bodies/
offices/divisions, whilst these people do not play an actual role in reality. The
latter is to consult with higher government levels to avoid annulment of
regulations, planned by the District. ‘The listing names’ strategy allows the
agencies/bodies/offices/divisions which have initiated the regulation to feel
that they have attempted sufficient administrative coordination. For example,
the Regional Office of the Ministry of Agriculture (POMA) felt that they had
sufficiently engaged the Provincial Office of the National land Agency (PONLA)
in making the so-called Agreed Forest Land Use Plan by listing some PONLA
officials’ names in the team commissioned by PONLA. A similar argument was
used by a division of the Kutai Fishery Agency in making the Kutai Draft
Regulation on Fishing. The same also applied to the making of the Kutai Draft
Regulation on Fishery Business, in which the Natural Resources Bureau put
down two officials’ names of the District Fishery Agency without asking their
permission.
This type of quasi-engagement can lead to an ambiguous situation and
can have serious implications. In the case of the Mahakam Delta it happened
that the officials whose names were listed in the team or committee were not
informed beforehand. As a result they were often only involved midway
through the process. Meanwhile, a serious implication is that the coordination
may not be able to meet its primary goal of avoiding overlap or confusion
(kesimpangsiuran) among the agencies/bodies/offices/divisions. In the Maha-
kam Delta this happened when the initiating agency, body or office was not
willing to figure out what initiatives and progress the other agencies, bodies
or offices had made so far, and therefore could not use the progress as a point
of departure. The strategy was used in order to hide something while avoiding
criticism from other agencies/bodies/offices/divisions; and out of an arrogance
of particular agencies/bodies/offices/divisions, which could lead to neglecting
other agencies’ capabilities.
It is important to note that the poor coordination does not always derive
from the agencies/bodies/offices/divisions, which have initiated the regulation
making. They can also come from the invited agencies/bodies/offices/divisions
as well. A factor that could hamper the coordination is when the invitees
suspect the initiating agencies/bodies/offices/divisions of having narrow
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vested interests in organizing the regulation making. Sometimes, no extensive
coordination was needed. It happened, for instance, that the invited agencies/
bodies/offices/divisions had previously attempted to make regulations, yet
failed due to a lack of access to the Legal Bureau or local legislators. In those
cases, they hoped that the new initiating agencies/bodies/offices/divisions
would succeed. Such expectations would rise, when they knew that the new
initiating agencies had closer political ties with the local legislators. In that
situation, the invitees were unlikely to object, if the regulation making process
was carried out without thorough coordination.
Meanwhile, coordination or what the local officials commonly call ‘consulta-
tion’ with the Provincial government and relevant departments of the central
government usually takes place. This occurs due to two reasons. The first
reason, often mentioned by the officials, is to avoid annulment by the Minister
of Home Affairs, as already happened in the case of two Kutai Regulations
in 2004 and 2008. Annulment, it was said, can be avoided by getting initial
inputs from departments, where the consultations are held. Yet for some
reason, this seems implausible. Firstly, in practice the local officials who
undertook the consultation did not only meet the Ministry of Home Affairs
yet also other sectoral departments which did not bear any relation to the
annulment process of local regulation. Secondly, the officials hardly made any
minutes of the consultations, to which they could have referred when they
were drafting the planned regulations. Another impact of the absence of
minutes was that an agency could carry out a new consultation despite the
subject matter being similar to matters that they had consulted on before. Such
futile consultations could have been avoided if minutes had been made.
Thirdly, they undertook the consultations despite the fact that the draft of the
regulation at hand was often not ready yet, allowing them to only orally
present general ideas during the consultation. Fourthly, they usually preferred
to carry out the consultations in person, eventhough consultations by phone,
especially with the officials of the Provincial Legal Bureau, would have been
an easier option.
The abovementioned doubts with regards to the first reason of the import-
ance of the consultation leads to a second reason: a vested interest to get
additional income through allowances. Recently, the opportunity to get addi-
tional income from allowances has increased due to increased supervision over
project management (in Indonesian popularly named as proyek)5 which used
5 Project management points to the implementation of planned programs as stated in the
Short-Term Working Development Plan and Annual Budget Plan of the regional government
(see Section 4.4). Administratively, when the agencies of the regional government implement
their planned programs, the head of the agencies appoint his particular officials to imple-
ment the planned programs. The appointed officials are popularly called as project head (in
Indonesian popularly known as kepala proyek). When the central government carries out a
financial audit of the implementation of the planned programs, the appointed officials are
responsible for any corruption allegations found besides their superiors. See Section 4.4.
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to be a favourable source of getting additional income. Of the several activities
for which an allowance can be obtained, travelling out of town is one of the
favourites.
10.2.3 Public Input
For some of the Kutai draft regulations efforts were made to invite the public
to participate. The local officials asked the affected groups – in this case
fishermen and farmers – what they thought was needed in the draft regula-
tions. Nonetheless, the public hearings were rarely carried out. According to
the officials, this was due to three reasons. Firstly, the officials thought that
what the fishermen and farmers raised during the hearings was not reliable
knowledge because they were less well educated. Moreover, the officials
claimed to know what the fishermen and farmers aspired to as the officials
had for long interacted with them. Secondly, the draft regulations concerned
practical matters so what the officials required was to have the fishermen and
farmers willing to implement the regulations, instead of getting an input from
them during the law-making process. Thirdly, budget constraints did not allow
for public hearings.
Nonetheless, the last reason for not sufficiently carrying out public hearing
seems to be unreasonable when looking at the amount of money that was spent
on carrying out other methods to gather input. Comparative study and con-
sultation with higher government units are the two methods on which most
money was spent. Not only was much money spent on these two methods,
they also turned out to be rather inefficient and ineffective. The local officials
carried out the comparative studies on holidays and in regions which they
had visited before. Thus, it seems that rather than a budget constraint, the lack
of engagement with the affected groups in the regulation making was caused
by a budget displacement. The legislation-makers mostly spent money on
travelling rather than asking reliable sources of information, such as the
fishermen, farmers and field officials.
Having described what incentivized the officials to draft a regulation and
how the coordination and public consultation were carried out, it is interesting
to assess the extent to which these processes have influenced the contents of
the Kutai draft and enacted regulations. It is interesting to note that due to
a lack of public hearings the contents of the draft and enacted regulations were
not in favour of the fishermen and farmers. However, this does not make the
content of the draft and enacted regulations defective in terms of environ-
mentally-sound policies. It is apparent that the individual concerns of the local
officials regarding the environmental deterioration affected the content of the
regulations. However, at the same time, the process was also hijacked by vested
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interests. In such cases the actual rationale of a regulation got lost. As occurred
in the case of the Kutai Draft Regulation on Fishery Business, the content only
constituted a compilation of enacted and draft regulations making it unlikely
that they were able to protect fishery resources from large-scale resource
extraction, as was its original objective.
10.3 ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOUR IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW
As has been described extensively in Chapter 5 and 7, in response to factors
that are internal and external to administrative institution, the local officials
and legal enforcers behaved in such a way that it subsequently affected the
implementation of laws and regulations. The behaviours of the officials and
legal enforcers brought the implementation of law into two contrasting situ-
ations: on most occasions the implementation of law was ineffective, but
sometimes the implementation of law was effective.
10.3.1 Behaviours that led to ineffectiveness
Economic advantage, long residence, justice concerns and internal conditions
The officials and enforcers frequently mentioned the following reasons in
arguing why the implementation of law was ineffective: economic advantage
and settlement history as well as political power of the resource users that
would cause the government to have to spend a lot of money if they imple-
mented the law, justice concerns, resource shortage, and bureaucratic adminis-
trative culture. In addition, they mentioned the rationality of resource users
in legal compliance and the exercise of local power. Of those reasons, economic
advantage and long residence of the resource users seem to be the primary
factors that impeded the effective implementation of law. In all natural resource
sectors, these two reasons have been advanced as a reason not to carry out
law enforcement despite the resource users obviously violating the formal
rules.6 In the forestry sector, law enforcement was feared to worsen the liveli-
hood of the local people.7 It is suggested that in a situation whereby law
breaking in the form of forest occupancy is widespread, enforcing the law
strictly would only generate large-scale violation that would make enforcement
6 On how economic advancement has influenced effective implementation and enforcement
of the law see Kubo (2010, p. 246). For other accounts of the argument of long residence
see Arnscheidt (2009, p. 354) and Kubo (2010, p. 244).
7 See Kaimowitz (2003: 2004) on how law enforcement of forestry laws and regulations can
worsen the livelihood of local people.
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unfeasible.8 Legal enforcers in the forestry sector, therefore, thought that their
response to the violation of formal rules should not necessarily rest on pro-
secution or legal punishment, but on creating a sense of legal obligation
instead.9 Thus, in this case, as exactly occurred in the protection of the Pro-
duction Forest of the Mahakam Delta, the legal obligation could be perceived
as an exchange for the deliberately missed legal punishment. The idea behind
the exchange was an invitation from the local forestry officials to the shrimp
farmers to conduct a partnership in protecting the Forest Area.
Economic advantage and long residence of the resource users do not stand
alone. The cost of enforcing the law and justice concerns, are two correspond-
ing reasons which the local officials raised. The officials were aware that if
they would enforce the law, they would need to provide alternative sources
of income or compensation for the subsistent resource users.10 Apart from
the concrete repercussions of implementing the law, the local officials tried
to link the minimal presence of law enforcement over the Productive Forest
with justice concerns. They pointed to two unfair situations to illustrate those
concerns.
Firstly, on one hand the local users had lived in the area for a long period,
even prior to the 1983 designation, and had spent much money to construct
ponds and cultivate fish. On the other hand, the Provincial government and
the MoF hardly protected or guarded the forest. Giving a concrete example
of the absence of higher government levels, the local officials blamed the
Provincial government and MoF for not socializing the official status of the
Delta’s forest to the local people. It should be underlined that the local officials’
criticism on the unjust situation partly needs to be set against the context,
namely a competition between Kutai District government, and the Provincial
government and MoF regarding the authority to manage the forest. Secondly,
whilst the oil and gas companies earned a huge amount of money from the
oil and gas extraction, the larger-scale local fishermen and shrimp farmers
earned only a small amount of money. The abovementioned reasons caused
the local officials and legal enforcers to think that legal punishment was unfair
and therefore unnecessary.
Apart from the abovementioned reasons, the local officials also pointed
to the regulated groups. Their argument that the fishermen and shrimp farmers
were short-sighted was not only pointed out as factor that led to a decline
in people’s participation in law-making, it was also mentioned as a factor that
8 See Wasserman (1992) about the relation between the cost of compliance and enforceability,
and Gezelius and Hauck (2011, p. 461) for how a deterrence-oriented enforcement of fishery
regulation has strengthened resistance through increasing illegal fishing.
9 According to Kubo (2010, p. 246) the decision to not control and punish ‘illegal’ forest
occupants is in order to maintain a credible social relationship so that the officials can work
together with the communities. See also Kajembe and Monela (2000, p. 383).
10 Other scholars examined the decision to not enforce formal rules in order to avoid political
risk. See for instance Fisher et al. (2005).
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stopped the local officials from carrying out effective implementation of law.
In stressing the importance of character, the local officials and legal enforcers
sometimes added other associated character traits such as being greedy, tricky
or stubborn (Hidayati 2004; Simarmata 2011, p. 177-196). With this characteriza-
tion, the local officials and legal enforcers actually depicted two different sides
of the fishermen and shrimp farmers. On one hand they saw the fishermen
and shrimp farmers as vulnerable groups that needed to be understood, but
on the other hand they saw the fishermen and shrimp farmers as those who
have a determining influence over the implementation of law. This determining
influence seemed even stronger because the fishermen and shrimp farmers
complied (or not) with the laws and regulations on the basis of an estimation
of the cost and benefit they might get.11
Concerning factors derived from conditions internal to the administrative
institutions, the local officials and legal enforcers pointed to the lack of
resources and coordination as well as political interference. Carrying out
implementation and enforcement of law in a remote area such the Mahakam
Delta is extremely expensive, and budget displacement did not make the job
easier.12
Legitimacy delivery
It is interesting that local officials and legal enforcers did not only point to
non-legal factors, they also pointed to legal factors. They used the legal factors
to justify both inaction and action. They did not carry out effective implementa-
tion because the shrimp farmers were legal. They provided legitimacy to the
shrimp farmers, because they thought that their action of issuing or recognizing
the land letter did not violate the existing formal rules. They came up with
such perception by developing a particular interpretation of the law.13
The fact that some of the local officials thought that there was no illegality
in the actual resource use in the Mahakam Delta may suggest two things.
Firstly, an ambivalence had clearly emerged among the local bureaucrats in
looking at the legality of the actual resource use. Secondly, a heterogeneous
legal understanding emerged within the local bureaucracy from which different
legal meanings and actions could arise.14
11 Scholars with an economic approach to law and regulatory studies have pointed at the
influence of a cost and benefit calculation on legal compliance. See for instance Becker (1968),
and Baldwin, G.R., and Veljanovski, C.G (1984).
12 See Hyden, Court and Mease (2004, p. 136) and McCarthy (2006, p. 14) on how distance
really matters for public service provision in Indonesia.
13 On how forest users developed legal interpretations in an attempt to justify their actions
in utilizing Forest Areas see Safitri (2010, p. 213-215).
14 Santos (1995; 2006, p. 46) suggests that plural or heterogeneous legal meaning and action
could be the result from the co-existence of different or even contradictory legal orders
or cultures. Other literature on legal pluralism names the phenomenon as state law plural-
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Social distance
Meanwhile, the field officials are often members of the fishermen’s and
farmers’ neighbourhoods as they live in the same villages. This means that
they are socially attached to the community, and therefore maintaining social
relationships is unavoidable. It is a strategy for them to secure social backing
for playing their official role.15 For officials who are ethnic, kinship or family
members of a regulated group, the social attachment is stronger given they
also have to comply with traditional authorities.16 Together with the ack-
nowledgement of the economic advantage and long residence of the fishermen
and shrimp farmers, the social ties generated behaviours that led to field
officials favouring the regulated groups. They sometimes shifted their role
to become a defender of the regulated groups against the higher government
level officials or the officials of other agencies. In cases concerning the formal
status of the Delta’s forest, the field officials of the District Forestry Agency
most of the time acted as defenders of the shrimp farmers by showing old
documents that they had issued to prove the prior existence of the ponds.
When their sense of sympathy met with pragmatism, they shifted their role
to being a legal problem solver in which they discovered how actual use could
be fitted within the legal requirements.
However, the local officials as well as legal enforcers who were socially
distant from the fishing and farming communities, were mostly pragmatic
and cynical despite their understanding of the economic and social aspects
of the actual resource use. Their pragmatism often led to the concealment of
their official mission in front of the shrimp farmers. Meanwhile, their negative
characterization of the fishermen and shrimp farmers and favouritism of the
oil and gas extraction companies led these local officials and legal enforcers
to overlook the economic and social reality and as a result apply formal
deductive logic.17
ism. For accounts of state law pluralism see for instance Hooker (1975) and Woodman
(1998).
15 For literature which perceives the avoidance of law enforcement as a survival strategy see
Kajembe and Monela (2000, p. 383).
16 The implementation of formal rules in which informal rule is taken into consideration is
seen as a strategy to balance two normative orders. See Fleming (1966) and Kiggundu,
Jorgensen and Hafsi (1983, p. 77). Other literature sees it as cultural influence on the attitude
or behaviour of bureaucrats (Harris and Kearney 1963; Pizam, Abraham and Reichel 1977;
Haque 1997, p. 445). For how kinship, family and friend ties have considerably influenced
the way bureaucrats carry out public services see Riggs (1964, p. 274-276) and Conkling
(1975).
17 Eisendstadt (1969, p. 356-366) pointed out that in an effort to maintain relations with the
external environment, bureaucrats establish a continuous equilibrium in which they are
subversive of their desired goals on one hand, and maintain their autonomy by means
of strict implementation of law on the other hand.
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The effects of decentralization
In Section 3.3 it was shown that there is hardly a difference between the ways
in which natural resources of the Mahakam mainland and Mahakam Delta
were governed before and after the 1999 decentralization. This, of course,
stands in sharp contrast with the status of the Kutai District which has long
been seen as an icon of decentralization.18 Not only because of the position,
the Kutai District indeed made many local regulations and established some
new agencies in a way to decentralize. It is apparent that decentralization has
affected the administration of resource management in the Mahakam Delta
as can be seen in the perceptions and actual behaviours of local bureaucrats
and local users. When the changing perceptions and behaviours affected the
administrative resource management, they subsequently influenced how the
central government perceived as well as exercised their authority in the Delta.
Decentralization was not only reflected in the perception and behaviour of
the local officials, its effects were also reflected in the administrative compe-
tition between the different levels of government. The economic advancement
of the fishermen and shrimp farmers, to which the local officials pointed, is
actually a logical consequence of the District Government’s general insight
on decentralization. They believed that people’s prosperity is a final destination
where decentralization should head (see Section 3.3). In this respect, we could
say that the District Government advanced the goal of economic development
by temporarily overlooking the implementation of law. As a result, in dispute
settlements, instead of advancing the imposition of law, the local officials and
legal enforcers sought for a ‘win-win solution’.19
The way in which the local officials viewed decentralization in the Maha-
kam Delta was not only based on their personal views, they also took into
account local users’ perceptions of decentralization. The central government
transferred the authority to issue permits to the district/municipality govern-
ment in a response to the emerging social conflicts regarding natural resources
use. Not only did the central government respond to the emerging situation
through administrative means, it also refrained from imposing laws upon those
who illegally occupied and utilized Forest Areas as happened in the Delta.
Moreover, the MoF even advised the companies to compensate the forest
occupants.
Meanwhile, given there is no powerful oil and gas regulatory agency left
since the great repositioning of Pertamina in the early 2000s, the exercise of
administrative power on oil and gas resource use in the Mahakam Delta has
18 Kutai District has been an icon of decentralization due to two advantages. Firstly, it has
the largest District Annual Budget Plan of all districts in Indonesia. Secondly, it used to
have a District Head who was famous and chaired the Indonesian Association of District
Governments (2000-2004).
19 Interview NUS, 26/8/2009.
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changed. The new regulatory agency, the Executive Agency, which received
authority on the basis of deconcentration, does not have the same amount of
power as Pertamina. As a result, the Executive Agency advised the oil and
gas companies to refrain from advancing legal enforcement for it could disrupt
extraction. Hence, the change in administrative authority which occurred
alongside the emergence of the resource user’s perception on decentralization
seems to have led to law playing its former role: to integrate various interests
of groups of society.
10.3.2 Behaviours that led to effectiveness
Meanwhile, in the instances when the implementation of law has been effective,
this has been largely influenced by the interest to ensure continued oil and
gas exploration. As mentioned in Section 3.2, in the past on the Mahakam
mainland, the implementation of law had been effective in the forestry sector
due to its important contribution to the District’s revenues. Throughout the
periods of state intervention, it is evident that oil and gas regulations were
fairly effectively implemented, making it difficult to implement the regulations
of other resource sectors effectively at the same time. Apart from favouring
the oil and gas extraction, another factor that has allowed for effective imple-
mentation is the characterization in which the local officials and legal enforcers
saw the fishermen and shrimp farmers as profit seekers. In that situation, the
local officials and legal officers did no longer see the fishermen and shrimp
farmers as a vulnerable group who needed an ‘understanding policy’. They,
instead, saw the fishermen and shrimp farmers as those whose behaviour
should be controlled in order to be in line with the existing laws and regula-
tions.
10.4 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH
As said the second part of this chapter shows how this book is placed in and
contributes to the wider academic debate on legal processes of administrative
management of natural resources. Finally, this section also makes a number
of suggestions for further research both to enrich academic discussion and
provide reliable input that can be used for any law and policy reform initiative.
10.4.1 Theoretical considerations
The reasons and factors that the local officials in the Mahakam Delta mentioned
to explain why they did not implement and enforce the formal rules as offi-
cially desired, again confirm views which suggest that the bureaucracy is not
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always a threat for society (see Section 1.3.1). The incongruence between the
administrative practices in natural resources management and the formal rules
is not a result of self-interest or corrupt behaviour despite the fact that, as Auer
et al. (2006) and McCarthy (2006) point out, it could risk natural resources.
In the Mahakam Delta, the incongruence has emerged on account of both
rational and emotional considerations. The rational consideration is to avoid
conflict and a larger workload, and to maintain credible social relationships.
The emotional consideration is sympathy or respect as an expression of social
concern.
Some literature as cited in Section 1.3.1 points out that when actions to
violate formal rules constitute a main or sole source of income to sustain the
livelihood of the resource users, the bureaucrats often prefer to only warn the
law-breakers instead of imposing the formal rules (Kubo 2012; Chhteri, Larsen
and Smith-Hall 2012). This book found that the imposition of a non-legal
obligation on law-breakers as an alternative administrative punishment was
used besides the warning. As said, the Kutai District officials asked the shrimp
farmers to plant mangrove trees as an exchange for their unlawful occupation
and use of the Forest Area.
The concerns of the local officials with the people’s livelihood alongside
other historical and socio-cultural considerations, have been suggested to be
a manifestation of rational and emotional considerations on behalf of the local
officials. As Van Rooij (2006) points out, the imposition of law, which regulated
groups find demanding, might generate conflict or larger violations. As
Gezelius and Hauck (2011) have shown, deterrence-oriented enforcement of
fishery regulations could result in resistance through increased illegal fishing.
In a situation where the bureaucracy is lacking resources, the imposition of
the formal rules could increase their workload, for they have to provide
compensation or other employment opportunities. Kajembe and Monela (2003)
and Kubo (2010) have pointed to the importance of maintaining credible social
relationships which enables the bureaucrats to work together with the affected
communities as another rational motive. Moreover, for a place like the Maha-
kam Delta, in which the punggawas are considerably powerful due to their
economic and social role (see Section 2.4), maintaining credible social relation-
ships is even more important.
Nevertheless, as I mostly found in the Mahakam Delta, the attention to
livelihood seems to be an expression of what some literature names ‘social
concern’ or ‘non-maximizing behaviour’ (Barnard in Milne 1970; North 1990;
Dixit 1997). The social concern which manifested in sympathy and respect
also included concern about the fact that the local users had spent money to
sustain their source of income and the fact that they only carried out subsistent
resource use. The imposition of the formal rules was therefore believed to
potentially worsen the livelihood of the local resource users (Kaimowitz 2003).
This book found that the concern with local users was greater when the
local officials had real justice concerns. In the era of decentralization, such
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concern emerged when the local officials noted the unfairness and inequality
that the central government authority had created in the regions. When such
justice concerns were at play, the local officials were not merely compromising,
cooperative, responsive or inclusive like the existing literature has pointed
out (Thomson 1964; Milne 1970; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Aalders and
Wilthagen 1997), but they would shift their role to become the defender of
the local users causing them object against formal rules.
However, the social concerns that the local officials showed, do not merely
originate from objective facts that they had observed. It also originates from
their self-perceived role as a social group which has a higher status than the
ordinary people (Abueva 1970). Regarding origin, some say that this culture
of paternalism stems from the post-colonial period when, due to the small
size of an entrepreneurial class, bureaucrats emerged as the elite (Hirschmann
1981; Haque 1997; Hirschmann 1999). According to the concept of the ‘bureau-
cratic clect’ in which the bureaucracy is formed and functions on the basis
of communal exclusiveness, as Riggs (1965, p. 276) suggests, the feeling might
derive from a perception of bureaucrats who regards themselves as a leader
or father (Ind. bapak) on whom the regulated communities rely. In that role,
the local officials may have felt the duty to guide (membina) the fishermen and
shrimp farmers. At that point, the local officials were possibly not thinking
about carrying out legal duties, but instead about helping (membantu) and
giving (memberi). As Gray (1985: 55) notes, that feeling may come from
Indonesian legal culture in which citizens are concerned with a wise exercise
of power. In that culture, generosity of the state administrators is more valu-
able than their attitude towards the law.20
Apart from the rational and emotional considerations, this book adds the
interpretation of the formal rules by local bureaucrats as another motive used
to explain why they did not impose the formal rules. Not only did the legal
interpretation justify their decision to legitimize the actual resource use, it also
resulted in their opinion that the actual resource use was not illegal. This of
course contributes to a higher level of perceived tenure security (Safitri 2010;
Reerink 2011). As was described in Section 8.4, the legal professionals and
company employees shared the same perception on the legality of forest use.
This study of the Mahakam Delta shows two more factors which enhanced
perceived tenure security. The first is that due to severe incoherence and
inconsistency of the formal rules, the bureaucrats undertook legal interpreta-
tions which overlooked the principle of the hierarchy of legislation and justified
the actual resource use. The second is the bureaucrats’ perception of the actual
implementation of law. Having found that some regional government agencies
and private companies had illegally used the forest but had not been
prosecuted, the local bureaucrats concluded that the shrimp ponds were also
20 See also Lev (1972, p. 305).
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legal. Thus in the Mahakam Delta, these two factors complement long residence
and land-related documents, as Reerink has noted before (2011), to form
perceived land tenure security.
However, as some literature has pointed out, in a situation where imple-
mentation and enforcement of law hardly exist, sometimes formal rules are
strictly imposed. Yet, rather than regarding this development as a means for
bureaucrats to pursue personal gain, I would rather see the imposition as a
matter of what Eisenstadt (1969) called ‘maintaining a continuous equilibrium’.
As a frontier area where ‘national vital objects’ exist, it is important to maintain
the credibility of threat in order to keep the oil and gas extraction running
(Braithwaite 2002). For the field officials, the responsive and repressive atti-
tudes could be a consequence of playing a role as intermediary to keep both
the superiors and affected groups satisfied (Arce 1993).
Another aspect of the legal process, namely that the local officials hardly
took into consideration the fishermen and shrimp farmers’ opinions, is more
visible in the law-making process. Similar to the implementation of law, in
the law-making process the officials considered themselves as an educated
elite or father and believed they knew what the local users were thinking and
demanding. They therefore thought that listening to the affected groups in
the law-making process was unnecessary. Consequently, this led to top-down
law-making, in which bureaucrats who closely worked together with local
university lecturers dominated (Riggs 1964; Seidman 1978). During the making
of the 1983 Agreed Forest Land Use and 1975 and 2004 Circular Letter concern-
ing fishing ground restrictions, the bureaucrats served the interests of the oil
and gas companies.
On other occasions the legislation making also appeared as an arena in
which the various district agencies competed. Yet it should be noted that in
the Mahakam Delta, the competition cannot be regarded as a result of the
agencies’ rivalry, as the bureau-political theory points out, or the need to put
their own organizational interests ahead of other agencies’ interests.21 It is
evident that the competition was rather influenced by the pursuit of personal
interests, namely additional income and pursuing access to political institutions.
Thus, unlike what the incrementalist theory on policy making suggests, namely
that during such competition the agencies fight for their own coherent and
clear goals and ideologies, in the Mahakam Delta decisions and choices con-
cerning law making were also based on fluid personal preferences making
it difficult for organizational cohesion to exist (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972;
Tanner 1995).
21 For the accounts of the bureau-political theory see Arnscheidt, Van Rooij and Otto (2008).
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10.4.2 Some suggestions for further research
The suggestions for further research that this book would like to make are
not merely for scientific development, but also in an effort to better understand
the legal and administrative aspects of the Mahakam Delta in order to formu-
late knowledge-based policies.
This book points to the recommendations of previous research reports and
stakeholder meetings, which prematurely suggested the making of new regula-
tions, institutions and law enforcement as solutions to the management of the
Mahakam Delta.22 This instrumental approach rests on two misleading as-
sumptions. First, it assumes that the local officials will behave on the basis
of prescribed norms. Second, that compliance can be achieved through fiercer
law enforcement. As scholars have noted, this assumption is based on the idea
that the government ‘tells’ and others ‘act’ (Baldwin 1997; Gunningham,
Grabosky, and D. Sinclair 1998; Black 2002: 2-3; Baldwin, Carve and Lodge
2012, p. 106-107). The two misleading assumptions have resulted in many
people remarkably overlooking the complex picture of the implementation
of law. Furthermore, they deny the ability of local officials to respond to the
real problems of local communities.
Therefore, this book suggests that upcoming research on the Mahakam
Delta should further examine the accounts of the implementation of law. Since
this research focuses on the government institutions dealing with the manage-
ment of resource use, the upcoming research should try to find out the extent
to which the formal rules are implementable from the point of view of the
resource users. Such research would complement this research and other
existing research on some of the socio-legal aspects of the management of the
Mahakam Delta. That would provide data and analysis on how the formal
rules work when they encounter local social and political institutions.
The combined findings of the present and proposed research would provide
accounts on a variety of dimensions of the government dealing with resource
use in the Mahakam Delta. Such multi-dimensional view will enable the
formulation of law and policy which takes into account the ability of both the
local officials and resource users to implement and comply with the formal
rules. Moreover, these findings and analysis would probably help shape law
and policy with the underlying assumption that the implementation of law
22 For research reports suggesting such recommendations see for instance Bourgeois et al.
(2002, p. 94-95); Hidayati (2004, p. 106 and 110); Hidayati et al. (2004, p. 175) and Syafruddin
(2005, p. 127-130). For the recent stakeholder meetings which proposed similar recommenda-
tions see a proceeding of the ‘Lokakarya Penyelamatan Delta Mahakam Program Terpadu
Multi Pemangku Kepentingan’, held by Total E&P Indonesie in collaboration with the
Government of East Kalimantan and Kutai District, 27-28 October 2009 and ‘Policy Work-
shop Analysis on Mahakam Delta, held by the Mulawarman University in collaboration
with the University of Essex, Wageningen University, Stockholm Environment Institute,
Kasetsart University and Vietnam National University, September 2010.
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needs to be regarded as essential and that much could be learned from this
process. Instead of regarding the implementation of law from which informal
resource tenure has emerged, as irrelevant, law and policy formulation should
take these processes into account and incorporate them into the proposed rules
and institutions.
Summary
Indonesian Law and Reality in the Delta
A Socio-Legal Inquiry into Laws, Local Bureaucrats and Natural Resources Manage-
ment in the Mahakam Delta, East Kalimantan
Due to their wealth of natural reserves, deltas worldwide attract people. For
ordinary people who seek a better life, a delta is a promising place because
its natural resources can be collected and utilized. Meanwhile, states make
legal arrangements to control the resource use of deltas so that they can
generate state revenue and protect the environment. Nevertheless, in many
deltas around the world increasingly destructive natural resource extraction
has led to a number of social and environmental problems.
The Mahakam Delta of East Kalimantan, Indonesia, is no exception in that
regard. It has repeatedly been suggested that deforestation, namely the con-
version of mangrove forest into particular uses, is the main cause of the
environmental destruction of the Mahakam Delta. In turn, deforestation has
caused other forms of environmental destruction, such as abrasion, water
intrusion, depletion of fishery resources and reduced biodiversity. All those
forms of environmental destruction have tested the vital ecological functions
of the ecosystem of the Mahakam Delta over the last fourteen years. One result
has been the fact that the Mahakam Delta has lost much of its ability to provide
environmental services. In addition to the environmental destruction, conflicts
between resource users have arisen.
These two problems raise socio-legal questions about the Mahakam Delta’s
legal and administrative arrangements. How does law regulate resource use
in the Mahakam Delta? To examine the extent to which formal rules on
resource use have functioned, it is important to assess the extent to which
government officials have actually implemented the formal rules, and which
actors and factors have influenced the implementation of law. To better under-
stand legal and administrative arrangements it is important to also know the
law-making process of formal rules so that explanations for why resource use
is regulated in a particular way can be provided.
As far as the law is concerned, law has long regulated resource use of the
mainland as well as the marine part of the Mahakam Delta. Nevertheless, one
should say that when we discuss the making of implementing rules, regulation
concerning resource use on the mainland of the Mahakam Delta is ahead of
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such regulation on resource use in the marine part. Regulations regarding state
control over resource use constitute an important part of the legal arrange-
ments. The state has actually exercised formal control over all forms of resource
use in the Mahakam Delta; the type of control has depended, though, on the
form of use. For forestry resource use, law applied control through a territorial
strategy whereas for oil, gas and fishery resource use law applied a non-
territorial strategy. In forestry resource use, law determines that complementary
to the designation of a Forest Area, there has to be a physical delineation
through which the state affirms its tenure claim over the delineated area. By
contrast, in case of a state mining or fishing zone, law determines no such
physical delineation. In addition to the exercise of state control, there are laws
and regulations on spatial planning, whereby each natural resource sector and
each government unit has its own spatial plan.
The different sectors of natural resource apply different forms of state
control, but the legal provisions on use are similar. In general, they stipulate
that the state determines how and by whom resources within the designated
and delineated areas can be used. They also determine that only those who
have obtained a permit, license or rights from particular assigned formal
authorities are allowed to collect or utilise natural resources. Those who offend
the provisions could be sentenced to imprisonment or a fine. To be able to
exercise their rights over resource use, the permit or right holders are required
to fulfil a number of particular obligations. The companies with a Production
Sharing Contract for oil and gas extraction, for instance, are required to acquire
the land from private parties, before they exercise their rights of exploration
and exploitation.
In addition to the abovementioned legal provisions, there are provisions,
which assign the government the task to implement laws to control resource
use and carry out environmental protection whereby the different government
institutions have to be mutually interdependent. Forestry regulations, for
instance, appoint the central and regional government agencies to carry out
forest delineation and forest protection. Meanwhile, fishery regulations assign
only to the regional government the task to make implementing rules on input
and output control to avoid overexploitation.
However, due to a combination of complex factors, laws and regulations
on natural resources management of the Mahakam Delta have not been effect-
ively implemented, with a few exceptions. In the forestry sector, the Provincial
Forestry Agency carried out forest delineation only seventeen years after the
forest designation was made. With regards to forest utilization, neither the
Regional Office of the Ministry of Forestry, nor the Regional Technical Imple-
mentation Unit of the Ministry of Forestry nor the Technical Implementation
Unit of the East Kalimantan Forestry Agency have imposed the laws on oil
and gas companies because no permit had been issued by the Minister of
Forestry. At the same time, neither the officials of the East Kalimantan Forestry
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Agency nor the officials of the Kutai Forestry Agency carried out the official
surveillance of the Production Forest of the Mahakam Delta.
Meanwhile, despite a long list of actual and only-scheduled activities of
the various agencies of Kutai district in the Mahakam Delta, it is evident that
control over destructive fishing through a permit mechanism is (still) lacking.
So is the implementation of regulations and policies concerning environmental-
ly friendly shrimp ponds. Dysfunctional implementation of law can also be
detected in laws and regulations on spatial planning as sectoral departments
and the regional government, to whom had been assigned the task to de-
marcate the designated areas, hardly did anything.
There are several reasons for why the implementation of law has not been
effective. The first explanatory factor is legal, and is related to the observation
that the laws and regulations on resource use are neither consistent nor co-
herent with one another. In general, laws and regulations are inconsistent when
they are contradictory and incompatible.
On the basis of some major cases which are assessed in this book, such
as regulations on forest management authority, the rights of small-scale fisher-
men and the legality of possessory land evidence, it can be concluded that
the contradictions arise from three sources. Firstly, there are contradictory
regulations between the different natural resource sectors. Secondly, a number
of higher and lower regulations are incompatible. Thirdly, newly introduced
laws and regulations have often ignored already existing laws and regulations.
In addition, the laws are often incoherent mainly because of the severe
lack of mutual referencing between sectoral legislation as well as disharmony
between statutory and case law.
In practice, the inconsistency and incoherence have diminished the rights
security of the resource users, and led to confusion about the level of authority
and legality of the regional and local government officials. Inconsistency
between statutory and case law has led to inequality between right holders.
A lack of rights security, inequality, unclear legality and authority have been
caused by the fact that particular regulations de-legitimised other regulations.
This has led to a situation whereby illegitimate regulations are unable to
pursue their primary goals. Nevertheless, it should be noted that inconsistency
and incoherence have also resulted in an increase of legal interpretations by
local officials used to justify the legitimacy they had given to the actual
resource use.
Next to the abovementioned legal factor, there are also several non-legal
factors, which have hampered an effective implementation of law. In a simple
classification, the non-legal factors can be divided into: (i) factors that are
internal to the government institution tasked with implementing the law; and
(ii) factors that are external to such administrative institutions. There are
common problems shared by all natural resources sectors, but each sector also
has its own specific problems.
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Regarding factors internal to the administrative institutions, one may say
that a lack of resources, administrative competition, and rigid planning and
budgeting procedures are common factors that have hampered an effective
implementation of law. Specific to the forestry sector is an issue, which this
thesis has called ‘timber orientation’. Timber orientation has made local forestry
officials reluctant to protect the Production Forest of the Mahakam Delta,
because no forest concessions have been awarded there. Specific to the fishery
sector is the question whether its local officials are strongly committed to or
concerned with the environment or not.
Factors external to the administrative institution are more complex. Apart
from a few differences between the natural resource sectors, generally speaking,
there are two factors which have impacted the planned implementation of
law: the long residence of the local users in the Mahakam Delta in line with
long existing local use rights, and the economic importance of resource use
for local livelihoods. On the basis of these two main factors local officials have
tried to justify putting social legitimacy ahead of legal legitimacy, when they
had to make sure whether the local users had resource rights or not. Local
officials also took into consideration the political power of certain resource
users, when deciding not to implement the law. Notably the regional forestry
officials were reluctant to impose rules on permit use on the oil and gas
companies as they were afraid of powerful national backing of the companies,
whereas local fishery officials did not implement rules on destructive fishing
as they might encounter other local officials who had to serve their consti-
tuencies and relatives.
When real interaction between field officials, or ‘street-level bureaucrats’
in Lipsky’s words, and local resource users is taken into account, we witnessed
a strong emotion, which has profoundly influenced the implementation of
law. Mixed feelings of empathy, respect, fear as well as pragmatism formed
two attitudes commonly found among the field officials. Firstly, the belief that
non-compliance by local resource users is not something against which legal
action should be sought. For explaining this inaction, the field officials raised
reasons that have already been mentioned, such as the economic subsistence
of the local users. Fear of being harmed and/or losing credible social relations
with local users are other reasons which the field officials mentioned. On many
occasions, the field officials even defended local users when the latter were
accused of violating regulations of other sectors of natural resource. They also
concealed the original objective of their activities – the implementation of law -
to avoid resistance from the local users so that they could realize their planned
programs and activities.
Meanwhile, the government’s implementation of law has often been effect-
ive when it concerned oil and gas companies. They are classified as national
vital objects and have significantly contributed to both central and regional
government revenues. Due to its strategic role, oil and gas resource use was
often favoured by local officials and law enforcers to ensure that the oil and
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gas extraction kept running. It should be underlined that the perception of
the importance of oil and gas resource use has coincided with the way in
which the local officials often characterized the local users, or Delta inhabitants.
The local officials often perceived the local users to be short-sighted, greedy,
tricky and stubborn.
Not only in the implementation of law, negative characterization also
emerged in law-making. The Kutai government hardly took notice of the input
from the locals who lived in Kutai district, but did pay attention to input from
outsiders. In this respect, Kutai district government favoured legal legitimacy
provided by the central government over social legitimacy provided by the
local residents. The reason that certain local officials gave for not actively
engaging the locals was that they perceived themselves as better educated.
Moreover, they claimed to know what the local users aspired to.
From the extensive and comprehensive examination of the most important
actors and factors which influenced the implementation of law and legal
enforcement, it becomes clear that rather than the pursuit of personal interests
or the interests of closely affiliated groups, it is actually a combination of
rational and emotional considerations which drove the local officials and law
enforcers to not effectively implement and enforce the law concerning resource
use in the Mahakam Delta.
The local officials realised that if they were not adaptive and responsive
to the reality and merely resorted to a strict implementation of laws and
regulations, this would potentially do more harm than good. They have been
fully aware that without providing any form of compensation, implementation
and enforcement would only worsen the livelihood of the local users. The field
officials risked four possible consequences when implementing and enforcing
the law. Firstly, they risked not being able to realize other planned programs
and activities, due to lack of goodwill with local inhabitants. Secondly, the
local users, reacting to the implementation and enforcement, could jeopardize
the local officials. Thirdly, the local officials could lose their social insurance
derived from having credible social relations with the communities of the local
users. Fourthly, the implementation and enforcement of law could increase
the workload of the local officials, a problem considering the lack of resources.
In terms of their emotional considerations: these were related to a sense
of social concern. Social concern arose alongside feelings of empathy and
respect. The local officials felt a sense of fairness, as the local users had long
been residing in the Mahakam Delta and carried out resource use only to
survive. Such feelings of fairness were often strengthened, when the local
officials discovered unjust situations, for example when the central government
had hardly paid any attention to the inhabitants of the Forest Area, whilst
oil and gas companies earned huge benefits. This sense of social concern
combined with the inconsistency and incoherence of legislation, brought local
officials to the conclusion that the actual resource use was fair, and legal. As
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such, the local officials were often not only responsive and compromising,
but on some occasions they would even act as the defenders of local users.
In the light of these observations, this book argues that the lack of imple-
mentation and enforcement of law does not always mean that local officials
are advancing personal gain. Rather, they try to maintain a continuous equi-
librium between adapting to external influences on one hand and maintaining
their level of autonomy, on the other.
This book strongly recommends further research on the management of
the Mahakam Delta to better understand the way in which implementation
of law works in this area. Further research will help to form perspectives,
which do not prematurely disrespect the role of local officials or bureaucrats
in coping with legal and non-legal factors that make the implementation of
law difficult. Such insights may help with the making of relevant local policies
and regulations for the future. To be relevant it is important for such regula-
tions regarding informal and semi-informal resource use to be jointly created
by local officials and local resource users.
Samenvatting
Indonesische wet en werkelijkheid in de Delta
Een socio-legal onderzoek naar wetgeving, lokale ambtenaren en beheer van natuurlijke
hulpbronnen in de Mahakam Delta, Oost Kalimantan
Door hun rijkdom aan natuurlijke grondstoffen trekken delta’s overal in de
wereld mensen aan. Voor gewone mensen die op zoek zijn naar een beter
bestaan, is een delta aantrekkelijk omdat zij de natuurlijke hulpbronnen (hierna:
hulpbronnen) kunnen vergaren en benutten. Tegelijkertijd scheppen staten
juridische kaders om het gebruik van hulpbronnen in de delta’s te controleren,
ten behoeve van zowel de staatskas als bescherming van het milieu. Desalniet-
temin zien wij in vele delta’s in de hele wereld dat een steeds destructievere
exploitatie van hulpbronnen heeft geleid tot sociale en milieuproblemen.
De Mahakam Delta in Oost Kalimantan, Indonesië, vormt in dat opzicht
geen uitzondering. Ontbossing, met name door de conversie van mangrove-
bossen in andere vormen van gebruik, wordt vaak genoemd als één van de
belangrijkste oorzaken van de vernietiging van het milieu van de Mahakam
Delta. Ontbossing heeft op zijn beurt ook weer geleid tot andere vormen van
milieuvernietiging, zoals abrasie, waterverontreiniging, uitputting van de
visstand, en verminderde biodiversiteit. Al deze vormen van milieuvernietiging
hebben gedurende de afgelopen veertien jaar de precaire balans van het
ecosysteem van de Mahakam Delta aangetast. En dit heeft ertoe geleid dat
de Mahakam Delta veel minder goed in staat is om de milieuvoorzieningen
(environmental services) te bieden. Naast de schade aan het milieu, is er ook
sprake van een toename van conflicten tussen de gebruikers.
Deze twee problemen – de milieuvernietiging en de conflicten – roepen
een aantal socio-juridische (socio-legal) vragen op over de juridische en bestuur-
lijke arrangementen voor de Mahakam Delta. Hoe reguleert het recht het
gebruik van hulpbronnen in de Mahakam Delta? Om erachter te komen in
hoeverre de formele regels voor dit gebruik functioneren, is het belangrijk om
na te gaan in hoeverre ambtenaren de formele regels hebben geïmplementeerd,
en welke actoren en factoren de implementatie van het recht hebben beïnvloed.
Om juridische en bestuurlijke arrangementen beter te begrijpen is het belangrijk
om ook het proces waarbij formele regels worden opgesteld en vastgesteld
te kennen, zodat uitleg kan worden verschaft waarom het gebruik van hulp-
bronnen op een bepaalde manier geregeld is.
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Juridisch beschouwd, bestaat er sinds lang wetgeving die het gebruik van
hulpbronnen regelt, zowel voor het vasteland als voor het kustgebied en het
maritieme deel van de Mahakam Delta. Wel moeten we vaststellen dat bij de
uitwerking van die wetgeving in lagere regelgeving die voor het vasteland
voorop loopt vergeleken bij die van het kustgebied en maritieme deel van de
Delta. Regelgeving voor het beheer van hulpbronnen door de staat vormt een
belangrijk onderdeel van de bestaande juridische arrangementen. In feite heeft
de staat het formele beheer over alle vormen van gebruik van hulpbronnen
in de Mahakam Delta aan zich getrokken; het type van beheer verschilt echter
steeds per hulpbron. In het geval van de bosbouw, heeft de wetgever gekozen
voor een territoriale strategie, terwijl in het geval van olie, gas en visserij, is
gekozen voor een niet-territoriale strategie. Die territoriale strategie voor
bosgebieden uit zich hierin dat nadat volgens wettelijk voorschrift zogenaamde
Bosgebieden (Forest Areas) zijn vastgesteld, er ook daadwerkelijk een gebieds-
markering plaats moet vinden waarmee de overheid haar het bezit van het
desbetreffende gebied bevestigt. Echter, als het gaat om mijnbouw- of visserij-
gebieden, is een dergelijke fysieke markering niet verplicht volgens de wet.
Naast het genoemde overheidsbeheer is ook de wet en regelgeving met betrek-
king tot de ruimtelijke ordening belangrijk; voor elke sector van hulpbronnen
en voor elke daarmee corresponderende overheidsdienst, gelden eigen ruimte-
lijke plannen.
Terwijl de vormen van beheer verschillen per sector, zijn de wetsbepalingen
die gelden voor het gebruik van hulpbronnen in hoofdzaak gelijk. In het
algemeen schrijven deze bepalingen voor dat de overheid bepaalt op welke
manier en door wie de hulpbronnen in de aangewezen en afgebakende gebie-
den gebruikt mogen worden. Voorts bepalen zij dat slechts degenen in het
bezit van een vergunning of bijzondere gebruiksrechten toegekend door de
daartoe bevoegde diensten, de hulpbronnen mogen verzamelen en gebruiken.
Zij die de bepalingen overtreden kunnen veroordeeld worden tot een boete
of gevangenisstraf. Om hun rechten op het gebruik van de hulpbronnen te
mogen uitoefenen, dienen de houders van een vergunning of recht aan bepaal-
de verplichtingen te voldoen. De bedrijven met een Production Sharing Contract
voor olie en gas, bijvoorbeeld, zijn verplicht om voordat er met exploratie en
exploitatie wordt begonnen de benodigde grond van de rechthebbenden te
verwerven.
Naast de genoemde bepalingen, zijn er ook regels die bepaalde overheids-
organen de taak geven om wetgeving voor het beheer van hulpbronnen en
de bescherming van het milieu nader uit te werken; hierbij zijn verschillende
overheidsinstellingen op elkaar aangewezen. Regelingen voor bosbeheer,
bijvoorbeeld, wijzen de centrale en gewestelijke overheid aan om de bosmarke-
ring en bosbescherming uit te voeren. In het geval van visserij, is alleen de
gewestelijke overheid aangewezen om uitvoeringsregels te maken voor input-
and outputcontrole die overbevissing moeten voorkomen.
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Echter, vanwege een combinatie van complexe actoren, zijn de wetten en
regels met betrekking tot het beheer van hulpbronnen in de Mahakam Delta –
niet op een effectieve manier geïmplementeerd, enkele uitzonderingen daar-
gelaten. Een kenmerkend voorbeeld uit de bosbouw is dat de Provinciale
Bosbouwdienst een aangewezen bosgebied pas zeventien jaar nadat het gebied
officieel was vastgesteld, daadwerkelijk markeerde. Voor wat betreft het
gebruik van grond in Bosgebied, is opmerkelijk dat geen van de voor bos-
beheer verantwoordelijke diensten de wet daadwerkelijk oplegden aan de olie-
en gasmaatschappijen, omdat er geen vergunning was verschaft door de
Minister van Bosbouw. Dit gold zowel de Gewestelijke Directie van het Minis-
terie van Bosbouw als de Regionale Technische Implementatie Unit van het
Ministerie van Bosbouw, alsook de Technische Implementatie Unit van de
Provinciale Bosbouwdienst van Oost Kalimantan. Tegelijkertijd verwaarloosden
de ambtenaren van zowel de Provinciale Bosbouwdienst als van de Districts
bosbouwdienst van Kutai hun surveillancetaken in het ‘Productiebos’ van de
Mahakam Delta.
Ook is het evident dat controle op milieubelastende visserij in de Mahakam
Delta door middel van een vergunning niet heeft gewerkt, ondanks alle bepa-
lingen, en ondanks lange lijsten van feitelijke of geplande uitvoeringsactivitei-
ten van de verschillende afdelingen van het district Kutai. Hetzelfde geldt voor
de implementatie van regelingen en beleid voor milieuvriendelijke garnaal-
vijvers. Gebrekkige wetimplementatie zagen wij ook op het terrein van de
ruimtelijke ordening, waar sectorale ministeries en gewestelijke overheden
wier taak het was om aangewezen gebieden officieel te markeren, weinig tot
niets uitvoerden.
Er zijn verschillende redenen waarom de implementatie van recht niet
doeltreffend heeft gefunctioneerd. Het eerste deel van de verklaring is juridisch,
en heeft te maken met de observatie dat wetten en regelingen voor het gebruik
van hulpbronnen noch consistent zijn noch onderling coherent. De inconsisten-
tie van wetten en regelingen is, algemeen gesproken, gelegen in hun innerlijke
tegenstrijdigheid en incompatibiliteit.
Op basis van een aantal belangrijke gevallen die worden beschouwd in
deze studie – zoals de regelingen betreffende bevoegdheden in het bosbeheer,
de rechten van kleinschalige vissers, en de juridische aanvaardbaarheid van
bewijzen van landbezit – kan worden geconcludeerd dat de tegenstrijdigheden
uit drie bronnen voortkomen. Ten eerste zijn er regels in de verschillende
grondstofsectoren die onderling tegenstrijdig zijn. Ten tweede zijn sommige
hogere en lagere regelingen niet met elkaar verenigbaar. Ten derde gaan nieuw
ingevoerde wetten en regelingen vaak voorbij aan reeds bestaande wetten en
regelingen.
Daarnaast bestaat er vaak incoherentie tussen wetsbepalingen vanwege
het feit dat bepalingen in de verschillende sectoren niet naar elkaar verwijzen,
alsmede vanwege de disharmonie tussen wetgeving en jurisprudentie.
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In de praktijk heeft het gebrek aan consistentie en coherentie de rechtszeker-
heid van de gebruikers van hulpbronnen verzwakt, en geleid tot onduidelijk-
heid over de mate van gezag en wettigheid van gewestelijke en plaatselijke
ambtenaren. Doordat wetgeving en jurisprudentie elkaar tegenspraken, is
ongelijkheid ontstaan tussen de houders van rechten. Het genoemde gebrek
aan rechtszekerheid, de ongelijkheid, en de onduidelijkheden rond gezag en
wettigheid konden ontstaan doordat bepaalde regelgeving andere regelgeving
delegitimeerde. In deze situatie kon de gedelegitimeerde regeling haar primaire
doel niet meer nastreven. Overigens heeft het gebrek aan consistentie en
coherentie ook geleid tot nieuwe juridische interpretaties door plaatselijke
ambtenaren, ter rechtvaardiging van hun erkenning van bestaand gebruik van
hulpbronnen als juist.
Naast de bovengenoemde juridische verklaring, is er ook een aantal niet-
juridische factoren die implementatie van het recht hebben belemmerd. Volgens
een simpele classificatie kan men de niet-juridische factoren indelen in twee
groepen: (i) factoren binnen overheidinstellingen; en (ii) factoren buiten over-
heidsinstellingen. Men ziet veel van dezelfde factoren optreden in de verschil-
lende sectoren van hulpbronnen. Daarnaast kent elke sector ook zijn eigen
factoren die een rol spelen.
Met betrekking tot factoren binnen de overheidsinstellingen kan worden
gezegd dat een gebrek aan middelen, bestuurlijke rivaliteiten, en rigide proce-
dures voor planning en begroting gemeenschappelijke factoren zijn die een
effectieve implementatie van de wet hebben belemmerd. Naast deze factoren,
heeft de bosbouwsector in het bijzonder te kampen met een bias van ambtena-
ren voor houtproductie. Deze factor heeft plaatselijke ambtenaren van bos-
beheer zeer terughoudend gemaakt als het ging om bescherming van het
‘Productiebos’ van de Mahakam Delta omdat daar immers geen vergunning
voor houtkap was verschaft. In het bijzonder voor de visserij hangt het succes
van de wetsimplementatie af van de vraag of de plaatselijke ambtenaren zich
duidelijk betrokken en verantwoordelijk voelen voor de bescherming van het
milieu of niet.
De externe factoren, dus degene die buiten de overheidsinstellingen vallen
zijn complexer. Afgezien van enkele verschillen tussen de sectoren, zijn er,
algemeen gesproken, twee factoren die van invloed zijn op de voorgenomen
implementatie van recht: het langdurige verblijf van de lokale gebruikers van
hulpbronnen in de Delta en de dus al lang bestaande plaatselijke gebruiksrech-
ten, en het economische belang van deze hulpbronnen voor het leven van de
mensen ter plaatse. Op basis van deze twee factoren hebben lokale ambtenaren
geprobeerd te rechtvaardigen waarom zij sociale legitimiteit boven juridische
legitimiteit stelden, toen ze moesten vaststellen of de lokale gebruikers nu
gebruiksrechten hadden of niet. Lokale ambtenaren hielden bij hun beslissing
de wetgeving niet te implementeren ook rekening met de politieke macht van
bepaalde gebruikers. Met name bosbouwambtenaren waren terughoudend
om bij het gebruik van vergunningen regels op te leggen aan olie- en gasmaat-
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schappijen, omdat zij bang waren voor de machtige nationale achterban van
deze maatschappijen. Lokale visserijambtenaren implementeerden de wetgeving
tegen overbevissing en visserij-met-milieuschade niet, omdat dat hen zou
kunnen confronteren met andere plaatselijke ambtenaren die de belangen van
hun gemeenschappen en familieleden hadden te dienen.
Bij het observeren van de daadwerkelijke interactie tussen de plaatselijke
ambtenaren in het veld – de zogenaamde street level bureaucrats zoals Lipsky
hen noemt – en de plaatselijke gebruikers van hulpbronnen, zagen wij dat
de implementatie van de wet ook sterk beïnvloed werd door sterke menselijke
emoties. Een mengeling aan gevoelens – medeleven, respect, angst en pragma-
tisme – droeg ertoe bij dat ambtenaren twee houdingen aannamen. In de eerste
plaats zagen de ambtenaren het gebrek aan naleving niet als iets waar actie
tegen ondernomen hoefde te worden. Vaak werd door hen, zoals gezegd, als
uitleg gegeven de economische afhankelijkheid van de plaatselijke bevolking
van het gebruik van de hulpbronnen. Daarnaast zeiden veldambtenaren ook
dat zij vreesden dat hen kwaad zou worden berokkend en/of dat ze hun
geloofwaardigheid bij en het vertrouwen van de plaatselijke bevolking zouden
verliezen als zij de wet zouden opleggen. In veel gevallen, verdedigden plaatse-
lijke ambtenaren de lokale gebruikers tegen beschuldigingen van het schenden
van wetgeving. Daarnaast hielden veldambtenaren soms ook het officiële,
eigenlijke doel van hun activiteiten verborgen voor de bevolking, om tegen-
stand te voorkomen en zo hun programma’s en activiteiten te kunnen realise-
ren.
Intussen was de implementatie van de wet vaak wel effectief als het ging
om olie- en gasmaatschappijen. Die werden immers erkend als national vital
objects, en droegen fors bij aan het inkomen van de centrale en gewestelijke
overheden. Vanwege de belangrijke strategische rol van deze sector, genoten
bedrijven in de olie- en gaswinning vaak een voorkeursbehandeling van de
plaatselijke ambtenaren en wetshandhavers die immers handelden in het
belang van een ononderbroken gas- en oliewinning. Hier moet bij vermeld
worden dat de perceptie van olie- en gaswinning als een zaak van groot
gewicht, samenviel met een bepaalde stereotypering van de plaatselijke bewo-
ners door de plaatselijke ambtenaren. De inwoners werden dikwijls door hen
gezien als kortzichtig, hebberig, listig en koppig.
Niet alleen bij de implementatie van de wet- en regelgeving maar ook bij
maken van wetten en regelingen was er sprake van dergelijke stereotypering.
De districtsoverheid van Kutai hield nauwelijks rekening met de mening van
de plaatselijke inwoners van Kutai district, terwijl buitenstaanders wel inspraak
hadden. Op deze manier verkoos de districtsoverheid van Kutai juridische
legitimiteit in de ogen van de centrale overheid boven sociale legitimiteit, in
de ogen van de plaatselijke bewoners. De reden die sommige plaatselijke
ambtenaren gaven om de plaatselijke bevolking er niet bij te betrekken was
dat zij zichzelf als meer ontwikkeld, beter geschoold, zagen. Bovendien zeiden
zij de wensen van de plaatselijke bevolking al te kennen.
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Uit de uitgebreide en veelomvattende analyse van de belangrijkste actoren
en factoren die een rol speelden bij de implementatie en handhaving van de
wet, blijkt dat de lokale ambtenaren en wetshandhavers vaak niet zozeer
handelden uit eigen belang of het belang van hun naasten, maar dat zij de
wet- en regelgeving betreffende gebruik van hulpbronnen in de Mahakam
Delta niet altijd effectief implementeerden vanwege een combinatie van ratio-
nele en emotionele overwegingen.
De plaatselijke ambtenaren realiseerden zich dat, als zij zich niet zouden
aanpassen aan en reageren op de realiteit en de wetten en regelingen op een
rigide manier zouden implementeren, dit waarschijnlijk meer nadelige gevolgen
dan voordelen zou hebben. Zij waren zich er volledig van bewust dat als zij
niet enige vorm van compensatie zouden aanbieden, dat implementeren en
afdwingen van de wet het bestaan van de plaatselijke bewoners zou verslechte-
ren. De plaatselijke ambtenaren zouden vier risico’s lopen als zij de wet streng
zouden implementeren en handhaven. Ten eerste zou het moeilijker zijn om
hun eigen plannen en activiteiten te realiseren vanwege gebrek aan goodwill
bij de bevolking. Ten tweede zouden de plaatselijke bewoners, als de wet
geïmplementeerd zou worden, de ambtenaren in gevaar kunnen brengen. Ten
derde liepen de plaatselijke ambtenaren het risico hun sociale erkenning onder
de plaatselijke bevolking te verliezen. En ten vierde, als de wet strenger zou
worden geïmplementeerd, vreesde men extra werkdruk, en dat terwijl de
plaatselijke overheid te kampen had met een gebrek aan middelen.
Wat betreft de emotionele overwegingen, deze hadden voornamelijk te
maken met sociale betrokkenheid. Deze betrokkenheid werd vooral opgewekt
door gevoelens van medeleven en respect, die hierboven beschreven zijn. De
ambtenaren realiseerden zich dat de bewoners al lang in de Delta woonden
en de hulpbronnen nodig hadden voor hun bestaan. Zulke overwegingen van
rechtvaardigheid werden vaak versterkt wanneer de lokale ambtenaren on-
rechtvaardige situaties tegenkwamen waarbij bijvoorbeeld de centrale overheid
weinig aandacht besteedde aan de ‘Bosgebieden’ in de Delta terwijl dichtbij
olie- en gasmaatschappijen enorme winsten boekten.
De sociale betrokkenheid van de plaatselijke ambtenaren, in combinatie
met het gebrek aan consistentie en coherentie in de wetgeving, leidden ertoe
dat zij het bestaande gebruik van hulpbronnen door plaatselijke bewoners
terecht achtten, en juridisch aanvaardbaar. Met hun betrokkenheid en juridische
interpretaties, waren ambtenaren niet alleen responsief en tegemoetkomend,
maar traden zij bij bepaalde gelegenheden zelfs op als verdedigers van lokale
gebruikers van hulpbronnen.
Tegen deze achtergrond stelt dit boek dat gebreken bij de implementatie
en wetshandhaving niet altijd wijzen op lokale bureaucraten die puur uit eigen
belang handelen. Veeleer proberen zij het evenwicht te bewaren tussen aanpas-
sing aan externe invloeden enerzijds, en behoud van autonomie anderzijds.
Deze studie beveelt sterk aan dat meer onderzoek wordt verricht naar het
beheer van de Mahakam Delta om nog beter te begrijpen op welke manier
Samenvatting 279
implementatie van recht hier in zijn werk gaat. Dergelijk vervolgonderzoek
zal bijdragen tot de vorming van perspectieven waarin niet bij voorbaat de
rol van plaatselijke ambtenaren of bureaucraten – bij hun confrontatie met
juridische en niet-juridische factoren in het proces van implementatie van wet-
en regelgeving – in twijfel wordt getrokken. Zulke inzichten zouden kunnen
helpen bij het maken van toekomstig beleid en relevante regelgeving. Om
relevant te zijn, is het van belang voor zulke regelgeving inzake informeel
en semi-informeel gebruik van hulpbronnen, dat deze door de plaatselijke
ambtenaren en lokale gebruikers samen wordt opgesteld.
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